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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis sets out to explore journalists’ anticipatory reasoning on audience uptake, i.e. 
on the ways in which the audience will react to news. In order to reach this goal, I conduct 
an argumentative analysis of various types of newsroom activities. The analysis sheds light 
on journalists’ reasoning processes concerning audience uptake that lead them to 
broadcast/publish one certain news item instead of another, or on the way they decide to 
broadcast/publish a news item, starting from their anticipatory inferences. The adopted 
corpus consists of data gained from two distinct datasets; a) data from a previous project, 
Ideè Suisse, consisting of TV-journalism data in Swiss German and French, and b) print-
journalism data in Italian collected at the newsroom of Corriere del Ticino, the main 
Italian-language newspaper in Switzerland, in the framework of the project Argumentation 
in newsmaking process and product. The data consist of videotaped editorial conferences, 
informal and formal journalist discourses, frame interviews, retrospective interviews, 
news products and source materials. The contextual and argumentative analysis aims at 
investigating the distinct aspects involved in the anticipation of audience uptake and at 
investigating the places of reflection (i.e. editorial conferences, informal meetings and 
retrospective interviews) wherein certain kinds of standpoints are at stake and particular 
aspects of audience uptake are anticipated. The anticipated uptake includes 1) anticipation 
of an emotive effect, of a news 2) anticipation of a cognitive effect, and 3) anticipation of 
a persuasion. I sketched a typology of journalists’ anticipation of audience uptake in terms 
of illocutionary, locutionary, and perlocutionary force. On the theoretical level I merge 
two theories that both aim at studying the human mind from a rational perspective. On the 
one hand, I use Castelfranchi’s theories on anticipation based on the cybernetic notion of 
goal, while, on the other hand, I use the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti and Greco 
Morasso 2011) for the study of the inferential configuration. I connect the fundamental 
notions of both theories as in a syllogism. Results have shown the noticeable prominence 
of anticipation of audience emotive uptake, where the object of journalists’ anticipation 
are the audience emotions. This type of anticipation can be intertwined with cognitive 
audience uptake anticipation and both types have proven to be subordinated to the 
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anticipation of persuasion, since in the end journalists want to promote public 
understanding as well as capture audience attention. Results further show that many cases 
of anticipatory reasoning involved counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning 
focussing on better unrealized scenarios has been found to occur mostly in evaluative 
editorial conferences. Whereas counterfactual reasoning focused on worse unrealized 
scenarios mostly occurs in retrospective interviews in which the journalist justifies the 
goodness of his editorial choices. Empirical evidence of the relationship between 
invalidation of expectation and counterfactual reasoning is also provided. Finally, I 
provide evidence of the argumentative foundations of counterfactual reasoning.  
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1. Journalists anticipating audience uptake of a news piece: 
a key form of collective reasoning for newsmaking and an 
hitherto unexplored domain of argumentation 
 
 
1.1 Why studying journalists’ anticipatory inferences concerning the audience 
uptake in the newsroom?  
 
This thesis sets out to explore journalists’ anticipation of the audience uptake of news 
items. Such anticipation constitutes a crucial form of collective reasoning for 
newsmaking.1 In this thesis, I will argue that this kind of anticipatory reasoning strongly 
contributes to determine the way in which news items are chosen, shaped and presented, 
providing a rich documentation in the form of eight case studies. I provide an 
argumentative analysis of journalists’ anticipatory reasonings in editorial conferences and 
in other types of interviews, in order to clarify the way in which these kinds of reasoning 
influence news selection, framing and editing. 
 Through an analysis of journalists’ argumentative discussions in editorial conferences and 
in other types of newsroom discourses, I will illustrate how journalists accommodate not 
only their writing style, but also the topics and framing of the news to their audience’s 
anticipated cognitive and emotive demands. All types of anticipatory reasoning, in terms 
of the configuration of beliefs and goals and in terms of anticipation of the audience uptake 
(emotive uptake, cognitive uptake, and anticipation of audience persuasion) will be 
discussed.  In doing so, I show that the anticipation of persuasion plays a crucial role in 
journalists’ anticipatory reasoning concerning audience uptake, since most of the other 
types of anticipation appear to be subordinate to an attempt to influence the beliefs and 
opinions of the audience about the reported events. Technically speaking, it appears that 
                                                
1 The present PhD thesis has been developed within the framework of the project “Argumentation in 
newsmaking process and product” aimed at examining the role of argumentative practices in	
newsmaking	discourse with  special attention paid to the forms of practical argumentation in newsroom 
decision-making (funded by the SNF (PDFMP1_137181/1, 2012-2015)	
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journalists attempt to persuade their audiences of their own views on reported events, even 
if they would only rarely present their activity in that light (typically, only when the 
production of opinion pieces is concerned). However, journalists’ attempts to persuade 
represent only a part of their aims; indeed, they also aim at conveying a balanced view of 
the event they are reporting and at enabling readers to build an autonomous opinion about 
it.  
    It can be said that journalists construct the presentation of the news in a fashion that is 
similar to the Pragma-dialectical (P-D) model of strategic maneuvering; journalists give 
the audience the elements to build an opinion, putting forth standpoints supported by 
arguments in a reasonable way (conveying a balanced view of the event) and persuading 
(capturing the audience) at the same time. There is, however, a fundamental difference 
between Pragma-dialectic strategic maneuvering and journalistic maneuvering; P-D 
maneuvering presupposes an argumentative discussion, whereas the journalist does not 
necessarily want to suggest that there is a divergence of opinion regarding what s/he is 
saying to the audience. In short, the journalistic ideal of “conveying a balanced view to 
the audience” does not exactly correspond to the P-D ideal of criticality, which consists in 
solving a difference of opinion on the merits. 
The prototypical news style, i.e. the way in which journalists present their news in 
terms of choosing relative topical importance and audience, is included in the idea that 
journalists are making inferences in an attempt to respond to their audience’s demands2. 
In a nutshell, journalists shift their style to make the news more suitable to their audience. 
Accordingly, as Allan Bell observes, “the basic dimension on which we can examine a 
speaker’s style is therefore a responsive one”3 (Bell 1991: 105). Traditionally, we can 
distinguish two types of approaches to studying the way a speaker constructs his or her 
message for the audience; while Bell’s strand of research, focused on audience design, 
                                                
2 As a matter of fact, we will see that all levels of a journalist’s linguistic choices are concerned. 
3 Audience design parallels closely the principles of the Soviet literary theorist and philosopher of 
language, Michael Bakhtin. Bakhtin’s theoretical framework is based on the dialogic essence of speech 
and literature: “For the word (and, consequently, for a human being) nothing is more terrible than a lack 
of response” (Bakhtin 1986: 127). Speaking means giving an answer and eliciting an answer: “An 
essential (constitutive) marker of the utterance is its quality of being directed to someone, its 
addressivity” (Bakhtin 1986: 95). 
	 	
	
	
19	
came from a sociolinguistic background applied to journalism and media, a parallel 
approach arose in social psychology, under the name of accommodation theory. As the 
latter theory largely accounted for how speakers modify their speech in interpersonal 
encounters, the context of mass media characterized by an absent audience shows specific 
accommodative strategies exploiting stereotyped audiences. This state of affairs calls for 
the consideration of the link between two domains, namely journalism studies and 
pragmatics.  
On the one hand, the research trend concerning the audience uptake in media studies 
(e.g. Peters 2012, 2013; Witschge 2012, 2013) concentrates on audience demand as a 
social criterium, and is based on theories aimed at standardizing the pressure of social 
forces on newsmaking decisions, so that audience demand is considered a simple criterium 
intervening in journalists’ newsmaking discussions. On the other hand, pragmatics (e.g. 
Grice 1969, 1991, 2001; 2004; Recanati 1988, 2003; Sbisà & Turner 2013; Senft 2014) 
deepens the way in which the speaker benefits from anticipatory reasoning (mostly 
expectations) regarding the way in which the other speaker will intervene. Nevertheless, 
pragmatics largely lacks an empirical study of linguistic practices in context.  
Therefore, these approaches do not investigate the way journalists concretely reason 
on the basis of their anticipatory inferences regarding audience uptake in the real life of 
the news organization.  
The argumentative lens I adopted helps to shed light on journalists’ reasoning 
processes concerning audience reactions that lead them to publish a certain news item 
instead of another, and on the way in which journalists decide to publish a news item, 
starting from their anticipatory inferences concerning audience reaction. Indeed, an 
argumentative approach allows us to understand the audience design not just in terms of 
the abstract mapping of speakers’ anticipations concerning the audience uptake, but also 
in terms of a reasoning process that does not occur solely on an intra-individual level. 
Rather, the process is worked out publicly on a collective level, through concrete speaking 
practices within conference meetings. In fact, looking at argued anticipatory strategies in 
the newsroom provides an important contribution to socio-linguistic research on 
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newsmaking, and complements the focus that a large share of it places on audience design 
(e.g. Bell 1984; Bell 1991), and more generally on message design (e.g. O’Keefe 1991).  
In the next section, I will present and discuss the research questions guiding this study and 
discuss why it is important to study journalists’ anticipation of the audience uptake with 
an argumentative perspective. 
 
 
1.2 Why studying journalists’ anticipatory inferences concerning the audience 
uptake in the newsroom? Research questions of this dissertation 
 
How do journalists reason on audience uptake in TV- and print-journalism? In fact, 
journalists make a typical rhetorical action: they reconstruct how their readers will 
understand, perceive and use in their opinion formation the news items they produce. This 
journalist’s conception reminds to the figure of the epideictic rhetor; epideictic rhetoric is 
one of the three branches of rhetoric as delineated in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and is employed 
to praise or blame during ceremonies. The epideictic genre is not addressed to a kritès, but 
rather to a spectator: nevertheless, the spectator is also a kritès, since he also needs to make 
a judgement. As Aristle writes 
 
     Now the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement; for 
when a thing is known and judged, there is no longer any need of argument. And there is 
judgement, whether a speaker addresses himself to a single individual makes use of his 
speech to exhort or dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this 
single individual is equally a judge, since, speaking generally, he who has to be persuaded 
is a judge; if the speaker is arguing against an opponent or against some theory, it is just 
the same, for it is necessary to make use of speech to destroy the opposing arguments, 
against which he speaks as if they were the actual opponent; and similarly in epideictic 
speeches, for the speech is put together with reference to the spectator as if he were a 
judge (Rhetoric, II, 18, p.263). 
  
  In the epideictic rhetorics the object of praise is to kalon, whereas the object of 
blame is to aiskhorn. Aristotle deepens many characteristics of to kalon as “the honorable, 
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fine, or noble,” but does not deepen the features of to aiskhron, “the shameful” (75). He 
writes: “Let shame be a sort of pain and agitation concerning the class of evils, whether 
present or past or future, that seem to bring a person into disrespect” (132) (2007). 
  As previously said, neither traditional pragmatic studies nor media studies are apt 
to understand the actual reasoning dynamics at stake when journalists reason about the 
audience uptake in editorial conferences. The present study aims at filling this gap, starting 
from the fact that journalists’ anticipatory reasoning concerning the audience uptake 
strongly influence their decisions concerning news editing and news selection, and that 
such anticipatory processes strongly determine the framing given to the news item. From 
such a hypothesis, a series of questions arise. Is it possible to find evidence of the fact that 
journalists’ anticipatory inferences strongly determine editorial decisions and of the fact 
that these inferences strongly determine the whole framing given to the whole news? 
Which kinds of standpoints can be found in association with these anticipatory reasonings 
and in which places of reflection can we find them? Furthermore, with reference to the 
way in which journalists’ anticipations concerning the audience uptake affect news items, 
how does the journalist shape the item in a peculiar way, having in mind anticipatory 
representation of audience’s reactions?  
This dissertation answers these questions and sheds light on the function of 
argumentation in journalists’ discussions concerning anticipated audience uptake while 
looking at the degree to which newsroom interactions are argumentative. 
  Journalists are not neutral providers of news. Rather, they are openly involved 
agents who take a precise stance (standpoint) on decisions concerning the news to be 
broadcasted/ published. Ideally, these standpoints should also reflect their newsroom’s 
mission or mandate and respect the commitments imposed by it. This last remark is 
particularly relevant in the case of media that have a clear public service mandate. 
Journalists’ anticipatory representations are a fundamental part of the decision process in 
that, they can be used as goals and can guide their behavior. Their reasoning is necessarily 
anticipatory, since it is guided by the representation of the state of their goal, namely 
‘reaching a desirable audience uptake’ and the present state of affairs (the actual 
alternatives of news/ of news’ details). One hypothesis here is that journalists’ anticipatory 
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representations are strictly bound to their decisions and to their consequent actions. Since 
journalists’ anticipatory reasonings, particularly their expectations concerning their 
audience’s mental states are expected to be crucial for explaining and predicting a large 
share of their motivations, newsmaking decisions, and planning activities, the first crucial 
research question, with accompanying sub-questions, are; (RQ 1) How do journalists 
reason about audience uptake in television and print-journalism before producing news 
items? (RQ1a) How do journalists argue about the way in which the audience will react 
to the news item they will produce?  
In their everyday work, journalists reason in distinct places of reflection, such as 
formal and informal editorial meetings, that are used to decide crucial details about the 
editing of a forthcoming news item or to evaluate a past news item. When journalists 
evaluate a certain news item or decide about which news item to broadcast/publish or 
discuss the details of a forthcoming item, they advance difference types of standpoints. 
Observing the distinct standpoints in journalists’ reflections concerning audience uptake 
allows us to understand when and how journalists decide about news editing and news 
selection. Accordingly, a second research question, with sub-question, arises: (RQ 2) 
Which types of standpoint do journalists put forth when they anticipate audience uptake? 
(RQ2a) Is there a correlation between the specific place of reflection, such as 
evaluative/deliberative formal or informal editorial meetings and a specific kind of 
standpoint? 
There are different types of anticipation of audience uptake, therefore a third 
research question arises: (RQ3) Which types of anticipation of audience uptake can we 
identify? I hypothesize that in order to anticipate the possible effect of their news items on 
the audience and to know whether it is reasonable to publish one news item rather than 
another, journalists attempt to predict distinct aspects of the audience uptake.  
Generally speaking, an important starting point for predicting others’ behaviours 
and for interacting in an appropriate way consists in anticipating their future emotions (e.g. 
Salovey and Meyer 1990; Salovey and Grewal 2005). Doing so is a means for predicting 
their goals, adjusting their behaviours, and consequently influencing them. Accordingly, 
we can hypothesize that journalists try to predict their audience’s reactions by anticipating 
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their feelings and sensitivity to possible journalistic choices. Accordingly, the third 
research question arises:  
  (RQ 4) Which role does anticipation of audience emotive uptake plays in audience 
uptake oriented argumentative discussions in editorial conferences as well as in other 
types of data? I hypothesize that when journalists anticipate the possible audience 
emotions in reaction to journalistic choices, they attempt to anticipate and predict how the 
audience emotions may be strengthened or changed as an effect of the journalists’ choices 
about news products; does this attempt enable the journalist to decide which particular 
perspective should be given to each news item? I hypothesize that this attempt provides 
an opportunity for critical discussion, but at the same time may present some risks of unfair 
framing. This concern leads to a sub-research question: (RQ 4a) In which way does 
audience emotive uptake influence the quality of reporting? Do journalists have a 
persuasive intention which acts on the emotion of the audience, by inducing in the 
audience a judgement of reality that may be false, ambivalent or that simply may not be 
the only possible?  
During the research and the observation of the corpus, I noticed that many 
anticipatory reasonings were counterfactual reasonings. The crucial role of counterfactual 
reasoning in the newsroom has emerged: journalists try to imagine possible alternatives to 
past audience reactions or future/ hypothetical audience reactions to forthcoming news 
items concerning events that have already occurred but that may have been different if.. .. 
This has led to a theoretical in-depth-analysis that has enriched the research questions. 
Therefore, another important research question emerged during the research is: (RQ 5) 
What role does counterfactual reasoning play in journalists’ argumentative discussions 
centred on audience uptake?  
The type of audience that a journalist has in mind plays a crucial role in 
determining journalists’ topical choices of anticipatory inferences, which may depend on 
the culture in which both a certain newsroom and a certain audience is embedded. With 
reference to this, we are compelled to ask ourselves: (RQ 6) Do journalists rely on highly 
culture-specific shared premises? Given that previous research has emphasized the 
importance of what is called the ‘shared cognitive environment’ (Tindale 2015: 145), for 
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conducting argumentation, my hypothesis is that journalists often argue using premises 
that refer to the cultural background of their audience. The type of audience that a 
journalist has in mind plays a crucial role in determining journalists’ topical choices of 
anticipatory inferences, which may depend on the culture in which both a certain 
newsroom and a certain audience is embedded. 
There are two main conceptions concerning the role of the journalists in news 
products. While a classic normative view of journalism emphasizes norms of objectivity 
and neutrality of reporting, downplaying the ‘rhetorical’ dimension of  newsmaking 
mentioned above, a large literature on journalistic news framing, in contrast, highlights 
the active role of the journalist in reconfiguring collected information for the production 
of a certain news item, thereby framing it in a particular perspective, capable of activating 
certain inferences in the audience. To address these contrasting conceptions, another 
relevant research question needs to be addressed: (RQ 7) Does the observation of 
journalists’ anticipatory reasoning about audience uptake offer elements of an 
explanation for the news frames adopted by journalists? Specifically, can we trace the 
news frames underlying the text of news products, the explicit arguments observable in 
the products, and the stylistic choices made by the journalist to episodes of anticipatory 
argumentative reasoning? To answer (RQ7) it is necessary to carefully observe the traces 
left by anticipatory reasoning in final news products. Journalists apply the editorial 
strategies discussed in the newsroom in their news items. However, it is not always the 
case that they succeed in so doing, and they may be more or less aware of those failures. 
Thus, one of my objectives is also to understand whether and how the editorial strategies 
discussed by journalists in the editorial conference are developed in the news items. 
Frame choice can be motivated by persuasive aims (conveying a certain viewpoint 
consistent with the journalist’s or newsroom’s values), and, in every case, frames can de 
facto activate inferences in the audience affecting the audience’s beliefs in a way that is to 
some extent predictable and that can be the object of design. Yet, journalists remain 
committed to norms of objectivity deeply entrenched in their professional ethos. In the 
thesis I approach anticipatory reasoning looking also at how these two seemingly 
contradictory perspectives can coexist. In terms of a research question, we can ask: (RQ 
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8) Do journalists struggle between impressing the audience/capturing its attention and 
conveying an objective view of the event they are reporting? My hypothesis is that 
journalists’ struggle between conveying rhetorically constructed news (imposing of a 
unique distinctive framing) and conveying a balanced view of the event (exigency of 
checking the frame by testing it with all the available evidence) they are reporting. They 
may use arguments aiming at neutralizing an unbalanced view of the reported event, 
thereby opening a space for critical reasoning in a limited resource context like the 
newsroom. However, it is important to note that in order to influence the audience it is not 
sufficient to follow their expectations and desires. Rather, it is sometimes necessary to 
modify their values and emotive reactions. To change the audience’s evaluations, it is 
necessary to create a contradiction between their values and judgements.  
Finally, with reference to the way in which journalists handle news sources and 
transform them into news items, a further research question arises: (RQ 9) Do journalists 
act as knowledge mediators between their available sources (corporate press releases, 
interviews to experts or to people involved in a reported event ...) and the audience, 
framing the whole news taking into consideration the audience uptake? Do journalists 
want their audience to maintain a critical attitude towards the news that they report? And 
how is this related to the anticipation of the audience’s uptake of an item? There is a strong 
connection between the distinct parts of a news items in which the protagonist is the 
journalist who produced the item. Reported interviews with lay people involved in events 
or with experts often represent arguments favouring the protagonist’s standpoint, i.e. the 
journalist’s standpoint.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the dissertation 
 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to illustrating the data, methodology, and results of the overarching 
research project Argumentation in newsmaking processes and products, within which the 
present dissertation is situated. The project has investigated the role played by 
argumentative practices in the newsroom -i.e. practices of socialized reasoning and reason-
giving in newsmaking discourse and in final news products, showing that argumentation 
	 	
	
	
26	
is a fundamental professional dimension of journalistic practices. To understand the role 
played by argumentation, many distinct types of data were collected following a 
methodology called “Progression Analyisis” and were analysed from an argumentative 
perspective. The data have been transformed into case studies, that confirmed the 
importance of analysing argumentation at all levels of newsroom activities, from 
journalists’ collective interactions to intermediate and final products, as well as to writing 
processes. 
Chapter 3 provides a state of the art of the literature on newsroom discourse. The 
chapter is subdivided into sections concerning verbal interaction in the newsroom (3.1 and 
3.2), news source material as intermediate texts leading to final news products (3.3), and 
newswriting (3.4). These studies lay the groundwork for understanding journalists’ 
reasoning in the newsroom. 
Since the present work aims at investigating how journalists argue about 
anticipated audience uptake, and since the data have undergone a contextual and 
argumentative analysis, Chapter 4 is devoted to illustrating the adopted theoretical 
frameworks. In particular, in subsection 4.1 the focus is on the model of communication 
context provided by Rigotti and Rocci (2006), in subsection 4.2 on explaining the most 
recent developments of argumentation theory and the argumentative approach known as 
Extended Pragma-dialectics, while in subsection 4.3 I focus on the theoretical framework 
used to analyse inferential configurations of the journalists’ reasoning, namely the 
Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010).  
In Chapter 5 I focus on anticipation, one of the main mental processes on which 
journalists rely when they reason about how to frame a news item. The first part of the 
chapter is devoted to illustrating the importance of a goal-based approach for 
understanding newsroom deliberation (5.1), the importance of anticipatory reasoning in 
human behaviour (sub-section 5.2) and of the distinct kinds of anticipatory reasoning (sub-
section 5.3). Then, in 5.4 I classify the different types of anticipation journalists adopt in 
terms of audience uptake. Finally, I devote subsection 5.5 to the anticipation of emotions, 
since it represents the most prominent type of anticipation in my corpus, and subsection 
5.6 to the anticipation of persuasion. 
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The data analysis begins in Chapter 6, where I illustrate a case of study involving 
a journalists’ discussion about the way in which the audience could be persuaded to watch 
a TV-debate by reading an article in the newspaper. 
In Chapter 7 I present a case study wherein journalists anticipate audience 
interest, which can be characterized as a type of audience emotive uptake. In this case 
study, the journalists’ anticipations rely entirely on past experience. Using these insights, 
I then deepen the role of past analogy. 
At this point of the analysis, since many case studies on anticipatory reasonings 
were counterfactual reasonings, in Chapter 8 I define the notion of counterfactual 
reasoning, and I identify the main triggers of it (8.1 and 8.2). I point at the main 
determinants of counterfactual content (8.3), and I make a theoretical reflection illustrating 
the relationship between counterfactual reasoning and argument schemes (8.4). To 
conclude the chapter, I focus on the relationship between upward counterfactual reasoning 
and regret (8.5) and downward counterfactual thinking and relief (8.6).  
In Chapter 9 I move from the theoretical to a case study entirely focused on 
counterfactual reasoning. In this case, during an editorial conference, the journalists 
anticipate the audience’s emotive uptake and want to convey to the audience the emotions 
that they themselves experience as a result of their counterfactual reasoning. I use this case 
to show how this can have slightly unfair framing implications for the news item. 
Chapter 10 presents a case study in which journalists retrospectively anticipate 
unrealized better scenarios during the evaluation of an already published item. The 
negative evaluation of how a past item has been handled leads the journalists to 
repeatedely use counterfactual reasoning. My analysis shows the functions of 
counterfactual reasoning when journalists work both individually and collectively.  
In Chapter 11 I survey four short cases illustrating journalists conducting different 
types of counterfactual reasoning, imagining unrealized better as well as worse scenarios.  
The general results of the research are drawn in Chapter 12. The examination of 
the analysed data opens new crucial theoretical questions in the area of anticipation and 
counterfactual thinking. Specifically, it sheds light on the distinct types of audience uptake 
in terms of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary force (12.2.2.3). Furthermore, 
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for what concerns counterfactual reasoning, I have given evidence of the argumentative 
foundations of it (12.1.5). I have also given evidence that counterfactual reasoning is 
correlated with the shift of verbal tense from past to present, therefore demonstrating that 
some cases of counterfactual reasoning may prolong the editorial discussion, therefore 
being productive (12.2.2.2). The study of this topic would be the aim of future 
developments of the present research (12.3) along with plans to study the role played by 
personal and interpersonal relationships in newsroom discussions as well as a sketch of a 
typology of journalists’ conflicts.
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2. The research project “Argumentation in newsmaking 
process and product”: data, methodology and results 
 
 
The present dissertation is part of the project Argumentation in newsmaking process and 
product, (PDFMP1_137181/1, 2012-2015), funded by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation. This research project has investigated the role played by argumentative 
practices in the newsroom occurring both in newsmaking discourse as well as in final news 
products, showing that argumentation is a fundamental professional dimension of 
journalistic practices, since it enables to understand which types of reasoning journalists 
apply when they build their news items and on which basis they do that. The Project has 
included a doubly comparative perspective, considering different media (radio-television 
vs. print-journalism) in the three main linguistic and cultural areas of Switzerland 
(German, French and Italian)4. The media organizations taken into account are two distinct 
sections of the public service broadcaster Schweizer Fernsehen and Télévision Suisse 
Romande (henceforth SRG) and the leading Italian language newspaper printed in Ticino, 
i.e. Il Corriere del Ticino (henceforth CdT), which is partly owned by a non-profit private 
foundation, which defines its mandate. 
The Argumentation in newsmaking process and product project represents an ideal 
prolongation and an addition of the project “Idée Suisse: Language policy, norms and 
practice as exemplified by Swiss Radio and Television” (NP 56, 2005-2008). On the one 
side, it is a prolongation since the project relies on the Idée Suisse data, and a new corpus 
has been gathered using the same method- i.e. Progression Analysis. The Idée Suisse 
corpus comprehends data from three programs of the Swiss public service television (SRG 
SSR) in German and French, while data of the new corpus have been gathered at Corriere 
del Ticino, the leading Italian language newspaper in Switzerland. On the other side, the 
Argumentation in newsmaking process and product project brings an added value to the 
                                                
4 It has involved researchers from the Università della Svizzera italiana (Andrea Rocci, Marta Zampa, 
and the author), the University of Lausanne (Marcel Burger, Laura Delaloye Saillen) and the Zurich 
University of Applied Science (Daniel Perrin).	
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study carried out in the Idée Suisse project since it involves an argumentative analysis of 
the corpus.  
 
 
2.1 Objectives and general structure of the Research Project 
 
 Discourse analysis has investigated for a long period print and TV-journalism. The 
domain of study concerning TV-journalism has mostly investigated interaction (Bell and 
Garret 1998; Clayman and Heritage 2002), whereas studies on print-journalism have 
mostly investigated the representational aspect of news items (Clayman 2008). Recently, 
a new strand of research on news discourse has appeared, whose aim is to connect the 
sociological approaches to news products with the linguistic essence of newsmaking 
processes (Macgilchrist 2007; O’Halloran 2009). 
  However, these recent studies did not take into account the role of argumentation 
neither in the processes that lead to newsmaking decisions nor in news products. 
Thus, there is little scientific literature on argumentation in journalism domain. 
Indeed, even though studies dealing in various ways with arguments in the written and 
broadcast news occur frequently outside the argumentation community, they are spread in 
distinct fields of linguistics, spanning from Critical Discourse Analysis to computational 
linguistics, as well as of communications, so that it is impossible to recognize a common 
scientific debate.   
The project Argumentation in newsmaking process and product is composed of 
three different but interweaved studies, in the shape of three different PhD dissertations 
carried out by the three PhD students involved. All three analyses are based on a common 
groundwork, which has aimed at investigating argumentation in newsmaking processes 
(newsroom editorial conferences, journalists’ informal discourses, writing strategies…) 
and in final news products. In order to achieve this aim, the project has investigated the 
following dimensions of news production chain: (1) institutional mission of the newsroom, 
(2) newsroom interaction, (3) journalists’ writing processes, (4) textual products. More 
specifically, the project has examined the role of practical argumentation in newsroom 
decisional processes both at a collective and at an individual level of analysis. For what 
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concerns individual problem-solving strategies, the three dissertations have investigated 
also the writing strategies adopted by journalists, in order to understand how much explicit 
or elicitable arguments have influenced newsmaking decisions and how much newsroom 
deliberation can be said to be a critical discussion. More specifically, with elicitable 
arguments I refer to arguments that the researcher has elicited to the journalist whereby 
specific interviews: this is very useful in order to understand how a journalist reasons and 
how this way of reasoning accounts for argumentations in the newsroom or for the way in 
which he anticipates an argumentative exchange with the reader/TV-viewer. Furthermore, 
the three works analyzed the role of argumentation in final news products and in different 
genres and desks. As a result of this, the theses shed light on distinct aspects of the role of 
argumentative practices in the newsroom, which are nevertheless bound by a common 
concern for the comprehension of the reasoning dynamics that lead journalists to publish 
certain news instead of others or that lead them to focus on certain details of a certain event 
instead of others. 
 
 
2.2 The Swiss public service broadcaster Schweizer Radio Gesellschaft 
 
The Swiss national public service broadcaster Schweizer Radio Gesellschaft (henceforth 
SRG) presents certain specific features that make it particularly adapted for the study of 
argumentation in the context of newsmaking processes. These characteristics are 
connected to what van Eemeren (2010: 129) calls the “raison d’être of the institution” and 
to what Rigotti & Rocci (2006: 172) identify as the “shared goals” of the institutional 
interaction field, to which participants are committed in their distinct roles and capacities 
(Rocci, Perrin and Burger 2012: 11).  
Public service broadcasting companies are very powerful in Europe. In Switzerland, 
SRG is the broadcaster with the highest audience ratings. Being a public service institution, 
SRG has the responsibility to fulfill a mandate that involves federal, societal, and cultural 
aspects. This mandate concerned promoting social integration by promoting public 
understanding. Due to the multilingual nature of Switzerland, SRG is obliged to conceive 
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its mandate also taking into account the linguistic perspective of a multilingual country, 
which, at a first glance, seems to comprise fostering discourse beyond the language 
borders. At the same time, SRG is a media enterprise, that necessarily undergoes market 
and competitors. Note, also, that if audience ratings diminish, it would mean that a contact 
with the public was not properly established; hence, the mandate of promoting public 
understanding was not fulfilled. These tensions, which were investigated in the Idée Suisse 
project, have been further examined thanks to the argumentative lens in newsmaking 
processes and products; indeed, thanks to an argumentative analysis it is possible to clearly 
understand journalists’ problem-solving strategies and to make explicit their implicit 
knowledge (Rocci, Perrin and Burger 2012: 11). 
 
 
2.3 CDT: A Swiss Italian-language regional newspaper  
 
CdT is the main Italian language newspaper published in Switzerland. It is published in 
Muzzano (Lugano) by the Fondazione per il Corriere del Ticino, in just under 40,000 
copies daily and the current amount of readers has been estimated to be over 125,000.  
 
It employs 50 journalists and about 200 freelancers. One fundamental feature of 
CdT is its commitment to have, at the same time, the function of local, regional and 
national newspaper. Recently, CdT has spread to other media including a free online 
edition, a TV presence in the programming of the local broadcaster TeleTicino, and radio 
presence on Radio3. Moreover, the newspaper presents a weekly Extra (Entertainment 
and Leisure) and the magazine Ticino7. According to commissioned surveys, CdT 
audience includes people of all ages, mainly from the Italian part of Switzerland. CdT is 
owned by a private non-profit foundation. The statutes of the Foundation demand that the 
newspaper ensure the respect of the essential principle of state secularism (“laicità dello 
stato”) and of the autonomy of its legislative, administrative and educational activities 
from any authoritative belief and from percepts and rules of any religion. At the same 
time, the statutes mention the “proper respect” and “special regard” that should be had 
for the Catholic religion, since it is the most widespread religion of the Ticino Canton. 
Furthermore, the statutes also state that the newspaper should follow “the research of the 
positive factors of understanding and cooperation in the political and humanitarian fields, 
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aimed at promoting peace, justice and mutual help among nations, emphasizing the 
traditional values of the presence of an independent Switzerland and open to the dialogue 
among nations” (Rocci, Perrin, Burger 2012: 12). 
 
These statutes originated in a particular cultural humus in which the Ticino 
Canton was: in 1841 the Liberal-Conservative party was founded after years of long 
and lacerating political conflicts in Tessin, in order to guarantee the free market 
economy and reconciliation. In this socio-political context the statutes of CdT had 
been created in order to support the comprehension and dialogue among people. The 
Argumentation in newsmaking process and product project attempted to explain 
how this socio-political institutional mission, which is deeply anchored in the 
cultural and political history of the Ticino Canton (Agliati 2003), as I said above, as 
well as in long-established Swiss values, is currently construed by journalists, also 
by observing the way in which institutional mission and market pressures are 
intertwined in the discourse at the distinct levels of the organization. In my 
dissertation I have investigated this point by looking at journalists’ anticipatory 
reasonings and at the way in which they struggle between conveying a balanced 
view of the reported news following the institutional mission on the one hand and 
satisfying the audience demand following market pressures. 
 
 
2.4 Data and methodology 
 
The research has been carried out partly on the basis of an already established corpus from 
the Idèe Suisse project, and partly on the basis of a corpus established for this project. The 
corpus inherited from the project Idée Suisse consists of two large datasets collected in 
2006 at the two SRG units Schweizer Fernsehen and Télévision Suisse Romande. The more 
recent dataset has been collected in January 2013 at the newspaper CdT.  
Data from the Idée Suisse project enable the study of argumentative practices in 
three TV-journalism newsrooms of two distinct linguistic and cultural regions of 
Switzerland; while the new data collected at CdT have enabled us to observe the same 
	 	
	
	
34	
practices in a print-journalism newsroom in the Italian-speaking region. The multiplicity 
of data enabled comparative multimedia and multilingual studies5. This dimension of the 
project has been important also in my dissertation. Indeed, on the one hand I have taken 
into account the multilingual perspective in order to understand whether journalists take 
into account the cultural premises when they anticipate the audience uptake and when they 
make their topical choices. On the other hand, the main vantage of having collected data 
from two different types of media has consisted in the possibility of observing how TV- 
and print-journalism share some characteristics but at the same time diverge for what 
concerns some phases of the newsmaking process: however, in my work I have not 
handled this topic which I set out to explore in future research.  
Data have been collected applying Progression Analysis (Perrin 2013), a 
methodology to gather and assess data regarding the context and the shaping of a text, 
which associates “ethnographic observation, interviews, computer logging, and cue-based 
retrospective verbalizations to gather linguistic and contextual data” (Perrin 2013: 63). In 
order to collect data, the organization and journalists under investigation had to give the 
consent to the video recording and computer logging, privacy and data security had to be 
guaranteed. The following kinds of data were gathered: a) editorial conferences, i.e. formal 
meetings in which journalists discuss the issues of the day which consist in deciding which 
and how news should be published/broadcasted and in evaluating the adequacy of previous 
news, b) informal discourses, such as  journalists’ spontaneous discourses on general 
topics as well as informal desk meetings c) frame interviews, i.e. interviews led before that 
the journalist writes the news items which will be analyzed, in order to find out the 
journalist’s culture, instruction, duties and in order to understand his/her function inside 
the organization, d) news products (newspaper articles and TV programs). For what 
concerns newspaper articles, we have handled distinct genres such as editorials and 
articles. For what concerns TV-programs, we have looked at the newscasts transmitted in 
                                                
5 Bonelli, L, & Luciani, M., 2015, Pragmatic strategies of empathy in journalistic news items and their 
influence on arguments’ acceptability in the audience: a multilingual and multimodal comparative 
study, 14th International Pragmatics Conference, July 26-31 2015, Antwerpen, Belgium. 
Perrin, D., Ehrensberger-Dow, M., & Zampa, M. (2016). Translation in the newsroom. Losing voices 
in multilingual newsflows? Journal of Applied Journalism and Media Studies. 
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the German speaking part and in the French speaking part of Switzerland, which belong 
to prevalently informative genre, and at the program 10vor10, which is halfway between 
an informative and an entertainment program. Then, at the level of writing practices, data 
consists of e) retrospective verbal protocol, i.e. a review of the writing process exactly 
after that it had been finished: the researcher interviewed the journalist while showing him 
the recording of his desktop. This kind of datum is useful since it enables to understand 
“the decisions that an author could have made in principle” (Perrin 2013: 64). As states D. 
Perrin, “the RVP is transcribed and then encoded as the author’s verbalization of aspects 
of his or her language awareness: writing strategies and conscious writing practices” 
(Perrin 2013, 64). Furthermore, another type of data are f) review interviews, namely 
interviews carried out right after the retrospective verbal protocol so that it was possible 
to sum up what had been done during it and to remark on it. After the data collection phase, 
a large amount of data belonging to the Italian-language corpus of Corriere del Ticino as 
well as a part of the data from the previously established corpus of the project Ideè Suisse 
has been transcribed and translated. In the Tables 1 and 2, the number of transcriptions 
and trasnlations done for each type of data (editorial conference, frame interview, review 
interview, retrospective verbal protocol) and for all interactions is shown. 
 
Table 1. Total amount of transcribed data subdivided for each type of interaction. 
 
TRANSCRIPTIONS 
 
 Editorial 
conferences 
Frame 
interviews 
Review 
interviews 
Informal 
discourse 
Retrospective 
verbal 
protocols 
CdT 
Newsroom 
(Italian) 
14 5 5 4 5 
Téléjournal 
newsroom 
(French) 
5 5 5 1 5 
Tagesschau 5 5 5 2 5 
10vor10 5 5 5 2 5 
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Table 2. Total amount of translated data subdivided for each type of interaction, newsroom and 
linguistic area. 
 
TRANSLATIONS 
 
 Editorial conferences 
Frame 
interviews 
Review 
interviews 
Informal 
discourses 
Retrospective 
verbal protocol 
Language of 
translation 
CdT 
Newsroom 
(Italian) 
9 2 2 3 5 English 
Téléjournal 
Newsroom 
(French) 
3 2 2 3 1 English 
10vor10 
Newsroom 
(German) 
3 2 3 2 2 English 
Tagesschau 
(German)  2 1 1 1 2 English 
CdT 
Newsroom 
(Italian) 
2 3 1 1 3 French 
 
Additionally, a part of transcriptions has been refined according to conversation 
analytical criteria for interactional and multimodal analysis in order to be apt for a detailed-
oriented analysis of argumentation in interaction and for studying the para-verbal and non-
verbal dimension of argumentation in the newsmaking process, in a fashion that is typical 
of multimodality and linguistic ethnography. This part of work has been done by Laura 
Delaloye for the purposes of her dissertation. 
Firstly, the context in which the interaction took place, i.e. the newsroom of Il 
Corriere del Ticino, Tagesschau, 10vor10 and Téléjournal, has been taken into 
consideration, since the goals of the place in which an interaction takes place strongly 
influence the argumentation. Different kinds of signals derived from the context and from 
the text (such as argumentative indicators) allowed the members of the whole project to 
identify the presence of argumentative discussions in the collected data. Then, the issue at 
stake for each argumentative discussion identified in all types of data under consideration 
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and the final and/or intermediate standpoints supported have been identified. Later, the 
argumentative reconstruction has been carried out; the arguments supporting each 
standpoint were identified and the structure of argumentation has been delinated by 
illustrating the way in which the arguments were linked to the standpoints and to each 
other. In a nutshell, reconstructing argumentation means “representing argumentation in a 
form which ensures that its structure is represented explicitely, precisely and 
transparently” (Brun and Betz 2016: 45)6. I will explain in detail the model I adopt for 
making the argumentative analysis in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the inferential analysis of 
the focal argumentative moves of the argumentative discussion under investigation has 
been carried out according to Argumentum Model of Topics (henceforth AMT, Rigotti and 
Greco Morasso 2010), which I will explain in section 4.3. In short, making an inferential 
analysis means to analyze the reasoning passage that makes possible to reach a conclusion 
starting from a given premise7. In particular, the AMT method gave the possibility to lay 
stress on the missing link represented by implicit premises and enabled to shed light on 
the newsmaking’s endoxa, i.e. the shared and accepted opinions within the journalistic 
community. 
A large amount of data has been already analyzed, and the obtained results are 
shown in the main publications and presentations to conferences8. Many analyses of the 
data are still ongoing and many publications are in preparation.  
                                                
6 For more details see Chapter 4, subsection 4.2. 
7	For more details on inferential analysis and AMT see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.	
8 A list of publications resulted from the project can be found here: 
Andone, C. and Rocci, A. 2016, “Argumentation in journalism. Professional practices and the public 
sphere”. [Special Issue], Journal of Argumentation in Context, 5:1.  
 Andone C. and Rocci, A. 2016, Argumentation in journalism: professional practices and the public 
sphere, Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Argumentation in journalism:  professional practices and the 
public sphere’, Journal of Argumentation in Context, 5:1, 1-8. 
Burger M. and Delaloye L. 2016, “The Framing of Argumentation in the Making of a Political Editorial: 
From Normative Expectations to Stylistic Credo of the Journalists” (2016), Journal of Argumentation 
in Context, 5 (1), pp. 29-47.  
Burger, M. and Perrin, D. 2014, “Ce que le quotidien des journalistes nous dit sur les tension des disours 
médiatiques” dans, Berthoud Anne-Claude et Marcel Burger (eds.), Repenser le rôle des pratiques 
langagières dans la constitution des espaces sociaux contemporains, Bruxelles, De Boeck, p. 165-194. 
Delaloye, L., 2016, “Approche ethnographique et linguistique de l’écriture d’un éditorial”, dans A. 
Touboul, I. Hare, J.M. Rampon, J.F. Tétu (eds.), Informer avec internet. Reprises et métamorphoses de 
l'information, Besançon, Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté. 
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2.5 Some key results 
 
The analysis of the distinct types of data specified in the previous section (sub-section 2.4) 
carried out by the members of the project has shown that argumentation is a fundamental 
professional dimension of journalistic practices, which is evident both in the newsmaking 
activities as well as in news products. An important result concerns economic-financial 
journalism: economic-financial journalists often act as argumentative intermediaries 
between corporate press releases and and the audience. Indeed, whereby argumentation 
they filter information coming from corporate press releases and propose a balanced view 
of the reported event, therefore opening a space for critical discussion in the audience’s 
minds (Rocci and Luciani 2016).  Furthermore, I have given evidence of the importance 
of argumentation when journalists attempt to anticipate the audience emotions in editorial 
conferences; whereby argumentation they decide how to frame the news in such a way to 
have the best impact possible on the audience (for more details see Chapter 9). In general, 
                                                
Delaloye, L. 2015, “Compte-rendu de la conférence Langage et Argumentation 2015”, Studies in 
communication sciences, 95, pp. 229-230.  
Luciani M., Rocci A. & Zampa M., Capturing editorial gatekeeping through the analysis of 
argumentation in editorial conferences, in Miecznikowski, J., Casoni, M., Christopher, S., Kamber, A., 
Pandolfi, E.M., Rocci, A. (eds.) (2015). Norme linguistiche in contesto / Sprachnormen im Kontext / 
Normes langagières en contexte / Language Norms in Context. Actes du colloque VALS-ASLA 2014 
(Lugano, 12-14 février 2014). Special issue of Bulletin suisse de linguistique appliquée (3 volumes), 
Volume 2, 215-236.  
Luciani, M., 2016, Journalists’ Emotionally Colored Standpoints: A Path Leading to Foster Existing 
Stereotypes in the Audience?, in ‘Argumentation and reasoned action’, Proceedings of the 1st European 
Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon 2015, Volume I, 429-452. 
Rocci, A., & Luciani, M., 2016, & Economic-financial journalists as argumentative intermediaries, in 
Journal of Argumenation in Context, Special Issue Argumentation in Journalism, 88-111. 
Zampa, M. 2016. Objectivity in newsmaking: an argumentative perspective. Proceedings of the 11th 
International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18th-21st May 
2016. 
Zampa, Marta, & Perrin, D. (2016). Arguing with oneself. The writing process as an argumentative 
soliloquy. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 5(1), 9–28. 
ZAMPA, M. (2017). Argumentation in the newsroom. Argumentation in context Book Series, edited by 
Frans H. van Eemeren and Bart Garssen. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
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the results obtained thanks to the argumentative analysis carried out can be staged at three 
distinct levels. 
At the level of newsroom interaction, the argumentative analysis let emerge two 
distinct types of editorial conferences, that included different kinds of discussions, 
revolving around various issues of newsmaking. Firstly, there are deliberative editorial 
conferences, in which argumentation has proved to be relevant when journalists decide on 
good journalistic practices. Secondly, there are evaluative editorial conferences, in which 
argumentation has proved to be relevant when journalists evaluate both general editorial 
practices (therefore involving standpoints that regard newsmaking routinized practices and 
polices) and specific past decisions (therefore involving standpoints that regard specific 
instances of newsmaking). Furthermore, as a result of a fine-grained analysis of newsroom 
discussions, it has been shown that gatekeeping practices rely on argumentative reasoning, 
in which news values and other aspects play the role of endoxical premises, therefore 
contributing to the endoxical function. Moreover, argumentation has proved to be relevant 
when journalists decide about the framing of a given news item, especially in view of the 
audience emotive uptake, which strongly influences journalists’ editorial decisions. 
Thanks to the analysis of the inferential structure of arguments, we have been able to look 
at implicit premises, showing how the connection argument-standpoint is actually 
realized; loci from final cause have been found to recur frequently in editorial conferences, 
since deliberative discussions attempt to satisfy institutional goals. Therefore, arguments 
often draw upon a standpoint’s foundation in relation to such goals. Even the frequent 
occurrence of loci from past analogy has been observed, indeed journalists often rely on 
past editorial experiences in order to predict future outcomes of editorial choices, therefore 
arguments often draw upon a standpoint’s validity in relation to past experiences. At the 
level of endoxa shared by the journalists, news values and editorial norms as well as 
desirable editorial goals have emerged. In this endeavor, multiple relevant results both for 
studies on argumentation in context and on journalism have been brought by Marta 
Zampa’s thesis on news values as endoxa of newsmaking (Zampa 2015). Results made it 
possible to see how everyday journalistic practices correspond to the pragma-dialectical 
model of a critical discussion and how journalists reason from recurrent loci that are 
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dependent from the institutional preconditions of the newsroom. Moreover, it showed the 
argumentative role played by news values in journalistic reasoning, as well as the internal 
complexity of the category, going beyond the classification traditionally considered in the 
literature. It also showed how journalists do not – as often stated by scholars – act only in 
a standardized way. On the contrary, they carefully ponder on their decisions, are willing 
to comply with the mandate of their organization and to produce the best news possible.   
At the level of news products, results obtained have shown that journalists edit their 
argumentation in their news products; indeed, journalists construct their item according to 
their beliefs and to what they have collectively discussed in editorial conferences. 
Journalists individually reformulate their source material, which is argumentative and 
often rhetorically constructed, and its argumentation in the news product. Moreover, it has 
also been observed that journalists’ argumentation in news products can have a strong 
influence in argumentation in the public sphere, since journalists’ argumentation in news 
products has the power to lead the audience to accept a certain conclusion instead of 
another in a way that is persuasive per se. Indeed, observing all kinds of news products 
we have observed that journalists construct their news items using arguments in favor of 
a given standpoint that they themselves support. This has been confirmed thanks to the 
analysis of writing practices. 
At the level of writing processes, the argumentative analysis of retrospective verbal 
protocols has been useful in order to understand the ways in which the journalist had 
reasoned about changes that he had made and about certain linguistic choices. The 
retrospective interviews can be considered as a live soliloquy by the writer, whose 
decisions may be subject to change, reformulation, questioning and critical evaluation. 
Argumentation has proved to play a major role in writing processes, being writing 
practices highly reflective moments in which journalists’ inner argumentation emerges. In 
retrospective interviews, in which journalists argued with themselves, it become clear why 
journalists had edited some texts and the way in which they reasoned as well as their 
conscious writing strategies and practices; for instance, in one case of study of the business 
desk, in the retrospective verbal protocol the journalist had clearly spelled out his difficulty 
of adopting a critical stance towards the source material. Furthermore, one strand of 
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research has shed light on journalists’ individual decisions concerning an item, for instance 
providing insights into a writer’s conscious decisions that resulted in a coherence problem 
in his or her text. Multilingual problems in the news have also been investigated (see Perrin 
et alii 2016).  Moreover, writing processes have been observed as an argumentative 
soliloquy and observed as precious sources for studyin journalists’ inner argumentation 
(see Zampa and Perrin 2016).  
By applying Progression analysis and by making an argumentative analysis of the 
whole intertextual chain of newsmaking processes, some journalists’ decisional tensions 
have emerged, namely a) a decisional tension between hard news’ genre’s rules –such as 
avoiding authorial involvement- and the will to give a judgement and b) a decisional 
tension between journalists’ will to convey a balanced view of the event and open to the 
critical discussion on the one hand and the journalists’ will to capture audience attention 
on the other hand. 
As a result of this focus of research, a Special Issue on Argumentation in Journalism 
(see Andone Rocci 2016) was entirely dedicated to journalistic argumentation, focused on 
the role played by argumentative practices as a precondition for the better understanding 
of the dynamics of journalism as a profession as well as for comprehending how 
journalism participates  in the creation of the public sphere in contemporary societies, by 
creating a space where issues pertaining to different domains are reconfigured and are 
played out publicly.  The peculiarities of the economic-financial journalism and the role 
of argumentation in the business-finance desk were also deeply investigated (see Rocci 
and Luciani 2016), by looking at how the economic-financial journalist faces the 
argumentative and persuasive essence of corporate press releases on financial results on 
which he relies for his reporting. Light was shed on the way in which journalists of the 
economy desk compose their items, “showing that even within the constrained genre of 
hard news reporting and despite the epistemic and practical limitations of newsmaking 
practices the journalist does not renounce to a critical stance towards the argumentation in 
the source” (Rocci and Luciani 2016: 1).  
A slightly different strand of research has focused on the discursive construction of 
identities in the newsroom domain. One of the main results of this strand concerns the 
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normative expectations constraining political editorials in the work by Burger and 
Delaloye (Burger and Delaloye 2016: 1). The authors have adopted an internal perspective 
focusing on the process of “making” an editorial: “how and why is argumentation 
constructed and what is at stake with it from the journalistic point of view”. Taking into 
account the editorial conferences where the topic is examined as well as the writing 
process, the authors have analyzed the “emergent normative expectations and the 
individual credos of argumentation in the editorial” (Burger and Delaloye 2016: 1). 
Results have shown how journalists’ expectations are embedded in the daily activities at 
three different levels: the generic, the institutional and the individual level that the 
journalist has to face.  
 
 
2.6 Relevance of the present dissertation for project 
 
In this sub-section I highlight the strict relationship between the research questions behind 
my thesis and behind the project. Firstly, (1) having analyzed argument exchanges 
concerning journalists’ anticipation on the audience uptake in newsmaking processes, the 
dissertation has considered an audience-oriented activity which is typical of the 
newsroom; (2) furthermore, the present dissertation has enabled to understand how 
journalists’ reasoning on the audience uptake deals as a starting point for framing news 
items in a peculiar way, which answers one of the main question of the research project, 
that sounds ‘how do journalists maintain a balance between capturing the audience 
attention and promoting public understanding, therefore aiming at fulfilling the public 
mandate?’ 
Thirdly, (3) the inferential analysis and evaluation of argument schemes has offered 
the opportunity to understand hidden premises of journalists’ arguments concerning 
audience uptake, therefore revealing their inferential path. To be more specific, the 
inferential analysis is useful since it enables to understand which values journalists rely 
on when they anticipate what could produce a positive and a high impact on the audience. 
Fourthly, (4) the high attention paid to counterfactual reasoning has represented an 
important point of investigation, since it has enabled to shed light on some important 
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journalists’ reasoning patterns that often include simulative –and not only actual- 
premises. This is in line with one of the main goal of the project, namely that of discovering 
the most recurrent types of reasoning in newsmaking practices9, which in turn represents 
an important contribution to studies on argumentative patterns in argumentation in 
context10. 
 (5) Furthermore, in my dissertation I have investigated how journalists try to find a 
balance between capturing the audience attention by making a certain framing of the news 
on the one side and conveying a balanced view of a reported event on the other side.  
At a more practical level of contribution to the project, this dissertation may provide 
interesting suggestions to media professionals for different aspects. In particular, it may 
offer a better understanding of (a) the processes through which information is selected, 
represented and adapted to the emotive and cognitive abilities of the audience as well as 
to their sociological and ideological interpretation; (b) the different phases of the decision-
making processes during newsroom editorial conferences; (c) the general coherence of 
such processes in relation to the declared goals of the media institution and the individual 
journalists. 
                                                
9	Zampa, M. (2017). Argumentation in the newsroom, Argumentation in context Book Series, edited 
by Frans H. van Eemeren and Bart Garssen. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins.	
10	Argumentative patterns can be defined as “a particular constellation of argumentative moves in which 
in a particular kind of argumentation structure a particular cobination of argument schemes is exploited 
in defense of a particular type of standpoint” (van Eemeren and Garssen 2013: 7).	
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3. Newsroom discourse: from editorial conferences to final 
news products 
 
 
This chapter is dedicated to discussing the various strands of research on newsroom 
discourse. As briefly sketched in the Introduction, various disciplines have contributed to 
the study of newsroom activities that lead to the production of news items; in this chapter 
a part will be devoted to gatekeeping in newsroom discourse (3.1), one to shed light on 
how news sources are transformed into news products (3.2), and one to newswriting 
strategies (3.3). 
 
 
3.1 The concept of gatekeeping in newsroom discourse 
 
 The term “gatekeeping” was coined by the social psychologist Kurt Lewin (Lewin 1947): 
with this term, he firstly referred to a wife or mother as the person who chooses which 
aliments can be found on a family’s table. Even though Lewin firstly applied the concept 
of gatekeeping to the food chain, afterwards he focused on the news media. According to 
him, the gatekeeping process in the news media consists in the way in which news items 
flow through communication paths. The gatekeeper is the person who chooses what shall 
proceed through each gate section in any process. Lewin’s gatekeeping concept can be 
traced back to his work on social planning and is conceived as an individual matter (1947); 
“in any organizational environment a singular decision-maker functions as the gatekeeper, 
and the primary phenomenon of interest is that gatekeeper’s ‘psychology’-presumably, the 
attitudes and values favoring certain choices over others” (179).  
On the contrary, the sociological perspective emphasized criteria of newsworthiness 
that act as selection criteria, conducting editors as they choose which stories will be apt to 
be published. Newsroom decisions are bound either to the reporter’s innate and impulsive 
tendency to choose the most apt news or to stardandized conducts (Gieber 1964; White 
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1964 [1950]) filtering the information to be conveyed to the audience. In these sociological 
appraoches journalists are conceived as actors that carry out standardized logics and that 
undergo market pressures. Thus, in this perspective journalists are conceived as machines 
that produce news in a purely mechanistic way. 
More recently, some studies in sociology and media linguistics introduced a new 
perspective, suggesting that real life dynamics of a newsroom may be understood only by 
observing all kinds of interactions of newsroom activities from the editorial conferences 
to the final news products (Clayman and Reisner 1998; van Hout and Jacobs 2008; Perrin 
2013). The way in which journalists reason when they build a news have not been 
examined until now, except for researches coming from the Argumentation in newsmaking 
process and product project (illustrated in Chapter 2); and in particular, the ways in which 
journalists reason when they customize their news for their audience have not yet been 
investigated in argumentative terms, except for the attempts made in this dissertation. This 
study owes much to Clayman and Reisner’ s paper (Clayman and Reisner 1998) who 
clearly state that abstract criteria of newsworthiness “tend to have weak predictive value 
[in order to understand news selection processes], and they do not fully explain actual 
selection decision” (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 179). Furthermore, the authors highlight 
the need for an analysis of interaction in the newsroom and they also maintain that  
 
journalists’ reasoning process does not take place exclusively within editors’ 
minds; it is worked out publicly, through concrete speaking practices embedded in 
courses of interaction within conference meetings. To describe, evaluate and select stories 
is to engage in basic forms of social action that remain largely unexamined in the 
newsroom context (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 180). 
 
The authors deepen the concept of gatekeeping: Who is responsible for choosing 
news stories? In which way are they selected and in which way are they evaluated as 
appropriate in order gain the prominency given by the front page? The sociology of news 
media has long dealt with these issues; indeed, they are connected to the fact “that 
journalists work within a complex institutional and cultural environment that leaves its 
imprint on the daily news” (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 196). According to the authors, 
the way in which stories are selected and adapted to a certain audience can be understood 
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only by studying the ongoing newsmaking practices actually at stake in a newsroom. 
Furthermore, Clayman and Reisner’s analysis is implicitly close to the focus of the present 
dissertation, since it implicitly recalls the concept of anticipation of audience uptake; 
indeed, it focuses on the way in which journalists judge news stories as more or less 
newsworthy for a certain audience, so that the salience of a certain news story is more or 
less implicitly established on the basis of the anticipated audience uptake. 
Some scholars have pointed to newsroom interaction as journalists’ elective site for 
taking decisions on news production (e.g. Shoemaker 1991; Tuchman 1978); however, 
they only point to the important role played by newsroom interaction, without deeply 
analyzing it. On the contrary, Clayman and Reisner (1998) go one step further and analyze 
editorial conferences in detail. They adopt a sociological approach, inspired in part by 
Conversation Analysis (Garfinkel 1984 [1967]; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; 
Schegloff 2007). The authors concentrate on gatekeeping practices in editorial 
conferences, classifying distinct journalistic strategies aiming at fostering news stories for 
page one and at analyzing how journalists ascribe newsworthiness to news stories. 
As a result of their empirical investigation conducted in the newsrooms of eight 
American daily newspapers, Clayman and Reisner state that gatekeeping is a “reasoning 
process” which is “worked out publicly, through concrete speaking practices embedded in 
course of interaction within conference meetings” (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 180). 
Indeed, during editorial conferences journalists decide which stories can ‘pass’ and are 
therefore suitable for publication. Clayman and Reisner point at the presence of specific 
phases of the editorial conference, that they label as preliminaries, story review, story 
selection, aftermath. During the preliminaries phase, the editorial team simply sets the 
conditions for the newsroom activities, such as controlling that all involved personell is 
present and introducing guests. In the second phase, the editorial team summarizes and 
reviews the most important stories of each section. Reactions to stories’ summaries come 
primarily from the managing editors, who initiate the vast majority of responses, although 
the frequency of responses varies greatly from newspaper to newspaper. The authors 
observe that at smaller newspapers managing editors ‘usually do not comment on the 
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newsworthiness of particular stories, but they may offer forms of acknowledgement, probe 
for further details, make suggestions regarding angles to be pursued, facts to be verified’.  
In the third phase, the authors observe that journalists begin to talk about how the 
stories should be disposed in the newspaper, and in particular about which stories should 
gain prominence on the first page. On the contrary, in the empirical part of my dissertation, 
I will show some examples of story selection and of story’s details selection that do not 
deal with selection for page one but rather with news’ selection for overall media coverage. 
And then, in the closing phase, the aftermath, journalists may have some additional 
spontaneous conversations before going back to their activities. 
In the passages of editorial conferences analyzed by Clayman and Reisner (1998: 
185), the discussions mainly focused on newsworthiness assessment for page one stories, 
in order to reach the main aim of their study. On the contrary, the cases analyzed in my 
research deal with journalists’ interpretations on which news story may be good in view 
of the audience uptake. During editorial conferences journalists establish which facts of a 
story are newsworthy for a certain audience and try to imagine what reaction a given story 
or a given detail of a story could produce in the audience. 
There is a certain difference for what concerns newsworthiness assessment 
depending on print- and TV- journalism (Zampa 2015: 137). Even though editorial 
conferences are quite similarly organized both in different media and in distinct nations 
(cf. Clayman and Reisner 1998; Cotter 2010), some diversities bound to the medium can 
be noticed with reference to journalists’ way of anticipating audience uptake in editorial 
conference discussions analysed in this dissertation. In television editorial conferences, 
journalists devote a great amount of the editorial conference thinking aloud about the 
distinct alternatives and try to anticipate which would be the best alternative to choose. 
These exclusion-of-the-alternatives phase is also devoted to establish a hierarchy of 
salience of events that could at the same time better capture the audience and fulfill the 
program’s mandate; at this stage journalists attempt to frame their stories in such a way 
that suits with the audience cognitive and emotive expectations. In this case we face a 
shared and inter-individual decision-making process, whilst in the case of print-
journalism, journalists arrive to the editorial conference with already individually taken 
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decisions, so that the editorial conference’s function is mainly to share an a priori taken 
decision and profit from further discussion (Zampa 2015: 138). Furthermore, as also stated 
by Zampa (Zampa 2015)  
 
TV journalists check what other programs of the same media organization did on 
the topic and how they presented it in more detail than newspaper journalists. 
Crosschecking between different media also takes place. At television, avoiding 
repetition with respects to what has already been broadcasted is an earnest concern, 
whereas they more easily get around dealing with others’ prerogatives when they can 
make an exclusive out of it (Zampa 2015: 138). 
 
Differently, at a newspaper each journalist is specialized in a precise topic 
depending on the specific desk in which the journalist works; the functions of the 
participants to the discussion are clearly defined and the issues strictly depend on the type 
of desk. Consequently, discussions in newspaper newsrooms often consist of dialogues 
between the journalist in charge of the editorial conference and the journalist of a certain 
desk. The other journalists are seen simply as “auditors” [(Bell 1984)], namely “known, 
ratified but unaddressed participants, who can nevertheless intervene in the discussion” 
(Zampa 2015: 138). 
 
 
3.2 The interactional approach to gatekeeping 
 
I am indebted to Clayman and Reisner’s innovative study (1998), since they argue in favor 
of an interactional approach to gatekeeping. Furthermore, they explicitly consider the role 
played by the context and they implicitly take into account the audience uptake as a 
parameter on which much newsmaking decisions processes are based. However, my work 
goes one step further than Clayman and Reisner’s interactional approach on gatekeeping. 
Indeed, this study follows their point of view, but also marks an improvement in two 
directions. Firstly, it helps us in understanding journalists’ actual reasoning processes at 
stake in editorial conferences, which provides first evidence to react to the authors’ 
demand for “further research […] necessary to specify the relative importance of criterial 
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news values” (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 197). As a result of an in-depth study of 
newsroom discussions, I will show the argumentative basis of newsroom decision-making 
processes. Secondly, this study provides a more focused and precise insight on those 
individual and collective journalistic reasonings that concern anticipation of the audience 
uptake.  
It is interesting to notice that even though Clayman and Reisner do not explicitly 
speak of argumentation, they hint at it when they delineate how the editorial team decides 
which stories can be defined newsworthy and which not; the authors use terms such as 
justify, defend, provide evidence, criticism, justificatory account, defensive move when 
they speak about journalists taking decisions, in a fashion that is similar to argumentation 
scholars when they speak of participants’ argumentative moves in argumentative 
discussions.  
Clayman and Reisner concentrate on the stories that deserve consideration for the 
front-page placement; they show that the participants display an adherence to this norm 
when it is broken- that is when the salience of an item being offered for review is in doubt. 
The managing editor, for example, may disapprove an editor who pays too much attention 
to material that does not seem suitable for the front page.  
The authors look at journalists’ orientation to page one: the authors show an example 
in which when the managing editor asks the city editor about a particular story not 
mentioned in his review, the city editor explains its absence by reference to the expectation 
that only page-one candidates warrant inclusion in the review. Similarly, but also very 
differently, my research will focus on journalists’ expectation that only candidate news 
that are appropriate for a certain audience may be included in a newspaper/Tv-program. 
Furthermore, the authors point at the fact that the focal point of editorial conferences 
is not the phase of stories’ summarizing, but rather they claim that it is the third phase in 
which stories summaries are commented, motivated and fostered: as they say, 
“summarized stories are being offered, and are understood as being offered, as candidates 
for the front page” (185). Journalists promote their summarized stories as means that 
potentially enable to capture the audience, therefore as means that enable a desirable goal 
for the whole newsroom. 
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When journalists promote stories they have in mind an imagined audience, and the 
system of values that enable to judge a certain story as good for a certain audience is shared 
by the whole journalistic team. The authors often use terms such as importance and 
significance to refer to a news, therefore frequently emphasizing the concept of salience 
of a news: nevertheless, they do not say with respect to what and/or to whom a story should 
be important and an event significant. Obviously, the significance of an event and the 
importance of a news are assessed with reference to the audience: indeed, an event is 
significant for the journalists in view of the audience uptake and a news is important in 
view of the audience uptake. Therefore, stressing the role of audience uptake anticipation 
is crucial in order to understand how a story is presented and fostered, which in turn is 
crucial for understanding the gatekeeping process. The authors identify three types of 
journalists’ promotional practices; a) one promotional practice may concern the 
positioning of a given story within the review phase. Editors may classify their evaluations 
in a way that enables to start with those stories they consider to be prominent, whereas 
they may present subsequent stories in order of decreasing prominence, b) a second 
promotional practice concerns the design of the story summary itself. Peculiar facts may 
be singled out, defined, and framed in such a way that stresses the novelty, impact, and/or 
significance of the events delineated in the story, c) another promotional practice concerns 
stories’ promotion by means of explicit evaluative stancing. Editors may go beyond the 
specific facts of the story and comment explicitly on the story’s appropriateness for the 
front page. More specifically, these comments concern assessments of newsworthiness. 
The authors focus on the most important type of journalists’ evaluation, namely on 
assessments of newsworthiness; assessments are occasionally introduced in the midst of a 
story summary, and these internal assessments do not concern the whole story, but rather 
particular facts about the story. Therefore, the referent of each assessment may not be the 
whole story, but rather a particular fact with which the story is associated. Journalists 
concentrate on the parts of the story that they believe to be significant for a certain 
audience, indeed the assessment terms used are all variants of interesting, good, good read, 
which presuppose an interest and a goodness for an audience. 
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For what concerns assessments of judgement, they tend to be favorable in character, 
but only mildly favorable, so that stories are considered fairly interesting, pretty good, 
fairly important; this is an interesting evidence, since it indicates a certain degree of 
uncertainty in journalists for what concerns a future audience uptake, that may be 
anticipated but that can never be predicted in a clear way. 
On the contrary, strongly favorable assessments are often justified by many 
arguments, since there are more clear grounds that enable to predict a positive audience 
uptake (190).  
For what concerns unfavorable assessments, they are framed as characterizing the 
speaker’s own perspective or attitude towards the story (e.g. I am not hugely enthusiastic). 
This contrasts sharply with the design of favorable assessments, which directly 
characterize the story itself (e.g. it’s a good story). Potentially newsworthy good read 
stories are thought for an audience: the role of subject of the story (the story is a good 
read..) emphasizes the story’s inclination to be spread to the audience, whereas the passive 
role attributed to stories in unfavorable assessments emphasizes the subjective feeling of 
the journalist and shifts the attention from the potential audience uptake to the subjective 
perception that the news is not apt for a certain audience. 
Another interesting point of Clayman and Reisner’s work is the authors’ hint at the 
anticipatory behavior in the newsroom, even though they focus on journalists’ anticipation 
concerning the other journalists as an audience: in fact, the scholars notice that journalists’ 
“justificatory accounts in particular seem designed to head off anticipated resistance” 
(191). Similarly, but differently, the focus of my research will deal with journalists’ 
anticipatory behavior concerning the audience uptake, that I will deepen (from a 
theoretical point of view) in Chapter 4.  
The authors underlie that journalists’ both stronger and weaker endorsements are 
offered much more cautiously, with justificatory accounts, markers of subjectivity, and 
distinct forms of mitigation. Some of these features may be efforts to make the assessment 
less vulnerable to criticism or attack.  Editors thus are more cautious or defensive when 
rendering assessments that are either stronger or weaker than mildly favorable norm (191). 
Furthermore, they observe that “a cautious/defensive stance may emerge whenever an 
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editor feels him- or herself to be going out on a limb” (191): the future continuous signals 
that the editor is anticipating an uncertain future outcome that depends on the present state 
of affairs.  
The various promotional practices analyzed by Clayman and Reisner (1998) are 
strongly associated with gatekeeping outcomes. All in all, this indicates that what counts 
in the gatekeeping process is not only the news values that editors have in their own 
individual minds, but rather what they express with words and actions publicly and 
collectively during the editorial conference. However, gatekeeping processes is not limited 
to news values, which represent only one dimension of it. My study is a reply to Clayman 
and Reisner’s invitation to further research in order “to specify the relative importance of 
criterial news values and context-sensitive promotional practices” (197): in my research I 
focus in some way on the ‘context-sensitive promotional practices’ that deal with the 
audience uptake anticipations that may support the fostering of a story within a given 
newsroom and that are not limited to news values. 
 
 
3.3 Journalists as active intermediaries: from source material to audience-driven 
news  
 
In the previous sub-sections we have seen that many researchers in sociology and media 
linguistics have deepened the study of the newsroom discourse in recent years and looked 
at newsroom interaction. However, the key role played by journalists’ sources in news 
items’ production has not yet been introduced; it is necessary to deepen this topic in order 
to carry out the main aim of the present study. By looking at the contributions on the topic 
(Van Hout & Jacobs 2008; Catenaccio et al. 2011; Van Hout 2010; Jacobs 1999; Cotter 
2010) it is immediately possible to define the point of interest of these studies for the 
present dissertation, by describing the core dynamics of the process of knowledge 
transformation acted out by journalists in re-elaborating the sources and in producing the 
news item; indeed, this point is crucial for understanding why journalists take editorial 
decisions anticipating the audience uptake, since sources or pieces of them are always 
selected, redefined and re-elaborated in view of the potential audience.  
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3.3.1 Journalists as knowledge creators and mediators11 
 
 When journalists build their news, they mediate between the events reported by the 
sources that they consult and the potential audience, therefore playing the crucial role of 
mediators –and even creators- of information in the newsroom. The core dynamics of 
journalists’ mediation are realized when journalists observe sources, modify them, and 
merge them with their own ideas, thus shaping them in an individual way by giving them 
a particular frame and interpretation and by giving more prominence to some aspects of a 
given fact or event instead of others. On the one side, journalists strongly rely on sources 
of all type (press releases, interviews…); on the other side, they take distance from them 
and judge their content, thereby attempting to ascertain the best way to convey an event 
to the audience, in a way that should be attractive, comprehensible and true at the same 
time (Cotter 2010).  
Therefore, journalists are prominent actors in spreading knowledge, they may 
strongly influence the public opinion on given events and topics, by individually framing 
an event and reporting it in a peculiar way to the vast public. Several authors analyzed 
which is the process starting from journalists’ observation of source material and leading 
them to produce news items’ contents. Jacobs (1999) analyzed what is usually included in 
corporate press releases and how specific features in the writing process might guide the 
journalists’ response. Later, Van Hout and Jacobs (2008: 59) focus on the “notions of 
agency, interaction and power in business news journalism” and apply these theoretical 
notions to press releases and especially to the linguistic pragmatic investigation of the 
precise collective and textual habits that enable their conversion into news items. The 
authors rely on data gathered at the economy desk of Flemish newspaper; they use a novel 
methodology that merges “newsroom ethnography and computer-assisted writing process 
analysis” (Van Hout and Jacobs 2008: 59), which gives the chance to observe the way in 
which a journalist comes across a story that is not yet news, proposes it to the editorial 
board, writes and meditates on it. This methodology enables to focus on the individual 
                                                
11 In this section I follow the path traced by Van Hout 2010.  
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journalist’s writing practices and to understand the way in which he handles sources and 
his degree of dependence on press releases. Following the path traced by Beeman & 
Peterson (2001), the authors support the conception of journalism as an “‘interpretive 
practice’ and of news production as a process of entextualization involving multiple actors 
who struggle over authority, ownership and control” (Van Hout & Jacobs 2008: 59). Later, 
in his Ph.D. dissertation, Van Hout (2010) focused on the process that transform a press 
release into a news product. In his view, journalists act as knowledge mediators, 
interpreting and not only reporting the content of the disclosed information. He examines 
a corpus collected at of a Belgian paper, and more precisely at the Economic Desk, and 
handles matters of writing research that are very similar to those investigated in the present 
research.  Van Hout focuses on the active role played out by journalists that must decide 
the significance of an information and that must convey it effectively, establishing the 
most relevant information for the audience. He follows the path traced by Picard stating 
that 
 
if value is to be created, journalists cannot continue to report merely in the 
traditional  ways  or merely re-report the news that has appeared elsewhere. They must 
add something that creates value. They will have to start providing information and 
knowledge that is not readily available elsewhere, in forms that are not available 
elsewhere, or in forms that are more useable by and relevant to their audiences (Picard 
2009). 
 
 
In particular, Van Hout underlines three main theoretical gaps in media discourse, 
newsroom ethnography and journalism studies, that all concern the disregard of 
journalists’ active and interactive role. These gaps can be summarized as follows (Van 
Hout 2010: 152); 
1- previous research has been too much focused on language (see for instance Kress 
& Trew 1978; Blommaert & Verschueren 1998; Koller 2005), as if it was the only 
important factor in newsroom activities, without paying attention to “producers, 
practices and processes”, as we can read in the following quotation: 
 
The instrumental relation between language and news media has yielded productive lines of inquiry in 
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disciplines such as critical discourse analysis, conversation analysis, corpus linguistics, sociolinguistics, 
text linguistics and linguistic anthropology (for an overview, see Cotter 2001). Summarizing a large 
body of literature then, these systematic and detailed studies argue that meaning-making is a social 
activity, a construct based on negotiating shared knowledge and producing versions of events which 
could always also be told in other ways (Fairclough 1995; Koller 2005; Bhatia 2006; Wodak 2006; 
Doolin 2007). They have pointed to ways in which news texts make particular worldviews seem 
commonsense (Kress & Trew 1978; Blommaert & Verschueren 1998; van Dijk 1998; Briggs 2005), 
how they engender social identities (Spitulnik 1999; Talbot 2007) and canonize ways of speaking 
(Peterson 2005; Higgins 2007). This body of literature has also yielded important insights into the 
structure (Bell, A. 1991; Bell, A. & Garrett 1998), epistemology (Peterson 2001; Khalil 2006; Thomson, 
White & Kitley 2008; Thorsen 2008) and function (Fairclough 1995; Richardson 2007) of news texts 
and has described micro level, interactional aspects such as the mechanics of turn-taking, repair and 
positioning in news interviews (Clayman & Heritage 2002; Montgomery 2008; Weizman 2009). 
Although these insights lay the theoretical foundations for my study, investigations of media language 
have tended to remain ‘unpeopled’ and text-based, with little focused attention paid to the production 
process. In other words, these studies have focused primarily on the textual products of journalism. 
(Van Hout 2010: 8). 
	
      2- sociological studies concerning ethnography in news production have disregarded 
journalists’ agency, i.e. the human ability to act in any given environment 
      3- journalists were previously considered as “news processors rather than news 
generators”; this brings to the fore the interesting issue of journalists’ source dependence 
in print journalism but underestimates the discursive processes underlying journalism. 
These three gaps all point to the disregard of the active role played by journalists 
both at the individual and at the inter-individual (collective) level; however, looking at 
journalists as active actors is a fundamental pre-requisite to conceive journalists’ audience 
uptake anticipations as a determining factor in framing the news in an individual and 
peculiar way. Van Hout’s study has shown that source reliance is not simply synonymous 
of source copying, but rather it has shown that intertextuality can be considered form of 
social action during which journalists are active generators of knowledge. More 
specifically, the analyses presented by this scholar have shown that intertextuality is also 
(and always) “a strategically deployed practice through which producers […] construct 
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meanings, frame activities and pursue outcomes” (Peterson 2003: 239). At this point it is 
necessary to introduce the notion of intertextual chain, which can be defined as as a  
 
network of texts and events. What is said and done and written in a particular event 
or text is intertextually related to other events and texts: people inevitably draw on, 
anticipate and respond to other events and other texts.  So we cannot understand particular 
events or particular texts, or the significance of these for the participants, without 
exploring (and asking about) these wider intertextual chains (Fairclough 2010).  
 
Thus, it is clear that the study of intertextual chains is fundamental for investigating 
the effects of discourse in different contexts of interaction (Krieg-Planque 2009). In the 
newsroom intertextual chains are made up by source materials, editorial conferences, news 
items and retrospective interviews: in all case studies that I will present in the thesis I will 
look at intertextual chains (sections 6, 7, 9, 10, 11).  
As these studies show, and as I will show in the empirical part of the research, not 
all news based on whatever kind of source and news agency feeds can be said to be a mere 
facsimile of the source material. As Van Hout says 
 
 reproductive writing is a far more complex matter than simply churning 
preformulated news discourses into newspaper articles. It crucially involves the 
recontextualization of multiple news discourses (a corporate press release, interview 
notes, news archive material, prior knowledge) into a single narrative, re-framed as an 
authoritative, unified account of a news event (Van Hout 2010: 158). 
 
 Indeed, journalists are responsible for many tasks that can be considered the basis 
for producing a news article: they start from previous source materials, then they check 
the authoritativeness of sources, establish the significance of events and facts, gather 
information and deal with stylistic and audience concerns (Van Hout & Jacobs 2008). 
In a similar fashion, focusing on financial journalism, the role of the financial 
journalist as a mediator between the firm-generated contents and the audience welcoming 
is pivotal in the paper by Rocci and Luciani (2016); the authors put in evidence how 
journalists are able to interpret and assign value to the information, cleaning out potentially 
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exaggerated or hard-to-believe self-promotional content by the firm, providing in this way 
the readers with the means useful to build a proper opinion by themselves.  
All the mentioned recent studies highlighting an active role of journalists in shaping 
the news (Van Hout 2010, Van Hout & Jacobs 2008, Rocci & Luciani 2016) follow 
Beeman and Peterson’s notion of interpretive practice: according to them, interpretive 
practices are “the ways that routine procedures, cultural categories, and social positions 
come together in particular ‘instances’ of interpretation” (2001: 159). If we implement this 
conception of interpretive practice to studies on news production, it  
 
turns our attention from the structures that organize action to the contingency that 
is always present in media production and the specific momentary, negotiated processes 
by which agency is employed to challenge, change or reproduce structure (Peterson 2003: 
186).  
 
The contextual processes described in the quotation above hint at all kinds of 
interactions in the newsroom, in all kinds of newsroom activities, between sources, 
reporters and editors. Therefore, in these studies journalists are considered as active 
interpreters, who builds connections with economic and social structures in which he acts. 
This conception of the journalist as able of an interpretative action highly differs from 
those proposed by sociological approaches that conceives the journalist as a machine 
described at the beginning of the chapter (section 3.1). In my dissertation, I will follow 
this strand of research and I will focus on journalists’ anticipatory inferences at stake in 
all these kinds of interactions, also looking at their use of source material and looking at 
source material’s selection and reformulation in view of the audience uptake. What can 
help to dispel the myth of the journalist as a machine if not the focus on his anticipatory 
inferences? My approach is thus decidedly focused on exploring the relationship between 
journalists’ agency and audience uptake anticipation, since I focus on individual 
journalist’s anticipatory inferences, deepen the precise manners in which he situates his 
story and on the way in which he frames the whole news in view of the audience uptake. 
Starting from the fact that journalists rely in a strong way on sources in all fields of 
journalism, I am forced to pay attention to issues of source-news interaction. In which way 
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are journalistic sources and news stories interrelated? In which way does the journalist 
change the linguistic content of his sources? In which way does the journalist composes 
the news item? In this dissertation I will answer these questions by providing an 
argumentative analysis of news discourses concerning anticipation of audience uptake and 
of news products and of source materials in some empirical case studies. 
 
 
3.4 Studies on newswriting  
 
In the previous sub-sections I have shown the contribution given by the study of source 
materials, conceived as intermediate texts. However, the study of source materials is not 
enough to understand how journalists build a news item and how they take a decision. 
Therefore, D. Perrin focused on newswriting processes and developed the innovative 
methodology labeled Progression analysis in order to understand journalists’ reasoning 
while they construct a news piece (Perrin 2013).  
This subsection is devoted to describing the studies of linguistics of newswriting 
that I take into consideration in the present research: in this part of my dissertation I mostly 
rely on the book “The linguistics of newswriting” by D. Perrin (Perrin 2013). Indeed, the 
study of newswriting strategies represents a crucial point in order to understand 
journalists’ anticipatory strategies. By observing newswriting activities, it is possible to 
discover the distinct phases of journalists’ reasonings about the way in which texts are 
modified from one version to the other, how they are constructed and framed in view of 
the audience uptake. In the present research I embrace Perrin’s perspective about the 
linguistics of newswriting (Perrin 2013), which considers newswriting as the field of 
professional language use. But what is linguistics of newswriting? Linguistics of 
newswriting is a sub-discipline of media linguistics. Media linguistics is a sub-field of 
applied linguistics that focuses on linguistic usages in media products and in the 
production processes, therefore completing previous discourse analytical and sociological 
studies on the topic that disregarded this point that is crucial in order to understand real-
life language uses in the newsroom (Cotter 2010). It is situated between theoretical and 
applied linguistics, therefore it may place its attention on theoretical as well as on applied 
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issues (Perrin 2013: 29). Under a theoretical angle “it uses data from media settings to 
answer research questions raised by linguistics itself”, while under an applied perspective 
“it clarifies problems of media practice with linguistic tools” (ibid.). Media linguistics can 
be subdivided in many inner sub-disciplines, depending on the specific subfield of interest.  
The linguistics of newswriting is the sub-discipline in the field of media linguistics 
that examines the routines of news generation that are based on linguistic verbal or written 
practices and considers news journalists as an ingroup with an own specific language use 
(e.g. Perrin 2003, Van Hout & Jacobs 2008). The linguistics of newswriting has a twofold 
object of interest for what concerns language users; at the individual level the crucial 
language users are journalists and editors, whereas at the collective level the crucial 
language users are editorial boards or media systems. Since, as suggested by Perrin “they 
are in close contact with sources and in permanent indirect contact with their audiences” 
(Perrin 2013, 31), it is crucial to take into consideration the linguistically-based practices 
between them for the scope of the present research, namely for understanding journalists’ 
anticipations based on the audience uptake. 
Furthermore, according to Perrin, among the distinct linguistic activities, the 
linguistics of newswriting focuses on cooperative writing (Perrin 2013, 31). Two are the 
conceptions of writing activity that can be sketched; in a narrower sense, writing can be 
seen simply as the mere production of written language, whereas in a more widespread 
sense the activity of writing may be seen as comprising all linguistically-based news 
editing connecting the text, sound and pictures as well as comprehending all kinds of 
preparatory activities such as reading steps, for example such as reading source texts. 
Furthermore, the linguistics of newswriting also takes into consideration the 
dynamics of text production, which can be observed at distinct levels of zooming; at a 
more restricted level of observation workflows in the newsroom, at a medium level of 
observation writing sessions devoted to build a certain news item, and at a smallest level 
of zooming single decisions during the writing process can be investigated (Perrin 2013:  
31). 
 In this approach, all writing phases (including actual writing processes as well as 
other phases more indirectly bound to writing such as source reading phases) play a crucial 
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role and are seen as the focal center of the newsroom activities. However, the present 
dissertation does not look at writing processes with the eye of newswriting studies, but 
rather with the eye of the argumentation scholar; therefore, I will look at writing processes 
whereby the argumentative lens, shedding light on reasoning processes hidden behind 
writing processes. Indeed, this thesis goes beyond linguistics of newswriting, since 
argumentation enables to uncover journalists’ reasoning processes at stake when they 
compose news items. 
In studying newsroom writing, Perrin (2013: 64) considers audience design as one 
important focus of study of linguistics of newswriting; assuming that linguistics can treat 
language as a means able to connect what people do in a given context and social structures 
and processes, “a linguistics of newswriting will focus on how social groups such as 
editorial teams customize their linguistic products for their target audiences” (Perrin 2013, 
64).  
Which linguistic devices, for instance how many terms belonging to the same frame, 
does an editorial board/ a journalist choose to insert in a certain item in view of a certain 
audience? For what concerns nouns’ morphology, how many nomina agentis are used by 
a journalist in an item in order to stress the agents’ role? An interesting way to look at 
linguistics’ finesses is by applying version analysis, which according to Perrin “is the 
method of collecting and analyzing data in order to reconstruct the changes in text features 
from version to version throughout intertextual chains” (Perrin 2013: 62). The comparison 
of various versions of texts enables to understand the way in which texts are accomodated 
from one version to the other. Nevertheless, “version analysis fails to provide any 
information about whether the journalists were conscious of their actions when re-
contextualizing or engaging in other practices of text production” and “whether the 
practices are typical of certain media with certain target audiences; or whether the issues 
associated with those practices are discussed and negotiated in the editorial offices”. 
(Perrin, 2016: 364) In order to understand such issues, more sophisticated methodological 
approaches are needed. One useful methodology is variation analysis, which is able to 
grasp these linguistic finesses, being it the methodology of gathering and studying textual 
data in order to analyse the distinctive characteristics belonging to the language of a given 
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discourse community. Variation analysis investigates “the type and frequency of typical 
features of certain language users’ productions in certain kinds of communication 
situations such as newswriting for a specific audience” (Grésillon and Perrin 2014: 92). 
Perrin’s assumption that 
 
 variation analyses investigate the type and frequency of typical features of certain 
language users’ productions in certain kinds of communication situations, such as 
newswriting for a specific audience [and that] what variation analysis discerns is the 
differences between the language used in different situations by the same users (e.g. 
Koller 2004) or by various users in similar situations (Fang 1991, Werlen 2000) (Perrin 
2013, 63-64) 
 
 perfectly mirrors the findings of this research (Section 12.3.1.3), which concern the 
framing implications on news items depending on journalists’ anticipatory inferences on 
the audience uptake; all journalists try to maneuver strategically the news item in such a 
way to convey a balanced view of the situation. However, this method alone cannot 
explain the reason why a community opts for framing its texts in a given manner, so that 
the integration with a methodology such as Progression Analysis and with an 
argumentative analysis becomes fundamental in order to understand the actual reasoning 
processes at stake in journalists’ mind when they anticipate their audience uptake and 
when they frame the news item taking into account these anticipatory inferences. This is 
confirmed in various instances in my corpus, where variation analysis sheds light on 
different editing details of multiple intermediate drafts of a news item thereby highlighting 
a change in the journalist’s cognitive process; however, it is only with progression analysis 
that it was possible to shed light on the reasons why the journalist had modified the 
previous drafts of an item in view of the audience uptake. More specifically, variation 
analyisis enabled me to observe that there were two distinct framings given by the 
journalist in two distinct drafts of the news items (an intermediate and the final draft); 
however, I could understand the reasons of these two distinct framings, namely the 
editorial board’s excessive emotional involvement, only thanks to Progression analysis 
and to an argumentative approach (see TEMPO case in Section 9). A similar case is the 
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JUGE case, in which variation analysis has simply shown different versions of a same 
news item and the interweaving of progression analysis and of an argumentative analysis 
has then revealed the journalist’s will to create a framing that accounted for both audience 
cognitive and emotive needs (see JUGE case in Section 7). In another case of the print 
journalism, variation analysis enabled me to verify the presence of two distinct titles in 
two distinct drafts of the news items, and the merging of progression analysis and of an 
argumentative lens revealed that the journalist changed them in order to convey an overall 
balanced view of the reported event. Concluding, a congruent overview of how an editorial 
board/ a journalist reasons on the anticipated audience uptake and of how a news item is 
shaped depending on the journalists’ expectations on the audience uptake can be reached 
only thanks to the interweaving of version analysis, variation analysis and progression 
analysis with an argumentative analysis. This is exactly what I have done in my research, 
and what I will show in the empirical part of the dissertation. 
At a wider level, progression analysis is a multimethod approach to obtain and relate 
data on three stages: the work circumstances, the writing moments, and the writing 
strategies and conscious practices. These methods were initially outlined to study 
newswriting, but they have been used to investigate also other writing contexts.  
One of the focal concept of newswriting that progression analysis is able to 
underline very well is that of newswriting strategies, and more specifically, these emerge 
in the retrospective verbal protocol as one of the aspects of the journalist’s aware 
externalization of aspects bound to his or her language consciousness. According to 
Bisaillon, strategies represent not actual but rather potential dynamics, i.e. in nuce 
dynamics that have the possibility to be realized in a more or less near future but that in 
the present moment are not realized. Potential dynamics are counterposed to actual 
dynamics, e.g. practices, routines, and procedures that represent currently existing 
dynamics (Bisaillon 2007).  
For what concerns writing strategies, Perrin identifies them as “the reinforced, 
conscious, and therefore articulable idea of how decisions are to be made during the act of 
writing so that the writing process or text product has a great probability of fulfilling the 
intended function” (Perrin 2013, 55). In the author’s view strategies are considered as 
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recursive mechanisms, indeed they may contain sub-strategies. Both journalists and 
editorial boards have a huge set of writing strategies, so that they can choose among many 
alternatives the most suitable in view of the audience uptake, by making an online 
selection of the strategy that best fits the journalists’ anticipations on the audience uptake. 
The study of writing strategies is a focal point for my research, since observing writing 
strategies enables to look at journalists’ aware reflections on the audience uptake in a clear 
way, therefore shedding light on what we may call journalists’ naïve pragmatic theories 
on the audience uptake.  
 
3.4.1 The social context of newswriting  
 
Taking into account the social context of newswriting is fundamental in order to 
understand journalists’ dynamics that lead them to follow certain editorial strategies 
instead of others. 
The different editorial figures, such as managing editors, producers, desk 
coordinators, news editors, work together in order to define items and issues within an 
environment that imposes strict time and space limits. They have to merge routines and 
creativity to pursue the main purpose of the newsroom, namely to select relevant topics 
for the audience that may help to promote public understanding on time.  
In the case of the newsroom at stake in my corpus, the Swiss public broadcasting 
company SRG asks their editorial board to be committed to promote public understanding. 
Therefore, journalists ask themselves how they could best realize their main goal of 
promoting public understanding; their anticipatory representations may guide their 
editorial choices. Journalists’ goal of promoting public understanding is on the basis of 
the attention for the cognitive and emotive audience uptake that drives the behaviour of 
the journalist in newsroom activities. From a sociolinguistic perspective, fostering public 
understanding in Switzerland signifies connecting different speech communities among 
each other, therefore connecting the German, French, Italian and Romansh cultural areas 
among each other. In multilingual countries promoting public understanding means 
fostering communication across the language borders; nevertheless, from a sociolinguistic 
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perspective, it is worth to review the language borders idea (e.g. Widmer, Coray, Acklin 
Muji, & Godel, 2004). Indeed, there may be distinct linguistic varieties also depending on 
the socio-economical and geographical factors of a given population. Due to the fact that 
the mandate refers to the need of fostering public understanding in all kinds of 
communities, in my research, I attempted to understand in which way the media 
organization, torn between public service claims and market pressures, realizes such 
mandate. As stated by Perrin, 
 
Promoting public understanding interacts with psychobiographical, 
organizational, and wider contextual structures of variegated durability and power, 
ranging from journalists’ individual language awareness to the cultural resources of 
Switzerland as a rich country in the Western world. All these structures enable or 
constrain newswriting activity and are reproduced or altered by it. The key elements and 
relations in this interplay can be condensed into the following proposition: Promoting 
public understanding involves agents, requires resources, is realized through journalistic 
practices, causes impacts, and triggers evaluations (Perrin 2013: 4).  
 
In order to illustrate the relevance of studying newswriting in the newsroom, Perrin 
shows some case stories that show the importance of newswriting in different critical 
situations. Perrin lays stress on the difference between case studies and case stories; 
indeed, according to him, case stories consists of results of the research process and have 
an instrisic narrative nature. One interesting case story is the LEBA case, which reports 
the appearance and accomplishment of one journalist’s intention to modify one specific 
word and to make it become the main theme. Unlike European media, that usually give 
account of violence in Lebanon due to political problems, the journalist R.G. decided to 
lay stress on nonviolent features of the demonstrations in Lebanon in his news items. In a 
first moment the journalist had inserted the term expressway to define the straight itinerary 
over the Mediterranean sea, la voie express de la méditerranée. Then, when he was 
interweaving the text with the images he noticed that inserting a tranquil path, la voie 
tranquille, would have better matched with the quiet journey of a boat. When the journalist 
became aware of this, he chose to eliminate express and substituted it with tranquille. 
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Together with other details added by the journalist R.G. and by the emergence of his 
language awareness, the design given to the item became clear: the journalist wanted to 
stress the pacifistic side of demonstrations in Lebanon. Perrin lays stress on micro 
linguistic details that activate macro changes by investigating the retrospective interview. 
In the retrospective verbal protocol the journalist constantly refers to the audience. The 
journalist “says that he loves the adjective ‘tranquille’ because it corresponds not only to 
the image of the boats but also to the tranquility of the demonstration.” Furthermore, “he 
expects the ‘tranquill’ to resonate in the minds of the audience” (Perrin 2013: 23). The 
journalist assimilated the source material and decided which knowledge should be 
conveyed to the audience, in order to give comprehensible and relevant information to the 
audience: this is the operation that mostly enables the journalist to promote public 
understanding. 
Perrin shows a single-case analysis, the LEBA case, in which an experienced 
journalist elaborates strategies to merge market claims and the public mission. “By altering 
a single word, he found a leitmotiv that helped him overcome stereotypes and explain 
phenomena from new perspectives” (Perrin 2013: 41).  
 
3.4.2 Investigating language functions in newswriting: how do journalists 
transform knowledge for their audience?  
 
Perrin zooms on four increasingly complex functions of language across which 
newswriting takes place: the referential, the cognitive, the interactive, and the social 
function.  
The first investigated function is the referential function. “Language usually refers 
to things outside itself; it relates to non-verbal phenomena and labels things in the world. 
Every form of communication makes use of this labeling” (Perrin 2013: 105). 
Nevertheless, “as the term suggests, journalist news is concerned with conveying new 
information” (ibid.). However, linguistics of newswriting ca be said to examine not only 
references to and explanations of what is new, but also the processes leading to correct 
and clear references to entities in the reported world. 
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The second investigated function is the cognitive function: “the use of language 
requires and generates cognitive processes: by speaking or writing, people express 
thoughts in the form of language. Understanding this language triggers new thoughts” 
(Perrin 2013: 106). With reference to the interweaving of cognitive language function and 
language use in journalistic media, a question arises: how is language processed in the 
mind? How does prior knowledge contribute to texts’ comprehension? Due to the fact that 
journalists do not know the audience to which they are communicating, they rely on 
fundamental assumptions based on previous knowledge. In particular, the linguistics of 
newswriting “investigates not only how journalists conceive their audience’s emotions, 
expectations, and previous knowledge in order to write attractively and comprehensibly, 
but also how they exploit their own mental resources when writing” (Perrin 2013: 106). 
This fits very well with an argumentative approach, since adopting an argumentative lens 
on newswriting data enables to reconstruct the actual reasoning processes at stake in 
journalists’ minds, that are consciously externalized during the various retrospective 
interviews. 
The third investigated function is the interactive function. “Cognitive change favors 
interactive change: when knowledge changes, behavior can change. People do things with 
language purposefully, i.e. to make something happen” (Perrin 2013: 107). Furthermore,  
“in journalistic communication, participants such as media professionals, sources, the 
target audience, and society at large pursue objectives that partly contradict each other” 
(ibid.). At this point a theoretical question arises concerning the interface between 
pragmatic language function and language use in journalistic media: which intentions do 
journalists have and how do they realize them in the media? On an empirical level, the 
same question arises with reference to the conflict caused by the journalistic need to inform 
and attract the audience at the same time. When the focus is on newswriting, media 
linguistics examines practices related to conflicts and solutions revolving around writing 
processes and the resulting texts. Again, an argumentative approach perfectly suits to this 
topic of interest of newswriting, since it enables to understand journalists’ reasoning 
mechanisms at stake in deciding about whether to give priority to audience information or 
audience attraction in a given news item. 
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The last investigated function is the social function. Journalistic communication 
helps to connect the language of specific communities, such as the language of experts, 
with lay audiences. This enables to overcome societal disparities- and conteporaneously 
to reinforce them. From the point of view of language use in journalistic media the 
question sounds; how can journalists reliably arrive at distinct audiences with linguistic 
tools and contemporaneously specify a single portrait in the market and committing 
audience? Media linguistics employs devices from sociolinguistics to analyze audience 
design, namely language use by which media professionals commit their target groups 
(Bell 1984, Conboy 2010, Perrin 2011). When focusing on newswriting, media linguistics 
investigates not only which languages, variants, styles, styles, shifts, and audience design 
apply and work for whom in which conditions, but also how they are negotiated in the 
newsrooms and beyond.  
In practice, newswriting takes place across these functions. News refers to real 
world events, triggers changes in knowledge and behavior, and fosters discourse between 
societal groups. The same applies for the processes of newswriting. Journalists explain 
what is new, connect it to their audience previous knowledge, balance various 
stakeholders’ goals, and mediate between linguistic communities. In doing so, they deal 
with sources, topics, own positions, stories and audience. Through newswriting the 
journalist re-elaborates the information coming from the sources; it is only by deepening 
the relationship between language functions and newswriting with an argumentative lens 
that we can fully understand how journalists shape and transform knowledge taking into 
account their audience uptake. 
 
3.4.3 How journalists’ argumentation on anticipated audience uptake fits with 
the linguistics of newswriting  
 
In this sub-section I illustrate the reasons for which examining evidence of journalists’ 
argumentation on the anticipated audience uptake well fits with the applied linguistic 
research agenda of the linguistics of newswriting. In what follows, I will focus mainly on 
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three general points of reciprocal benefits that the two distinct viewpoints on the same 
topic may gain.  
Firstly, examining evidence of argumentative structure in news products and 
evidence of argument editing in the writing process, naturally complements production 
based research on journalistic stancing (Perrin 2012). When journalists take a stance, either 
directly via their authorial voice, or, indirectly, by framing reported voices, they typically 
also present arguments in support of such a position (standpoint) either directly or 
indirectly, by framing reported arguments. Since, typically, the situation originating the 
reported voices is itself an argumentative confrontation. In particular, examining evidence 
of journalists’ argument editing on the basis of anticipated audience uptake well suits with 
the newswriting’s strand of research focused on revealing audience design aimed at 
understanding how editorial boards and journalists “customize their linguistic products for 
their target audiences” (Perrin 2013: 64). 
Secondly, more generally, argumentation, and particularly the analysis of practical 
reasoning offers a convenient format to capture and describe the conscious problem-
solving strategies of journalistic writers (cf. writing strategies in Perrin 2013) as elicited 
in retrospective interviews (Zampa and Perrin 2016). Indeed, retrospective verbal 
protocols reproduce practical standpoints of soliloquial argumentation (that the journalist 
has spontaneously given himself while he was reflecting on what he was writing), so that 
journalists’ reasoning about writing choices and strategies is made explicit. In particular, 
with reference to the present research, light is shed on the conscious decisions that lead 
journalist to adopt certain writing strategies instead of others in order to be congruent with 
the audience uptake. 
Finally, if we take into account the applied nature of the newswriting research 
agenda we might want to consider the value of moments of newsroom argumentation in 
view of their transparency for discussing best practices with practitioners. These often are 
moments where a reflective practitioner truly emerges, and are precious for further 
reflection. In this endeavor, journalists’ reasonings on the audience uptake easily come to 
the fore either in the shape of evaluations of previous negatively or positively judged 
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audience-oriented news items, or of deliberations based on more or less established 
journalistic practices, therefore representing a respective bad or good example to follow. 
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Without context, words and actions have no meaning at all. This is true not only of human 
communication in words but also of all communication whatsoever, of all mental process, of all mind, 
including that which tells the sea anemone how to grow and the amoeba what he should do next. 
(Bateson 1979: 15) 
 
 
4. General theoretical framework 
 
 
In this Section I give an overview of the theoretical framework that I have adopted in my 
dissertation. In order to analyse argumentative discussions, I embrace the perspective of 
the Lugano group, analyzing the context (Rigotti and Rocci 2006; Palmieri 2010, 2014) in 
which argumentative discussions are embedded (4.1) and merging crucial notions of the 
extended pragma-dialectical theory (4.2), and more specifically the model of a critical 
discussion, with the analysis of the inferential configuration of arguments via the AMT 
(Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010) (4.3).   
       Argumentation theory dates back to the studies of logic, rhetoric and dialectic in 
Antiquity12; more specifically, argumentation theory finds its point of origin in Artistotle. 
In classical times logic, rhetoric and dialectic were studied together. On the contrary, in 
the 1500ies and in the 1600ies dialectic and logic were considered separatedly from 
rhetoric. It is only in recent times that logic, dialectic and rhetoric have been reunited, 
namely when argumentation scholars have noticed the importance of producing not only 
reasonable argumentation –being thus centred only on solving a disagreement according 
to an ideal model- but also effective argumentation, therefore aiming at persuading the 
audience. 
In recent times two approaches to argumentation have been developed that both 
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originate from the “perceived insufficiency of logical validity as defined in modern 
(formal) logic as the sole criterion of soundness for the arguments” (Dascal et al. 2005: 2). 
These two models are the Toulmin Model (Toulmin 1958) and the model developed by 
Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2010[1958]).  
The Toulmin Model (Toulmin 1958) “has the advantage of presenting the whole 
argumentative process as an ongoing dialogue between an arguer and a challenger, who 
asks the reasons for the arguer’s claims; such a perspective evidences the dialogical nature 
of argumentation” (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2009: 31). Therefore, Toulmin has the 
merit of having shed light on the inherently dialogical nature of argumentation. An author 
who has deeply investigated Toulmin’s dialectic interpretation was James B. Freeman in 
his work “Dialectic and the macrostructure of arguments” (1991). J. B. Freeman is above 
all interested in the way in which entire sentences act in natural language argumentation, 
“with the kinds of support sentences can offer to other sentences and with the structure of 
those support relationships; this is what he means when he talks about the 'macrostructure' 
of argument” (Fischer 1992: 193). 
The New Rhetoric (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 2010 [1958]) zooms on the 
efficacy of argumentation and contains a theory of the audience, which is sub-divided in 
particular and universal audience. “According to these authors, every argumentation is 
developed towards a certain addressee or audience (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1958:7); moreover, the validity of its acceptance depends on its acceptance by the 
audience.” (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2009: 31) This view is clearly a relativistic one, 
since the fundamental criterion that leads to positively evaluate an argumentation is its 
audience’s acceptance. Furthermore, the New Rhetoric includes a fine-grained study of 
argument schemes that relies on the ancient topical tradition.  
Both Toulmin and Perelman treat logic in an alternative way in comparison with 
traditional approaches to logic. Indeed, in their perspective 
 
a logic exclusively preoccupied with formal criteria of validity risked abandoning outside 
the pale of rationality most of the arguments that are exchanged in ordinary life – indeed 
everything outside mathematics and (perhaps) the natural sciences. Both took law and 
judicial practice as a paradigm of a rationality that could not be reduced to formal logic 
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(Rocci 2017a: 36). 
 
This reconciliation of logic with matters that are closer to those of argumentation theory 
fits with the research strand within argumentation theory that investigates “the rules of 
inference supporting ordinary arguments” (Rocci 2017a: 43). This strand of research is 
labeled argumentation schemes (Walton 1996, Walton et al. 2008):  
the term scheme refers to the rules of inference, while other authors approach these 
concerns drawing on the rich Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance tradition of the topics 
and use the notion of a topic (alternatively, τόπος, ‘topos’ or locus) as their main 
theoretical construct (Rigotti 2009; Rigotti and Greco-Morasso 2010) (Rocci 2017a: 43).  
 This path of research coincides only partially with the matters of logical inquiry for non-
deductive reasoning. Indeed,  
it is true that often argument schemes are presented as non-deductive rules (be they 
inductive, abductive or presumptive), what is even more characteristic of them, however, 
is that they are not formulated in terms of abstract logical forms, but at a more concrete 
level, involving a rich inventory of semantic-ontological relations on which the inference 
is based. One speaks, for instance, of arguments from cause to effect or from parts to 
wholes and so on. Katzav and Reed (2004) call “relations of conveyance” those relations 
between facts such as cause, part, class membership on which an argument scheme can 
be based. Rigotti and Greco-Morasso (2010) simply call these relations loci, recovering 
one of the readings of the topos/locus in the Medieval tradition (Rocci 2017a: 43). 
In recent appeals to argument schemes (for instance Walton et al. 2008, Rigotti 
2007, 2009, Rigotti and Greco-Morasso 2010) “it often appears that schemes, while 
described at the level of more concrete semantic-ontological relations, do have an 
underlying logical form, even though not necessarily a deductive one” (Rocci 2017a: 43). 
In this dissertation I will apply the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT) and its concept 
of locus (Rigotti and Greco-Morasso 2010), “which takes into account both the semantic-
ontological content of argument schemes and their logical form” (Rocci 2017a: 43). I will 
explain Argumentum Model of Topics into more details in Section 4.3. 
	 	
	
	
73	
 
 Another at the same time similar and different influential approach to argumentation 
theory that dominates the current scene of argumentation theory is Pragma-Dialectics, 
which has been developed at the University of Amsterdam. This dialectical approach has 
been highly influenced by “Hamblin’s work on the dynamics of commitment in idealized 
argumentative dialogues and other works in the same formal dialectic vein” (Rocci 2017: 
38). This approach recovers ideas belonging to the rhetorical and dialectical traditions of 
classical times, reuniting them: 
 
This orientation was inaugurated by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendost (1984, 
2004) who proposed a theory (Pragma-Dialectics) that seeks to bridge the gap between 
formal dialectical systems and real world discussions by integrating Searlean speech-act 
theory and Gricean pragmatics with a normative dialectical model. Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (2004: 21) regard argumentation as “part of an explicit or implicit 
discussion between parties who try to resolve a difference of opinion (which may be 
implicit) by testing the acceptability of the standpoints concerned”. (Rocci 2017:  38) 
 
    In recent times argumentation theory has known a ‘contextual turn’, thus focussing 
on argumentative practices in real-life contexts: 
 
the understanding of the context of argumentation, conceived of as dialogue type where 
argumentation is at work [Walton and Krabbe 1995 can be considered a foundational work 
in this respect] and including the rules of communication that argumentation depends upon; 
and the study of the rhetorical aspects of discourse, including the role of the audience in 
evaluating argumentation” (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2009: 33).   
 
The importance of looking at argumentation in context has been maintained 
especially by the Lugano School of argumentation (Rigotti and Rocci 2006; Rigotti and 
Greco Morasso 2009). The context itself intervenes on and modifies the argumentative 
discussions; therefore, it plays a crucial role in argumentative discussions. Many different 
real-life contexts have been the object of study of many argumentation scholars in the last 
ten years; more specifically, studies have been carried out in the medical context (Craven 
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et alii 2012; Rubinelli and Schulz 2006; Zanini and Rubinelli 2012 [among the others]), 
in the legal context (Feteris 2016; Saunders 1993; Feteris 2013), in the political sphere 
(van Eemeren 2002; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Finlayson 2013; Lewinski & 
Mohammed 2013; Zarefsky 2008), in therapeutic discourse (Grossen and Salazar Orvig 
2006). In the field of financial communication, many studies have deepened the financial 
context (Palmieri 2014; Rigotti and Palmieri 2010, 2014). Furthermore, the context of 
mediation (Aakhus 2003; Greco Morasso 2011; Jacobs 2002) and that of advertisement 
(Kjeldsen 2007, 2012; Rocci 2008; Rocci, Mazzali-Lurati and Pollaroli 2013) have also 
been widely investigated by many argumentation scholars.  
 
 
4.1 Model of communication in context13 
 
Due to the contextual essence of argumentation, many researchers in the field have started 
examining extensively the context in which argumentation takes place. Actually, the 
context acts on argumentation at different stages. Generally speaking, a given context, 
conceived at a broader level of zooming as a culture, community or institution, 
contemplates a certain level of argumentation, which regulates the extent to which the 
involved people can argue, the commitment to argue, the possibility to take a stance and 
to assess others’ opinions. At a narrower level of zooming, every real-life domain can 
include distinct types of aims, questions, problems, and conclusions, which respectively 
call for distinct argumentative processes. A given social context enables to a speech event 
to carry out certain actions and the actions carried out by the speech event change the 
social context. 
However, the context does not only influence argumentation, but rather it is itself 
affected by argumentation, since the latter may be deployed as a tool to achieve a certain 
aim and enables to modify the interested social reality. The arguer can be conceived as an 
agent whose aim is to realize a goal which can be conceived as a mental representation 
“which corresponds to a change in the present world (context) into a more suitable possible 
                                                
13 In order to explain the model of communication in context I will mostly base on Palmieri 2010. 
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world (a new envisaged context), undertakes an activity realizing such a context’s change” 
(Palmieri 2010: 34; Rigotti 2008). However, contexts are characterized not only by 
individual goals, but rather –and above all- by shared goals that an agent has joined in his 
interactions with other people in a given context.  This is perfectly in line with the general 
definition of goal given by Castelfranchi: according to him, it is a mental representation,  
 
a) which is always anticipatory about how the world is not (or better it is assumed 
not to be), b) of any possible format (sensory-motor, abstract and symbolic, propositional 
or linguistic, procedural), and c) is employed as a set-point in a control-system, in the 
cybernetic cycle driving the external behavior (that becomes an action) of the agent for 
modifying the world’ (Castelfranchi 2012: 835-836).  
 
In argumentative terms, if the arguer wishes to produce changes in the context 
starting from his/her anticipated needs/desires, the knowledge of such context (that must 
be modified) is essential so that it is possible to produce suitable arguments. Knowing the 
context is crucial not only for single agents’ decisions but also – and especially- for inter-
individual decision making processes; “Indeed, a few goals can be achieved by means of 
individual actions, requiring instead joint actions14 (Clark 1996), in particular interactions 
(Rigotti 2003, 2005a), which involve two agents, one of which must be convinced to 
accept the standpoint15”. 
For what concerns the analysis of the context in which the argumentative 
discussions in the newsroom are situated, this dissertation takes the perspective of the 
model of social context of communication elaborated by the Lugano school, and especially 
by Rigotti & Rocci (2006). As it is illustrated in Figure 1, according to this model, the 
context has two distinct dimensions, namely an institutionalized and an interpersonal 
dimension. This representation is based on the concept of interaction field, which 
                                                
14 Following Clark, joint actions enable human beings to engage in shared actions (1996: 59). The author 
describes a joint action as “an action by an ensemble of people” (1996:18) (quoted in Palmieri 2010: 
34). 
15 Interactants’ goals have distinct but interdependent goals and combine their corresponding causal 
chains in such a way that the accomplishment of one agent’s aim implies the accomplishment of the 
other’s aim. On the contrary, a co-operation, contemplates two co-agents who share the same aim and  
are therefore synchronized in activating the same causal chain (cf. Rigotti 2003, 2005). 
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represents a fragment of social reality (Searle 1995) in which a communicative episode 
(for instance an argumentative discussion) is situated and on which it intervenes (for 
instance the newsroom), and is determined by a common leading goal (frequently 
corresponding with its mission) emerging from the interactants’ personal aims. At the 
same time, it establishes the conditions of relevance and of possibilities of a given 
argumentation and it is influenced by the outcome of the discussion. Some instances of 
interaction field are: a university, a school, a doctor’s office, a psychotherapeutic practice, 
a newsroom16. “Within an interaction field, in order to realize their shared and individual 
goals, people undertake communicative and non-communicative activities in which they 
assume mutual commitments and roles” (Palmieri 2010: 34). In Fig. 1 I show the model 
of communication in context elaborated by the Lugano school: 
 
 
Figure 1. The model of communication context (Rigotti & Rocci 2006). 
                                                
16 We can observe an interaction field from distinct angles and at distinct degrees of zooming (cf. Rigotti 
& Greco 2005; Rigotti & Rocci 2006; Rocci 2009): at a bigger level of zooming we can observe the 
interaction field of the newsroom, wheras at a smaller level of zooming we can observe the peculiarities 
of the interaction field of a specific newsroom such as the newsroom of CdT.  
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Argumentative interactions, like every interaction, are situated into an 
institutionalized activity type (Levinson 1979/1992)17. A journalist attempting to find out 
the best way to convey a news to the audience accomplishes this within (“in the context 
of”) an editorial conference, in which the overall aim is to take editorial decisions that 
finest mirror the mission of the institution, in the case of SRG capturing the audience 
attention and above all promoting public understanding. 
In order to reach their goals, interagents often, even though not automatically, 
trigger an interaction scheme, which following Rigotti and Rocci can be defined as: 
 
“culturally shared ‘recipes’ for interaction congruent with more or less broad 
classes of joint goals and involving scheme-roles presupposing generic requirements. 
Deliberation negotiation, advisory, problem solving, adjudication, mediation, teaching 
are fairly broad interaction schemes; while more specific interaction schemes may 
correspond to proper ‘jobs” (Rigotti and Rocci 2006: 173). 
 
According to this theoretical frame of reference, an activity type corresponds to the 
projection of an interaction scheme onto an interaction field. Indeed, an interaction scheme 
is not sufficient to build an actual activity, being it a potential social reality; therefore, an 
interaction scheme always requires the application onto an interaction field, which instead 
coincides with a concrete fragment of social reality. The projection of interaction scheme 
onto an interaction field gives rise to roles and duties for the interactants and between 
them. Put in Rigotti and Rocci’s words, “the roles of the interaction scheme need to be 
made to correspond to compatible roles in the interaction field” (Rigotti & Rocci 2006: 
173). 
It is possible to map different interaction schemes onto the same field (for instance, 
deliberation and evaluation are two schemes possibly used within a newsroom). In a 
similar way, it is possible to use the same interaction scheme can be used in distinct 
interaction fields (deliberation, for example, can be applied in a newsroom, in case that 
                                                
17 Levinson made use of this key concept to refer to “a fuzzy category whose focal-members are goal 
defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraints on participants, setting and so on, but 
above all on the kinds of allowable contributions” (1979/1992: 69). 
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journalists should take some editorial decisions on which event should be published, as 
well as within a family when parents have to decide which school their children should 
attend). The projection of the interaction scheme onto the interaction field gives rise to 
distinct activity types. For example, when the interaction scheme of deliberation is applied 
onto the interaction field of the newsroom the result is a deliberative editorial conference, 
whereas when the interaction scheme of evaluation is mapped onto the interaction field of 
the newsroom the result is an evaluative editorial conference. Even though a given activity 
type instantiates specific roles, it is wise to specificy that these roles do not have to be 
conceived as boxes that must necessarily be filled; indeed, behind roles there are human 
beings that have an individuality which goes beyond the role and duties established by the 
institutional dimension. Apart from reciprocal duties, interactants are connected to each 
other by an interpersonal bond, which relies on a distinct type of cohesion (Perret- 
Clermont and Muller-Mirza 1999). Hence,  
 
besides the institutional dimension surrounding a communicative interaction, an 
interpersonal dimension is involved, which can assume a different specific relevance 
according to the specific activity type. We can imagine, for example, that the 
interpersonal dimension dominates in the context of a family mediation’s discussion 
(Greco Morasso 2011), unlike the context of legal fight, which is expected to be highly 
institutionalized (Palmieri 2010: 37).  
 
In other types of situations both aspects can be very relevant, like in a 
psychotherapeutic session during which a psychotherapist cures a person who has been a 
patient for a long time. 
In the context of the newsroom, both the institutionalized and the interpersonal 
components are at stake. For example, editorial conferences are institutional activities 
because the journalists are committed to take decisions that respect the mission of the 
institution, i.e. promote public understanding in the case of SRG. Nevertheless, the 
interaction occurring in this setting leads to developing and altering the cognitive 
environment of the individual journalists as well as the shared cognitive environment 
(among journalists), and may put into discussion and redefine the mission’s objectives. 
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Therefore, journalists’ personal and interpersonal stories may also play a major role in 
newsroosm activities. 
 
 
4.2 The extended Pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation 
 
In my thesis I carry out an argumentative analysis that follows the theoretical principles 
established by the extended Pragma-Dialectical approach to argumentation (van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 2004; van Eemeren 2010), since it is an essential tool for argumentative 
analysis, which enables me to shed light on the way in which journalists reason. The 
Pragma-Dialectical approach to argumentation is a very widespread theoretical approach 
to look into argumentation; it has been founded in the last three decades of the twentieth 
century at the University of Amsterdam and since then it has become one of the most 
influential theories of argumentation. 
Following Pragma-Dialectics18, argumentation is a practice that aims at finding a solution 
to an implied or open divergence of opinion, by putting forth arguments in order to support 
one’s standpoint or by rebutting arguments in order to refute an antagonist’s standpoint. 
Argumentation is situated in a critical discussion in which two figures are at stake; one is 
the person who advances a standpoint, namely a protagonist, and the other is the person 
who doubts on that standpoint or that advances arguments against it, namely the 
antagonist. Pragma-Dialectics concerns a model of an ideal critical discussion, namely a 
model that at the same time prescribes how a discussion should be and that describes how 
a discussion actually is. This model functions simultaneously both as an analytical tool as 
well as an evaluative tool. Moreover, the model presents both a dialectical dimension 
“because it is premised on two parties who try to resolve a difference of opinion by means 
of a methodical exchange of discussion moves”, as well as a pragmatic dimension, 
“because these discussion moves are described as speech acts that are performed in a 
specific situation and context” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 22). A normative 
                                                
18 In order to explain Pragma-Dialectics I partially follow the path traced by Zampa (2015). 
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critical discussion is guided by ten rules19 and occurs in five phases, that often do not come 
in chronological succession. Rules and phases are necessary conditions, or better said -
necessary sub-goals-, that it is necessary to pursue in order to reach a reasonable resolution 
of the divergence of opinion on the merits. The five stages are: a) the issue stage, in which 
the issue emerges as having importance and priority;  b) the confrontation stage, in which 
the standpoint is advanced by the protagonist and the doubts are more or less explicitly 
manifested by the antagonist;  c) the opening stage, during which the premises between 
the participants to the discussion are established; d) the argumentation stage, in which 
arguments are put forth and/or refuted; and e) the concluding stage, in which the discussion 
ends, either with a resolution of a divergence of opinion or not. 
 Furthermore, in terms of the disputed proposition, there are two types of divergence 
of opinion. Firstly, there is a divergence of opinion that can be labeld as single; this is the 
case of when only one proposition is disputed (the proposition can be confronted with a 
doubt, therefore being single non-mixed, or it can be confronted with a contradictory 
standpoint, therefore being single mixed). Secondly, there is a divergence of opinion that 
can be labeled as multiple; in this case more propositions are disputed (the propositions 
can be both doubted, therefore being the discussion multiple non-mixed, or they can be 
contradicted, therefore being the discussion multiple mixed). 
According to the typology of standpoints developed by Palmieri et al. (Palmieri et 
                                                
19 Following van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoek Henkemans I quote the ten norms of an ideal critical 
discussion. “Rule 1: Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward standpoints or casting 
doubts on standpoints. […] Rule 2: A party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if 
asked to do so. […] Rule 3: A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed 
been advanced by the other party. […] Rule 4: A party may defend his or her standpoint only by 
advancing argumentation related to that standpoint. […] Rule 5: A party may not falsely present 
something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he or 
she has left implicit. […] Rule 6: No party may falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point, 
or deny a premise representing an accepted starting point. […] Rule 7: A standpoint may not be regarded 
as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argument scheme 
that us correctly applied. […] Rule 8: The reasoning in the argumentation must logically valid or must 
be capable of beng made valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises. […] Rule 9: A 
failed defense of a standpoint must result in the protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a successful 
defense of a standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting her doubts. […] Rule 10: Parties must 
not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they must interpret 
the formulations of the other party as carefully and accurately as possible” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst 
and Snoek Henkemans 2002: 110-136).	
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al. 2015) standpoints can be; a) descriptive standpoints, that provide evidence in support 
of factual statements about the present situation or the past, or b) predictive standpoints 
that are justified when reasons are provided that make an expectation more plausible, or 
c) evaluative standpoints that are advanced when the grounds for the reasonableness of a 
qualitative assessment or valuation about a present or past state of affairs d) practical 
standpoints that refer to the desirability of a proposed future action and that answers to the 
question ‘what should we do?’, or e) explanatory standpoints that are advanced when the 
causes for a past event are at issue. 
A pragma-dialectical analysis begins with the analytic overview, in which the 
context of the argumentative discussion is characterized, and the point in question, the 
participants and their standpoints are identified.  
After having done the analytic overview, the argumentative reconstruction is carried 
out: the connections of all arguments with the standpoint(s) and the connections between 
arguments are shown. In case that one argument straight supports the standpoint, 
argumentation is labeled as single (x because y). In case that various arguments sustain 
each other (in a potentially endless chain) and finally sustain the standpoint, argumentation 
is labeled subordinative (x because y because of c…). Then, there is the case in which 
more than one argument supports the standpoint: in this cases two distinct cases of 
argumentation may be faced, namely multiple or coordinative argumentation. 
Argumentation will be said to be multiple in case that the arguments supporting the 
standpoint act autonomously (i.e. x because y, moreover because c), whereas it will be 
said to be coordinative when the arguments necessarily need to act together to support the 
standpoint (i.e., x because c and d and e) (Zampa 2015: 61-62). In what follows I will 
exemplify the distinct types of argumentation by reconstructing the argumentative 
structure of some excerpts of the editorial conferences of Clayman and Reisner’s study. 
By looking to the original excerpts of editorial conferences and to the respective 
argumentative analayses, it will be evident that an argumentative analysis consists in a 
series of transformations. In excerpt (1) we read 
(1) RE: -> the measles story is uh/ another very interesting 
story although its principal impact again/ is in the metro city 
area. there’s a/ the measles epidemic is now up to about uh/ five 
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hundred and eighty-three cases (Clayman and Reisner 1988: 188). 
An example of how a single argumentation is represented is shown in Fig. 2: 
 
 
Figure 2. Single argumentation (referred to Extract 18 of Clayman and Reisner’s study, Clayman 
and Reisner 1998: 188). 
 
In the following excerpt we can notice a subordinative argumentation: 
(2) RE: The best story we had was the crash test story/ the 
flight attendants/ the surviving flight attendants from the UA 
flight/ two thirty two held a press conference at the/ airport 
Hilton today it was a pretty emotional scene/ they talked about/ 
their experience during the crash and their feelings since then/ 
mixture as dopoing euphoria and grief (Clayman and Reisner 1988: 188). 
 
When a subordinative argumentation is at stake20, arguments are organized one on 
top of the other and a decimal is included one time for every rank. (Figure 3): 
 
                                                
20	Argumentation can be said to be subordinative when it has more than one subargument.			
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Figure 3. Subordinative argumentation (referred to extract 20 of Clayman and Reisner’s study, 
Clayman and Reisner 1998: 190). 
In excerpt (3) we see an example of multiple argumentation: 
(3) BE: -> we’ve got a fairly important bank deal today on 
LaBelle Street uhm/ LaBelle National Bank which is owned/ by a 
Dutch firm is acquiring the/ First National Bank of Metrocity 
which/ will make the combined/ bank will be the fifth largest bank 
in the state/ and will mean now that two of our top five banks 
are/ foreign owned uh both banks are quite/ well known and well 
established institutions on/ LaBelle streetand this is very much 
of a surprise/ deal that was announced early this morning (Clayman 
and Reisner 1998: 188). 
In case that the arguments supporting a standpoint are independent from each other, 
the argumentation is called multiple (Figure 4): 
 
 
Figure 4. Multiple argumentation (referred to extract 13 of Clayman and Reisner’s study, 
Clayman and Reisner 1998: 186). 
	 	
	
	
84	
 
Finally, in excerpt (4) we see an example of coordinative argumentation. 
(4) I’m not hugely enthusiastic about this he/ it is the 
President and it is a press conference/ but it – there’s not a/ 
not an awful lot of detail and there’s nothing/ wildly unexpected 
in what he said (Clayman and Reisner 1988: 191). 
In coordinative argumentation the arguments jointly support the standpoint (Figure 
5): 
 
Figure 5. Coordinative argumentation (referred to 21 of Clayman and Reisner’s study, 
Clayman and Reisner 1998: 191). 
Extended Pragma-Dialectics goes one step forward than Pragma-Dialectics, since it 
interweaves the dialectical dimension of argumentation, whose main goal is that of 
concluding a divergence of opinion on the merits in a reasonable way, with the rhetorical 
dimension, whose main aim is that of reaching effectiveness (van Eemeren 2010). Indeed, 
the protagonist of a standpoint in an argumentative discussion has to use reasonable 
arguments (thus exploiting the dialectical dimension) and has to act in such a way that 
her/his standpoint is accepted (thus exploiting the rhetorical dimension). Reaching an 
equilibrium between the dialectical and the rhetorical dimension is the goal of strategic 
maneuvering: this mechanism is the constant of every argumentative move and does not 
depend on the contextual situation. Due to the significance of the concept of strategic 
maneuvering for the investigation of argumentation in the newsroom, I dedicate an entire 
paragraph to it in Subsection 4.2.1, in which I will explain it in detail. Furthermore, another 
subsection (4.2.2) is devoted to explain how the journalist may usually strive between the 
dialectical dimension (aiming at conveying a critical view) and the rhetorical dimension 
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(being effective in order to capture the audience attention). 
Generally speaking, in recent times, argumentation is considered by the most 
prominent scholars in the field as  
 
a type of communication aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by critically 
testing the acceptability of the standpoints at issue. Generally, this communication will 
take place by verbal means, whether oral or written, but non-verbal elements (such as 
gestures and images) may also play a part. In practice, the term argumentation is used in 
two ways at the same time: it refers to a process (‘I am still in the middle of my 
argumentation’) as well to its result (‘Let’s examine what her argumentation amounts to’) 
(Van Eemeren et alii 2007). 
 
This definition is particularly thorough, since it underlines the interpersonal aspect 
of argumentation, which occurs in an open or tacit dialogue among an arguer, who puts 
forth some propositions, and a recipient, who receives the arguer’standpoint. The recipient 
is conceived as a kritès that critically tests the arguer’s standpoint as well as all his 
propositions; it is up to the addressee wheather to accept or not the arguer’s standpoint. 
 
4.2.1 A closer look at the notion of strategic maneuvering: reconciling dialectics 
and rhetoric 
 
As we have previously said, in the Extended Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren 2010), 
dialectics and rhetoric, the two fundamental levels of every actual argumentation, are 
reunited in spite of an extensive tradition which judged them as irreconcilable.  
Two are the goals of the arguers: a) finding a solution to a divergence of opinion 
concerning the issue at stake, and b) having success in the discussion and being effective 
with the audience (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002). In many real world contexts arguers’ 
main goal is that of persuading the audience. While argumentation is defined by the joint 
commitment towards a reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion, in many (not all) 
real world situations the chief goal of arguers is to persuade. It becomes thus clear that the 
rhetorical dimension plays a major role in argumentation; indeed, in real-life contexts and 
in actual human interactions, in which real-life issues are at stake, the rhetorical aspect 
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plays a crucial role in reaching the arguers’ purposes (Rigotti 2007, 2009). Human beings 
use argumentation when they want to accomplish several goals: They use argumentation 
in order to identify the pros and cons of the various alternatives, both for promoting a 
course of action focusing on its (additional) advantages, or contrasting another one by 
focusing on negative effects. Through argumentation people may try to persuade the 
others, in the sense that in order to change their goals or their preferences between given 
goals, they work on beliefs, memory retrieval, reasoning, etc. For instance, a 
psychotherapist may argue during a session in order to persuade a depressed patient to 
have a more functional view of the world. In all real situations there is a dynamic balance 
between a persuasive commitment and a commitment aimed at the reasonableness of the 
decision. 
As we shall see, also journalists argue in their editorial conferences in order to 
convince the editorial board of the goodness of a given editorial choice or they may argue 
in their news products in order to persuade the audience of a given opinion of an event. In 
this research I claim that journalists aim at fulfilling the mandate of their newsroom, trying 
to produce news items that are balanced and attractive at the same time, with a persuasive 
commitment and a search for reasonableness.  
The features of the relationship between the plausible disposition followed by 
dialectic and the effectiveness requested by rhetoric has been one of the nearly all disputed 
matters from the beginning of argumentation’s studies onwards. Generally speaking, 
dialectic and rhetoric have been regarded as antagonistic and even irreconcilable. This 
conception has been challenged and modified by van Eemeren & Houtlosser (van Eemeren 
& Houtlosser 1999, 2002, 2005), who have widened Pragma-Dialectics whereby the 
addition of the concept of strategic maneuvering: this notion is used by the authors to 
make reference to the arguers’ effort to reach a balance between the two distinct types of 
goals, namely the dialectical and the rhetorical goal. When arguers maneuver strategically, 
they attempt to reconcile their two main goals, namely that given by the congruence with 
their desire (persuading the audience) and that given by their commitment (being 
reasonable).  
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Following the extended Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren 2010), arguers conciliate 
dialectical needs and rhetorical aims at three intertwined levels, namely at the level of 
topical potential (1), at the level of audience demand (2), and at the level of presentational 
techniques (3). Put in van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s words, strategic maneuvering occurs 
when “a particular choice made from the available topical potential, a particular way in 
which the opportunities for framing the addressee’s perspective are used, and a particular 
way in which presentational possibilities are exploited” (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 
2009: 6). The topical potential is the first feature to be taken into account when one agent 
maneuvers strategically: the agent chooses the most convenient moves to reinforce his 
position. Here, arguers may single out among distinct perspectives of the issue and 
connected standpoints and may select distinct arguments in favour of their standpoint. 
Another feature of strategic maneuvering is audience demand: this aspect is particularly 
important in my dissertation, since it lays stress on the role played by the audience. Indeed, 
the audience is the kritès that establishes if it is the case of consenting to the validity of a 
standpoint or not21; subsequently, arguments must be accomodated to his/her cognition, 
attention, expectations, circumstances, preferences, sensitiveness, and so on. The 
adjustment to audience demand calls for the arguer’s encyclopedic knowledge of the 
recipients of the discourse. In editorial conferences two different critical discussions are 
at stake: a) a discussion in which the protagonist is a journalist X and the antagonist is 
another journalist Y, and b) a discussion in which the protagonist are the journalists and 
the antagonist is the audienc. The audience demand is a very important level for the scope 
of the present dissertation, since the final goal of the editorial board in an editorial 
conferences and in many newsroom activities is that of  persuading the audience either a) 
by producing news items that are coherent with the emotive and cognitive environment of 
the audience or b) by producing new items that contradict the audience premises and that 
lead them to change their previous opinion on a certain state of affairs.  
                                                
21 Following van Rees & Rigotti (2011), rhetoric can be harmonically integrated into a dialectical 
approach, and this “brings to the fore the strategic function of the addressee of the argumentative 
interaction that is identified as the audience”. Furthermore, topical potential and presentational devices 
– are, following these scholars, “teleologically ruled by the search of the maximum expediency in 
relation to the image of the audience activated by the arguer”. 
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The third aspect of strategic maneuvering is labeled as Presentational techniques: 
this aspect deals with the adequacy of the used communicative tools. Presentational 
techniques are truly helpful in enabling the arguer to accomplish the planned and desirable 
“communicative and interactional effects” (van Eemeren 2010: 119); indeed, by means of 
some presentational devices instead of others, a discourse can follow a path that is more 
acceptable and coherent and understandable for the recipient, therefore enabling him to 
accept and totally comprehend the arguer’s reasoning. Presentational techniques have 
proved to be very useful tools to find a merging point between the topical potential and 
the audience demand (van Rees & Rigotti, 2011). 
 
4.2.2 The journalist as a rhetor 
 
After having investigated the notion of strategic maneuvering, it becomes clear that the 
journalist can be conceived as a rhetor that attempts to find a balance between his 
commitment to criticality and his desire persuade the audience of a) the relevance and the 
credibility of the news and b) of the attempt to persuade the audience to adopt a given 
evaluative stance on a certain state of affairs. 
I will now zoom on the journalist’s attempt to persuade the audience, which is 
carried out on a twofold level. First of all, the journalist has to persuade the other 
journalists of the relevance of the news that he has selected and then he has to persuade 
the audience that the news is relevant and worth of being read/heard/watched: this level 
has to do with the persuasion of the relevance and of the credibility of the news. Secondly, 
the other level of persuasion concerns the journalists’ attempt to persuade the audience of 
their own stance on a given reported event; it is a kind of persuasion that deals with the 
acceptability of the journalists’ evaluations. This second type of persuasion can be carried 
out in an explicit way in the editorials or in an implicit way through an editorial framing. 
A persuasion towards a given evaluative stance can occur even in a very implicit way, 
whereby the usage of given words instead of others or whereby putting forth implicit 
arguments, as it is often the case in hard news, in which evaluations are often evoked or 
provoked rather than explicitly expressed.  
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Implicit evaluation has been deeply studied by J.R. Martin and P.R.R. White (2005), 
who classify distinct “journalistic voices” at stake in news items. They distinguish between 
reporter voice and writer voice. When the reporter voice is at stake, there is no authorial 
unmediated judgement and if there is some judgement, then it is ascribed. It goes without 
saying that in these cases, when reporter voice is at stake, the evaluation is always implicit, 
for example in the sentence “According to Zurich tourists, Lugano is a picturesque town 
on the lake” the term pictoresque signals some implicit positive judgement. In journalistic 
products in which a reporter voice is used, the journalist’s evaluative role is backgrounded 
and that of the quoted source is foregrounded; these news products advance or favor stance 
taking, even though evaluative meanings are explicitly relegated to quoted sources.  
 On the contrary, when the writer voice is at stake, there is always an inscribed 
authorial judgement: writer voice can be subdivided into correspondent voice (“in which 
there is no or minimal authorial inscribed social sanction; if there is an inscribed social 
sanction, then it is attributed; there are no co-textual constraints on social esteem”,) and 
commentator voice (“there are no co-textual constraints on judgement, there is free 
occurrence of unmediated social sanction and social esteem”) (Martin and White 2005: 
173). In these cases in which the writer voice is at stake, there is always an overt 
evaluation, such as in a sentence like “the future of the society is threatened”, in which a 
clear judgement is at stake.  
As I have argued above, journalists always have an inner tension between making a 
critical and fair item on the one side and making a rhetorically constructed item on the 
other side. This tension is often strongly determined by the anticipation of the audience 
uptake. In particular, journalists’ anticipatory inferences concerning the emotive audience 
uptake may lead the journalists towards an unfair framing that may present some risk of 
manipulative deviation.  In fact, there is a continuous struggle in the journalists’ mind 
between the will to convey facts in an objective/balanced way on the one side and to frame 
the news in such a way that is coherent with journalists’ anticipatory reasoning concerning 
audience emotive reactions; this can be said to be a strategic manoeuvring carried out by 
the journalist or by the newspaper (Van Eemeren, 2010; Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 
2002). This represents an attempt to report events in a reasonable manner and to satisfy 
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the audience emotive demand, therefore presenting a certain portrayal of events 
themselves. There is a close bond between the selection of a contextual frame and a 
specific plan activated by the journalist to support a certain stance. For this reason, 
argumentation plays a crucial role within the seemingly communicative type of news 
reporting. Keeping the balance between the adherence to reasonableness and the effort at 
being impressive results in the fact that the arguers have to maneuver strategically in every 
move that are realized in an argumentative discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002). 
For journalists, this means that they face a continuous struggle between the editorial 
commitment to open a space for criticality whereby giving a fair and balanced view of 
events on the one side, and the attempt at satisfying the audience demand whereby taking 
into account and predicting their possible/probable/desirable emotive uptake.   
In the next sub-section I will look at the inferential dimension of argumentation, 
namely at the reasoning proposed to a speaker in order to shift from a premise to a 
conclusion. 
 
 
4.3 Argumentum Model of Topics: the forms of reasoning in ordinary 
arguments 
 
Even though Extended Pragma-Dialectics is a crucial tool for analyzing argumentation in 
context and it is very helpful for reconstructing journalists’ argumentative interactions and 
the resulting news products in their dialectical and rhetorical dimension, it lacks an 
adequate tool to investigate argument schemes and implicit premises, i.e. premises based 
on the implicit common knowledge of the participants to the argumentative discussion. In 
order to analyse argument schemes and implicit premises, the Lugano School has 
developed a theory known as Argumentum Model of Topics. 
Argumentum Model of Topics, from now on AMT (Rigotti 2006, 2008, 2009; 
Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2010), is a theoretical framework developed to investigate the 
inferential conformation of arguments22. The inferential dimension is a crucial aspect of 
                                                
22 In order to explain AMT I will mostly rely on Palmieri 2010. 
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every argumentative interaction, and in particular, it is fundamental for the study of 
argumentation in the media and for understanding how journalists’ discussions (through 
their individual and collective decisions and through the reorganization of a mutual 
cognitive environment in the newsroom) influence news product’s construction. The core 
dynamic of newsmaking -put in Van Eemeren’s words, the point of all communicative 
activity types of the context of newsmaking- is to decide how to produce a news item 
which should be both objective/balanced and attractive for the audience: the essence of 
such decision is clearly inferential. If we want to ascertain the crucial role of 
argumentation in journalists’ discussions it is crucial to analyse the inference that makes 
a news or a detail of a news significant for deciding to publish it and that, for this reason, 
journalists can deploy strategically to convey a balanced view of the reported information 
and persuade their audience.  
Nowadays argumentation researchers usually construe the connection from the 
argument to the standpoint represented by inferences as an argument scheme (see Hastings 
1962; Garssen 2001; Kienpointer 1992; Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008), recognizing 
distinct types of argument schemes, such as the argument schemes from cause, from 
analogy, or from authority. The AMT developed by Rigotti and Greco Morasso is a 
theoretical framework of argument schemes which merges the ample contribution of the 
Antiquity- more specifically Aristotle and Cicero - and of the Middle Ages, including 
authors like Boethius, Peter of Spain, Buridan and Abelard, with contemporary works23. 
The study of the inferential structure of arguments with the AMT fits well with the 
dialectical-rhetorical reconstruction of extended Pragma-dialcetics. Firslty, the AMT 
enables to identify the purely inferential-logical part of the argument, which designates 
“the deep structure of the dialectical moves performed in the argumentation stage indicated 
by the analytic overview”; secondly, the AMT “accounts for the context-bound component 
of the argument, which comprises the material premises that must be shared in order to 
make the reasoning effective” (Palmieri 2014: 31).  
As noted by Palmieri (2014) 
                                                
23	A systematized illustration of AMT and of the other contemporary approaches to argument schemes 
is presented in Rigotti & Greco Morasso (2010).	
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 The analysis of the inferential configuration of an argument basically consists in 
the addition of those implicit premises without which the passage from the explicit 
premise functioning as argument to the standpoint would not be warranted. Indeed, 
arguers normally communicate their arguments with enthymemes, thus leaving some 
premises unexpressed: these are not uttered/written, but the arguer can be held committed 
to them on the basis of what he/she has said explicitly (Palmieri 2014: 31).  
 
For instance, if a journalist justifies his/her decision to broadcast a news item in an 
emotional way as a strategy to capture audience attention, refusing the claim that 
emotional news items capture audience attention would be unreasonable.24 AMT attempts 
to understand the way in which an agent sustains a standpoint via overt and tacit premises. 
Two distinct elements are at stake in the inferential configuration. On the one hand, a 
procedural element is at stake, which guarantees for the inferential connection between 
argument and standpoint; on the other hand, a material element consisting of contextual 
premises is at stake, which reconnects the abstract inferential part with the actual 
argumentation. The abstract procedural part of the inferential configuration consists of 
three levels: the locus, the maxim and the logical form, whereas the material part  
 
conjoins two distinct types of proposition situated in the context: the endoxon, 
which tends to remain implicit, and the datum, a minor premise which represents the part 
of the argument usually made explicit in the discourse (see Rigotti & Greco Morasso 
2010: 493-502) (Palmieri 2014: 31). 
 
In order to make clear the way in which the AMT merges these two components to 
achieve the inferential configuration, I show an easy case of argumentation gained from 
CdT newsroom. During an editorial conference two journalists are evaluating the editorial 
choices of a past item, and more specifically the discussion revolves around an item 
dealing with the Italian politician Berlusconi and the inadequacy of having put an old 
                                                
24  Refusing an implicit premise to which one is committed infringes one of the ten rules for critical 
dicussion and therefore gives rise to a fallacy. (see Rule 5. The unexpressed premise rule: A party may 
not deny a premise that he/she him/herself has left implicit.) 
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photo of him as a splash: one journalist evaluates in a negative way the fact that they had 
put an old photo and says: ‘Putting this old photo as a splash was not a good choice, it 
gives an old-fashioned idea of the newspaper’.  
The journalist’s standpoint is clearly ‘Putting this old photo as a splash was not a 
good choice’ and the argument that supports it is ‘it gives an old-fashioned idea of the 
newspaper’. This second information is called datum in the AMT: It is an actual and 
emerging piece of evidence, which the arguer communicates (like in the example above) 
or recalls from the context to reinforce the reasonableness of the standpoint. In order to 
understand the way in which the standpoint can be inferred from the datum, the first step 
is that of recognizing the locus, i.e. the ontological relation25 at stake between the aspect 
taken into account in the datum and the aspect taken into account in the standpoint. In my 
example, these two aspects correspond to ‘old-fashioned idea of the newspaper’ and ‘old 
photo as a splash was a bad choice’ respectively. Therefore, by asking ourselves the 
question what is ‘old fashioned idea of the newspaper’ in connection to ‘old photo as a 
splash was a bad choice’? we notice that ‘old fashioned idea of the newspaper’ is an 
undesired effect caused by the action of ‘having put an old photo as a splash’. The 
avoidance of a bad goal is at stake in this journalist’s argumentation: we face a locus from 
final cause. According to Rigotti, “within the ontology of human action, [the] locus from 
final cause focuses on the relation connecting the end (goal, purpose) of an action with the 
action itself” (Rigotti 2008: 566), which perfectly meets Castelfranchi’s conception of 
goal (or better said goal-directed action) as the fundamental mental representation of the 
cognitive universe: according to him, goal-directed action changes and adapts the world 
in a guided and prefigured way. As he says, “in the end it’s all about goals: -action is for 
goals, -knowledge is for goals, - intelligence is for goals (solving problems via mental 
representations), -sociality is for goals and goal-based, emotions are goal centered” 
(Castelfranchi 2012: 826). With reference to our example, in fact, using an old photo as a 
splash is an action that leads to a worse and undesirable state of affairs. Loci a causa finali 
are very frequent in journalists’ argumentative newsroom discussions, since all 
                                                
25 In Latin locus means ‘place’ (topos in Greek), meaning not a physical place but rather a sort of 
conceptual space, from which the argument is inferred (put in Cicero’s words: ‘locus sedes est 
argumenti, uel unde argumenta docuntur’).  
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discussions aim in a certain way to decide which editorial choices realize or do not realize 
the newsrooms’ goals.  
AMT accounts for inference “by considering at its roots the intersection of two 
syllogistic lines of reasoning: a topical (responsible for the inferential mechanism) and an 
endoxical one (providing persuasive effectiveness by linking the argument to a shared 
opinion in the community)” (Zampa 2015: 71). In order to graphically represent this 
complicated configuration, Rigotti and Greco Morasso have elaborated the so called ‘Y-
structure’, which visually resembles the letter ‘Y’; the two branches of the letter ‘Y’ 
represent the material (left branch) and the procedural starting points (right branch), and 
the stem of the ‘Y’ represents the intersection of the two kinds of starting points. In Figure 
6 I show the Y-structure that reconstructs the inferential configuration of a journalist’s 
argumentation:  
 
Maxim: 
-if the expected result of an action X 
is inconsistent with the pursued goal 
Y, then the action X should not be 
undertaken
Endoxon:
- Being up-to-date is essential to the 
image of professionalism that CdT
wants to convey
Datum:
-the publication of an old-photo of 
Berlusconi conveys an old-
fashioned image of the newspaper 
inconsistent with the requirement of 
being up-to-date
FINAL CONCLUSION: Putting this old 
photo with Berlusconi as a splash was not 
a good choice
Locus from 
Final cause
First conclusion/ Minor premise: the publication 
of an old photo of Berlusconi is inconsistent with 
the image that CdT wants to convey 
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Figure 6. Putting this old photo as a splash was not a good choice because it gives an old-fashioned 
idea of the newspaper. 
 
On the left branch of the Y structure there is the syllogism with context-bound 
premises. The major premise of this syllogism is an endoxon and the minor premise is a 
datum. An endoxon, following the Aristotleian terminology26, can be defined as a premise 
that is accepted by the cultural community in which the discussion is situated and it is 
often determined by the interaction field, comprising the institutionalized and 
interpersonal common aims, duties, principles and cultures. Due to the fact that endoxa 
are expected to be shared by the community, they are usually conveyed in a tacit manner. 
In our example the endoxon ‘being up-to-date is essential to the image of professionalism 
that CdT wants to convey’ is implicit, since the journalist does not need to express the 
basic requirement of any newsroom goals. The minor premise is a datum, which is overtly 
expressed by the journalist (‘the publication of an old photo of Berlusconi conveys an old-
fashioned image of the newspaper inconsistent with the requirement of being up-to-date’). 
The juxtaposition of endoxon and datum activates an endoxical syllogism, whose 
functioning I show in what follows: 
Major premise (endoxon): being up-to-date is essential to the image of professionalism 
that CdT wants to convey 
Minor premise (datum): the publication of an old photo of Berlusconi conveys an old-
fashioned image of the newspaper inconsistent with the requirement of being up-to-date 
First conclusion: the publication of an old photo of Berlusconi is inconsistent with the 
image that CdT wants to convey 
The first conclusion of this endoxical syllogism functions as minor premise of the 
topical syllogism, whose major premise is a maxim gained from the locus. The maxim 
induces a logic form (such as modus ponens and modus tollens) whose conclusion 
                                                
26 Aristotle conceives endoxa as ‘opinions that are accepted by everyone or by the majority, or by the 
wise men (all of them or the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them’ (Topics 100b.21). 
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corresponds to the standpoint.  
 For that reason, the first conclusion of the endoxical syllogism and the minor 
premise of the topical syllogism ‘the publication of an old photo of Berlusconi is 
inconsistent with the image that CdT wants to convey’ corresponds to the intersection 
point of the material and the procedural components. 
In what follows I show how the topical syllogism works: 
Major premise (maxim): if the expected result of an action X is inconsistent with the 
pursued goal Y, then the action X should not be undertaken 
 
Minor premise (first conclusion of the endoxical syllogism): the publication of an old 
photo of Berlusconi conveys an old-fashioned image of the newspaper inconsistent with 
the requirement of being up-to-date 
Conclusion: CdT should not have published the old photo of Berlusconi 
Every ontological relation (locus) generates a number of inferential connections, 
called maxims. 
 The datum and the standpoint are not simply related ontologically, but are connected 
by an inferential principle that links them in a particular way. A maxim is a 
hypothetical statement (having the form of a ‘if-then’ entailment, formally ‘p -> q’) 
which establishes a connection between the two extremes of the locus relation. 
(Palmieri 2014: 33).  
 
It is important to notice that since maxims combine the concepts of the locus, they 
are very generic assumptions that should be regarded as not bound to the context. Indeed, 
for instance, the maxim of the example above (if the expected result of an action X is 
inconsistent with the pursued goal Y, then the action X should not be undertaken) can be 
utilized in many other contexts and argumentative discussions in which an action should 
not be undertaken due to the inconsistency of its expected result with a pursued goal, as in 
the examples below: 
1. The layout template Y should not be kept because it is inadequate and confusing. 
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2. It was not a good choice to publish the service on the monastry of Claro and not on the 
monastery of Cademario because Claro gives a dead and Decadent idea of Catholicism. 
3. Alberto should not go out when it rains because he may get a cold. 
4. Margherita should not lay into the sun because she has a sun allergy. 
By applying the maxim onto the first conclusion in the topical syllogism, the final 
conclusion can be drawn: the final conclusion coincides with the standpoint of the 
protagonist. 
According to Rocci (2017) loci can be classified in a taxonomy (Fig. 6), which is 
indebted to those of the contributions from the Middle Ages. The author classifies loci in 
three categories. The first class is that of Intrinsic loci (1), which “are attached to the 
subject under discussion itself” (Cicero; Topica, 8), the second class is that of extrinsic 
loci (2), which are “drawn from without” and “which stand apart and are clearly 
dissociated”, and the third one is that of complex loci (3), which are based on ontological 
relationships merging features of intrinsic and extrinsic loci. In Figure 6 I show the 
taxonomy of loci according to Rocci (2017): 
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Figure 6. Taxonomy of loci according to Rocci (2017: 55).
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5. Anticipation of audience uptake  
 
 
In the present Chapter I focus on one of the main mental processes on which journalists 
rely when they reason on how to frame their items with their audience in mind, namely 
anticipation. My claim is that the mental operation of anticipation is a key cognitive 
process at stake in journalists’ minds when they argue in the context of newsroom 
deliberation about news selection and news framing. In this Chapter I propose a typology 
of the many types of anticipation in terms of configuration of beliefs and goals according 
to Castelfranchi and Miceli’ s cognitive account (2014) (see subsection 5.2). Furthermore, 
in the last part of this Chapter I will zoom on fictive anticipation in counterfactual 
reasoning, since many case studies that I have analyzed deal with this type of reasoning.  
I will also sketch an overview of the distinct types of audience uptake that are anticipated 
in the journalists’ mind, namely cognitive and emotive anticipation as well as anticipation 
of persuasion (see subsection 5.3). Among the many types of anticipation, I will devote a 
particular attention to the anticipation of emotions, in which the object of the anticipation 
are emotions; this choice is due to the fact that data analysis has revealed that anticipation 
of audience emotive uptake is the prominent type of anticipation at stake in the newsroom.  
Starting from the assumption that such reasonings strongly influence journalists’ 
decisions in newsmaking, my aim is to investigate this anticipating dimension of 
newsmaking from an argumentative perspective, and I will show some case studies. 
The argumentative lens that I adopt gives the chance to shed light on the reasoning 
processes concerning audience reaction that lead to publish a certain news instead of 
another and on the way in which journalists decide to publish a news, starting from their 
anticipatory inferences concerning audience reaction. We have seen in Chapter 3 how 
Perrin (2013) gives crucial importance to the comprehension of the audience design in 
journalistic newswriting. According to Clark and Murphy, whose analyses -differently 
from mine- have been mainly conducted on conversational data, “the speaker designs each 
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utterance for specific listeners, and they, in turn, make essential use of this fact in 
understanding that utterance. We call this property of utterances audience design” (1982: 
59). Even though in journalism the uptake of the listeners is not evident, Clark and 
Murphy’s definition is apt to stress the active role played by the journalist in customizing 
the news piece for the audience. 
The concept of audience design highly recalls Tindale’s matter of audience identity 
and audience make up (Tindale 2013, 2015). With reference to Perelman’s universal 
audience and using the concept of “cognitive environment” (Sperber and Wilson 1995), 
Tindale maintains that “a fixed audience is as obsolete as the idea of a fixed argument, 
unmoored from the dynamic situation of which it is an integral part” (Tindale 2013: 56). 
According to him, audience identity is crucial because matters of persuasion and 
assessment of argument strongly rely on this or can be attributed to it (Tindale 2013: 516).  
An argumentative approach allows to understand the audience design not just in 
terms of the abstract mapping of speakers’ anticipations concerning the audience uptake 
onto the message, but, in terms of a reasoning process which does not take place 
exclusively at an intra-individual level, but rather that is worked out publicly at a collective 
level through concrete speaking practices within conference meetings. As a matter of fact, 
looking at argued anticipatory strategies in the newsroom gives an important contribution 
to socio-linguistic research on newsmaking, and is complementary to the focus that a large 
share of it places on audience design (e.g. Bell 1984; Bell 1991), and more generally on 
message design (e.g. O’Keefe 1991). The analysis of argumentation enables to understand 
how journalists adapt to their audience because it captures the reasoning that formed the 
basis of editorial choices and on the basis of this reasoning it allows the reconstruction of 
the conscious pragmatic theories of journalists, as I will show in the empirical part of the 
dissertation. 
 
 
5.1 The centrality of a goal-based reasoning for understanding newsroom 
deliberation 
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Anticipatory reasoning emerges in the context of newsroom deliveration. In the present 
section I provide a goal-based account of newsroom deliberation with a special focus on 
the activity type of the editorial conference. This account will provide the broader context 
of practical and evaluative reasoning in which anticipatory inferences about audience 
uptake are deployed by journalists. Argumentation plays a crucial role in editorial 
conferences, which are a complex activity type, comprising copious participants and 
distinct phases that follow a rigid routine. The main goal of editorial conferences is that of 
making decisions that concern news production; in the end, all decision-making processes 
aim at establishing which is the best editorial strategy that fulfils the mandate of the 
newsroom, that in the case of the SRG coincides with enabling to promote public 
understanding. It is exactly during these decision-making processes that argumentation 
plays a pivotal role. As it is known from literature, editorial conference discussions often 
employ practical reasoning (Zampa 2015: 123), which can be defined as “goal-directed 
reasoning that culminates in an action” (Walton 2007: 180; Walton and Krabbe 1995: 74). 
The outcome of practical reasoning is a conclusion that it is good to carry out an action in 
order to reach a desired goal. The (course of) action is essential to fulfill the goals of the 
interaction field (e.g., promote public understanding) and has to adhere to the canons and 
restraints prescribed by it (e.g., editorial guidelines apropos the way in which a news item 
should be in a specific newspaper). “The interaction scheme applied can be thus labeled 
‘deliberating on a joint course of action over a matter of common concern’, and its 
outcome is a joint decision on how the action should be performed (e.g., on how the given 
news story should be reported)” (Zampa 2015: 123-124).  
The interaction scheme “deliberation” is employed so that it is possible to deliberate 
about the best way in which journalists should act in order to satisfy the goals of the 
newsroom. Thus, since the interaction field and the interaction scheme strongly determine 
the issue at stake, the issue underlying all argumentative discussions in the newsroom can 
be generally formulated as “what is the most productive way to publish/broadcast a news 
item that enables to reach the goal of fulfilling the public mandate of the newsroom X?”. 
However, this is the superordinate goal; in order to understand how journalists concretely 
argue in the newsroom it is necessary to analyse the whole hierarchy of goals, including 
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also intermediate goals. In Figure 7 I show the hierarchy of goals pursued by the editorial 
board within editorial conferences in a newsroom: 
 
Figure 7. Journalists’ goals’ structure in editorial conferences, carried out either via modification 
or via strengthening of audience emotions and cognitions. 
	 
Deliberation and evaluation that supports deliberation in the newsroom deal to 
improve editorial choices and editorial strategies on the basis of past errors or successes 
and on the basis of current practices. Improving editorial practices deals to two distinct 
lines of goals. On the one hand, it deals to produce objective news items (goal 2) that deal 
to properly inform the audience (goal 3), that in turn deals to let the audience to build an 
autonomous and balanced view of the reported event (goal 4). On the other hand, it deals 
to produce attractive news items (goal 2), which in turn deals to capture audience attention 
(goal 3), which in turn deals to the entertainment of the audience (goal 4). Both the 
Action 1: deliberation in the editorial conference (practical-oriented 
discussion) 
Action 2: evaluation in the editorial conference (knowledge-oriented 
discussion)
Goal 1: improve editorial choices on the basis of past errors, 
successes and of current practices
Goal 2 : produce balanced news items Goal 2: produce attractive news items
Goal 3: properly inform the audience Goal 3 : capture audience attention
Goal 4: let the audience build a 
balanced view of the reported event
Goal 4 : entertainment of the 
audience
Goal 5: promote public understanding
Goal 6 (superordinate goal): fulfill public mandate
via modification of audience emotions and 
cognitions, even invalidating its expectations if 
necessary
Via strengthening of audience emotions and 
cognitions, following its expectations
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perlocutionary goals of enabling the audience to build an autonomous and balanced view 
of the reported event and to entertain the audience in the end aim at promoting public 
understanding and at fulfilling the public mandate, which is the ultimate and superordinate 
goal. 
It is interesting to notice that that the two distinct lines of goals, namely the one 
directed at capturing the audience attention and the one directed at enabling the audience 
to build an a balanced view of the reported event, are carried out through two distinct types 
of persuasion modes. Firstly, in order to capture the audience attention, the journalist 
attempts to persuade the audience by strengthening the audience (cognitive and/or 
emotive) attitude, independently from what he believes. Secondly, in order to convey a 
balanced view of the event, the journalist attempts to persuade the audience also by 
modifying the audience (cognitive and/or emotive) attitude, depending on what he 
believes. This is part of the journalists’ strategic maneuvering, which is therefore due to a 
conflict of goals, namely being effective by capturing the audience attention on the one 
hand, and being reasonable by conveying a balanced view of the event on the other hand. 
The actions that enable journalists to reach these goals are carried out in the distinct 
phases of the editorial conference. Editorial conferences are divided in distinct phases that 
mark a specific function and that are directed towards a specific goal; each phase is 
characterized by its own interaction scheme, and each passage from a phase to another is 
marked and signaled by specific utterances. In what follows, I will characterize each type 
of interaction scheme at stake in each phase of the editorial conference of the newsroom 
of CdT. 
An editorial conference begins with the phase in which the responsible for 
advertisement joins the conference and communicates how many pages are devoted to 
advertisement and in which section they should be inserted, and the interaction scheme 
applied can thus be labeled ‘notice on the number of pages that should be devoted to 
advertisement’, and its outcome is journalists’ becoming conscious of the number of pages 
and columns of the newspaper that should be devoted to advertisement and of the physical 
space in which advertisement should be inserted. This is a very important phase, since it 
is necessary in order to plan all information to be conveyed to the audience and to organize 
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the layout of each page, of each thematic section and of the whole newspaper. 
Linguistically speaking, the utterance that signal the entrance into this phase is ‘pages’, 
uttered by the journalist who is in charge of the conference and directed to the person who 
is responsible for organizing advertisement; this utterance marks also the beginning of the 
conference. The journalist produces this utterance in order to reach the goal of getting the 
advertisement responsible to tell him the pages that they have at their disposal, thus to 
know how many and which pages they have at their disposal and in the end to distribute 
information in a reasonable way. 
The next phase is devoted to the evaluation of the news already published in the 
newspaper of the day. The phase is opened by a declarative speech act taking the form of 
an utterance like ‘Newspaper of today’ or ‘Observations’. The journalist utters 
‘newspapers of today’ or ‘observations’ in order to reach the goal to get the other members 
of the editorial team to inform the whole team of personal judgements of possible 
observations on past news item or general practices (goal 1), in order to know which 
items/details of items were a good choice and which not or which practices are fruitful or 
not (goal 2), in order to make better choices and to improve the quality of the newspaper 
(goal 3). 
The next step is the phase devoted to establish what should be inserted in the front 
page. The words ‘front page’ uttered by the journalist in charge of the conference open 
this phase, which is characterized by the interaction scheme ‘deliberation on the news to 
put in the specific section front page’. The journalist produces this utterance in order to 
gain the others’ attention and more specifically the attention of the journalist who is 
responsible for the desk/section at stake (goal 1), in order to ensure that in each section the 
most prominent topics are inserted. Depending on the section on which attention is drawn, 
the utterance is lead to pick up the most significant news for the respective section. 
Then, the journalist in charge of the conference utters the name of the desk for which 
a decision on the items to publish should be taken in order to start the respective decision-
making process: for instance, after having uttered ‘front page’ in order to introduce the 
decision-making process aimed at picking the most actual news of the day, he then utters 
all the names of the desks in order of appearance on the newspaper, aiming at initiating 
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the sub-phase of decision-making processes of the respective section, namely ‘Foreign 
affairs’, ‘Confederation’, ‘Canton’ ‘News section’, ‘Sport’, ‘Economy’, ‘Culture and 
show business’, ‘Web’. Then, the journalist in charge of the conference approaches the 
end of the conference by uttering ‘Other observations’, thus aiming at gaining the attention 
of the whole editorial team (goal 1), in order to ask them if they have any further remarks 
on some discussed topic or on some topics that have not been discussed yet (goal 2), which 
in turn aims at improving the quality of the forthcoming/future items (goal 3). At the very 
end of the conference, the journalist in charge of the meeting utters ‘Thanks and good luck 
with your work’, therefore applying an interaction scheme that can be conceived as ‘notice 
of closure of a meeting’: the journalist utters it in order to inform the editorial board that 
the conference is finished and that the editorial team is allowed to leave the place where 
the editorial conference has taken place. 
As we have seen, there are phases of an editorial conference that are devoted to 
evaluation and other phases that are devoted to deliberation, so that we may find two types 
of argumentative discussions within an editorial conference; one is a knowledge-oriented 
discussion, whose participants’ primary and direct goal is knowledge of facts of the world 
(fact-finding goal) and the other is a practical-oriented discussion (decisional goal). The 
goal of the latter type of discussion is a decision, but the final outcome is a change of the 
view of some facts of the world, which involves in some way a given degree of knowledge 
change. Therefore, we can say that both types of discussions influence journalists’ 
cognitive environment, since even a practical discussion has a cognitive effect; indeed, as 
a result of the discussion itself the view of the world is reshaped and reconsidered. 
Subsequently, the media products will be influenced in two distinct ways and two distinct 
perlocutive effects will be reached: firstly, they are modified in a decisional way and 
secondly they are modified in the sense that the cognitive environment is clearly modified 
from the consequences of the decisions. 
 
 
5.2 Anticipatory reasoning: a goal-based approach 
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Since anticipation is a crucial phenomenon in the newsroom that determines the whole 
framing given to the news, in this subsection I will illustrate the cognitive psychological 
principles underpinning the mental process of anticipation.  
Cognitive psychologists Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014) maintain that anticipatory 
reasoning is a crucial mental process of the human mind and mental anticipatory 
representations of future states of affairs play a fundamental role in everyone’s everyday 
activity, since they enable us to understand the reasons of a huge part of the others’ 
motives, decision-making and planning activities, feelings and behaviors (Castelfranchi 
and Miceli 2014: 3). Anticipation plays such a central role in human reasoning that the 
human mind has been defined as an “anticipatory device” (Castelfranchi 2005; Pezzulo 
and Castelfranchi 2007; Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014) that acts to anticipate and, in 
particular, construct and act on anticipatory representations. Mental activity is at stake 
when an individual succeeds in constructing internally a representation of a certain state 
of affairs; this signifies that the agent is able to build a representation that is not “the output 
of current perceptual stimuli, but a ‘simulation’ of perception” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 
2014: 3). This simulative mental representation is usually deployed in order to anticipate 
a future appropriate stimulus, or a more or less possible/probable consequence of a cause, 
or a more or less possible/probable action on the world. 
In support to the central role of anticipation in the human mind is also Dennet’s 
statement that the fundamental goal of brains is ‘to produce future’ (Dennet 1991: 177: 
quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). Furthermore, we gain confirmation of the key 
role played out by anticipatory reasoning in the human mind even from studies on 
memory; put in Schacter’s words, “given the adaptive priority of the future planning, we 
find it helpful to think of the brain as a fundamentally prospective organ that is designed 
to use information from the past and the present to generate predictions on the future” 
(Schacter et al. 2007: 660; quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). Empirical evidence 
that the mind is prospective and proactive (it tends to anticipate and problems, rather than 
reacting to themafter they have taken place) has been gained by Bar and Firth (e.g. Bar 
2007; Frith 2007: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). Therefore, anticipation can 
be considered a fundamental mental activity that unifies all brain functions.  
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Moreover, anticipatory representations are a core element underpinning the notion 
of schema as it used in psychology and cognitive science, as well as that of script (Schank 
and Abelson 1997: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3) and frame (e.g. Minsky 
1975). Scripts and frames are often used to attribute goals to the others: indeed, scripts 
contain the persons’ minds with goals within one framing. The concept of a cognitive 
activity as a generative process has been present already in Piaget (1926); according to 
him, every cognitive activity implies an integration of an inner already established 
schemata with informantion coming from the environment (from the sensorimotor phase 
to the symbolic phase). Existing schemata are accommodated (changed and/or altered) in 
light of new information; this is an essential principle common to many theoretical 
frameworks (e.g. Anderson 1977; Arbib 2003; Bartlett 1932; Neisser 1976; Rumelhart and 
Ortony 1977: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 4). Anticipation plays a pivotal 
role in these approaches, since schemata strongly determine the way in which new 
information is received whereby mental anticipations of the future stimulus, event or 
action.  
Even for what concerns memory, Bartlett (1932) already illustrated the way in which 
schemata model people’s understanding of upcoming information as well as their recall. 
Put in Huron’s words, “the biological purpose of memory is not recall but preparation” 
(2006: 219: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). Furthermore, our mind does not 
simply repropose past experience in the future, but rather it is capable of building 
completely new scenarios, of imagining never-existed alternative worlds. Indeed, the 
human mind is able to simulate new worlds and not only to retrieve them. 
Since anticipatory representations concern the formation of new possibilities, they 
are usually ascribed an epistemic function. Nevertheless, they do not automatically 
correspond to epistemic representations. According to Castelfranchi and Miceli 
“anticipatory representations can tell us not only how the world will be, but also how the 
world should be, or how the organism would like it to be” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 
4). In this dissertation I follow the path traced by Castelfranchi and Miceli in conceiving 
anticipatory representations as goals that direct the future actions of the agent. More in 
general, every goal-oriented system is intrinsically anticipatory, because it is guided by 
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the representation of the goal-state and stimulated by the latter’s interchange with the 
actual state of affairs (e.g. Miller et al. 1960). Anticipation is so much integrated with 
action that some authors (e.g. Kunde et al. 2007) have put forth the radical statement that 
no action is possible without anticipation. 
 
5.2.1 The notion of goal 
 
Since goals are a crucial component of anticipatory reasoning and of reasoning within 
deliberation as a whole, it is wise to specify what I mean by goal. Different disciplines 
such as philosophy, cognitive science and psychology propose what Castelfranchi has 
defined a “Ptolemaic” perspective of cognition, perpetuating the reductionist idea that 
information and representation can be said to coincide with ‘knowledge’. In line with this 
view, the main models of goal hierarchies and decision making do not investigate goal-
processing step by step and its relations with knowledge processing. Nevertheless, this 
poses some theoretical problems, since the mind’s functioning is based on knowledge and 
goals. “Moreover, what is missing from this picture is what gives purpose to cognition 
itself. What is ‘knowledge’ for?” (Castelfranchi 2012: 826).  
In this dissertation I will follow the path traced by Castelfranchi according to whom 
goals should be considered the keystone of cognition. Furthermore, according to him, 
information and representation do not coincide with knowledge, since goals are also a type 
of representation with a very peculiar function, namely that of directing action. Put in 
Castelfranchi’s words, “In the end, it’s all about goals: -action is for goals (and goals are 
for potential actions), -knowledge is for goals, -intelligence is for goals (solving problems 
via mental representations), -sociality is for goals and goal-based, -emotions are goal-
centered (Castelfranchi et al. 1996)” (Castelfanchi 2012: 826).  
We can say that Castelfranchi re-builds cognitivism on the basis of the Cybernetic 
principle of goal-directed action, which supports the view of the cognitive mind as an 
independent, purposive and goal-directed device. In Castelfranchi’s view, all the distinct 
functions that cognitive science ascribes to the mind are produced by the same Cybernetic 
mechanism that chooses goals on the basis of beliefs and common knowledge, fills the 
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gap between goals and states of affairs, and induces actions that accomplish goals by 
reducing the divergences (Pezzulo 2012:  13).  
The focus on goal-directed action, in which anticipation plays a major role, is the fil 
rouge that links Castelfranchi’s approach to Rigotti’s theoretical framework of the 
ontology of human action, developed within the AMT (which is explained in detail in 
Section 4.3).  In the next subsection I will sketch an overview on the ontology of human 
action as conceived by Rigotti and I will lay stress on the points of overlap with 
Castelfranchi’s approach. 
 
5.2.2 The ontology of human action 
 
In terms of AMT, the reasoning carried out by an individual that wants to pursue a goal 
and that acts in order to carry out that goal is represented by the locus from final cause 
(Rigotti 2008). Indeed, the locus from final cause pertains to the ontological domain of 
action (as it is shown in Fig. 9 below), which may be characterized in its fundamental 
components (in an ideal model) as an occurrence deliberately produced by a human being 
who, 
being aware of the present situation and of a new possible comparatively more 
convenient state of affairs, which is realizable through a causal chain available to her, is 
attracted by this new, possible, state of affairs and, taking the decision of applying a causal 
chain, activates it thus realizing her purpose (Rigotti, 2008; 565).  
 
This is highly similar to what has been claimed by Castelfranchi that anticipatory 
reasoning results from the comparison of the representation of a goal state with a current 
state of affairs and is guided by one’s desire.  
It is clear that the ontological domain of action as conceived by Rigotti presupposes 
the crucial role of anticipation; indeed, the agent has to anticipate “a new comparatively 
more conveninent state of affairs” that is still non-esistent, not perceivable and not yet 
true. This is in line with Castelfranchi’s view of ‘generative power of the mind’, which is 
able to produce new scenarios, new states of affairs that were never behold before. 
Furthermore, he says, we can conceive and even try to achieve states of the worlds (pursue 
as goals) that we never encountered before (Castelfranchi 2012: 827). This is similar to 
what Rocci states about the humans’ ability to refer to other worlds than that in which the 
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participants live: “this phenomenon relies on the very basic human cognitive ability of 
thinking that things might be otherwise, that is, thinking of alternatives: states of affairs 
others than what is the case” (Rocci 2009: 16).  
According to Rigotti, it is frequent that many distinct, not instrinsic features become 
important in the decision-making process: due to the fact that decision-making processes 
do not take place in a contextual vacuum, the situational factors such as distinct rival 
desires and distinct costs of the causal succession may lead the individual to leave or 
modify the purpose. Furthermore, 
 
 the possible positive or negative side effects, comprising the informative and 
relational implications of action, the possible presence in the causal chain of subservient 
instrumental actions and the quality of their ends and of their possible side effects turn 
the action into a complex and hardly manageable process, in which the human subject 
intensively “negotiates” the realization of its purposes with the surrounding context27 
(Rigotti 2008: 566). 
 
In Figure below (Figure 8) I show Rigotti’s representation of the ontology of human action 
(Rigotti 2008: 566, revised and adapted from Rigotti 2003).  
                                                
27 Rigotti’s view is very close to Castelfranchi’s conception of goals in the mental activity. According 
to him, the present models of goals lack of a model of goal-processing step by step and of its relation 
with knowledge processing. Furthermore, according to him, “what is missing […] is what gives what 
gives purpose  to cognition itself. What is ‘knowledge’ for?” [Italics added]. According to Castelfranchi, 
we must abandon the Ptolemaic view that conceives both epistemic or doxastic ‘representations’ as 
synonyms of ‘knowledge’. “Representations can have a motivational, axiological, or deontic nature; 
they tell us not only how the world is, was will be, but how the world should be, how the organism 
would it like to be. That is, these representations can be used as goals driving the organism’s behavior” 
(Castelfranchi, 2012; 827).  
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Figure 8. The ontology of human action (Rigotti 2008: 566, reviewed from Rigotti 2003).  
In Figure 9 the ovals represent the points of critical scrutiny of the reasonableness 
of an action, i.e. the critical evaluation of the reasonableness of an action: a) Does an 
action corresponds to the hierarchy of goals? b) Is the reached state of affairs really 
desirable? c) Does the way in which resources are deployed answer to the priority? d) 
Does the action produce side effects? The rectangles stand for the predicates that are 
attributed to the agents, they concern the agent’s mental life: the agent knows and or 
believes the past present and future worlds, is affected by a desire concerning the 
representation of a new responding state of affairs (desire), decides to pursue this goal, 
and activates a causal chain. The lines that connects the rectangles indicate the 
presuppositions: for instance, the fact that an agent is affected by a desire presupposes that 
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he knows and believes the past, present and future worlds. The big arrow represents the 
shift from the physical dimension to the action: the agent activates a causal chain realizing 
the representation of a new responding state of affairs (desire). 
In the ontology of action, the locus from the final cause centers on the relationship 
linking the end (goal, purpose) of an action with the action itself. Distinct maxims are 
produced by this locus. For instance, since the end is a necesary element of every action, 
the maxim “if a behaviour has no end, it is not an action” can be derived. This maxim is 
recurrently used in the legal domain when the degree of responsibility of an agent involved 
in a misfact has to be established. Other two maxims can be drawn from the concept of 
action: “if the pursued end is impossible, the decision of achieving the action is irrational” 
and “if the pursued end is evidently harmful for the agent, the action is unreasonable”. 
Moreover, the maxim “if an action is strictly required in order to reach a desired goal, this 
action should be undertaken” is very close to Walton’s primary notion of practical 
reasoning28. Generally speaking, the same logical assumption based on the connection of 
desirability of a given action due to the desirability of its outcome can be found also in 
Garssen (1997: 21, quoted in Van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoek Henkemans 2007: 166) 
as a subcalssify of the causal argument scheme. The label used by Garssen (2001: 92) for 
this logical rule is “‘means-end practical argumentation’ or ‘pragmatic argumentation’”.  
A similar maxim, namely “cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est” (“if the end is 
good, the thing is good too”) can be found already in Boethius (De differentiis topicis, 
P.L. 64, 1189 D). This maxim is further validated and approved by Abelard (Dialectica 
416, 436) and Peter of Spain (Summulae logicales 5.2.7). However, Buridan casts doubt 
on it (Summulae de dialectica 6.4.13), since he has claimed that no property can be 
attributed to something that does not exist yet; subsequently, according to him, the end 
cannot be good or bad, since it does not yet exist before the completion of the action.  
 
 
                                                
28 Walton classifies two central argument schemes of practical reasoning (Walton 1990: 48): the 
necessary condition and the sufficient condition schemes. These enable to recognize crucial components 
of practical reasoning: the conception of goal and compelling issues stemming from the indivudual’s 
connection with actuality (practicality and side effects).  
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5.3 Distinct kinds of anticipatory representation in terms of configuration 
of beliefs and goals  
 
Generally speaking, anticipatory representations have been generally conceived as 
“expectancies” or “expectations” (e.g. Huron 2006; Olson et al. 1996); nevertheless, it is 
crucial to shed light on the different kinds of anticipatory representations, since these 
strongly influence the type of argumentative discussion in the newsroom, that in turn may 
strongly influence news’ framing. I intend to analyse these differences in terms of the 
configuration of beliefs and goals implied by the various anticipatory representations, 
because these different compounds are likely to induce journalists to apply different types 
of reasoning. In order to distinguish the main types of anticipatory reasoning, I mostly rely 
on Castelfranchi and Miceli’s classification illustrated in the book ‘Expectancy and 
emotion’ (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014, Chapter 4). 
Firstly, I will consider simple anticipatory reasonings, namely mere beliefs of 
possibility. Beliefs, and especially beliefs dealing with future states of affairs, may vary 
for what concerns the degree of certainty; if the perceived likelihood that a certain state of 
the world will be realized is high, then the belief will be more certain. On the contrary, if 
the perceived likelihood that a certain state of affairs will be realized is low, then the belief 
will be less certain. Generally speaking, a prospective event p that is ascribed up to 0.5 
likelihood is simply a possibility. “One’s belief about p is a hypothesis, or better implies 
two opposite hypotheses- ‘p may happen’ and ‘p may not happen’, each of which does not 
exceed the chance threshold” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 31). In this situation, the 
person usually ascribes more likelihood to one of the two hypothesis and favors it. The 
simple process of hypothesizing augments the perceived likelihood of the hypothesis in 
that it augments the accessibility of the information at disposal (e.g. Kahneman and 
Tversky 1982: Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 31). Furthermore, evidence has been given 
that the simple imagination of a hypothetical future state of affairs, as well as explaining 
its occurrence, augments the perceived likelihood of that event (e.g. Carrol 1978; Sherman 
et alii 1983: Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 32).  
The second type of anticipatory representation is prediction. When an agent makes 
a prediction, he has a “belief about a future state of affairs in which the chance threshold 
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has been exceeded” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 32). Generally speaking, a prediction 
is when an agent considers a future event as probable and not simply possible, therefore 
ascribing to the event more than 0.5 probability. The agent has some encyclopedic 
knowledge that enables him to establish that it is probable that the future event will 
happen; in the empirical part of the dissertation I will show that predictions may be based 
on loci from past analogy, due to the fact that past evidence may deal as a point of reference 
for future comparisons. When one agent predicts an event, a certain regularity of 
occurrence is implied, enabling one to be convinced that p will occur. Predictions may 
have distinct degrees of certainty that convey more or less force to the convinction. In case 
that the belief that the future event will occur is strong, the agent will wait for p in a more 
intense way and will think that the event ‘should’ occur. The factors that mainly contribute 
to ascribe certainty to a prediction are determined by one’s deductive knowledge or 
previous experience with p’s likelihood; more specifically, these factors include a) the 
assignment of p’s happening to permanent causes (e.g. Weiner 1985: Castelfranchi and 
Miceli 2014: 33), b) the availability of the prediction (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1973: 
Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 33) and the consensus information (e.g. Olson et al. 1996).  
Predicting is an intrinsic act of the human being. More specifically, agents “both need to 
anticipate future events-by knowing what causes will produce what effects- and to find 
their anticipations validated by facts” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 34). Predictability 
is indeed the main cognitive element of self-efficacy (Bandura 1982).  
The third type of anticipatory representation I will deal with are the interested 
anticipatory representations, which are different from mere beliefs and predictions. 
Indeed, interested anticipatory representations imply goals; their constitutive cognitive 
elements are beliefs and goals about future states of affairs. An interested anticipatory 
representation according to Castelfranchi and Miceli “is composed of an epistemic 
anticipatory representation (either a belief of possibility or a prediction proper) about p, 
plus a goal about p (or not-p)” (2014: 37). Therefore, an interested anticipatory 
representation, unlike a mere epistemic anticipation, is never a cold anticipation but rather 
always has a valence. The valence is positive when the epistemic representation is in line 
with the goal (one has the goal that p and anticipates that p will occur or one has the goal 
	 	
	
	
115	
that not-p and anticipates that not-p will occur). On the contrary, the valence is negative 
when the epistemic representation is not in line with the goal (one has the goal that p and 
anticipates that not-p, or vice-versa) (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 38-39).  
Finally, in terms of valence, the more ‘strong’ type of anticipatory reasoning is the 
expectation, which is defined by Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 41) as an interested 
anticipatory representation implying a prediction about p conjoined with the goal that p 
(or not-p). Unlike, interested anticipatory representation, they base on a prediction and a 
goal and not simply on a belief and a goal. 
As previously said with reference to interested anticipatory representations, 
expectations may have a positive or negative valence. The valence will be positive when 
the goal is in line with the prediction, whereas it will be negative when the goal is not in 
line with the prediction. It is known from literature that expectations play a major role in 
the pre-decision making phase (e.g. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer 1987), by strongly 
guiding intention formation (or maintainance) and pursuit.  
If the degree of certainty of a prediction is high and if the goal is very important, 
then it will be very likely that the agent simulates a state of mind in which p appears as if 
it was already actualized (even though p is actually not yet realized). That is, positive 
expectations- entailing both a deeply-rooted belief that p will happen and the goal that it 
does happen- encourage the anticipatory impression of prelude of p’s accomplishment and 
the subjective pleasure bound with it (Miceli and Castelfranchi 1997: quoted in 
Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 43). Subsequently,  
 
if p doesn’t occur and the positive expectation is invalidated, the pain of p’s 
thwarting is likely to be greater than what one would experience either in the absence of 
any expectations or in the presence of a mere interested anticipatory representation (where 
the implied epistemic anticipation is a simple belief of possibility rather than a 
prediction), or in the presence of negative expectations (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 
43). 
 
 I will show a case of study (the BEBE case) in Section 10, in which it is evident the 
invalidation of a journalist’s positive expectation that his collegues should have followed 
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the editorial norms; when he realizes that this has not happened and that not following the 
newspaper’s guidelines has had a very negative outcome, he initiates an argumentative 
discussion and puts forth a negative evaluative standpoint referred to what has been 
previously made. Indeed, in this case of study, the journalist expects that a dramatic news 
such as that of the abandonment of a newborn is handled by the editorial team in an 
empathic and emotional way. He did not expect that the other journalists could have avoid 
to follow the newspapers’ guidelines, stating that news touching people’s sensitiveness 
should be handled in an empathic way, because it is an implicit editorial norm, which 
should tacitily be observed. It is known from literature that when failures are unexpected, 
they are usually harder to cope with than in case of expected ones (Mellers et al. 1997). 
The anticipated pleasure of a desired goal increases the pain caused by the goal’s non-
realization; indeed, if failed acquisitions arise after positive expectations, they can be 
compared to losses and can be seen as a form of grief.  
Nevertheless, a positive expectation does not simply imply a mere prediction 
conjoined with a goal. In positive expectations, the epistemic ‘should’ (frequently used in 
predictions becomes a deontic ‘ought’ (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2002). “The probabilistic 
force of predictions, conjoined with the motivational force of goals, produces a sort of 
normative belief: p is no longer viewed as something that should happen because it 
‘normally’ happens, but as something that is ‘prescribed’ to happen” (Castelfranchi and 
Miceli 2014: 43). The invalidation of a positive expectation has more serious 
consequences than invalidation of other anticipatory reasonings, since it causes a sensation 
of abuse, as if a norm was infringed and as if someone would undergo the injustice due to 
the norm’s infringement. The feeling of abuse is directly proportional to the force of the 
positive expectation; when the positive expectation is particularly strong, the sense of 
injustice increases a lot. When a positive expectation is invalidated, the consequent 
emotive reactions comprehend irritation, bitterness, and a sense of unfairness.  
Put in Castelfranchi and Miceli’s words, x’s positive expectation that p implies that: 
 
 (a) x’s prediction that p will occur; (b) x’s goal that p occurs; and (c) x’s implicit 
normative belief that p ought to occur, produced by the joined force of x’s prediction and 
x’s goal (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 4). 
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In case that p involves a human agent, then it is this agent who ought to behave as 
expected.  For example, Sara’s expectation that she will have a brilliant future in the 
Academia will probably imply some tacit norm set on every person who might play a 
causal role in the event of her moving ahead in the Academia, including herself. 
Furthermore, “the more the expectant believes p to be dependent on some agents’ 
intentional- rather than merely causal- behavior, and consequently holds such agents 
responsible for p’s realization, the more binding will be the norm set on them” 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 45).29 
Until now I have spoken of the normative feature which is typical of positive 
expectations. Unlike positive expectations, negative expectations do not imply normative 
features. When one agent has the goal that p but makes the prediction that not-p (or vice-
versa), “one does not set any deontic norm that p or not-p ought to happen” (Castelfranchi 
and Miceli 2014: 46): there is only a mere belief that not-p should (epistemically) happen, 
even though the agent would like that not-p does not happen. Unlike invalidation of 
positive expectation, when a negative expectation is disconfirmed, the agent who has the 
expectation will certainly be taken by surprise, but is very improbable to complain or feel 
upset. On the contrary, the agent will experience relief and gratification, because his goal 
p has been fulfilled. I will show that the invalidation of negative expectation is closely 
bound to a downward counterfactual reasoning that consists in the imagination of 
unrealized worse scenarios (for more details see Section 8.8). In the empirical part of the 
thesis I will show some case studies that deal with invalidation of negative expectation 
and counterfactual reasoning (Section 11.5).  
There is a tight relationship between violated expectations and counterfactual 
reasoning. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that violated expectations may easily 
promote counterfactual thinking (e.g. Roese and Olson 1995b; Sanna and Turley 1996). 
This is due to the fact that when one agent faces an undesired outcome, one will easily 
                                                
29 The framework developed by Castelfranchi and Miceli could benefit from the theory developed by 
Rocci (Rocci 2017a), in which he states that something is binding for the others in four situations: a) if 
one’s own goal is a common goal in one’s community, b) if by chance my goal corresponds to the 
other’s duty (a norm or a law for example) c) if a commitment exists involving the other: if the other 
has expressed the intention to do something d) if a religious thinking is conceived in which God is 
responsible for everything (Rocci 2017a). 
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contrast it with ‘what might have been’ in line with the initial expectation. More 
specifically, when disconfirmed positive expectations (predictions plus goals) are at stake, 
not only the “what might have been”, but also the “what ought to have been” path is 
followed. In this case two are the possible ways of interpreting the modal “ought”, which 
in a broad sense can be considered deontic. In one case, a personal deontic based on one’s 
own desire may be at stake; in order to reach the goal, it is necessary that the goal is not 
impossible and that there is a desire. In the other case, a stronger deontic -a stricto sensu 
deontic- may be at stake, in which a prediction plus a goal plus one of the conditions listed 
in footnote 21 is involved (Rocci 2017a). In the case of invalidated positive expectations, 
an upward counterfactual reasoning, simulating a better unrealized state of affairs, will be 
easily applied. Unlike violated expectations, disconfirmed beliefs and predictions might 
consist of simple disconfirmed beliefs about future states of affairs. In case of 
disconfirmed predictions, not only the “what might have been” but also the “what should 
(epistemically) have been” path is followed.  
 
 
5.4 Journalists’ types of anticipation in terms of audience uptake 
 
By looking at the interaction field of the newsrom, and considering its main goal, namely 
that of promoting public understanding, it is reasonable to expect that audience uptake 
anticipation plays a key role in my corpus; indeed, in my corpus I observed the presence 
of many cases concerning the anticipation of audience uptake. The term ‘uptake’ has been 
introduced by Austin, who maintained that the securing of uptake is fundamental to the 
performance of an illocutionary act (Austin 1962: 117). Indeed, following Austin (1962: 
22, 116), one of the main requirements for an illocutionary act to be “felicitous”, to take 
place, is that it must “secure uptake”: this means that the imagined audience for the speech 
act must both hear and grasp the point of what is said. Therefore, Austin’s focus is on the 
the comprehension of the illocutory act. 
The concept of uptake has been investigated under a different perspective by Clark (1996) 
and Sbisà (2002; 2009), who have a different conception of uptake in comparison to 
Austin. Indeed, both –and especially Clark- point at the importance of showing that the 
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illocutory act has been understood. In particular, Clark has mainly focused on uptake in 
joint actions; he states that “uptake is evidence of understanding” (Clark 1996: 200). In 
his conception, uptake is conceived as evidence of construal, since it provides evidence 
not only that the hearer understands an utterance, but also of the way in which the hearer 
interprets that utterance. In case that the speaker acknowledges the uptake, that construal 
can be considered as the joint construal. Furthermore, uptake also displays the level of 
commitment to an activity: for instance, imagine that Mary says “let’s go to the cinema 
tonight” and that John answers “Ok” or “Yes, it’s great!”. Finally, uptake gives the speaker 
the chance to validate or adjust the construal. For instance, imagine that a professor and 
his PhD student are correcting the student’s thesis in the professor’s office and the 
professor says to his PhD student ‘would you like to wait out, please?’ and the PhD student 
says ‘no, I prefer to wait’. The professor can adjust the construal and say ‘it wasn’t a 
suggestion, it was an order’. 
 As previously said, the notion of uptake has been studied also by Sbisà (Sbisà 2002; 
2009). The author claims that “illocutionary acts are conventional, first of all, because they 
have conventional effects” (Sbisà 2009: 33). According to Sbisà, Austin considered such 
effects as necessary to illocution and she argues that “the bringing about of conventional 
effects is bound up with the indispensability of uptake” (Sbisà 2009: 34). The author 
claims that the classical speech act theory is unable to clarify sequential features, and she 
focuses on the fact that no dialogue move can give rise to its conventional features if it is 
separated from its uptake. She says that  
 
while the role of uptake in illocution has usually been taken as evidence of the 
intention-based nature of illocutionary acts as opposed to their alleged conventionality, I 
reinterpret it as stemming from the conventionl status of the effects of illocutionary acts: 
it is in order for an utterance to produce conventional status of the effects of illocutionary 
acts: it is in order for an utterance to produce conventional effects that it needs to be 
understood as bringing about those effects  (Sbisà 2009: 34). 
 
Sbisà includes only implicitly the dimension of anticipation in her work; indeed, she asks 
herlsef “what happens to the illocutionary act, and to its conventional effects, if uptake is 
not achieved, or if actual uptake does not correspond to the speaker’s expectactations?”, 
but she does not develop a full theory on the relationship between speaker’s expectations 
and uptake. 
	 	
	
	
120	
  On the contrary, Bakhtin has made explicit the dimension of expectation involved 
in the uptake, stating that a speaker “talks with an expectation of the listener preparing a 
response” (Bakhtin 1986: 69). Furthermore, Bakhtin explicitly talks about the objects of 
the speaker’s expectation, which range from response, agreement, sympathy, objection, 
execution and so on, as we can read in the following passage; 
 
all real and integral understanding is actively responsive, and constitutes nothing 
other than the initial preparatory stage of a response (in whatever form it may be 
actualized). And the speaker himself is oriented precisely toward such an actively 
responsive understanding. He does not expect passive understanding that, so to speak, 
only duplicates his own idea in someone else’s mind. Rather, he expects response, 
agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth (various speech genres propose 
presuppose various integral orientations and speech plans on the part of the speakers or 
writers). The desire to make one’s speech understood is only an abstract aspect of the 
speaker’s concrete and total speech plan. (Bakhtin 1986:69).  
 
Even though Bakhtin does not speak of argumentation, he implicitly assumes its 
importance in dialogue; indeed, he speaks of agreement and objection, which are two 
commonly used terms in argumentation theory. The former is typically used to refer to an 
opinion divergence which has been resolved in some way in the concluding stage, whereas 
the latter is typically used to refer to an argument put forth in opposition to another during 
the argumentation stage.   
Furthermore, in an often quoted passage, Bakhtin says that “utterances are not 
indifferent to one another and are not self-sufficient; they are aware of and mutually reflect 
one another” (Bakhtin 1986: 91). Therefore, each contribution to a dialogue is intrinsically 
‘other-oriented’, comprehending an interpretation of previous contributions and at the 
same time being sketched to involve some sort of prolongation, thus also comprising a 
prospective interpretation, or anticipation, of what is going to follow.  
The analyzed authors -in particular Clark and Sbisà- have in mind a conversational 
situation in which the audience uptake is evident, whereas in the context of news media 
the audience uptake is not evident at all. 
  In what follows I show a typology of audience uptake anticipation in terms of 
‘objects of anticipation’ classified on the basis of their belonging to the three distinct levels 
of the linguistic act, namely the illocutionary, the locutionary and the perlocutionary level, 
as it is shown in Figure 10; 
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Figure 10. Typology of audience uptake anticipation on the basis of their belonging to the three 
distinct levels of the linguistic act, namely the illocutionary, the locutionary and the 
perlocutionary level. 
As it is shown in Fig. 10, we can distinguish between a) anticipation of audience 
interpretation, which deals with either the locutionary or the illocutionary force and a b) 
anticipation of audience persuasion, which can aim to modify the audience attitude (acting 
either on the cognitive or on the emotive uptake of the audience or on both) or the audience 
behavior, therefore dealing with the perlocutionary force. The notion of uptake in literature 
on linguistic acts is situated inbetween locution, illocution and perlocution: I conceive 
uptake in a broad sense, dealing with the whole scope of locutionary and perlocutionary 
effects. I am particularly interested in cognitive and emotive effects and not in 
conventional effects, since persuasive effects are the most important ones in the context 
of news media. Indeed, uptake’s signals from the audience are indirect and limited in 
journalism, differently from the conversations analyzed by Clark for instance. 
Anticipation of persuasion is the most prominent type of anticipation in the 
newsroom, since journalists’ ultimate goal is that of capturing the most possible number 
of readers or TV-viewers in order to promote public understanding (Perrin 2013): this goal 
is reached whereby a persuasive appeal that deploys the journalists’ emotions and that acts 
on the audience attitude and/or behavior. In fact, also according to Aristotle, persuasion 
may be reached thanks to the reciprocal and mutual action of ethos (persuasive appeal 
bound to the persuader’s character and moral fiber), logos, i.e. persuasion through “the 
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arguments (logoi) when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is 
persuasive in each case” (1356a, 39), and pathos (the consideration of the emotions of the 
audience). Following Aristotle, there is persuasion 
 
 through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the 
speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and 
more quickly on all subjects in general and and completely so in cases where there is not 
exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from 
previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some 
of the technical writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness on the 
part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, 
so to speak, the controlling factor in persuading (Rhetoric 1365a). 
 
 On the contrary, pathos alludes to persuasion that takes place “through the hearers 
when they are led to feel emotion […] by the speech” (Rhetoric 1356a, 38) and is defined 
as “putting the audience in a certain frame of mind” (Rhetoric 1356a). In the Rhetoric of 
Aristotle, we find a positive view of persuasion, since Aristotle claims that persuasion is 
a means that may help to convey truth. In the journalism domain, we can say that cognitive 
and emotive anticipation are a sub-type of audience persuasion, since journalists try to 
modify or strengthen the audience emotions or cognitions to reach the final aim of 
persuading the audience to think and consequently to act in the way that journalist deem 
convenient and desirable.  
At a first glance, it may be difficult to distinguish between audience interpretation 
uptake and audience cognitive uptake; in order to explain the difference I retake Rocci’s 
distinction between pragmatic (communicative) inferences and argumentative 
(communicated) inferences (Rocci 2006); following Rocci (2006) 
 
 marrying argumentation theory and inferential pragmatics can help us to 
distinguish two kinds of inferential processes involved in argumentative discourse – 
corresponding respectively to what we can call the communicative and the persuasive 
dimensions in argumentation- and to elucidate the interplay between these two kinds of 
inference, on which the interpretation and acceptance of argumentation rests (Rocci 
2006: 418-419).  
 
In line with Rocci’s distinction between communicative and communicated 
inferences, I will consider journalists’ audience interpretation uptake that deals with the 
locutionary force as based on communicative (pragmatic) inferences, and journalists’ 
audience interpretation that deals with the illocutionary force as well as journalists’ 
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anticipation of audience cognitive and emotive uptake as based on communicated 
inferences, namely on those further inferences that arise from the initial comprehension of 
the journalistic product. Differently from communicative inferences, which deal with the 
change of the comprehension of communicative intentions, communicated inferences deal 
with the proposal of an inferential path, whose result is a change of belief in the audience: 
in short, if communicative inferences deal with a change of understanding, communicated 
inferences deal with a change of belief. In order to clarify this point, I will now insert some 
examples of audience interpretation that deal with both locutionary and illocutionary 
force.  
An example of audience uptake interpretation dealing with the locutionary level of 
a linguistic act can be found in the retrospective verbal protocol made to the journalist that 
has written an item on a prolonged duel for a seat between Venezuela and Guatemala 
concercning the election for five-nonpermanent countries for the United Nations Security 
Council. In the following exerpt, in which the journalist refers to his collaboration with 
the cutter, we can see how the focus of his anticipatory reasoning is the language and its 
comprehensibility itself in view of the audience uptake; 
Obviously I look with an eye what he is doing/ and i try 
even to shorten my text a little bit/ I try to improve the 
language (0359-
0362)(RVP,sf_ts_061018_1300_strub_sicherheitsratabstimmung_verbal.txt)  
In a similar fashion, in a subsequent passage of the same retrospective verbal 
protocol, the journalist points at the importance of modifying some linguistic aspect in 
order to make text implicatures more comprehensible for the audience: 
Especially in languages/ that we understand well/ […]/ 
when in the background you can hear english/ that he says 
one thousand and eight hundred eighty/ and we say one 
thousand and nine hundred eighty/ even when it is meant 
one thousand and nine hundred eighty/ yes this is tricky/ 
we can correct this a bit with the tone down/ so that we 
do not hear it/ because it has no sense/ to confront people 
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with such a linguistic error(0513-0526) 
(sf_ts_061018_1300_strub_sicherheitsratabstimmung_verbal.txt) 
I n this interesting passage, in which the journalist faces a content error in the text 
of the interviewed person, he attempts to convey a coherent information to the audience. 
In particular, the interviewed person utters a wrong figure in English (one thousand and 
eighty hundred eighty) and the journalist corrects it in German (one thousand and nine 
hundred eighty): the item looks like an ambiguous multimodal text. The journalist 
translates into German the correct figure, namely what the interviewed person should have 
said (according to the truthfulness of facts) but that has not said. However, this 
juxtaposition creates a situation in which two contradictory messages to the audience are 
conveyed; the journalist seems to be aware of the fact that it would be detrimental to 
convey two contradictory messages simoultaneously to the audience. Therefore, the 
journalist decides to eliminate all doubts on the propositional content by lower the tone, 
so that the message will be clear, correct and truthful. 
For what concerns illocutionary audience uptake interpretation, journalists often 
reflect on the illocutionary effect of style, text genres, layout and graphical disposition on 
the audience interpretation of the news. This deals with the communicated inferences of 
texts. In my corpus, I have found that quotations often play a crucial role in this sense; the 
way in which they are disposed acts as a semiotic tool to reach a journalist’s desired 
communicative inference instead of another. The issue of how journalists should 
adequately contextualize a given quotation in order to enable the audience to understand 
the reported news is not new in literature on rhetorics of the news (Cramer 2011; Haapanen 
2016; in press 2017a; in press 2017b). In particular Haapanen conveived the quoting 
process as an intertextual chain and devoted his work to find out how these quoting 
practices link the original interview discourse into the final quotation discourse. In what 
follows I show an excerpt of a retrospective verbal protocol in which the journalist argues 
that the quotation should be attached to the item in a coherent way;  
the quotation cannot simply be attached/ but rather there 
should be a connection/ sometimes it is difficult to make 
connecting passages/ because it is a big danger/ if you 
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say something in one sentence that says/ what you can hear 
afterwards in the discourse/ sometimes you also have to do 
that/ because perhaps the quotation is not so 
comprehensible/ you must a bit help/ at the beginning you 
could have attached the quotation directly/ I think/ it 
would be a further difficulty for the hearer/ because it 
is everything so quick/ he has to comprehend it then (0441-
0454)(sf_ts_061018_1300_strub_sicherheitsratabstimmung_verbal.txt) 
Also in the following passage of the same retrospective verbal protocol the 
journalist uses quotations’ dispositio as a semiotic tool that should help the hearer to better 
understand the news; 
these two quotations/ what you can make in certain cases/ 
and what we also make/ i have now found that here it is 
not so good/ it is-/ they have to be placed into each 
other/ they have to be strictly connected among each other 
in order that it functions/ otherwise the comprehension is 
relatively difficult(0604-0612) 
(sf_ts_061018_1300_strub_sicherheitsratabstimmung_verbal.txt) 
Also style can be used by journalists as a semiotic tool in order to reach their 
communicative objectives. We see an example of how the style contributes in helping the 
journalist to reach his communicative intention in the subsequent excerpt of the 
retrospective verbal protocol. In the retrospective interview a journalist reflects on a news 
piece concerning the famous Austrian circus Roncalli for the program Tagesschau; 
here I have reflected on how/ how i come to this poetry/ 
how i make the connection/ i had „poetry“/ i am now arrived 
to eroticism/ and he speaks then afterwards about poetry 
again/ how do i guide the hearer to that/ or the viewer/ 
and he has talked frequently of poetry/ always with 
reference to the circus/ in the circus poetry for him means 
that and that/ therefore I have now retaken the word 
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“circus”/ […]/ but now I am thinking all the time/ what 
they connect with the word/ or with the keyword poetry/or 
with the concept/ that in roncalli is so strong (0765) 
(RVP, sf_ts_061031_1930_rierola_roncalli_verbal.txt). 
In this case the journalist inserts the term “poetry” in order to be coherent with 
what the interviewed person has said, namely an artist of the circus; he has decided to 
repeat the word “poetry” because it is a keyword and it has a very important meaning in 
the circus. 
Turning to the graphical layout in the newspaper, this can also be can function as 
a semiotic tool for enabling audience understanding, as we can see the FORM case30, 
dealing with a case of study of the CdT corpus, in which there is a divergence of opinion 
among two journalists concerning the positioning of the title imposed by a given layout 
template. The debated issue concerns the understandability of the identitity of the 
interviewed person. The journalist who is contrary to keep the layout template says that 
the layout should not be kept because one starts reading from “Coming back 
from Sundance festival” which is on the left side/ and then 
one must go down to the headline to find the name of the 
speaker (0284-0288). This journalist thus supports the standpoint that the audience 
will not understand easily the identity of the interviewed person. On the contrary, the 
journalist in favor of the questioned layout says that the layout should be kept because 
this template is hard to dispense with/ it allows to make 
a full-page opening/ when we have a photo/ that if we would 
put in five columns/ in this format it would become 
unacceptable (0306-0311).31 This is a clear example of how journalists can 
conceive graphical elements as semiotic tools and use them to lead the audience to a 
better understanding of the news. (Editorial conference, 
cst_cdt_130128_1030_editorial_discourse_1.docx).  
                                                
30 I will go into more details of this case study in chapter 11.6 when I will analyse the case of study as 
a case of downward counterfactual reasoning. 
31	For a detailed analysis of the FORM case see Luciani, Rocci and Zampa 2014.		
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After having illustrated some examples of audience uptake anticipation dealing 
with the locutionary and illocutionary level, I will now present some examples of the 
anticipations of the audience uptake that deal with the perlocutionary level. In every case 
journalists’ anticipations concerning the effects of news products’ details on the audience 
all lead to persuasion; indeed, they often anticipate the best ways in which the audience 
may be persuaded to think and behave in the way that they deem correct or convenient, in 
such a way that the audience uptake will be updated forming an image of the situation that 
they deem to be appropriate or expedient. Indeed, there is a journalist’s effort to give an 
expedient and correct view of the world. Journalists’ anticipations can deal with the 
audience’s changes of belief, of emotive or evaluative stance: sometimes they even 
concern the imagination of behavior’s changes, both in punctual as well as in general 
terms. For instance, journalists attempt to change the audience behavior in a punctual way 
when they anticipate that a detail of a news item will convince them to watch a given news 
program or to read a given news item. Differently, journalists will attempt to change the 
audience behavior in a general way when they anticipate that the audience will stop having 
racial prejudices if they broadcast/ publish news in a certain way instead on another. It is 
important to notice that the audience behavior is always inevitably mediated by a change 
of beliefs and of evaluative attitudes: there cannot be a change of behavior if there is not 
a change of cognitive and/or emotive attiude before. Indeed, journalists’ persuasion is 
supposed to act at the level of audience opinion formation that in turn may influence 
audience behavior. The anticipation of persuasion that aims at modifying the audience 
behavior is the most perlocutionary type of anticipation, since it aims at modifying an 
action of the audience and not simply an opinion or an attitude. With reference to this 
point, it is wise to remark that usually promises, threats, prises and punishments are used 
in order to persuade someone to carry out a certain action; journalists do not have these 
tools at their disposal in order to lead the audience to change its goals. All in all, the 
anticipation of persuasion can be said to be the superordinate kind of perlocutionary 
anticipation, since it comprehends both cognitive and emotive anticipation of audience 
uptake, as it is shown in Figure .  
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Anticipating others’ emotions and cognitions is an instrument to state in advance 
which goals the others want to pursue and to regulate consequently one’s own behavior 
correspondingly. Furthermore, the possibility to know how the others will behave gives 
the chance to have a certain effect or to exercise some power on them. Indeed, if one has 
the possibility to know in advance the others’ cognitions and/or emotions, one has the 
possibility to reach the desired effect on the other; it is a complex kind of anticipation, 
since it is not a simply antcitipation of what the others might do, but rather it is an 
anticipation of an effect of a possible action, of what the others might do as an answer to 
one’s possible action. It is an anticipation of a perlocutive effect ‘if I say this thing, the 
audience might feel threatened’; it is not only a simple anticipation that regulates my 
actions, but rather it is a simulation of the effects of one’s actions, it is a simulation of the 
effects of a prospective behavior that is not still present.   
After having said why the anticipation of persuasion can be said to be the 
superordinate type of anticipation of audience uptake with reference to perlocutionary 
effects, I will now analyse into details its subordinate components related to the attiude, 
namely the cognitive uptake anticipation and the emotive uptake anticipation.  
Firstly, journalists may anticipate the audience cognitive uptake when they want 
to predict how the audience could logically understand and cognitively elaborate a certain 
content or layout template of a news. The objects of this type of anticipation are all the 
mental activities that the audience uses in the acquisition of knowledge and information 
as well as in understanding. I will show an example of this type of anticipation in Chapter 
8, which is a case in which emotive and cognitive anticipation are strictly intertwined, and 
in Chapter 6 (the PIAZ case), in which the cognitive anticipation is explicitly subordinated 
to the anticipation of persuasion, in which the persuasion is aimed at modifying the 
audience action.   
Secondly, journalists may anticipate the audience emotive uptake, in which the 
object of their anticipation are the emotions. I will devote a particular attention to this type 
of anticipation in subsection 5.4, since anticipation of audience emotive uptake is 
pervasive in the data and since it often plays a crucial role in arguing editorial decisions. 
Journalists anticipate the way in which the audience will emotionally react to the news; 
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they anticipate whether the audience could be struck, shocked and impressed. Certain 
editorial decisions concerning the topic, the content and the way of presenting a news may 
be more or less emotionally involving and may lead to distinct emotive reactions.  
An important way of anticipation of how to modify the audience’s attitude is represented 
by journalists’ attempt to anticipate the way in which the audience may interpret news’ 
contents depending on how they are proposed; this type of anticipation represents what is 
usually called ‘news’ framing’ in media studies. All the definitions of news framing that 
are given in media and journalism studies are vague, conceiving news framing as a simple 
mode of presentation of information, as it is witnessed by the following definition by 
Scheufele and Tewksbury; 
As a macroconstruct, the term ‘‘framing’’ refers to modes of presentation that 
journalists and other communicators use to present information in a way that resonates 
with existing underlying schemas among their audience (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). 
This does not mean, of course, that most journalists try to spin a story or deceive their 
audiences. In fact, framing, for them, is a necessary tool to reduce the complexity of an 
issue, given the constraints of their respective media related to news holes and airtime 
(Gans, 1979) (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 12). 
 
However, news framing is much more than a simple mode of presenting 
information. At a fine-grained analysis ‘news framing’ appears to involve journalists’ 
argumentation in favor of an implicit standpoint. With reference to this, I follow Van 
Eemeren’s idea that “framing always involves an interpretation of reality that puts the fact 
or events referred to in a certain perspective” (Van Eemeren 2010: 126). Following the 
path traced by Greco Morasso (2009), he emphasizes that the theoretical consideration on 
frames illustrates that the linguistic characterization of a point in question cannot be 
impartial, since the way in which we define a given issue is always profoundly intertwined 
with its interpretation and is always valenced, namely it depends on the value that we 
ascribe to it. Following Greco Morasso, in fact, “there is a strong interrelation between 
frames and cultural premises, which may be then used in argumentation to build up 
arguments in favour of a certain standpoint” (Greco Morasso 2012: 200). Following Greco 
Morasso I argue that news framing, whereby the choice of certain presentational devices, 
acts as a generator of cultural premises “which are then used by the journalist to support a 
certain standpoint” (Greco Morasso 2012: 200). In addition to this argumentative framing, 
there is also a conception of framing derived by the linguistic analysis of Fillmore et alii, 
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who investigate the microlevel of framing. They have made many examples of frames 
(Fillmore 1976; Fillmore and Atkins 1992); the use of certain verbs and nouns instead of 
others can evoke a particular scenario without making every term belonging to the frame 
explicit. From a cognitive perspective, this means that frames do not necessarily require 
to be complete, since journalists can rely on their audience contextual and encyclopedic 
knowledge to fill in gaps (Van Dijk 2004). A conception of the framing in Fillmorian 
terms may also play a role in journalists’ arguing in favor of an implicit standpoint; the 
evoking of a given perspective instead of another may act as a datum in the argumentation. 
After this brief overview on argumentative news framing, it becomes clear why journalists 
aim at modifying the audience attitude whereby the anticipation of the audience emotions 
and cognitions as effects of their potential news products; depending on the way in which 
journalists decide to frame the news and therefore to argue in favour of their own 
individual –often implicit- standpoint, the audience will imagine and conceive the reported 
event in a certain way instead of another and will build a more or less desirable opinion 
(desirable in view of the journalist’s goals and desires) of the reported event.  
In the empirical part of this dissertation I will show four major case studies that deal 
with the above mentioned distinct types of journalists’ anticipation of audience uptake. To 
a large extent I will deal with anticipation of persuasion that can encompass the change of 
the audience attitude and/or behavior, as I have shown in subsection 5.3. In table 3 I show 
a list of these major case studies. To each of them is devoted an entire Chapter, in which I 
analyse from a contextual and argumentative point of view both newsmaking texts and 
news products.  
 
Table 3. Major case studies analysed in the dissertation, classified on the basis of the type of 
medium, type of interaction and type of anticipation. 
 Type of 
medium 
Type of data Type of 
anticipation 
Topic of the 
case of study 
Argumentative 
issue 
TEMPO 
case 
TV 
(SRG, 
10vor10) 
Editorial 
conference, 
informal 
discourse, 
Retrospective 
verbal 
Anticipation 
of audience 
emotive 
uptake 
News 
concerning a 
girl run over 
by a car in a 
residential 
area. 
Should we publish 
the item 
highlighting the 
adjusted speed of 
the car or not? 
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protocol 
(RVP) 
JUGE 
case 
TV 
(SRG, 
10vor10) 
Editorial 
conference, 
Restrospective 
verbal 
protocol 
(RVP) 
Anticipation 
of audience 
emotive and 
cognitive 
uptake 
News about 
youth 
aggressiveness 
against elderly 
people. 
Should we make 
another topic on 
youth 
aggressiveness? 
BEBE 
case 
Press 
(CdT) 
Editorial 
conference 
Anticipation 
of audience 
emotive 
uptake 
Evaluation of 
a published 
news on an 
abandoned 
baby. 
Was the way in 
which we handled 
the news of the 
baby good? 
PIAZ 
case 
Press 
(CdT) 
Editorial 
conference 
Anticipation 
of persuasion 
(behavior), 
anticipation 
of audience 
interpretation 
Discussion 
about how to 
promote TV- 
political 
debates on the 
newspaper 
How should we 
frame the item in 
order not to make a 
less journalistic 
thing? 
 
In Chapter 9 I will focus on a case (the TEMPO case) in which the anticipation of 
emotions leads to a rhetorically constructed item and implements a strategic maneuvering. 
In Chapter 7 I will focus on a case of study (the JUGE case) that deals with journalists’ 
reliance on previous positive outcomes for predicting the impression that a news could 
have on the audience. Finally, in Chapter 10 a case of study will be shown in which the 
journalist negatively evaluates the way in which a previous item was handled and proposes 
to adopt a new way of handling touching news, in such a way that cares of the emotional 
impact on the audience. Further examples of audience anticipation will be examined in 
Chapter 11, with an empirical part which focuses on the interaction between anticipation 
and counterfactual reasoning. As it becomes clear from the table above, journalists’ 
anticipation of emotions is a widespread tendency in the data I have analysed. Therefore, 
in the following subsection I will analyse into more detail the theoretical mechanisms of 
emotive anticipation, a very peculiar type of anticipation.  
 
 
5.5 Anticipating emotions 
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As previously said, journalists’ anticipation of audience emotions is the most prominent 
type of anticipation in newsroom activities: therefore, I will briefly explain the way in 
which anticipatory representations of possible future emotions function. Anticipated 
emotions are future emotions that are not present at the moment of the anticipation. For 
instance, Paola may anticipate that she will be happy when her friend Margherita will go 
to her place to visit her after that they have not met for a long time. Future emotions are 
the objects of this type of anticipatory representations. Further distinction can be made 
between anticipation of one’s own emotions and anticipation of other subjects’ emotions: 
for instance, Margherita may anticipate that her friend Paola will be happy when she will 
go to her place to visit her after that they have not met for a long time. Anticipation of 
audience uptake is by definition anticipation of others’ emotions. 
There are different types of emotions’ anticipatory representations; each emotion 
can be the object of a belief, of a possibility, of a prediction, of an interested anticipatory 
representation and of an expectation. 
As stated by Castelfranchi and Miceli, 
 
 An emotion may be the object of either a belief of possibility, when a future 
emotional state is assigned up to 0.5 probability, or of a more or less certain prediction, 
when the chance threshold has been exceeded. An emotion may also be the object of a 
(positive or negative) interested anticipatory representation or expectation proper when 
the epistemic anticipatory representation (either a belief of possibility or a prediction) 
about a future emotion is associated with the goal to feel or not to feel that emotion 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 184). 
 
Anticipated emotions can be said to be complex mental states, since they are 
composed of “mental states about mental states” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 184). 
This ability to reason and anticipate own and others’ states of mind corresponds to what 
in literature is known as ‘theory of mind’, namely when an agent “imputes mental states 
to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory 
because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make 
predictions about the behavior of others” (Premack and Woodruf 1978: 515).  
Emotions’ anticipatory representations are made up by beliefs and goals about a 
particular kind of future mental states, namely emotions. They not only involve beliefs 
and goals about future state of affairs, but rather they involve beliefs and goals about future 
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states of affairs and belief and goals about emotions. In the following figure I will 
schematize the anticipation of one’s own emotions with an anticipatory epistemic attitude; 
 
 
Figure 11. Epistemic anticipatory attitude of one’s own emotions. 
 
As we can see from the Figure 11, in this case a mental state of one’s own mental 
state is at stake; the agent has an epistemic anticipatory attitude (based on a belief) 
concerning one’s own emotions concerning a given state of affairs.  
The situation will be different in case that an agent anticipates his own future 
emotions concerning a given state of affairs and in case that he has the goal of feeling 
these emotions, as I show in Figure 12; 
 
EmotionX
X
Anticipation ₑ
s (state of affairs)
Anticipation of one’s own emotions: epistemic anticipatory attitude,
based on beliefs
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Figure 12. Anticipatory attitude based on goals of one’s own emotions.	
 
A different path is followed in cases that one agent’s anticipation does not deal with 
his own emotions but rather with another agent’s emotions. In cases that one agent does 
not simply anticipate his own emotions, but rather in cases that he anticipates the emotions 
of another agent, a mental state of another agent’s mental state concerning a state of affairs 
is at stake, as I show in Figure 13 below: 
EmotionX
X
Anticipation (goal)
s (state of affairs)
Anticipation of one’s own emotions: anticipatory attitude based on
goals
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Figure 13. Epistemic anticipatory attitude based on beliefs of another agent’s emotions. 
 
In the case of an epistemic anticipatory attitude (based on beliefs) the agent of the 
mental state of another agent’s mental state concerning a state of affairs is at stake. A 
person X has an epistemic anticipatory attitude (belief) concerning another agent’s 
emotions (Y) concerning a given state of affairs. In the journalism domain, this could be 
the case when a journalist has an epistemic anticipatory attitude towards the audience’s 
emotions concerning a given state of affairs.  
Differently an agent may have not only a simple belief but rather a goal that another 
agent feels a given emotion with reference to a given state of affairs, as I show in Figure 
14; 
EmotionX (journalists)
Y (audience)
Anticipation ₑ
s (state of affairs)
Anticipation of another agent’s emotions: epistemic anticipatory
attitude, based on beliefs
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Figure 14. Anticipatory attitude based on goals of another agent’s emotions. 
 
For instance, in the journalistic domain, journalists may have the goal of inducing 
the audience to experience disappointment; journalists may anticipate the audience’s 
emotions in response to a certain news.  
Generally speaking, in order to predict others’ behavior and to communicate with 
them it is important not only to recognize and evaluate the others’ emotions (e.g. Salovey 
and Meyer 1990; Salovey and Grewal 2005), but also to anticipate their future emotions 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 194). In particular, Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014) claim 
that “both understanding people’s concurrent feelings and predicting the feelings they will 
experience are a means for predicting their goals” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 194). 
Therefore, it goes without saying that predicting others’ goals by anticipating their 
emotions is instrumental to modify their behavior and to influence them, it is a means for 
EmotionX (journalists)
Y (audience)
Anticipation (goal)
s (state of affairs)
Anticipation of another agent’s emotions: anticipatory attitude based
on goals
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persuading. Journalists’ anticipation of audience emotions may be a means to induce the 
audience to build a certain opinion on the reported event. In the next subsection I will 
focus on the tight relationship between emotions’ anticipation and persuasion.  
 
 
5.6 Anticipating persuasion  
 
That anticipating the others’ emotions may be a means of persuasion is clear since from 
Classical Rhetoric. Indeed, in his Rhetorics, Aristotle highlights that it is desirable to 
modify the audience’s emotions whenever there is the necessity, therefore giving an 
implicit example of pathos and implicitly delineating the first psychological theory of the 
audience;  
 
 So that whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid, it is 
necessary to make them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding them that others 
greater than they have suffered, and showing that their equals are suffering or have 
suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner 
and at times when they did not think it likely (Aristotele, Retorica, II, 1383a. 13-17).  
 
Aristotle has a positive conception of persuasion: the word Πίστις (pistis) plays a 
crucial role in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Depending on the distinct contexts we can translate it 
into reliability, consideration, reasonable adhesion, proof, argument or persuasion. It is 
bound to the indoeuropean root *bheid- that conveys the meaning of trust (Rigotti 1995, 
1997, Benveniste 1976: 89). In ancient greek, πιστός means “faithful”, πείθοµαι means 
“obey”, πείθω «persuade» that originally according to Benveniste’s reconstruction means 
“to make someone obey you”. In Latin πίστις means argumentum, and πείθω means 
(per)suadeo, which is a verb bound to an indoeuropean root that vehiculates the meaning 
of ‘sweetness’ (lat. suavis, ted. Süß, ingl. sweet) (Rocci 2017b 91). The attention to 
persuasion in the rhetorical study of argumentation can be traced back to Aristotle’s 
definition of rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in any case the available means of 
persuasion” (Rhetoric I, 2, 1355b 26-27), and in rhetorical studies derived from Aristotle 
arguments are nearly always considered as means of persuasion. The bond between the 
positive conception of persuasion and anticipation of another agent’s emotions is very 
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tight; indeed, when a rhetor wants to persuade and to make someone trust and follow him, 
his communication will attempt to modify the audience beliefs by anticipating the emotion 
that the audience will feel as a consequence of his discourse. 
According to Aristotle, persuading through rhetorics is useful, since it helps to reach 
truth. If truth is not reached, this is due to the fact that the speaker has not succeeded in 
bringing it to light and in showing it: 
 
It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring under the rules of art what is 
outside the subject, and have rather inclined to the forensic branch of oratory. 
Nevertheless, rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are naturally superior to their 
opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made, they must owe their defeat to their 
own advocates; which is reprehensible (Rhetoric I, 1355a) 
 
Furthermore, Aristotle argues in favor of persuasion, since he maintains that it is 
praiseworthy to defend oneself with words instead that with the body, since language is 
unique to humans.   
 
Besides, it would be absurd if it were considered disgraceful not to be able to 
defend onself with the help of the body, but not disgraceful as far as speech is concerned, 
whose use is more characteristic of man than that of the body. If it is argued that one who 
makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a great deal of harm, this objection 
applies equally to all good things except virtue, and above all to those things which are 
most useful, such  as strength, health, wealth, generalship; for as these, rightly used, may 
be of the greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm. 
(Rhetoric I, 1355b) 
 
Moreover, Aristotle also claims that there is a tight interrelation between 
argumentation and persuasion; 
  
It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with any one definite class of subjects, 
but, like Dialectic, [is of general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its 
function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing means of 
persuasion (Rhetoric I, 1355b). 
[…] 
… It is further evident that it belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent 
means of  persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the real and apparent 
syllogism (Retorica I, 1355b). 
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In more recent times, looking at the contributions from argumentation it is not 
infrequent to find occurences of the word ‘argument’ designated by remarking notions of 
persuading, for instance van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 43 and all chapter 3), 
Johnson and Blair (1977: 3), Johnson (200: 168), and Pinto 1995 (reprinted in Pinto 2001: 
32), as stated in Pinto (Pinto 2003: 1).  
In particular, Pinto sees arguments as “invitations to inference” (Pinto 1996: 168), 
and as “a set of statements or propostitions that one person offers to another in the attempt 
to induce that other person to accept some conclusion” (Pinto 2001: 32). According to 
him, an argument presented in a given communicative context is persuasive per se, since 
it can produce modifications in that context, and can act on the behavior and duties of 
participants in that context (Pinto 2003:1).  
This interdependent relationship between argumentation and persuasion fits very 
well the definition of persuasive intention given by Castelfranchi and Miceli, that conceive 
the persuasive intention as an “intention to modify, through communication, another’s 
beliefs as a means for modifying (generating, activating, or just increasing the value of) 
the other’s goals” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 195; Miceli et al. 2006). In particular, 
with reference to persuasion through emotions, they refer to a persuasive intention that 
uses the others’ emotions. The peculiarity of this particular type of persuasion is that in 
emotional persuasion the persuader P uses emotions (and not other means) in order to 
attempt to change the recipient’s beliefs and, subsequently, his goals. I will show an 
interesting case in which journalists try to emotionally persuade the audience by 
anticipating the TV-viewers emotions in Chapter 9.
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6. Anticipating persuasion in an editorial conference 
discussion 
 
 
6.1 Argumentative analysis of a journalists’ discussion on news’ framing 
 
The case of study presented in this Chapter is based on a Monday morning editorial 
conference, held on the 21st January 2013 in the newsroom of CdT. Typically, during 
Monday morning editorial conferences, journalists argue newsmaking decisions about 
news items for the upcoming week. In the case under investigation, the discussion is 
focused on the way in which the newspaper should cover two political debates to be 
broadcasted on TV. The two debates deal with the incoming local elections in Switzerland, 
to be held in April 2013, for the renewal of the Executive and of the Legislative of the 
Municipality of Lugano. The coverage of the TV debates by CdT also has a promotional 
side. In fact, the local TV- station Teleticino is owned by the same media company 
controlling Corriere del Ticino and the concerned political talk-show, Piazza del Corriere, 
employs the same brand of the newspaper CdT. In the Monday morning editorial 
conference journalists discussed the way in which the two debates could have been 
promoted via newspaper articles. In table 4 I list the four news items (A, B, C, D) 
concerning the town elections: 
 
Table 4. List of the news items published on CdT and respective TV debate broadcasted on 
TeleTicino.  
Date CdT article Debate Article discussed 
during January 21 
editorial conference? 
25 January 2013 A) First TV debate no 
26 January 2013 B) article about 1st 
debate 
Second debate yes 
 C) article about 1st 
debate 
Second debate yes 
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 D) article about 2nd 
debate 
Second debate no 
 
 
One newspaper item was published the day before the first debate, enticing people to 
watch the first debate (A). The other three newspaper items was published the day after 
the first debate and before second debate (B, C, D). (B) reported the main highlights of the 
TV-debate broadcast on the previous evening, (C) provided complementary information 
on the topics being debated, and (D) had the function of promotional item for the TV 
debate of the 27th January. The debate during the editorial conference focuses on articles 
B and C. It is interesting to stress that the case study deals with the interweaving of print-
journalism and TV-journalism; indeed, we observe an inter-media chain in the editorial 
conferences, which can be found also in the news items published in the newspaper.  
As typically for Monday conferences preparing the news budget for the week, the 
interaction scheme is deliberative. The participants to the analysed discussion are two 
journalists: one of them is the desk editor of the news section and the other one is the desk 
editor of the Canton section and will also lead the forthcoming TV-debate on TeleTicino. 
The interaction field is the CdT, but also the entire media group TImedia to which both 
the newspaper and the TV station belong. Journalists aim at taking a decision on how the 
items on the town elections debates should be framed. Since the news section has the duty 
of publishing news concerning daily topics, and since CdT has the goal of not publishing 
pure summaries of events, the issue is all focused on the news’ framing. The issue at stake 
in the discussion is: “how should we frame the items on town elections?” The issue at 
stake can be inferred from the following textual elements:  
(1) X1 0001: On the basis of the program kindly received 
from [name of the show’s host]/ 0002: as news section in order 
to avoid to do a truly un-journalistic thing/ 0003: we 
discussed also with [name of the show’s host]/ 0004: that is 
just saying yesterday evening teleticino did electoral 
debates. 
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By looking at extract (1), we notice the journalist’s intention not to insert an article 
that simply repeats what has been said about electoral debates on TeleTicino and not to 
make an un-journalistic thing, meaning a news devoid of newsworthy content. 
The desk editor of the news section goes on highlighting the importance of inserting 
an interview on the same topic of that discussed in the television studio but to other 
politicians with respect to those present in the television studio: 
(2) 0010: however in short starting from the twentyfive 
when you will go on the air/ 0011: on the twentysix we will 
say yesterday evening etcetera etcetera/ 0012: and then we 
will hear other politicians in respect to those present in 
the television studio/ 0013: with a brief declaration on that 
topic/ 0014: and we will interview people/ 0015: more or less 
interested in the topic 
In so doing, journalists can reach two distinct but interwined aims: on the one hand, 
they can reach a promotional aim, namely the cross-medial promotion, and on the other 
hand, they can guarantee the journalistic quality by avoiding to make a mere summary. It 
is thanks to the focus on the same topic of the TV-debate deepened by other politicians 
that the newspaper article can be truly complementary to the TV-debate: if the newspaper 
handled a different topic, it would not reach the promotional aim, whereas if the newspaper 
made a mere summary of what had happened during the TV-debate, it would not satisfy 
journalistic quality.  
Then, the discussion concentrates on what to pusblish in the period of time that goes 
between one debate and the other, and focuses on news item B. Let us now analyse 
journalists’ discussion on the news item B. Journalists project themselves to the moment 
after the first and before the second debate and they raise the problem of how they can 
avoid to be redundant with respect to TV and of how they can be synergical with it. The 
final standpoint, put forth by a journalist of the news section, is the practical standpoint 
“we should publish an article presenting complementary information on the debate topics, 
interviewing other politicians (with respect to those presente in the TV studio) on the same 
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topic and announce to our readers that this article will be forthcoming”, that can be 
identified thanks to textual traces:  
(3) 0021 there will be a support we will say yesterday we 
spoke about this/ 0022 and we will make a complement of 
information on the newspaper. 
The journalist who has put forth this practical standpoint supports it with an argument 
that appeals to audience comprehension: 
  (4) 0023: so that it is not something that navigates on 
its own. 
In this passage it is clear that the journalist’s worry is that the readers may not 
cognitively understand an article that may seem to handle a different topic. However, the 
journalist’s main worry is to stress the added value that the newspaper should give to the 
audience, and more specifically the worry focuses on giving something tha should be 
perceveid as valuable by the audience, as we can read in excerpt (5): 
(5) 0024: but above all it is not the newspaper that makes 
the simple summary of a debate/ 0025: that if one has yet 
seen the debate/ 0026: it is useless to read it the day after/ 
0027: indeed we give something more to the debate/ 0028: 
saying that there was the judge that there was this host and 
this.  
Furthermore, the journalist says that a complement of information is necessary in 
order to entice people to watch the second TV-debate: 
 (6) 0029: and finally speaking with the collegues we said/ 
0030: in this way we force people to watch the debate/ 0031: 
probably not the first/ 0032: but one for sure wants to see 
the subsequent/ 0033 there is the game given by the 
confrontation). 
In excerpt (6) the journalist uses the anaphor ‘in this way’ with reference to the 
complement of information and via the insertion of interviews from other politicians with 
respect to those that were present in the television studio: in this way people will be invited 
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to watch the second TV-debate, because journalists’ complementary information will have 
raised curiosity and opened a debate in the readers’ minds and among readers. Therefore, 
the journalist predicts that people will be interested in watching also the second debate, 
since they will be interested in looking at the differences with the first debate (0033 the 
game given by the confrontation).  
Let us now reconstruct how the journalists argues in favor of the necessity to 
interconnect in an interesting way the information given in the newspaper item with the 
information given in the TV- item as a means to reach anticipated audience persuasion. In 
Figure 15 I show the argumentative reconstruction: 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Argumentative reconstruction of the standpoint that the journalist supports. 
 
1. “There will be a support, we will make a complement of information and we will interview
other politicians (in comparison to those present in the TV studio) on the same topic.” (1)
(0012-0022)
1.1a in order to 
avoid to make an 
un-journalistic 
thing (1) (0002)
1.2 it deals 
not to make 
something 
that sails on 
its own (4) 
(0023)
1.3 in this way we 
force people to 
watch the TV-
debate, probably 
not the first, but 
one for sure wants 
to see the 
subsequent (6) 
(0030-0031) 
1.1b.1 if one 
has watched 
it, it would 
be useless to 
read the 
news item 
(5) (0025-
0026)
1.1b.2 we 
give 
something 
more to the 
debate (5) 
(0027)
1.1b above all it is 
not the newspaper 
that makes the 
summary of a 
debate (5) (0024)
1.3.2 there is the 
game given by the 
confrontation (6) 
(0033)
1.1a.2 it 
would be 
reductive (1) 
(0004)
1.4 also [name 
of the show’s 
host] has 
approved that (1) 
(0003)
1.3.1 because we 
come out on the 
twenty-six (6) 
(0031)
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As we can see from the Figure above, the argumentative structure in favour of the 
journalist’s standpoint is multiple and subordinative. The journalist asserts that it is 
necessary to add some new and complementary information with respect to what is said 
on TV via the insertion of interviews to other politicians with respect to those that were 
present in the television studio, in order to avoid to make an un-journalistic news (0002), 
meaning devoid of newsworthy content (1.1a). In order to be newsworthy, news must be 
considered by a journalistic community interesting enough for the audience. While the 
first argumentative line deals with the necessity to follow to publish something un-
journalistic, the second argumentative line (1.2) supports the need to make something 
coherent with the TV debate, something logically linked with the information already 
given on TV.  
Looking at the whole argumentation structure, we notice that the third argumentative 
line takes a different direction, focusing on incentivizing the newspaper audience to watch 
the TV debate. Two are the main goals: a) avoiding redundancies between TV and 
newspaper and therefore giving value to the newspaper and improving journalistic quality 
and b) guaranteeing the connection TV-newspaper and therefore promoting TV. In order 
to reach the main goal, journalists interview different politicians, whereas in order to 
guarantee the connection TV-newspaper journalists focus on the same issue both on TV 
and in the newspaper. In the first and second argumentative lines the journalist refers to 
the already broadcast TV debate and pays attention not to publish a summary of the debate, 
then the journalist gives reasons on how to make a reasonable connection of the 
information given on the newspaper item with that already given on the TV. Finally, in 
the third argumentative line the journalist completely concentrates on the way in which 
the audience could be persuaded to watch the forthcoming TV-debate, so that the 
newspaper item becomes a means of persuasion. The fourth argumentative line is an 
argument from authority “we discussed it also with [name of the show’s host] and he has 
approved that (0003)” (1.4); the show’s host is an authoritative figure in the field, since he 
is a prominent figure in the editorial board of CdT and he has a leading role in the TV-
program. 
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The show’s host intervenes in the debate immediately afterwards (0035-0039) and 
confirms the necessity for connecting TV and newspaper in order to reach a cross-medial 
promotion:  
(7) 0035-0039: on the day of the debate as previously 
planned/ we will make the classical promotional news item in 
the news section of Lugano and Mendrisio/ as we make for the 
normal program of piazza del corriere/ and in the first page 
I have ordered to insert the cross-media announcement 
(Italian: strilloncino)32. 
 
The analysis conducted above enables us to identify the correlation between the 
deliberative editorial conference as a place of reflection and the emergence of a practical 
standpoint based on the journalists’ anticipated audience uptake concerning audience 
persuasion. In this case the anticipatory inferences on the audience persuasion represent 
the basis of a practical argumentation, i.e. the argument for a practical standpoint. 
Let us now move to the analysis of the inferential configurations underlying the 
arguments in Figure 16. I will now sketch the Y-structure of the first argumentative line 
of the argumentative structure shown in Fig. 15 “we should make a complement of 
information since in that way we can avoid to make an un-journalistic thing and above all 
it is not the summary that makes the summary of the debate” (1>1.1a, 1.1b). The inference 
is based on a locus from final cause:  
 
 
                                                
32	The Italian term strilloncino, diminutive of strillone (lit. cryer), originally meant a newspaper hawker, 
or paperboy crying out the day’s most sensational headlines.	
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Figure 16. We should make a complement of information interviewing other politicians on the 
same topic because we should avoid to make an un-journalistic news item. 
 
       In this Y-structure we notice that the endoxa consist of a belief, i.e. an implicit 
editorial norm (un-journalistic items, i.e. pure summaries, do not interest the audience) 
and of a goal (not making pure summaries is a desirable goal for CdT). It is an 
argumentatively constituted endoxon. If un-journalistic items do not interest the audience 
and if not making  a summary of a debate is a desirable goal for a newspaper and for CdT 
(endoxa) and if creating a complement of information enables not to make a mere 
summary of the debate (datum), then not making a summary of a debate via a complement 
of information and via interviews to other politicians on the same topic allows the 
journalist and the newspaper to achieve a desirable aim (first conclusion/ minor premise). 
Therefore, assuming that if X has a goal Y and Z is the best means to achieve Y, then Z 
must be undertaken (maxim form the final cause), the journalists should make a 
Locus from 
final cause
Maxim: if X has a goal Y and Z is the best 
means to achieve Y, then Z must be 
undertaken
First conclusion/ Minor premise: avoiding 
to make a less journalistic item via a 
complement of information inserting 
interviews with other politicians on the same 
topic allows the journalist and the newspaper 
to achieve a desirable goal
Final Conclusion: we should make a complement 
of information and we will interview other 
politicians on the same topic (1)
Datum: creating a 
complement of 
information enables not to 
make a mere summary of 
the debate (=1.1b)
Endoxa:
- un-journalistic items do 
not interest the audience 
(belief) (=1.1a)
-not making a summary of 
a debate is a desirable goal 
for a newspaper and for 
CdT (goal)
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complement of information and interview other politicians on the same topic (final 
conclusion). 
Moving to the subordinate argumentation 1.1b> 1.1b.1-1.1b.2, which can be 
classified as a locus from termination and setting up, we can observe the presence of a 
compound endoxon based on the belief that pure summaries of events already reported to 
the audience are useless (belief) and on the goal not to publish news items that are useless 
for the audience, as I show in Figure 17; 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. CdT should not publish news items as summaries of the debates because it would be 
useless for the audience. 
 
Locus from 
Termination and 
setting up
Maxim: if an activity X is 
counterproductive for Y, then Y should 
not undertake it 
First conclusion/ Minor premise: 
publishing pure summaries of TV 
debates would be boring for the 
audience and counterproductive for 
CdT
Final Conclusion: CdT should not 
publish news items as summaries 
of the debates (1.1b)
Datum: CdT has the possibility to
publish a news item as a pure
summary of a debate that the
audience has watched on TV
Endoxon:
-pure summaries of events already 
reported to the audience are 
useless (belief) (1.1b.1)
-publishing news items that are 
useless for the audience is a 
counter-productive goal for CdT 
(goal) (1.1b.1)
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The datum deals with the actual possibility of raising disinterest by carrying out an 
action (publishing the news in form of a summary of a debate) that would be useless for 
the audience. The conjunction of the statements of the endoxon and datum creates an 
inferential effect leading to the first conclusion “Publishing pure summaries of TV debates 
would be useless for the audience and counterproductive for CdT”. This conclusion 
perfectly meets the condition established by the maxim and, conjoined with it, allows 
inferring the standpoint. We know from the maxim that “if an activity X is 
counterproductive for Y, then Y should not undertake it”, and from the first 
conclusion/minor premise that “publishing the news in form of a summary would be 
useless for the audience”. Therefore, the journalist is forced to conclude that they “should 
not publish news items as summaries of the debates”. 
In the third argumentative line the journalist argues in favor of the need to add new 
information in order to foster curiosity and therefore to persuade the audience to watch the 
TV-debate (1.3). Again, according to the taxonomy of loci, this argument concerning the 
anticipation of persuasion can be classified as a locus from final cause. Generally 
speaking, in editorial conferences “the locus from the final cause can be expected to recur 
frequently because deliberative discussions aim at fulfilling institutional goals, therefore 
arguments will draw upon a standpoint’s validity in relation to such goals” (Zampa 2015: 
125). 
 In the figure below I analyze more in depth the argument scheme under investigation 
by producing another Y-structure: 
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Figure 18. CdT has to make a complement of information interviewing other politicians on the 
same topic because this forces people to watch the TV-debate. 
 
Referring to the locus from final cause through the Y-structure allows us to observe 
the presence of an endoxon based on a goal centered on the desirability of persuading 
readers to watch the TV debate. The datum is focused on the prediction that making a 
complement of information would force people to watch the TV-debate. On the vertical 
level of the structure the conjunction of the endoxon and of datum creates an inferential 
effect leading to a first conclusion, which is determined by the positivity of the action 
(making a complement of information), which permits to achieve a desirable goal, namely 
forcing people to watch the TV-debate; the first conclusion that is obtained from the 
material starting point is equally exploited by the procedural starting point. Indeed, this 
conclusion perfectly meets the condition established by the maxim and, conjoined with it, 
allows inferring the standpoint “we need to make a complement of information on the 
Locus from 
Final cause
Maxim: if an action X fulfills a goal 
of an institution Y, then Y has to 
undertake X
First conclusion/ Minor premise: 
making a complement of information 
on the newspaper would achieve 
CdT’s goal to force people to watch 
the TV debate on the program Piazza 
del Corriere
Final Conclusion: CdT has to make a
complement of information interviewing
other politicians on the same topic (1)
Datum:
making a complement of 
information interviewing other 
politicians on the same topic 
would force people to watch the 
TV debate (prediction) (1.3)
Endoxon:
Forcing people to watch TV 
debates on the program Piazza del 
Corriere is a desirable goal for an 
institution such as CdT (goal)
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newspaper”. We know from the maxim that “if an action X fulfills a goal of an institution 
Y, then Y has to undertake X” and from the first conclusion/minor premise that “making 
a complement of information on the newspaper would achieve CdT’s goal to force people 
to watch the TV-debate on the program Piazza del Corriere”. As a result of this, the 
journalists can conclude that “CdT has to make a complement of information on the 
newspaper”. This inferential configuration is clearly based on an expectation, since it 
involves the presence of a goal and of a prediction. 
 
 
6.2 Verifying journalists’ anticipatory strategies in the newspapers’ items 
 
At this stage of the analysis, a test of journalists’ anticipatory reasonings discussed in the 
editorial conference, i.e. of the attempt to frame the news in a certain way in order to 
persuade the newspaper audience to watch the first and the second debate (in this way 
we force people to watch the TV-debate/ probably not the 
first/ but one for sure wants to see the subsequent/ there 
is the game given by the confrontation 0030-0033), is carried out. On 
the day of the first TV-debate, namely on the 25th January 2013, a promotional newspaper 
item with the participants to the debate and with the most intriguing issues of the election 
campaign is published (A), as we can see in Figure . On the day after the first TV-debate, 
namely on the 26th January 2013, three newspaper items are published (B, C, D); one is a 
news item directly concerning the broadcast TV-debate (B) (Figure 21), the second is a 
news appendix (C), which represents a complement of information to the other item and 
to the TV-debate (Figure 24), and the third is a promotional item concerning the second 
TV-debate (D).  
Firstly, following the chronological order of appearance on the newspaper, I focus on 
the promotional item published before the first TV-debate (A) (Figure 19). 
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Figure 19. News item A, published on the 25th January 2013. 
 
Starting from the title “Elections Is Lugano the center of the world?” (Nr. 1 in Fig. 
19)33, the news item aims at raising interest in the audience on topics that highly involve 
citizens.  
In Fig. 20 I show the argumentative reconstruction of the promotional news item; 
 
                                                
33 We translate. 
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Figure 10. Argumentative reconstruction of the news article A. 
 
As a whole, this news article can be seen as an argumentation, and the argumentative 
reconstruction in Figure 20 displays the argumentative aspects of the persuasive strategy, 
therefore showing the argumentative dimension of the text that is aimed at sustaining a 
promotional strategy. The first argumentative line acts on raising the audience interest 
(1.1), by focusing on the attractive topics bound to town elections via a semantically strong 
idiom, which compares the elections of Lugano to the world’s center, inducing the 
audience to construe Lugano as the place in which the most important political debates of 
the country, hyperbolically ‘of the world’ take place. The second argumentative line (1.2) 
points at the added value given by the TV debate via a series of thematic comparisons. 
The third argumentative line (1.3) is an argument from authority and the fourth 
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argumentative line (1.4), via the explicit invitation to the readers to send a feedback via e-
mail or via twitter, aimes at enticing the audience to get involved and to be responsive.  
At this point we need to analyze also the other items of the intertextual chain (B, C, 
D) and to look at the news items published on the day after the first debate, in order to 
have an overview of the promotional nature of the intertextual chain.  
The items published on the 26th January, discussed in the editorial conference, 
represent the fundamental clue of the persuasive nature of the anticipatory strategy planned 
by the journalists in the editorial conference. This strategy can be verified by observing 
the news article (B) about the debate of the 25th of January (Figure 21) and the news 
appendix referred to this news article (C) (Figure 24). 
Firstly, we will focus on the news article (B), handling the contents of the TV-debate 
of the 25th January, which is shown in Figure 21;  
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Figure 21. News item (B) published on the 26th January 2013 about the TV debate of the previous 
evening. 
 
This news item (B), published on the 26th January casts new light on the topics 
handled during the TV-debate; the title ‘Politics; The town bets on Lombardy and Expo 
2015’is not just a mere summary of the main contents handled on TV, but it represents an 
implicit positive stance taken by the journalist towards the need for an active involvement 
of the Canton in Expo 2015 and in the institutional relationships with Lombardy. Looking 
at the news item, we observe that the title represents a standpoint, supported by an 
argument represented by the highlight, as shown in Figure 22; 
 
	 	
	
	
156	
 
Figure 22. Argumentative reconstruction of title and highlight. 
 
This argumentation hints at the future developments of the relationships of the 
Canton with Lombardy and Northern Italy in general and fosters people to watch the 
second TV-debate, in order to see what will happen. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice the presence of a concessive counter-
argumentation in the lead paragraph; 
 
(8) Lugano’s relationship with the other local, 
cantonal and international realities: this was the 
established topic of the first episode of ‘Piazza 
del Corriere- Special town elections’, broadcasted 
yesterday evening on TeleTicino. However, the CdT 
journalist Gianni Righinetti could not exempt 
himself to introduce since from the first minutes 
the topic that has inflamed the political week: the 
retirement from the candidacy to the Luganese 
Executive of the socialist Patrizia Pesenti. 
 
 
This concessive counter-argumentation signals the journalists’ will to present the 
broadcast debate as a program that has changed the scheduled contents of the discussion 
in favor of more intriguing and interesting topics, namely the retirement from the 
candidacy to the Luganese Executive of Patrizia Pesenti; in so doing, the journalist 
presents Piazza del Corriere as an attractive program that handles unexpected and very 
exciting topics. In Fig. 23 I show the argumentative reconstruction of the concessive 
counter-argumentation: 
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Fig. 23. Concessive counterargumentation in news item B (see Fig. 25): Audience’s implicit 
standpoints drawn due to the journalist’s arguments. 
 
As we can see in Fig. 23, if we conceive arguments as invitation inference (Pinto 
2006), the body of the text preceding and following the concessive however can be seen 
as arguments from which the audience can draw two implicit standpoints. Thanks to the 
connector however the journalist prepares the audience to the major relevance of the 
second datum, namely that the program has focused on a newly emerged topic. 
In the body of the text we observe six quotations of the politicians who were present at the 
debate; these quotations do not simply have the function of summarizing what was 
discussed during the TV-debate, but rather they deal to support the journalist’s standpoint 
and are framed by him in an individual way.  
In the editorial conference that we have analyzed in the previous subsection (6.1) the 
journalist puts forth a standpoint in which she states that there is the need to make also a 
complement of information to the TV-debate and to the article about the TV-debate. We 
1.1 The planned topic of the 
first episode of Piazza del
Corriere concerned Lugano’s
relationship with the other
local, cantonal and 
international realities
1.1 The show’s host has 
introduced since from the first 
minutes the topic that has 
inflamed the political week: the 
retirement from the candidacy
to the Luganese Executive of 
the socialist Patrizia Pesenti
(1 The program follows pre-
established topics)
(1 The program has focused on 
a newly emerged interesting
topics)
HOWEVER
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can observe the result of this editorial strategy by looking at the news appendix published 
on the 26th January (C) right on the left of the article about the TV-debate ‘Politics The 
Town bets on Lombardy and Expo 2015’; this appendix handles the same topics discussed 
on TV and reports opinions of other experts in comparison to those interviewed on TV. 
Consider Figure 24:  
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Figure 24. News appendix (C) published on the 26th January 2013. 
 
Starting from the title of the column “ideas in comparison” the attempt of raising 
audience’s attention on an open discussion on political issues seems to be the main aim: 
this is what the journalist considers the complement of information in the editorial 
conference and this news appendix is the item in which some interviews to other 
politicians in respect to those of the TV debate are shown.  
Every subtitle is underlined in red and followed by a question, which is answered by a 
politician. All the six main areas of intervention bound with Lugano are covered: the 
government, the other municipalities, the relationships with Bern, Lugano and tourism, 
Lugano and Lombardy, Lugano and the world. In order to build an inter-media connection 
between newspaper item and TV-debate, the journalist keeps an analogy as regards the 
number of interviewed experts; the appendix is composed of six brief interviews, like the 
number of politicians interviewed on TV. Even though at a first glance we may think that 
the journalist simply quotes the answers of the interviewed, the journalist consciously uses 
these quotations in order not to make a simple summary of the TV debate and to promote 
the discussion of ideas. More specifically, by inserting the interviews to other politicians 
on the same topic discussed in Tv, the journalists invite other licit participants to the 
interaction field, to the political discussion, in line with the main goal derived from CdT’s 
mission with reference to the public sphere, namely the improvement of the free 
circulation of ideas.  
The structure of this third news item, by presenting direct questions followed by the 
answers of other experts in respect to those of the broadcasted debate, opens a space for 
argumentative reasoning also in readers’ minds and fosters interest, leading them to go on 
in deepening the raised issue, and therefore persuading them to watch the next TV-debate. 
These questions attempt to create a critical space for the debate and the politicians’ 
answers are highly argumentative. In Fig. 25–26-27-28 and 29 I show the argumentative 
reconstructions of the answers of the interviewd politicians: 
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Figure 25. Argumentative reconstruction of the first interviewed politician (Roberto Badaracco) 
of news article C. 
 
 
 
Fig. 26. Argumentative reconstruction of the second interviewed politician (Cristina Zanini 
Barzaghi) of news article C. 
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Fig. 27. Argumentative reconstruction of the third interviewed politician (Angelo Jelmini) of news 
article C. 
 
 
 
Fig. 28. Argumentative reconstruction of the fourth interviewed politician (Federico Haas) of 
news article C. 
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Figure 29. Argumentative reconstruction on the six interviewed politician (Alberto Siccardi) of 
the news article C. 
 
A confirmation of this journalistic intention comes also from observing that a 
promotional item with the contents of the next forthcoming TV-debate is published on the 
26th January (D), on the bottom of the same page of the news item and of the news 
appendix analyzed, as we can see in the Figure below; 
 
Figure 30. Promotional item (D) published on CdT concerning the TV-debate to be broadcasted 
on Teleticino on the 27th January 2013. 
 
The argumentative analysis carried out has illustrated that journalists’ anticipatory 
reasonings concerning the ways in which the audience may be persuaded strongly 
influence the news items’ framing.  
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In the next Chapter I will present another case of study that deals with another type 
of anticipation, namely with anticipation of audience interest, which can be considered as 
a subtype of anticipation of emotions. 
  
	 	
	
	
165	
7. Journalists anticipating the audience interests on the basis 
of past experience  
 
 
In this Chapter I focus on a case study that deals with a sub-type of audience emotive 
anticipation, namely journalists’ anticipation of audience interest. When journalists have 
to decide about which item to publish in order to interest their audience, they have many 
alternatives at their disposal and they may rely on past experience in order to make 
probability predictions on audience uptake. Indeed, as it is known from literature, direct 
experience is istinctively recognized as the best guarantee of knowledge’s certainty 
(Castelfranchi and Poggi 2002).  
 Firstly, I look at the role played by past items’ evaluation in journalists’ anticipation 
of audience interests. I will show that journalists may use past analogy to support a 
prediction concerning a future news piece. I will show that the references to past 
experience can correspond to inferential processes of analogical nature. More specifically, 
I will focus on the way in which evidence derived from past experience can lead to 
reasonable decisions and may be a crucial component of editorial gatekeeping in the 
newsroom; in this case, journalists can base their editorial decisions on the comparison of 
future items with past ones. I will show that past items that are positively evaluated and 
that have led to positive audience reactions in the past may contribute to the selection 
process of forthcoming news.  
Secondly, I will look at the role played out by analogy based on multiple evidences 
that lead to a conclusion.  
 I will examine a complex argumentation in an editorial conference at the newsroom 
of the Swiss German program 10vor10. The case deals with the news of an 88-year-old 
man thrown in a pond by three adolescents that had been reported on the day before and 
that had had a positive impact in terms of audience; journalists positively evaluate the 
topic of the previous item and keep in mind the past audience reactions. On the basis of 
this positive evaluation of the past item on youth aggressiveness, they decide to broadcast 
another time an item with the same topic of the old man thrown in the pond, but they 
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decide to focus on other aspects of the event. Editorial evaluations of past items, based on 
arguments linked with deeply rooted endoxa, represent a starting point for decision-
making processes concerning future items. The evaluation of the previous audience 
reactions functions as a starting point for a future prediction.  
 
 
7.1 Argumentation based on past news’ evaluation in the newsroom leads 
to probability predictions on audience uptake anticipations 
 
The present case of study34 is based on a morning editorial conference, held on December 
6th 2006 in the newsroom of the Swiss German program 10vor10 broadcasted by the Swiss 
Broadcasting Corporation (SSR SRG), and on the respective news item discussed in this 
editorial conference. The original language is Swiss German, whereas the present analysis 
is based on a Standard German transcription translated into English. This gilts for all other 
cases concerning the Swiss German part of Switzerland35. 
The mission of the program is both that of informing audience on how things are 
going in the world and that of interesting people by going deeper into handled topics, 
fulfilling the mission of contributing to public understanding, as we can see in the program 
portrait: “as a program that uses to give news our aim is to make expert and emotioning 
contributes and to furnish discoursive material for public debates. […] What distinguishes 
the program are the deeply investigated background stories, the surprising viewpoints and 
strong reportages. Typical of this program are the key points and series, that enlighten an 
item from different perspectives” (10vor10 mandate). 
 This is confirmed also in the frame interview (for more details on frame interview 
see Section 2.4) by the journalist that has composed the item, in which he points to the 
priority of the program, consisting in deepening the topic of the day and in actualizing 
already handled topics; 
                                                
34 The acronym of the case of study under investigation in the official nomenclature of the Project is 
‘JUGE CASE’. 
35 TEMPO case.	
	 	
	
	
167	
(1)[for me the meaning of zehn vor zehn is/ what we have 
made/ to deal with trending themes/ to convey the most 
important things of the day/ possibly also by using a 
background/ by adding it/ with further information/ that 
perhaps in other/ in another more restricted daily magazine/ 
like perhaps the tagesschau/ or like short contributions on 
the radio/ is not deepened/ so it is important that what we 
present/ consists in deepening topics of the day on the one 
side/ and by presenting also latent trending themes (0117-
0132). 
At this point it should be clear that the newsroom of 10vor10, all focused on handling 
already presented topics, represents an ideal object of study for understanding journalists’ 
past experience’s influence on editorial decisions in the newsroom. On the basis of past 
experience, journalists feel able to predict how the audience should react in a future 
analogous situation.  
The editorial conference lasts about fifty minutes and involves the producer, the 
managing editor and eight journalists. In the first half part of the editorial conference, the 
editorial board decides the first news to broadcast, then the journalists start discussing 
about what should come next. Firstly, the journalists discuss many alternative topics, that 
they exclude since the information concerning the alternative news comes from an 
uncertain or unreliable source, like in the case of a sexual abuse committed by a child in a 
primary school and in the case of a sexual abuse committed by a famous sportsman, as we 
can see in the following excerpt of the editorial conference: 
  (2) [X6: what do you mean by a sexual abuse/ X7: something 
that has happened during schooltime/ during the pause/ he is 
eight years old/ she is seven years old/ […]/ P:yes it is 
interesting/ but we should clarify this better before/ […]/ 
like we did yesterday/ what we also yesterday decided not to 
report/ because it was a bit/ on a strange level/ yesterday 
the swiss national trainer of taekwondo […]/ has been 
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suspended/ due to sexual abuse/ […]/ but the notice did not 
come from the association/ but rather from a third party// 
this is also a news story/ that we could broadcast but/ that 
we should deepen more precisely before (0839-0875)]. 
 Again, journalists discuss the case of a killer mother as an alternative news, but 
they exclude it, since the information is still unclear, as we can see in the continuation of 
the previous excerpt of the editorial conference: 
(3)[X5: the killer mother/ (xxx) was attributed to/ this 
should be simply clarified/ R: yes that’s good/ we will 
clarify/ but we cannot do that today/ I think that’s clear 
(0882-0888)]. 
At this point the producer proposes to broadcast again something on the topic of youth 
aggressiveness and another journalist says that it was a very good choice: 
(4) [P: but perhaps we should choose again the topic on youth 
aggressiveness/ I mean yesterday we reported the other/ that 
had thrown in the pond/ the eighty years old man/ we have 
made also an interview/ X3: it was a very good choice 0885-
0889-0894]. 
Then the producer goes on to argue in favor of reproposing a topic on youth 
aggressiveness: 
 (5) [P: however the topic on youth aggressiveness is 
obviously/ then we have received/ I think we have received 
another message/ about adolescents in another circumstance/ 
I have the feeling/ this is now a topic that interests people/ 
because this happens every two days/ you hear read something 
and so on/ and the general climate I have the feeling/ is 
shifting slowly against adolescents/ yesterday we could a 
little bit convey this impression/ more impressive or-/ we 
have spoken about this yesterday/ you begin slowly/ the feet 
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in the tram/ by disturbing elderly people/ and yesterday it 
was really a crass day 0895-0911]. 
After a few minutes the editor in chief reinforces the producer’s opinion that the 
general climate is shifting against adolescents: 
(6) [R: you can feel how the elderly perceive the miserable 
disregard/ the lack of respect/ is something that you feel 
when you travel by tram/ when you travel by tram/ it is 
perceivable/ Zurich is really-/ X5: at my place in hongg they 
precipitate always inside/ because there are elderly people/ 
that you cannot come out anymore (0957-0965)]. 
  
The journalists discuss the reasons why the forthcoming item should deal with youth 
aggressiveness, and one of the main reasons is that they believe that youth aggressiveness 
is becoming more and more problematic and that this is perceived by people. Journalists 
are aware that they have the possibility to handle a topic that is already known in the 
audience and they believe that it is positive to reinforce this knowledge.  
In this case there are two types of argumentative discussions, namely a practical and 
a knowledge/evaluative argumentation. In the following sections of this chapter 
(subsection 7.2.1), I will illustrate into details these two types of argumentative discussion, 
by presenting the argumentative reconstruction and the inferential structure of some focal 
argumentative moves. Furthermore, I will verify journalists’ discussed editorial strategies 
by analyzing the news piece with the same methodology.  
 
 
7.2 Argumentation based on past experience supporting editorial 
gatekeeping: towards a practical reasonableness 
 
In the first type of argumentative discussion at stake in the editorial conference under 
investigation, namely the one situated in the interaction field of the newsroom, the 
participants to the interaction are the journalists discussing which item to broadcast. Since 
the interaction field determines the pertinent issue at stake (Rigotti & Rocci 2006), the 
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interaction field of the newsroom determines the issue “which topic should we choose for 
a forthcoming item?”.  
In the editorial conference, among many alternatives, the topic concerning youth 
aggressiveness has been chosen on the basis of two criteria; 
a) journalists have the certainty that this topic has already proved to be good for the 
audience, and in the ingroup there is a shared rooted endoxon that the aspects of the item 
that have proved to be good for the audience should be proposed again, as we can see from 
the excerpt below: 
(7) [P: but perhaps we should choose again the topic the 
topic on youth aggressiveness/ I mean yesterday we reported 
the other / that had thrown in the pond/ the eighty-eight 
year old man/ we have had also an interview/ X3: and it was 
a very good choice (0889-0894)] 
 
b) the other alternative topics do not come from a reliable source. Indeed, the 
predictability of positive outcome of the other hypothetical news proposals is uncertain, 
as we have shown in the previous excerpts (excerpts (2) and (3) in Section 7.1).   
As we can see in Figure, journalists aim at reaching a reasonable decision on which 
topic to choose and at framing the news in such a way that should be coherent with the 
audience expectations. The participants to the argumentative confrontation include the 
producer (P), the managing editor (R), and three journalists (X1, X3 and X5). As we can 
see in Figure and in Fig. 30, we are in front of two contradictory standpoints, the positive 
one [Figure 30, (1)], advanced by the producer and another journalist, and the negative 
one, advanced by another journalist, [Figure 29 (2.)]. The antagonist’s standpoint 
contradicts the positive standpoint of the protagonist concerning the possibility of 
choosing another item with the topic of youth aggressiveness, i.e. the same topic of the 
previous day. The antagonist (the journalist identified as J) doubts about the possibility to 
propose again another item with the same topic, and supports his standpoint with 
arguments concerning the need for a novel approach to the already chosen topic. Let us 
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now reconstruct the confrontation stage, in which the two contradictory standpoints 
emerge: 
 Producer P Journalist J 
Standpoint We should choose again the topic on 
youth aggressiveness  
We cannot make another time the topic 
on youth aggressiveness against elderly 
people 
 
For what concerns the opening stage, the starting points shared by the journalists of 
the newsroom of 10vor10 can be identified not only in the need to capture the audience 
attention but also and above all in the need to fulfill a public service mission aiming at 
promoting public understanding. Indeed, as states Perrin 
 
experienced journalists contribute to promoting public understanding by emergent 
solutions based on their tacit knowledge. Locally, they prove that mandate and market 
demands can be bridged with appropriate attitudes, knowledge, and methods (Perrin 
2013: 35). 
 
The practical standpoint ‘we should make another time the topic of youth 
aggressiveness against elderly people’ is advanced by the producer (protagonist), and 
marks the beginning of the discussion concerning the possibility to propose again a topic 
on youth aggressiveness. Within the newsroom of 10vor10, the producer controls the 
whole newsmaking process and is “responsible for the production processes and the 
content and dramaturgy of the daily issues. […]” (Perrin 2013: 13).  
 
   7.2.1 “Should we propose another time a topic on youth aggressiveness?” 
 
As we have seen above, during the editorial conference journalists actively discuss the 
possibility of proposing again the topic of the item of the day before, basing their 
anticipatory inferences on what they have done in the past; then, the argumentative 
discussion revolves around the reasonableness of conveying the well-known topic of youth 
aggressiveness.  In Figure 31 we can see into details the argumentative reconstruction of 
the argumentative discussion under investigation. We can notice that there are four co-
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arguers (two journalists -X3, X5-, the producer -P-, the editor in chief –R-) that constitute 
an argumentative coalition:  
 
 
Figure 31. Argumentative reconstruction of the whole argumentative discussion of the editorial 
conference including a subordinate knowledge-oriented discussion and the superordinate 
practical-oriented discussion. 
 
In Figure 31 we notice an argumentative line (1.1a and 1.1b) focused on the success 
of the item on youth aggressiveness of the day before. This reinforces the decision of 
reproposing it. The second argumentative line (1.2) lays stress on the repetitivity of 
aggressive facts committed by adolesccents: indeed, the journalists say that they have 
received another message of an event performed by other adolescents, therefore stressing 
the high frequency of violent episodes involving young people.  
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The third argumentative line (1.3) is a complex argumentation: in this argumentative 
line the journalist points at the main goal of every newsroom, namely interesting people. 
By saying that ‘it is a topic that interests people’ because ‘it happens every two days’ 
(1.3.1) and because ‘the general climate is shifting against adolescents’ (1.3.2), the 
journalist introduces a new explanatory/ evaluative issue. Indeed, the argument 1.3.2 can 
be considered an explanatory/evaluative sub-standpoint, answering an issue such as “how 
are things going with youth aggressiveness?”; this is a typical issue of knowledge oriented-
argumentation. This argumentative line aims at supporting the opinion that youth 
aggressiveness is increasing and that people are perceiving this feeling; furthermore, they 
say that it was a good choice to stress this impression in the item of the day before. Here 
the argumentation acts as a sort of generalization to be conveyed in the audience.   
     In this subordinate discussion, the interaction field is not the newsroom anymore, but 
rather the public sphere, since the argumentative interaction involves the journalists and 
the imagined audience. The interaction field of the public sphere determines the pertinent 
issue: ‘How are things going? Which are the relevant aspects of social reality in which we 
live? Which are the important things about the world that citizens must know? How do 
people perceive adolescents?’. This is a knowledge-oriented argumentation, since 
journalists argue in order to know how things are going in the world and whether it would 
be good or not that the audience would know certain things; journalists act for the common 
weal of all the audience in accordance with the public mission of their newsroom of 
promoting public understanding. 
As we can see in Figure 31, the sub-standpoint 1.3.2 “I have the feeling that the 
general climate is shifting slowly against adolescents (they are increasingly perceived as 
more and more aggressive against elderly people)” is an explanatory-evaluative sub-
standpoint, attempting to answer the knowledge-evaluative oriented issue. It is interesting 
that three out of the four arguments supporting the sub-standpoint 1.3.2 are reasons that 
signal the increasing of youth aggressiveness against elderly people based on journalists’ 
multiple past experiences that confirm the hypothesis made in the sub-standpoint. In 
1.3.2.2 the producer simulates a possible gesture of disrespect carried out by adolescents 
in the tram, in 1.3.2.3 and in 1.3.2.4 a journalist and the managing editor advance two 
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arguments based on their personal experience; in 1.3.2.3 the journalist X5 tells that 
adolescents always disturb elderly people in the tram where he lives in Hongg and in 
1.3.2.4 the managing editor states that in Zurich it is a common experience to perceive 
adolescents’ disrespect against elderly people. All the three participants to the discussion 
put forth the same typology of arguments based on their generalization of a personal 
experience or perception concerning youth aggressiveness and adolescents’ disrespect 
towards elderly people. 
In Figure 31 we see that the sub-standpoint 1.3.2 and its subordinate arguments 
support the sub-standpoint 1.3 ‘it is a topic that interests people’, that in turn supports the 
implicit predictive standpoint (1. It is probable that the topic youth aggressiveness will 
have positive outcome on the audience). In the argumentative passage 1.3.2.1->1.3.2 we 
notice that journalists again rely on past experience, indeed they rely on the fact that it had 
been possible to convey to the audience the general societal negative feeling towards 
adolescents, which they implicitly evaluate in a positive way. This attitude of conveying 
information that fits with audience expectations is in line with the mission of the program, 
namely that of deepening already handled topics, and with the public mandate of SRG, 
namely that of promoting public understanding. Journalists’ objective of transmitting an 
already known topic in the audience leads to a certain framing of the news that is coherent 
with the audience rooted beliefs concerning audience aggressiveness.  
As previously said, journalists’ argumentation in favour of publishing an item on 
youth aggressiveness is very strong and is advanced by editorial members with important 
roles in the newsroom. On the contrary, the implicit standpoint of the antagonist “we 
cannot make another time the topic youth aggressiveness against elderly people” is 
advanced by a journalist with no direction role:  
(8)[in order to have a news story/ you should have another 
case/ or you should deepen the case of yesterday of the pond/ 
you should go there and show/ and search/ you can also do 
that boulevard/ you should search the old woman/ and she 
should tell (0914-0922). Let us now look at the argumentative reconstruction 
of the antagonist’s standpoint: 
	 	
	
	
175	
 
Figure 11. Argumentative reconstruction of the argumentation in favour of the standpoint 
of the antagonist. 
As it is clear from the argumentative reconstruction, this negative standpoint is 
supported by a weak argumentation. 
Journalists’ will of choosing a topic that is known from the audience is evident also 
in another type of data, namely in the review interview made to the journalist that has 
composed the item. In the review (for more details on review see subsection 2.4) the 
researcher asks the journalist why they had chosen the topic on youth aggressiveness and 
the journalist justifies his choice by arguing that they had proposed the topic of the 
previous day due to the high sensitiveness that it had produced in the audience; 
(9) the topic has come out on the basis of a message of 
the police/ we briefly proposed the topic yesterday in the 
program/ because in the last days with the case seebach/ 
youth aggressiveness and youth assaults provoke a high 
sensitivensess / both in people working in the media and 
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probably also in the people/ that watch our program/ (0017-
0022)36. 
It becomes evident that the journalist decided to choose the topic ‘youth 
aggressiveness’ since it concerned a social phenomenon that was increasing, that was 
already known in the audience, and that had proven to be interesting for the audience. 
Furthermore, in the review we observe that when the journalist was explaining to the 
producers of the program what they could add to the forthcoming item on the same topic, 
he specifies that an important aspect was the increase of victims, confirming and 
reinforcing the information already given the day before, as we can see in this excerpt of 
the review interview; 
(10) how the case is developing/ I told him today we can 
add/ there are still more victims today/ new victims have 
contacted us (0077-0080). 
 
 
7.3 A generic argumentation structure of the interplay between past experience 
and prediction 
 
As we can see in Fig. 31, the final practical standpoint is supported by a hierarchical 
argumentative structure, involving an evidential basis and an implicit predictive 
standpoint. The evidential basis consists in past experience and in journalists’ past 
evaluation of audience reactions. Past experience functions as an argument supporting an 
implicit predictive standpoint with an evaluative component, based on the probability that 
the audience will react in a positive way, as it was the case for the previous news piece. 
Indeed, past experience “is only the origin. A fully developed mind is able to build never-
sceen scenes, new possible combinations of world elements never perceived; it is a real 
building and creation (by simulation) not just memory retrieval” (Castelfranchi 2005: 
                                                
36 Excerpt from the review made to the journalist that has composed the item. 
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259). This expectancy dimension of the predictive standpoint perfectly meets the 
definition of this kind of standpoint given by Palmieri et al.  
 
predictive standpoints are argumentatively defended when reasons are provided 
that make an expectation, forecast or ‘any forward looking statement’ more plausible. 
[They] refer to future state of affairs (Palmieri et al. 2015: 126). 
 
 The prediction in turn supports the overall practical standpoint, aimed at deciding 
the most suitable item to broadcast; it answers the final journalists’ question “what should 
we broadcast?”, and it has an evaluative component since it presupposes the 
reasonableness of a qualitative evaluation of the future (Palmieri et al. 2015: 126). 
In Figure  I sketch the generic argumentation structure of the investigated editorial 
conference. The evaluation of a past item and of past audience reactions determines the 
implicit predictive standpoint “it is probable that another hypothetical forthcoming item 
on the topic of youth aggressiveness will be good”, i.e. an intermediate standpoint 
concerning the prediction of the effect of the news on the audience. This intermediate 
standpoint in turn deals to support the final practical deliberative standpoint “we should 
make another time the item with the topic on youth aggressiveness”, as we can see in 
Figure 33; 
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Figure 33. Generic argumentation structure of the editorial conference under investigation. 
 
This generic argumentation structure, based on the abstraction of the concrete case, 
shows the presence of a prediction that mediates between the evidential basis and the final 
editorial decision. The implicit predictive standpoint is based on the journalists’ 
anticipatory reasonings and it reasonably connects the evidential basis and the final 
standpoint; it represents an interplay between evidence and expectation.  
More specifically, some sort of regularity of occurrence is implied in journalists’ 
prediction of audience reactions that allows them to believe that the items chosen on the 
basis of previous experience and positively judged should produce another time positive 
audience reactions.  
Indeed, journalists need to anticipate future audience reactions (they have to know 
which item will produce what audience reactions) and hope to find their anticipations 
Implicit predictive standpoint with 
evaluative component, prediction of 
future item 
(it is probable that another item on 
the topic of youth aggressiveness will 
produce a positive reaction in the 
audience and this is positive)
Practical standpoint with evaluative 
component 
(we should publish a topic on youth 
aggressiveness)
Evidential basis, past experience and 
evaluation of past item
(the past item on youth 
aggressiveness was a good choice: it 
was a success)
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concerning audience uptake validated by facts. Predictability is crucial in journalists’ 
argumentative discussions revolving around audience uptake, since journalists’ possibility 
to predict –at least in principle- future audience reactions on the basis of past experience 
enables them to know-ahead of the time- with a more or less high degree of certainty if 
their items will fit with audience expectations. Due to its efficacy in anticipating future 
states of affairs, predictability can also be considered to be one of the most important 
cognitive components of self-efficacy (Bandura 1982); therefore, journalists’ 
predictability on future audience uptake increases their beliefs about the efficacy of the 
future items that are in some way similar to the ones that have proved to be good. 
Finally, the prediction supports the overall final practical standpoint; The whole 
argumentative discussion can be classified as a practical argumentation, since journalists 
aim at reaching a decision concerning which item to broadcast, and their reasonings can 
be evaluated as reasonable since their premises are played out in the specific context of 
the editorial newsroom, in which certain starting points are shared by the whole 
journalistic ingroup of the newsroom for 10vor10.   
 
 
   7.4 Inferential analysis of a focal argumentative move based on past 
experience; an evidential basis favoring editorial gatekeeping 
 
Until now I focused on the argumentation structure; however, in order to prove that 
journalists’ reliance on past experience in the newsroom represents a reasonable way to 
make predictions on the outcome of future items and to take decisions, it is necessary to 
make a more in-depth analysis and to investigate the inferential configuration of 
arguments. Indeed, the analysis of the inferential structure of arguments following AMT 
enables to grasp the missing link represented by the implicit premises and to find out why 
certain traditionally considered weak premises – like premises based on similar past 
experiences may at a first sight seem to be- can lead to reasonable conclusions in a 
journalist’s reasoning process.  
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     7.4.1 Argument from past analogy; journalists’ past experience and future 
news’ choice 
 
In this sub-section I focus on an argument from past analogy, in order to show how 
journalists’ past experience enables them to predict the outcome of future items. As stated 
by Greco (2014), 
 
 in the AMT, analogy is included in the extrinsic loci. Intrinsic and extrinsic loci, 
namely the two fundamental categories of the typology proposed by the AMT, are 
distinguished on the basis of a criterion based on the ‘proximity’ of the (world of the argument) 
to the world of the standpoint […]. In the case of intrinsic loci, standpoint and argument belong 
to one and the same possible world. […] Contrastingly, with extrinsic loci, the argument and 
the standpoint belong to different worlds (Greco 2014: 508). 
 
For example, the argument from past analogy in our example is based on an analogy 
between a past experience and a hypothetical future experience, and more specifically, it 
is based on the analogy between a past news piece and a future news piece. However, the 
two constitute two logically distinct worlds, one belonging to the past and one belonging 
to the future. 
Many scholars have highlighted that the crucial problem with argumentation from 
analogy can be identified in the comparability of the interested entities or state of affairs. 
Some authors claim that argumentation from analogy is based on a functional genus, which 
is a pragmatic category including both entities, and not a genus in the traditional 
Aristotelian sense of this word (see in particular Macagno and Walton 2014). As stated by 
Greco (2014), “in an AMT perspective, the functional genus is functional precisely 
because it connects two possible worlds, working on an extrinsic locus such as analogy 
is” (Greco 2014: 509). 
In his account of argument schemes, Whately (1828 [1963]85-86) considers that in 
argumentation from analogy there is an explicit connection to a common class that 
comprehends both analogues, and that this common class (which arguably corresponds to 
the notion of functional genus) is actually a relation: the two elements (the one from which, 
and the one to which, we argue) are not, necessarily themselves analogous, but have 
similar relations with some other elements. This means that “the common genus which 
they both fall under, consists in a relation” (Greco 2014: 509). Therefore, the past news 
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piece and the future hypothetical news piece are not in themselves alike, but they are linked 
by a like relation based on the possibility of the topic of youth aggressiveness of generating 
a positive reaction in the audience. 
Let us now look at the argumentative line 1.1a-1.1b->1 (in Figure 31) since this is 
the crucial passage in which the journalist makes explicit his reliance on the evaluation of 
the previous item. This argumentative move, based on the locus from past analogy, allows 
journalists to predict the probability of producing positive audience reactions in re-
proposing an item with a topic that had already proved to be good, as you can see in the 
Y-structure produced in Figure 34; 
 
Figure 12. It is probable that another item on the topic of youth aggressiveness will produce a 
positive reaction in the audience because yesterday journalists broadcasted an item on youth 
aggressiveness and it was very good. 
 
Locus from past 
analogy
Maxim: if the past situation PS and the 
future situation FS belong to the same 
functional genus and X held for PS, it is 
probable that X will hold for FS as well
First conclusion/ minor premise: the
item broadcasted the day before on
youth aggressiveness was very good,
and it has the same characteristics of the
one hypothetical forthcoming item
Final Conclusion: it is probable that
another item on the topic of youth
aggressiveness will produce a positive
reaction in the audience (1)
Datum: yesterday we broadcasted an item
on youth aggressiveness and it was very
good (produced a positive reaction in the
audience) (1.1a-1.1b) (belief of evidential
nature)
Endoxa:
-The forthcoming item that journalists
may decide to broadcast belongs to the
topic ‘youth aggressiveness’, as the one
published on the previous day (belief of
common knowledge)
- News items that have proved to be good
in the past will probably be good again
(prediction)
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The endoxa at stake in this inference are: a) the forthcoming item that journalists 
may decide to publish belong to the topic ‘youth aggressiveness’, as the one published the 
previous day, b) items that have proved to be good will probably be good again. These 
premises are shared by the editorial board of the newsroom of 10vor10. Furthermore, on 
the left branch of the Y-structure we find the presence of a datum, the belief established 
on the basis of actual evidence; the datum ‘yesterday journalists broadcasted an item on 
youth aggressiveness and it was very good’ represents the actual piece of evidence on 
which journalists base for reaching their conclusion. The conjunction of the statements of 
the endoxon and of the datum creates an inferential effect leading to a first conclusion ‘the 
item on youth aggressiveness published yesterday was very good, and it handles the same 
theme of the candidate hypothetical forthcoming item’. This conclusion perfectly meets 
the condition established by the maxim and conjoined with it, allows inferring the final 
practical standpoint. We know in fact from the maxim that ‘if the past situation PS and the 
future situation FS belong to the same functional genus and X held for PS, it is probable 
that X will hold for FS as well’ and from the minor premise/first conclusion that ‘the item 
on youth aggressiveness published yesterday was very good, and it handles the same topic 
of the candidate hypothetical forthcoming item’. Therefore, journalists are led to predict 
that ‘it is probable that a forthcoming item on the topic of youth aggressiveness will have 
a positive outcome on the audience’. The connection of the material and the procedural 
starting points illustrates the way in which distinct kinds of premises are linked in real 
argumentation, and in the present case study it shows how a reasoning based on an analogy 
with past experience can lead to a reasonable conclusion.  
This analysis indicates not only the soundness, but also the reasonableness of this 
act of inference of the journalists’ reasoning in choosing the forthcoming news’ topic: the 
soundness is established thanks to the correctness of the semantic-procedural premises, 
whereas the reasonableness thanks to the appropriateness of the contextual premises in the 
Y-structure. In this sound and reasonable inferential structure, we do not observe a 
manipulation of the datum, but we simply observe an interaction of the datum with a 
certain expectation. On the contrary, the datum may be altered and manipulated when the 
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world of volition overcomes the world of uncertainty-certainty (Castelfranchi and Miceli 
2014).  
In the extracts that I have analyzed, some evidence is given that analogical reasoning 
in the newsroom leads to an implicit or explicit prediction, but the analogy is never the 
ultimate basis on which a journalist decides to publish/broadcast or not publish/not 
broadcast a news, but it is part of a more complex reasoning process that aims at 
establishing whether an item should be re-proposed or not in order to answer to the topics 
of interest of the Swiss German cultural community, as it is clear from the already quoted 
producer’s words in the editorial conference: I think we have received 
another message/ about adolescents in another 
circumstance/ I have the feeling/ this is now a topic that 
interests people/ because this happens every two days/ you 
hear read something and so on/ and the general climate I 
have the feeling/ is shifting slowly against adolescents 
(0895-0904. This is not surprising; when journalists have to decide whether to 
broadcast a given news or not, they have to decide under conditions of uncertainty; in such 
situations analogy is useful, since it allows them to anticipate the audience reactions to a 
news, by comparing the hypothetical future reactions to other previous similar cases.  
The conclusion of the analogical reasoning (implicit prediction) serves as a datum 
for the final reasoning process that aims at establishing whether an item helps to fulfill the 
goals of the institution: in Figure 35 I show the inferential analysis of the final 
argumentative move that leads to the ultimate decision to broadcast the item, that in the 
end is based on an expectation (1’>1). Indeed, the endoxon consists of a goal and the 
datum consists of a prediction: 
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Figure 35. 10vor10 should broadcast another time something on the topic of youth aggressiveness 
against elderly people because the forthcoming item on youth aggressiveness will have a positive 
outcome on the audience. 
 
In this sub-section I have shown the fundamental role played out by journalists’ past 
experience in deciding about the broadcasting of forthcoming items in a practical-oriented 
discussion.  
 
 
7.5 How the study of argumentation in context can help us in understanding the 
reasonableness of journalists’ argumentation based on past experience  
 
In order to understand the role of journalists’ argumentation based on past 
experience and on generalization in editorial decisions, it is important to remark that the 
interaction field determines the issue at stake and the starting points emerging in the 
Locus from 
Final cause
Maxim: if an action X fulfills the 
goals of an institution Y, then Y should 
undertake X
First conclusion/ minor premise:
reporting an item on youth
aggressiveness fulfills a goal of zvz
Final Conclusion: zvz should
broadcast another time
something on the topic of youth
aggressiveness against elderly
people (1)
Datum: it is probable that
the forthcoming item on
youth aggressiveness will
have positive outcome on
the audience (prediction)
(1’)
Endoxon: reporting news
items that elicit positive
audience reaction is a goal
of zvz (goal)
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opening stage. In this case of study two types of interaction fields are at stake. In the 
overall practical argumentative discussion based on past experience, in which the 
journalist argues in favor of editorial gatekeeping (a), the interaction field is the newsroom 
since the interaction takes place between two or more journalists; the interaction field of 
the newsroom determines an issue concerning the choice of the news piece to broadcast: 
P: but perhaps we should choose again the topic on youth 
aggressiveness/ I mean yesterday we reported the other/ that had 
been thrown in the pond/ the eighty-eight year old man/ we have 
had also an interview/ X3: and it was a very good choice (0889-
0894). 
In the knowledge-oriented argumentation based on multiple past experiences, 
journalists focus on establishing whether youth aggressiveness’ increase is perceived by 
people: and the general climate I have the feeling/ is shifting 
slowly against adolescents/ yesterday we could a little bit convey 
this impression/ more impressive or-/ we have spoken about this 
yesterday/ you begin slowly/ the feet in the tram/ by disturbing 
elderly people/ and yesterday it was really a crass day (P 0904-
0911). The editor in chief and another joiurnalist add some personal experiences that 
contributes to support the editorial team’s standpoint that “youth aggressiveness is 
increased and this is perceived by people”: you can feel how the elderly 
perceive the miserable disregard/ the lack of respect/ is something 
that you feel when you travel by tram/ it is perceivable/ Zurich 
is really-/ X5: at my place in hongg they precipitate always 
inside/ because there are elderly people/ that you cannot come out 
anymore (0957-0965). 
In this case the interaction field is the public sphere since the interaction takes place 
between the journalists and the imagined audience; the interaction field determines a type 
of issue aimed at understanding the truth and reasonableness of an event on which a news 
should be constructed. Furthermore, the interaction field determines also the starting 
points emerging in the opening stage, determining the significant common ground of the 
arguers. In the overall practical argumentation (a) the interaction field of the newsroom 
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determines as starting points the need to capture the audience as well as to fulfill the public 
service mission, whereas in the knowledge-oriented argumentation based on multiple past 
experiences (b) the interaction field of the public sphere determines as starting points the 
journalists’ commitment towards truth and common weal. 
In order to understand the reason why such types of argumentation can legitimately 
be considered the basis for reasonable decisions and can open a space for a critical 
discussion, we need to introduce what we mean by reasonableness. As stated by Greco 
Morasso “most decisively, what defines a reasonable attitude is the commitment to finding 
a resolution of the difference of opinion that is worthy of the human quality of the 
interlocutors” (Greco Morasso 2011: 116). This turns out to be clear when we investigate 
an argumentation based on past experience and generalization, in which pure rationality 
is insufficient for understanding the dimensions involved in an argumentation that may be 
based on weak premises; a more complicated disposition of reason is needed, which must 
consider the actual complexity of all contextual elements. Apparent weak or wrong 
premises can turn out to be strong and sound in a specific context of use. 
In this Chapter I have claimed that argumentation based on past experience and on 
generalization aiming at anticipating audience interests in the newsroom can be 
reasonable, since an argumentative interaction is produced in a specific context and 
between specific participants: the analysis of the argumentative exchanges and of the 
hidden premises of the focal argumentative moves of the discussion under a contextual 
perspective has enabled us to show that this type of argumentation aims at reasonableness. 
More specifically, in this single case study I have shown the presence of two distinct types 
of argumentation at stake in the editorial conference (practical argumentation and 
knowledge/evaluative argumentation based on past experience) aiming at two distinct 
types of reasonableness (practical reasonableness and knowledge/evaluative-oriented 
reasonableness). Firstly, journalists pursue a) a practical reasonableness when they aim 
at reaching the most reasonable decision in order to broadcast the most reasonable news 
piece, taking into account their need to fulfill a public service mission, which is a shared 
value of their newsroom. Secondly, journalists also pursue b) a knowledge/evaluative-
oriented reasonableness, when they aim at understanding the most reasonable state of 
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affairs of a certain event of the world, at judging the most reasonable way to convey it to 
the audience, and at understanding whether it can be reasonable to broadcast a news that 
is in line with the audience previous knowledge.  
 
 
   7.6 Verifying journalists’ reliance on past experience in the news product 
 
At this stage of the analysis, I make an argumentative analysis of the news piece discussed 
in the above investigated editorial conference and broadcasted on the 6th December 2006, 
which conveys the news of the old man attacked by some adolescents near a pond. The 
topic had been briefly handled on the day before, and journalists chose to propose it again, 
also adding new elements and adding further cases of elderly people attacked by 
adolescents. Journalists’ objective of reinforcing the information already conveyed to the 
audience (analyzed in Section 7.4) can be observed in the respective news product, in 
which we can find argumentative and linguistic traces that signal the journalists’ will to 
convey topics concerning audience already rooted endoxa and already known topics, 
perfectly matching the strategy discussed in the editorial conference. In what follows I 
show the transcript of the item: 
 
 001 M:  gestern haben wir berichtet über einen elfjährigen 
   Yesterday we reported on an 11-year-old 
 002  und zwei vierzehnjährige jugendliche 
   and two 14-year-old youths 
 003  die im aargauischen reinach 
   who in Reinach, Aargau, 
 004  betagte menschen angegriffen 
   attacked elderly people 
 005  und einen mann in einen weiher gestoßen hatten 
    and pushed a man into a pond. 
 006  heute haben wir erfahren 
   Today we have learned 
 007  dass dieselben täter 
   that the same offenders 
 008  gewalt noch gegen weitere opfer angewendet 
   used force against further victims, 
 009  zum beispiel einer älteren frau 
   for example, an older woman 
	 	
	
	
188	
 010  mit der faust ins gesicht geschlagen haben 
   whom they punched in the face. 
 011  michael perricone hat sich bei der KAPO aargau 
erkundigt 
   Michael Perricone has talked to the Aargau 
cantonal police. 
 012 A:  aufgrund der medienberichterstattung 
   Because of the media coverage 
 013  haben sich weitere drei personen gemeldet 
   three more people have come forward. 
 014  sie haben dargelegt 
   They stated 
 015  dass sie ebenfalls 
   that likewise they - 
 016  im bereich dieses weihers 
   in the area around this pond - 
 017  von diesen drei burschen geschlagen worden seien 
   had been beaten by these three kids. 
 018  noch wissen wir nicht genau 
   We do not yet know 
 019  was vorgefallen ist 
   what happened. 
 020  wir haben diese leute 
   We have (summoned) these people 
 021  auf den polizeiposten vorgeladen 
   to the police station, 
 022  müssen sie dann dort genau befragen 
   [and] have to carefully question them then. 
 023 I: wie viele betroffene gibt es jetzt 
   How many victims are there now? 
 024 A: insgesamt haben wir jetzt acht betroffene personen 
   In total we now have eight victims, 
 025  acht vorfälle 
   eight incidents, 
 026  die wir untersuchen und abklären müssen 
   that we are investigating and have to clarify. 
 027 O: rund um den weiher 
   Around the pond 
 028  im sonnenberger wäldli 
   in “Sonnenberger” woods  
 029  sind insgesamt acht senioren und seniorinnen 
   a total of eight senior citizens 
 030  bedrängt und geschlagen worden 
   were bullied and beaten. 
  031      drei jugendliche haben unterschiedliche 
spaziergänger 
   Three youths attacked various walkers, 
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 032  während fast zehn tagen angefallen 
   for almost ten days, 
 033  und es dabei auf alte menschen abgesehen 
   and targeted older people. 
 034  mitarbeiter des reinacher forstdienstes 
   Employees of the Reinach forest service, 
         035  haben sich nach eingang einer anzeige auf die 
lauer gelegt 
   after receiving notification, laid in wait, 
 036  um die täter in flagranti zu erwischen 
   in order to catch the offenders in the act. 
 037 A: wir haben den wald abgeriegelt 
   We sealed off the forest, 
 038  bei jedem eingang zum sunneberg ist jemand 
gestanden 
   had someone standing at every entrance to the 
“Sunneberg” - 
 039  zusammen mit der polizei haben wir das gemacht 
   we did this together with the police -  
 040  und haben beobachtet 
   and observed 
 041  wer alles in den wald hineingelaufen ist 
   everyone who entered the forest 
 042  und haben über funk miteinander kommuniziert 
   and [we] communicated with each other via radio. 
 043  wenn eine verdächtige person gekommen ist 
   When a suspect came along, 
 044  dann haben wir zugeschlagen 
   that is when we struck. 
 045 O: so konnte der haupttäter, 
   This is how the main offender 
 046  ein vierzehnjähriger türke 
   a 14-year-old Turk 
 047  und seine zwei schweizer helfer 
   and his two Swiss helpers 
 048  dingfest gemacht werden 
   were taken into custody. 
 049  einen achtundachtzigjährigen senioren 
   An 88-year-old senior 
 050  hatten die burschen in den weiher befördert 
   had been manhandled into the pond by the kids. 
 051  nur dank der hilfe seiner zweiundachtzigjährigen 
frau 
   Only thanks to the help of his 82-year-old wife 
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 052  konnte der rentner 
   could the pensioner  
 053  dem achtzig zentimeter tiefen gewässer entsteigen 
   get out of the 80-centimeter-deep pond. 
 054 A: es hat sicher noch fünfzig zentimeter schlick am 
boden 
   There is at least 50 centimeters of mud on the 
bottom 
 055  wo diese person natürlich eingesunken ist 
   that this person naturally sank into. 
 056 I: dann ists schwierig rauszukommen 
   Then is it difficult to get out? 
 057 A: dann ist es sicher schwierig rauszukommen ja 
richtig 
   Then it is certainly difficult to get out, 
correct. 
 058 O: im schulhaus homberg bei reinach 
   At the Homberg school close to Reinach 
 059  haben zwei der drei täter 
   two of the three offenders 
 060  die schulbank gedrückt 
   were enrolled. 
 061  beide sind sekundarschüler 
   Both of them are secondary school students. 
 062  zwar sind sie auf freiem fuß 
   They have been released, 
 063  müssen aber mit einer maßnahme der schulbehörden 
rechnen 
   but have to reckon with measures by the school 
board.  
 064 zur unterstützung der lehrkräfte hat der 
schulleiter 
   To support the teaching staff the principal has 
 065  ein care-team angefordert 
   requested a care team. 
 066 A: die lehrerschaft war sehr überrascht 
   The teaching staff was very surprised. 
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 067  und entsprechend ist die betroffenheit sehr groß 
   And accordingly their consternation is very great. 
 068 I: was passiert jetzt mit diesen schülern 
   What will happen to these schoolboys? 
 069 A: diese schüler sind heute bis zu weihnachten 
   These schoolboys have - from now until Christmas 
- 
 070  vom unterricht ausgeschlossen dispensiert worden 
   been expelled from classes, have been exempted 
 071  sie werden betreut durch die schul-
sozialarbeiterin 
   They are under the supervision of a school social 
worker 
 072  und werden mit hausaufgaben versorgt 
   and are being given homework 
 073  damit sie nicht ferien haben 
   so that they are not on vacation 
 074  sondern ihre leistung trotzdem erbringen müssen 
   but rather still have to perform.  
 075 O: gegenüber 10vor10 sagt der achtundachtzigjährige 
rentner 
   To 10vor10 the 88-year-old pensioner 
 076  der in den weier gestoßen wurde 
   who had been pushed into the pond 
 077  für ihn sei die sache abgeschlossen 
   (said) that for him the issue is settled. 
         078   heute nachmittag habe sich einer der schüler bei 
ihm entschuldigt 
   This afternoon one of the students apologized to 
him.  
 
The journalists’ will to convey an idea of adolescents as more and more aggressive 
leads them to frame the news in such a way that presents adolescents as more and more 
violent aggressors and elderly people as more and more passive victims; in so doing, they 
aim at informing the audience about events involving adolescents’ violence against elderly 
people in the most reasonable way, since events concerning youth aggressiveness are 
increasing. This is in line with the mandate of the SSR SRG, that as a public service 
institution has to fulfil the mandate of promoting social integration and of promoting 
public understanding. “In their programs SRG SSR promotes understanding, coherence, 
and exchange among the parts of the country, linguistic communities, cultures, religions, 
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and social groups […]” (Translation of the programming mandate 2007, article 2, 
paragraph 2). However, as stated by D. Perrin, as a media organization, “SRG SSR is 
subject to market and competitive forces. Losing audience would mean losing public 
importance. Therefore, the mandate presupposes that reaching the public will promote 
public understanding” (Perrin 2012: 402). In this sense, we can observe that the journalists 
maneuver strategically when they choose the presentational devices for their standpoint; 
indeed, they choose to give a perspective that suits the audience and that is coherent with 
the general societal climate, using “the communicative means that have the most beneficial 
effects on the audience” (van Eemeren 2010: 94). This news’ adaptation to the audience 
psycho-social perception of youth aggressiveness is shown in the reconstruction of the 
argumentative structure of the news product, which I show in Figure . 
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Figure 36. Argumentative reconstruction of the news piece. 
As we can see in Figure 36, the argumentative structure of the news piece mostly 
consists of narrating data that support the explanatory/evaluative standpoint “Adolescents 
are becoming more and more aggressive”: in the first argumentative line (1.1) the host 
remarks that the day before they had given a news concerning an old man pushed into a 
pond by three adolescents, and then he shifts the focus to the present moment by giving 
the information that “the same offenders used force against further victims”. It is 
interesting to notice how this incipit of the news product is rhetorically constructed, since 
it perfectly mirrors the journalists’ will to convey a news that fits with the audience 
previous knowledge on the topic; it aims at giving evidence that there is a continuum 
between past and present violent acts performed by adolescents against elderly people. 
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The subordinate arguments supporting 1.1., namely 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, all concern the 
increasing number of people attacked by adolescents. It is interesting to notice that 1.1.1 
consists of an interview made by the journalist to the police officer of the area, conveying 
authority to the information; the journalist selects a piece of interview in which the police 
officer remarks that ‘three more people have been beaten around the pond’, conveying the 
idea of repetition of the violent acts also by using the adverb more, presupposing that in 
the past other people were involved. By selecting a certain piece of interview, the journalist 
implicitly takes a stance and frames the news product in such a way that the audience 
perceives the increasing aggressiveness of adolescents; this is even more evident in the 
argument 1.1.2, in which the journalist asks to the interviewed police officer about the 
actual number of victims, so that his precise answer with the exact number of all victims 
‘we have now eight victims’ can be considered a strong argument (a datum) supporting 
the fact that youth aggressiveness is increasing. Furthermore, the interviewer, by asking 
“how many victims are there now?” presupposes that there had been other victims in the 
past, conveying an idea of repetition, perpetuating the conception of elderly as victims. 
Therefore, we can see how the journalist has an active role in framing the event; we find 
evidence of the journalist’s role of knowledge mediator even in the retrospective verbal 
protocol, in which the journalist explicitly refers to his role of moderator;  
(11)[here I hear the interview/ because I select from what 
the interviewee says/ the police officer/ the graser/ and 
I’m doing that in detailedness/ because the moderator/ has 
to write his moderation starting from this quotation (RVP 
0001-0007 )].37 
In the subordinate argument 1.1.2.1 the journalist comes back on the eight victims 
and stresses the repetitiveness of the violent acts and the big amount of attacked elderly 
by using linguistic markers that convey the idea of repetition and increase, such as a total 
of, various walkers, for almost ten days, targeted other people. In the second 
argumentative line 1.2, the journalist comes back on the already mentioned case of the old 
                                                
37 Excerpt from the retrospective verbal protocol: the journalist as knowledge mediator. 
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man pushed in the pond, showing the will to remark the violent fact; the subordinate 
argument 1.2.1 reinforces the idea of victimization of the old man, by describing the 
difficulty of the old man in getting out the pond.  
As a whole, it becomes evident that the journalist gives a particular framing to the 
news piece, by highlighting the role of the elderly people as victims and the role of 
adolescents as violent aggressors; this is a direct consequence of journalists’ editorial 
decision and this is coherent with the audience psychosocial perception. This framing 
becomes even more evident by comparing the linguistic markers used in the intermediate 
drafts of the item (observed thanks to the desktop recordings) and those used in the final 
news piece. For instance, the journalist in the first draft of the item writes ‘Round this 
pond in Sonneberger woods in the end of November three adolescents have attacked some 
elderly people’, whereas for the final product the journalist chooses to insert ‘Round this 
pond in Sonneberger woods a total of eight senior citizens were bullied and beaten’; the 
passive form stresses the aspect of victimization of the elderly who passively undergo the 
violent actions performed by the aggressors. Furthermore, in another passage of the news, 
the journalist changes the nominal phrase ‘the vigorous pensioner’ of the first draft into 
‘the Ø pensioner’ of the final draft, therefore eliminating the adjective, in order to avoid 
to invalidate the frame of the old man conceived as a victim. Another linguistic marker 
underlines the role of the adolescents as aggressors; with reference to the young 
aggressors, the journalist changes the first draft ‘both attend the secondary school’ into 
‘both are students of the secondary school’; the use of the nomen agentis stresses the social 
role and the agentivity of the authors of the attacks, therefore contributing to build the 
frame of youth aggressiveness. 
In another passage of the final draft of the item the journalist chooses to write 
‘During almost ten days, distinct walkers have been over and over attacked’; here, the 
journalists emphasizes a) the progressive and durative aspect of the attacks (during ten 
days, over and over), and b) the multiplicity, quantity and diversity of the attacked people 
(distinct walkers), therefore contributing to reinforce contents that the audience already 
knows.  
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With reference to this point, we have further evidence of this editorial strategy also 
from the retrospective verbal protocol. Indeed, in the retrospective verbal protocol the 
journalist explicitly expresses his will to convey to the audience an idea of repetition of 
the violent acts; 
(12) now I insert ‘different’/so that it is clear that/ 
they did not attack always the same people/ in the first 
sentence one could understand/that in one time they attacked 
eight elderly people/ but with the second sentence it is 
clear that/ there were more people/ distinct people/ in 
distinct moments/ distinct temporal points (0121-0130).38 
In this passage of the retrospective verbal protocol it is clear that the journalist wants 
to convey not only the idea of repetition but also he wants that the TV-viewers understand 
the right unfolding of the events, namely that different people in different temporal 
moments have been attacked. The journalist uses a counterfactual thought that refers to 
the past situation in which he was reflecting on the audience uptake, but he uses the present 
tense: he says ‘if I had left the first sentence in the way it was, one could understand that 
in one time they attacked eight people’, but in fact it is as if he said ‘if I had left the first 
sentence in the way it was, one could have understood that in one time eight people were 
attacked’. In this case, the journalist uses downward counterfactual reasoning, 
hypothesizing an unrealized worse scenario, namely the audience’s uncorrect 
comprehension of the reported event. In Figure 37 I show the inferential configuration of 
this passage; 
 
 
                                                
38 Excerpt from the retrospective verbal protocol: the journalist’s will to frame the news in a 
reasonable way. 
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Figure 37. I have chosen to insert the word “different” because otherwise one could have 
understood that in one time they attacked eight elderly people, therefore misunderstanding the 
event. 
 
In this downward counterfactual reasoning the locus from final cause and 
alternatives is applied. If a) inserting the word “different” and not inserting it are two 
alternative actions in the composition of an item and if b) when a journalist composes a 
news piece he has the goal not to lead the audience to misunderstand events (endoxa); and 
if journalists have chosen to insert the word “different” that has led the audience not too 
misunderstand the event (factual datum) and if it was possible to choose not to insert the 
word “different” and it would have led the audience to misunderstand the event (simulative 
datum), then the first conclusion arises that “among the two alternatives journalists have 
chosen the alternative that leads the audience not to misunderstand the event, disregarding 
the alternative that would have led to misunderstand it”. The first conclusion, which 
consists in an invalidation of a negative expectation. The first conclusion functions as a 
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minor premise of a topical syllogism that stems from the locus from final cause and 
alternatives, from where the maxim is derived that “if between two alternatives X, Y, in a 
course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not 
realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X”. Therefore, the final 
conclusion that “we have chosen the better alternative disregarding the worse one” can be 
drawn, which represents a postitive evaluative standpoint that may lead to experience 
possible relief. 
In Fig. 38, we have observed that the journalist gives a reason that does not only 
refer to factual outcomes but rather it refers to how things might have been otherwise; I 
will overtly face this topic in chapter 8 from a theoretical point of view and in chapters 9, 
10 and 11 I will show some case studies in which counterfactual reasoning plays a major 
role.  
Finally, it is wise to add that the fact that audience’s correct comprehension of the 
events is not the only reason on the basis of the journalist’s decision to insert the word 
‘different’; indeed, it is evident that the journalist wants to convey to the audience the idea 
of multiplicity of attacked persons. The framing of the news perfectly mirrors the editorial 
strategy discussed in the editorial conference, and confirms the journalists’ will to convey 
a news that fits the audience conception of the reported event. The journalist swings 
between capturing the audience attention and conveying a balanced view of the event. This 
is clear by looking at the following excerpt of the retrospective verbal protocol; 
(13)(to me it has been suddenly clear that/ i must bring 
the quotation before/ then it is good hacked down/ and then 
you can attach it behind/ and then you do not expect anymore/ 
such an awesome story behind it/ if I had begun with the 
pond/ then I have the feeling/ you raise an attitude of 
expectation/ that then the topic cannot satisfy 0052-0061) 
In this passage it is interesting to notice the use of downward counterfactual 
reasoning, namely the type of counterfactual reasoning that leads to consider unrealized 
worse hypothesis. The journalist considers an unrealized worse hypothesis since he is 
asked to give the reasons for his choice, which are presupposed to be good. More 
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specifically, the journalist gives the reason why he has decided that the item should have 
not begun with the framing of the pond; he sustains that the audience would have had a 
distorted perception of the event occurred, which would have appeared more dramatic than 
what it actually was. Subsequently, according to the journalist’s hypothesis, the audience 
would have developed a wrong expectation, an expectation of a very dramatic item in 
which someone may eventually also have died in the pond; however, this expectation 
would have been invalidated by the actual contents of the reported events, that simply 
consists in a caper acted out by some adolescents. The worse hypothesis that has 
fortunately –from the viewpoint of the journalist- not been carried out is then that of having 
invalidated the TV-viewers’ expectation. This point is very interesting, because we notice 
that the journalist is aware of the fact that it is unproductive to raise expectations in the 
audience that cannot be satisfied; he makes a sort of metapragmatic reflection on audience 
expectations. In Figure I show the inferential configuration of the counterfactual argument 
used by the journalist in support of his explanatory-evaluative standpoint concerning the 
fact that it was necessary to begin with a quotation and insert later the framing of the pond. 
In this case a reasoning from alternatives and final cause is applied, which accounts for 
the alternative chosen in view of the goal of not producing wrong expectations in the 
audience. As we can see in Figure, if a) putting the framing of the pond at the beginning 
and not putting it at the beginning are two alternative actions when one agent composes a 
news piece and if b) the goal of journalists when they compose a news piece is not to raise 
wrong expectations in the audience (endoxa); and if a) we have chosen not to put the 
framing of the pond at the beginning (factual datum) and if b) it was possible to choose to 
put the framing of the pond at the beginning of the item and it would have led to raise 
wrong expectations in the audience (retrospective prediction, simulative datum), then 
“among the two alternatives we have chosen the alternative that has led not to raise wrong 
expectations in the audience, disregarding the alternative  that would have led to raise 
them” (first conclusion and invalidation of negative expectation). The first conclusion 
functions as a minor premise of a topical syllogism that stems from the locus from final 
cause and alternatives, from where the maxim is derived that “if between two alternatives 
X and Y in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other 
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(X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X”. Therefore, 
the positive evaluative standpoint is drawn that “we have chosen the best alternative 
disregarding the better one” (final conclusion), leading to experience possible relief. 
 
 
Figure 38. It would have been different (worse) if the item had been published putting a the 
framing of the pond at the beginning because the TV-news piece would have produced wrong 
expectations in the audience. 
 
It is interesting to notice that the journalist shifts the verbal tense from the past to 
the present: out of context, this sentence would be ungrammatical, but whithin the context 
of the retrospective protocol, it provides a crucial function by allowing the journalist to 
merge the two worlds of the past in which he reasoned and the present moment in which 
he is reflecting and anticipating the audience probable feelings and expectations. The 
present tense symbolizes and represents the act of anticipation of the audience uptake: the 
past becomes present and the present symbolizes the imagined audience expectations and 
feelings. The past experience is embedded within the present moment of enunciation (you 
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raise an attitude of expectancy). The past moment of reflection is made present by the act 
of talking. 
As we have seen in the two excerpts of retrospective verbal protocol analyzed above, 
downward counterfactual reasoning seems to play an important role in this type of datum; 
in the following excerpt it is evident that the journalist hypothesizes an unrealized course 
of action that would have led to a worse scenario in order to support his explanatory-
evaluative standpoint; 
 
(14)(I have left it away because of the subdivision/ that 
with the vigorous pensioner/ and the concrete fall into the 
pond/ this has now to do with the pictures/ if I had already 
spoken of the vigorous pensioner/ and of the pond/ I should 
have already used the pictures of the pond/ I wanted to keep 
the pictures of the pond/ I must insert my people now/ because 
now the first quotation arrives 0153-0163) 
 
The journalist remarks that speaking of the pensioner in a first moment would have 
been a wrong choice, since it would have obliged him to insert the framings of the pond 
and this would have been a worse scenario, since he believes that it was better to insert the 
framings of the pond in the moment in which the quotations of the experts would have 
been inserted. Not using the framings of the pond at the beginning, before the quotations 
of the expert, was the action that enabled the journalist to reach the better goal of having 
a better impact on the audience.  
 
  
  7.7 Newsroom reasoning basing on past experience results in a reasonable 
framing of the news text 
 
The editorial board’s decision of acting on the basis of past experience is not simply an 
unwitting reasoning played out in a mechanistic way, but rather past experience deals as a 
trigger that incentivizes the participants’ discussion. Indeed, a) it enables journalists to 
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better understand how things are going in the world and b) it is used as an object of 
communication for the audience, enabling to convey an already known psycho-social 
phenomenon. Therefore, analogy based on past experience opens a space for critical 
discussion in the newsroom, being it anchored on reasonable arguments with premises that 
are sound within the ingroup of the specific editorial newsroom of 10vor10. Furthermore, 
it is interesting to notice that journalists rely on argument from past analogy when 
journalists have to decide for a future item and this favors editorial gatekeeping, but 
editorial decisions are always integrated with a bringing up to date of the themes in the 
present time and with the projection of the topic in the future. The journalist wants to 
convey an already known topic and a topic that has already proved to be effective, but he 
wants to cast a new light on it, by conveying the actual and present state of affairs of a 
social phenomena such as youth aggressiveness. We find a confirmation of this in the 
retrospective verbal protocol, in which the journalist explicitly expresses that a new aspect 
of the already known topic is inserted in the forthcoming item in order to actualize it; 
  
(15) now I inserted it because of the contribution/ 
journalistic thought/ we have to put up-to-date data at the 
beginning/ because in the end the topic that we have/ is a 
bit featureless/ and so we need to give force at the 
beginning/ by telling with up-to-dateness an advancement of 
the case (0021-0028).39 
  
                                                
39	Excerpt from the retrospective verbal protocol: importance to cast new light on an already handled 
topic.	
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8. Counterfactual reasoning  
 
 
 
 
Look in my face; my name is Might have been; 
I am also called No-more, Too-late, Farewell. 
-Dante Gabriel Rossetti 
 
Practical reasoning based on audience uptake often involves counterfactual reasoning. In 
the newsroom corpus also reasoning about evaluative standpoints concerning past editorial 
decisions and reasoning about journalists’ choices in retrospective interviews is rife with 
counterfactuals. The interplay between counterfactual reasoning and emotions is 
particularly noteworthy. On the one hand the reasoning might envisage a counterfactual 
emotional uptake of the audience (e.g. ‘people wouldn’t have empathized with that’). On 
the other side, the very process of counterfactual reasoning might result in outcomes that 
are emotionally charged (e.g. ‘that would have been terrible indeed! Thanks God we did 
not publish that’). As we will see, evaluative standpoints resulting from counterfactual 
reasoning are accompanied by the reflective emotions of regret or relief according to the 
‘simulation direction’ of counterfactual reasoning. Upward counterfactual reasoning 
concerns the imagination of better unrealized states of affairs, whereas downward 
counterfactual reasoning concerns worse unrealized states of affairs. Indeed, in order to 
anticipate emotions it is often necessary a counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual 
resoning necessarily involves a retrospective anticipation, whose object is “what might 
have been but has not been”, i.e. of the unrealized mental simulation. Since many cases of 
studies on anticipatory reasoning were focused on counterfactual reasoning, I decided to 
devote a part of this thesis to counterfactual reasoning including two case studies in which 
counterfactual reasoning plays a major role in journalists’ anticipation of audience emotive 
uptake (Chapters 9 and 10) and four minor case studies in which different uses 
counterfactual reasoning are at stake (Chapter 11).  
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8.1 What counterfactual reasoning is 
 
At this point, it is necessary to give a more careful definition of counterfactual reasoning. 
Counterfactual representations belong to the broad category of irreal worlds. Irrealis refer 
to such modal verbs as could, would, might, can, and may that indicate non asserted facts. 
Bybee and Fleischmann (1995) give an interesting definition of irrealis; they characterize 
irrealis as a prototype category, “at the semantic level, expressing a spectrum of meanings 
that signal a speaker’s lack of belief in or lack of commitment to any of the following; the 
reality or referentiality of a situation; the possibility that an agent’s wishes, hopes or 
intentions will effectively be realized; the authenticity of an utterance or a chunk of 
discourse; or the normalcy of a discourse or of a communicative situation” (Bybee and 
Fleischmann 1995: 12-13). Utterances in which irrealis appears (also called “irreal” or 
“irrealized utterances”) are typically considered by grammarians to be non factive; this 
means that they obligate the speaker neither to the truth nor the falsity of the proposition 
(Lyons 1977; 795). The assertion “Margaret went to Washington” becomes irrealized 
when modal verbs or non-factive phrases are added to indicate the contingent or the 
hypothetical nature of the statement: 
 
(1)  
Margaret could go to Washington 
Margaret may have gone to Washington 
Perhaps Margaret went to Washington 
It’s possible that Margaret went to Washington 
What would happen if Margaret went to Washington?  
 
In such cases, “the speaker is offering the proposition as hypothesis, expecting 
strong challenge and having little evidentiary support” (Talmy Givon 1984:121). In this 
thesis I will zoom on the types of propositions known to be false that are entertained as 
hypothesis to examine their consequences (contrary to fact hypothesis), and I will 
therefore refer to counterfactuals as to contrary to facts conditionals.  
Put in Chrisholm’s words:  
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There is a variety of types of situation where the use of the contrary-to-fact 
conditional appears to be the most natural means of expressing what we claim to know. 
First of all, of course, there are those occasions where we assert a conditional statement, 
knowing or believing its antecedent to be false. I may contend, for example, that had we 
followed a different policy toward Germany in the 1920's, the second World War would 
not have occurred. […] Equally important, from the point of view of knowledge, are those 
subjunctive conditionals which we assert, not knowing whether the antecedents are true 
or false. I try to avoid faling through the ice because I believe that if I were to fall I should 
get wet. Since I believe the conditional to be true, I endeavour to prevent the realization 
of the conditions mentioned in the antecedent. […] Still another use of this type of 
conditional is what has been called its ‘deliberative use’. When we prepare for-a crucial 
experiment, we review the situation and consider what would happen if our hypothesis 
were true and what would happen if it were false. The subjunctive conditional is essential 
to the expression of these deliberations. In defending a hypothesis, I may employ a 
subjunctive conditional even though I believe the antecedent to be true; I may say, ‘If this 
were so, that would be so; but, as you see, this is so. . .’. (Chrisholm 1946: 290-291). 
 
Albeit there is common agreement on the grammatical function of irrealis, their 
pragmatic function is still debated. It is acknowledged that irrealis have a subjective and 
phenomenological character; following logicians, irrealized utterances have the power to 
evoke possible or alternative worlds. As Lewis puts it: 
 
I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. If 
an argument is wanted, it is this. It is incontrovertibly true that things might be otherwise 
than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could be otherwise than they are. But 
what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways 
things could have been besides the way they actually are. (Lewis 1973: 14) 
 
In editorial conferences irrealis and –more precisely- upward counterfactual 
reasoning have a special function, namely that of fruitfully prolonging the discussion by 
directing it toward more strategic ways of constructing a news piece starting from past 
errors or reviewing and correcting present unproductive editorial strategies (to suggest that 
things might be otherwise) (for more details see 8.7 and 11.1.5). Upward counterfactual 
reasoning enables journalists to take the distances from unproductive discussions based 
only on the belief that “since things are as they actually are, what can be done?”. As the 
Austrian scientist Von Foerster would put it, irrealis helps to improve the journalists’ 
possibility to widen the number of choices (Von Foerster 1992). An extract from the 
editorial conference of the case of study that will be presented in Section 10 illustrates the 
special role of irrealis in editorial conferences that evaluate past items: 
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 (2) 0020 but this was the news about which everyone 
was speaking/ 0021 not only us but the whole Canton/ 0022 
a news that has hit people and that emotions/ 0023 even 
though it is through that the next day we have deepened the 
religious topic/ 0024 this was a thing that should have 
been developed in many ways/ 0025 we should have made the 
interview with the psychologist to say why one does that 
In this excerpt it is clear that the journalist focuses on how the news should have 
been handled and on how it has not been handled; this shifts the focus of the discussion 
directing it towards more fruitful ways of handling the news in future similar situations, 
such as making an interview to the psychologist saying the reasons why one person may 
abandon a child. 
We can speak of irrealis in a broad sense when a propositional content is not 
asserted as a fact of the world. The category of irrealis is very broad and contains distinct 
types of propositions that all deal with non-asserted facts. Firstly, there are propositions 
entertained as epistemically uncertain a), in which a probability assessment is at stake, 
such as ‘If I put myself on a diet, perhaps I would lose weight’. Secondly, there are 
propositions entertained for the sake of hypothesis without regard for their epistemic status 
(mere hypothesis) b): an example can be “If a civil war broke out in Switzerland, there 
would be no more work for anyone”. These propositions do not have arguments in favour 
of them and who utters them is not interested in the probability assessment but rather wants 
to examine only the consequences: it is presupposed that the probabilities that the 
antecedent happens are very low. Thirdly, there are propositions known to be false that 
are entertained as hypothesis to examine their consequences (contrary to fact hypothesis) 
c), which can be subdivided in eternally impossible (“if my grandmother had wheels, she 
would have been a bike”) and in possible in the past, which can be further specified in 
depending on human action (“If I had not eaten red meat, I would not have developed 
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cancer”) and in not depending on human action (“If there had been no earthquake, my 
house would be intact”). The classification of irrealis is shown in Fig. 39; 
 
Figure 39. Irrealis and their classification. 
 
In short, when the antecedents concern future, we face a case of irrealis; whereas 
when the antecedents (alternatives) deal with the past, then we face a counterfactual 
proper, as it is when we utter “it might have been…”. In this case we deal with things that 
were possible in the past but that have not been realized. On the one hand, if the possibility 
of realizing a certain unrealized state of affairs depends on human action, then one may 
experience regret, which is given by one’s possibility (and subsequent responsibility) of 
taking a certain course of action and not having taken it. On the other hand, if the 
possibility of realizing a certain unrealized state of affairs does not depend on the human 
action, then one may experience disappointment, which is provoked by external factors 
that interfere with one’s goals. 
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Folk psychology considers thoughts concerning unrealized states of affairs as 
strongly connected with negative emotional consequences. Indeed, people who ruminate 
on possible states of affairs that never were, that is on counterfactual alternatives of past 
experiences, are condemned to suffer from an experience of grief and of irreducible loss 
due to the fact that what has been lost cannot be recovered anymore, as it is clear in the 
well-known utterance of a sonnet belonging to the ‘The house of life’ by Dante Gabriel 
Rossetti “Look in my face; my name is Might have been; I am also called No-more, Too-
late, Farewell” (The House of life: 97, 1870). 
This topic is often to be found in literary narratives such as in Flaubert’s Madame 
Bovary (“if only Madame Bovary had not married the boring Charles Bovary…”) and in 
Rostand’s Cyrano (“if only Cyrano had had enough courage to declare himself to 
Roxanne”)40. The most illustrious words on that topic have been written by the poet and 
essayst John Greenleaf Whittier in his poem ‘Maud Muller’ in 1898: “For all sad words 
of tongue or pen, the saddest are these: ‘it might have been’”. In philosophy the ambiguous 
and criptic function of counterfactuality has also been studied; the term counterfactual 
itself was coined by the philosopher Nelson Goodman (Goodman 1947). Goodman’s 
words below point at the core of counterfactuals, namely they make it clear that 
counterfactuals’ antecedents did not occur:  
 
“Let us confine ourselves to those in which antecedent and consequent are 
inalterably false-as, for example, when I say of a piece of butter that was eaten yesterday, 
and that had never been heated, If that piece of butter had been heated to 150 F., it would 
have melted. Considered as truth-functional compounds, all counterfactuals are of course 
true, since their antecedents are false. Hence If that piece of butter had been heated to 
150 F., it would not have melted would also hold. Obviously, something different is 
intended, and the problem is to define the circumstances under which a given 
counterfactual holds while the opposing conditional with the contradictory consequent 
fails to hold. And this criterion of truth must be set up in the face of the fact that a 
counterfactual by its nature can never be subjected to any direct empirical test by realizing 
its antecedent.” (Goodman 1970: 4) 
 
It is only in recent times that social psychology has examined this topic indepth; one 
strand of research has highlighted how negative emotions give rise to counterfactual 
reasoning, whereas another strand of research has shown that counterfactual reasoning 
                                                
40 For more details see Flaubert (1857/1950) and Rostand (1898/1971). 
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may have beneficial effects in terms of suggesting better choices on future courses of 
action (Roese 1997). In the present dissertation I will follow the path traced by this strand 
of research that argues in favor of the fact that “short-term negative affect may be offset 
by inferential benefits that may aid the individual on a longer term basis” (Roese 1997: 
133). Indeed, counterfactual reasoning is often used as a reply to negative occurences that 
one would like to change; in this circumstances corrective thought would be very 
advantageous.  
In counterfactual reasoning a crucial factual result usually represents the basis for 
the counterfactual hypothesis (i.e. Madame Bovary’s boredom and Cyrano’s anxiety). 
Later, an agent can simulate a change of some factual antecedent (for example Madame 
Bovary could have considered what would have happened if she had not married Charles; 
Cyrano could have considered what would have happened if he would have had the 
courage to declare himself to Roxanne) and evaluate the effects of that modification. 
Therefore, counterfactuals consist usually in conditional propositions; indeed, they are 
composed by an antecedent and a consequent (for example if Madame Bovary had not 
married a boring husband, she would have been more content; if Cyrano had tried to 
seduce Roxanne, he might have felt more realized). In particular, a proposition can be 
defined as counterfactual when its antecedent is false (Goodman 1983). By contrast, the 
consequent might or might not be false; in the case that the consequent is false, the change 
of the antecedent invalidates the factual result. Most of the examples of counterfactual 
reasoning that I analyse in my case studies concern alternative versions of the past, so I 
will refer to counterfactuals as to negations of established facts and not to present states.  
One effective categorization of counterfactuals relies on their direction of 
comparison (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, and McMullen 1993; McMullen, Markman 
and Gavanski 1995; Roese 1994). Counterfactual reasoning can assume alternative 
hypothesis that are judged to be better than reality (i.e., upward counterfactuals) or that 
can be judged worse alternatives than reality (i.e., downward counterfactuals). For 
instance, when John rethinks to his exam, he may assume that it might have been better 
(e.g. If I had studied more, I would have got a better grade- upward counterfactual 
reasoning) or that it might have been worse than reality (e.g. If had not studied this topic 
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that the Professor has asked me, I would have failed the exam- downward 
counterfactuality). The direction of counterfactual reasoning is very important because it 
determines the function played by this type of reasoning in terms of future planning of 
course of action. On the one hand, upward counterfactual reasoning without rumination 
suggests “causal conclusions that illuminate paths to future success” (Roese 1997: 133), 
as I will show in Chapter 10, whereas downward counterfactual reasoning evokes relief 
and does not create a stimulus for the continuation of the discussion, as I will show in 
Chapter 11 (subsection 11.5). I will show two case studies in which it is evident that 
counterfactuals with these two distinct directions of comparison create the conditions 
appropriate for two different discussion outcomes. Following some scholars, upward 
counterfactual thoughts entail or incarnate causal conclusions that tend to offer fruitful 
instructions for efficient coming action (M. K. Johnson and Sherman 1990; Roese 1994); 
this is consistent with what can be observed in my corpus. To illustrate, imagine that the 
journalist XY has published a news item with an unattractive layout and then realizes that 
he would have produced a more attractive layout if only he had used another layout, he 
has pinpointed a causally powerful antecedent that might be consequently used to improve 
prospective behavior. Roese (1997) stresses that this kind of comparisons are well attested 
in the socio-psychological literature: 
 
 Indeed, as it is known from socio-psychological literature, upward social 
comparisons (i.e. comparisons of self with a better-off other) are shown to yield negative 
affect but also positive motivational and informational effects (Lazarus and Folkman 
1984; Taylor et al. 1990; Wood 1989), whereas downward social comparisons (i.e. with 
a worse-off other) have been theorized to fulfill self-enahncement goals because such 
comparisons, like downward counterfactual comparisons with a hypothetical worse state 
of affairs, may evoke positive affect via a contrast effect. (Roese 1997: 134). 
 
Upward counterfactual reasoning and downward counterfactual reasoning have two 
opposed evaluative polarities and the consequent is always false: however, there is also 
indifferent counterfactual reasoning, in which the consequent may is indifferent, such as 
“if I had studied more, the result would have been the same”. In the contextual domain of 
the newsroom editorial conference, the counterfactual reasoning’s direction of simulation 
strongly influences the argumentative discussion at stake. On the one side, upward 
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counterfactual reasoning is productive, since it gives rise to a discussion that deepens other 
topics and invites journalists to sift through other options and solutions: it is strongly 
bound to future deliberative decision-making. On the other side, downward counterfactual 
thought is unproductive, since it does not give rise to a fruitful prosecution of the 
discussion, but rather it acts in order to confirm the conclusion already reached. Downward 
counterfactual reasoning is bound to an interaction scheme in which someone must justify 
what he has done, it is an interaction scheme of justification, it deals to adjudicate and 
establish who was right and who was wrong. I will show two case studies (see 11.5), in 
which downward counterfactual reasoning has appeared in the final part of the 
argumentative discussion, complementing and confirming what has been said before.  
 
 
8.2 The main triggers of counterfactual reasoning 
 
In order to understand the function of counterfactuals, it is necessary to understand the 
factors that may activate them. Apparently, spontaneous downward counterfactuals are 
produced very rarely, whereas upward counterfactuals are produced more often; a study 
of Roese and Olson (Roese and Olson 1997) has found out that only 10% of the 
spontaneously registered counterfactuals produced after recent life happenings were 
downward. This is consistent with the data examined in my dissertation; in spontaneous 
interactions such as editorial conferences and other types of disourses, journalists used 
almost only upward counterfactuals; only in guided retrospective interviews, when they 
were asked to explain what they had done and when they were induced to retroactively 
imagine an interaction with the audience, they used downward counterfactual reasoning, 
in order to justify their editorial actions. For instance, during an editorial conference at 
CdT a journalist negatively evaluates a previous item about the old and isolated monastery 
of Claro and sustains that it would have been better if they had published an item about 
the more modern monastery of Cademario (for more similar and detailed examples see 
Chapter 10, sections 11.1 and 11.2). On the contrary, during a retrospective interview, a 
journalist of 10vor10 says that it would have been wrong to put a quotation in a previous 
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moment because if he had done this, he would have caused a wrong attitude of expectancy 
(for more similar and detailed examples see 7.5, 8.3.2, 8.4, 9.5).  
According to the psychological literature (Roese 1997; Castelfranchi and Miceli 
2014), three are the main activators of counterfactual reasoning, namely negative 
emotions, expectations and closeness: in what follows I will explain them in details. 
One of the main factors that lead to activate upward counterfactual thinking are 
negative emotions. Negative emotions foster counterfactual reasoning (Johnson-Laird and 
Oatley 2000) and Roese has observed that negative emotion are “the chief determinant of 
the mere activation of counterfactual processing” (Roese 1997: 135, quoted in 
Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 17). Furthermore, Baumeister et alii (2007) suggest that 
the main function of very intense emotions is not to directly influence behavior. Put in 
Castelfranchi’s words, “emotions serve as a stimulus to cognitive processing (about the 
situation, one’s own and others’ mental attitudes and recent behavior), thus facilitating a 
more advantageous future behavior” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2016: 17-18).  
The second factor that induces the activation of upward counterfactual reasoning are 
violated expectations (e.g. Roese and Olson 1995a; Sanna and Turley 1996). Expectations 
always imply a goal. In particular, positive expectations, especially when undoubted and 
imagined for a long time induce “a view of the implied goal in terms of maintainance” 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2002; quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64). Put in 
Castelfranchi and Miceli’s words, positive expectations contain the prelude of the 
desirable imagined event and connected contentedness (Elster and Loewenstein 1992; 
Miceli and Castelfranchi 1997), and therefore an in nuce fictive accomplishment of the 
goal is already present in them. The achievement of the goal is perceived as if it was 
already given, “maintained”, rather than “acquired”, as Castelfranchi and Miceli put it 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64). When the positive expectation is invalidated, one 
suffers a form of grief due to the loss of the fictively already reached contentedness, as I 
have said in Chapter 5 about anticipation (for more details see page 132). Thus, 
disappointment will be bound with a sense of injustice. Indeed, as it is known from 
literature, two distinct forces are at stake in the formation of the perceived in the sense of 
injustice; since expectations are formed by a prediction plus a goal (Castelfranchi and 
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Miceli 2014: 41), on the one hand, there is the ‘probabilistic force’ usual in predictions, 
and on the other hand, there is the ‘motivational force’ typical of goals (Castelfranchi and 
Miceli 2014: 43). The conjunction of the probabilistic force plus a motivational force gives 
rise to a normative force. When one forms an expectation about a future state of affairs, 
the imagined future state of affairs is not perceived anymore as something that should 
happen because it habitually happens, but as something that must compulsorily happen. 
As Castelfranchi and Miceli put it, 
because a maintenance goal tends to be implicitly viewed as grounded on some 
right, and a positive expectation favors a representation of the implied goal as a 
maintenance one, people are likely to feel entitled to obtain what they expect, and 
perceive a sort of right infringement when their positive expectations are invalidated 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64). 
 
Applied to counterfactuals, this means that when one anticipates something that 
“might have been” but that has not been, one experiences the desirable imagined event as 
real and therefore one fictively reaches the desirable goal; the contrary to facts antecedent 
is therefore fictively experienced as accomplished and the invalidation of the already 
reached goal produces a feeling of loss and infringement. When we face a disappointing 
and unexpected outcome, we will probabily compare it with ‘what might have been’ 
according to the initial expectation.  
A distinction can be made following Castelfranchi and Miceli between disconfirmed 
predictions and disconfirmed expectations. In the case of disconfirmed predictions “not 
only the ‘what might have been’ but also the ‘what should epistemically have been’ path 
is followed” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64). Differently, when disconfirmed positive 
expectations (predicitons plus goals) are at stake, “not only the ‘what might have been’ 
and the ‘what should have been’, but also the ‘what ought to have been’path is followed” 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64). 
This cognitive phenomenon may be bound to the so-called counterfactual fallacy. 
According to Miller and Turnbull (1990) the counterfactual fallacy consists in a natural 
disposition of the human mind, that is based on turning ‘what might have been’ into ‘what 
ought to have been’ (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 65). Therefore, violated expectations 
may often produce disappointment, regret and other emotions, mainly negative emotions. 
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In the empirical part of the thesis, I will show some case studies in which it is evident that 
journalists’ disconfirmed expectations produce regret (see Chapters 9 and 10).  
In Chapter 10 I will show a case (codenamed BEBE), in which a CdT journalist’s 
invalidated expectation about the way in which a news piece should be handled produces 
regret. According to the editorial guidelines of CdT news items should be written with an 
emotional and empathic attitude and all journalists have the professional duty to follow 
the editorial guidelines. Nevertheless, an important news piece about an abandoned baby 
has been handled by the editorial team in a ‘cold’ way without empathy, even though there 
was the active possibility of producing the news in an empathic and emotional way, 
following editorial guidelines. The case study is all focused on the journalist’s regret. In a 
similar way, in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9) journalists’ upward counterfactual reasoning 
is caused by a disconfirmed expectation that leads them to experience regret as well as a 
sense of injustice.  
Another important activator of upward countefactual reasoning is closeness 
(Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992; Roese & Olson 1996). Closeness points at the 
perceived proximity to the achievement of a goal; the more one agent was close to the 
achievement of a goal, the more he had the possibility to act in order to realize the goal. 
Therefore, closeness is an activator of counterfactual reasoning, since it points at the active 
possibility of having carried out an action that has not been carried out. For instance, for 
a PhD student that has to deliver his PhD thesis and that has not been able to respect the 
deadline, a deadline missed by 2 days will probably produce more easily upward 
counterfactual thoughts than the same deadline missed by 9 months. Indeed, closeness is 
bound to the possibility of action and regret may be experienced when one possibile action 
could have changed the actual and worse state of affairs. With reference to this point, it is 
interesting to notice that, in an interaction between two agents, counterfactuals that are too 
far from the possible achievement of the goal are often refused, since they are perceived 
as irrelevant and unuseful for future decisions. For instance, consider the idiom “if my 
grandmother had wheels, she would have been a bike”, that is often used in everyday 
discussions (note that we used this sentence earlier as an example of eternally impossible 
counterfactual). This idiom is often a critical reaction to a too far counterfactual, namely 
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to a counterfactual that is perceived as irrelevant since it does not have a sufficient 
closeness. For example, if Leonella says to Alberto that it would have been better that they 
had bought four houses instead of having bought only one small house, and if they had no 
money for buying even a second house, Alberto may refuse Leonella’s counterfactual and 
say “if my grandmother had wheels, she would have been a bike”, therefore implying that 
there was no possibility at all to buy four houses. If one agent wants to persuade another 
to consider and evaluate a choice, the degree of closeness is very important and one should 
produce a counterfactual with the possibly highest degree of closeness; therefore, with 
reference to our example, in order to persuade Alberto, Leonella should have used a 
counterfactual that was closer to the possibility of the achievement of the goal, such as “it 
would have been better if we had bought one bigger house”. In this way, Leonella will 
probably lead Alberto to reconsider the choice that they have made.  
 Also the effect of closeness on counterfactual triggering is useful; indeed, it seems 
sensible “to focus on near misses rather than far misses because they probably represent a 
more efficient locus for future improvement” (Roese 1997: 137). In order to reach a goal 
that has failed for a very small distance or amount, it will be necessary to make only very 
small and precise changes to make it as successful or effective as it should be.  
From a psychological point of view negative emotions, violated positive 
expectations and closeness have been indicated by Roese as antecendents that enable 
counterfactual reasoning’s activation, whereas from a pragmatic point of view these 
features can be considered the pragmatic and argumentative felicity conditions of 
counterfactual reasoning. Until now I have focused on the determinants of the 
counterfactuals’ activation. In the next sub-section I will look at the determinants of 
counterfactual content.  
 
8.3 The main determinants of counterfactual content: normativity and 
controllability 
 
In the previous sub-section I illustrated the factors that trigger counterfactual reasoning. 
At this point, since counterfactual processing may focus on an almost countless set of 
antecedents, I focus on the issue of how an agent chooses the antecendent. The agent will 
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choose the antecedent on the basis of proximity to existing norms and controllability, 
which are two features of closeness. An antecedent is chosen and it is then reshaped in 
some way; this modification is the instrument by which the crucial outcome is 
‘invalidated’ (Roese 1997: 137). For instance, if Jane has metastatis in the whole body, 
she might confront his actual bad medical situation, mentally undoing his bad situation by 
having chosen another doctor (if only I had gone to that other famous physician) or by 
changing his choice on the therapy (if only I had chosen that other new chemotherapy), or 
by having made cancer prevention with preventive screenings (if only I had done a 
sonography some months before). All these alterations proceed to the same consequent 
(“then my medical situation would be much better and maybe I would not have 
metastasis”). At this point we may wonder which one of the many alternatives will she 
choose and on which basis. Which alternative will represent the starting point for a 
counterfactual reasoning?  
There are very salient antecedents, such as norms: one chooses a norm as a 
privileged antecedent due to the fact that one has an expectation that is right and/or normal 
to follow norms both from an epistemic as well as from deontic point of view. Indeed, as 
it is known from literature, one of the main determinants of counterfactual content are 
existing norms (Kahnemann & Miller 1986). Indeed, counterfactuals’ content reiterates 
normality (Roese 1997: 137). That is, divergences from established norms or expected 
behavior usually give rise to counterfactual reasoning; counterfactual content eliminates 
the divergence and brings back the situation to a ‘normal’ status. In case that Jane’s choice 
to go to that physician was very atypical (for instance if all other patients with Jane’s 
pathology choose the other famous physician), then this antecedent should be the preferred 
way of departing from neglect reality: If only Jane had gone to that other famous phyisican 
where all other patients with her pathology go, she would have had a better medical 
condition. Copious experiments support the claim that counterfactual content is due to 
experienced normality (e.g. Kahnemann & Miller 1986; Kahnemann and Tversky 1982; 
Miller, Turnbull, & Mcfarland 1990; and Wells et al., 1987). In case that an anomaly from 
a norm is retrieved, the anomaly is eliminated and a normal state is restablished in the 
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resulting counterfactual reasoning: on the basis of the choice of the antecedent there is a 
reasoning from efficient cause.  
This way of reasoning based on the re-establishement of normativity, conceived as 
normality, gives rise also to another main determinant of counterfactual content; due to 
the fact that the normal (regular) course of action is what we usually have in mind, and 
that actions that diverge from the norm may be conceived as brusque divergences, then 
actions that diverge from the norm might incarnate counterfactual content to a bigger 
amount than normal (regular) courses of action.  
A figure/ ground relationship is at stake in the choice of the antecedent; indeed, 
agents will often choose as antecedents those elements that are part of the figure and not 
of the ground of the considered frame, i.e. elements that are characterized by closeness, 
by a minimal shift from reality. For instance, if there has been a scandal at the University 
of Messina due to a Professor’s public speech, it will be easier to say “if Professor X would 
not have held that speech, there wouldn’t have been any scandal” rather than saying “if 
this would not be a University, there wouldn’t have been any scandal”. Put it in semantic 
terms, one agent will construct a counterfactual on the basis of a background that diverges 
as little as possible from stable structures of reality. From a psychological point of view, 
we can say that when one agent constructs a counterfactual he will attempt to alter those 
aspects of reality that appear as unusual and that mostly diverge from normality. 
Another crucial element that determines the choice of the counterfactual’s content 
is the controllability of the antecedent. Since antecedents that are capable of being 
controlled are alterable in an easier way than antecedents that are not controllable, “people 
are more likely to make mental alterations to features that can be directly manipulated” 
(Miller et al. 1990; N’gbala & Branscombe 1995; Roese 1997: 137). Moreover, a study 
by Girotto, Legrenzi and Rizzo (1991), using stories regarding a travel from work to home 
that is interrupted by different occurrences, has shown that counterfactual changes focused 
on events that could have been controlled (for example delaying for meeting a friend) 
rather than on those that could not be controlled (for example delaying for being stuck in 
the traffic due to an unannounced demonstration).  
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In short, counterfactual thoughts focus on actions that can be directly controlled by 
individuals: these actions are even more in foreground. More specifically, they focus on 
actions that could have been subjectively manouvred to avoid the result at issue (Davis & 
Lehman, 1995; Davis, Lehman, Silver, Wortman, & Ellard, 1996; Mandel & Lehman 
1996). It is exactly the fact that counterfactual reasoning center on inner intentions and on 
behaviors that can be controlled that mostly explains their function: indeed, these kinds of 
antecedent events are the ones that are maximally useful for leading to better future 
outcomes by choosing more fruitful states of affairs (Weiner 1986).  
 
 
8.4 A theoretical reflection on the relationship between counterfactual 
reasoning and loci  
 
Counterfactual reasoning and all its related psychological consequences are due to two 
basic mental processes: “contrast effects and causal inference” (Roese 1997: 140). 
Concerning contrast effects, they arise when a judgement is emphasized by comparing a 
state of affairs with some reference coordinates or standard state of affairs (Sherif & 
Hovland 1961). For instance, if a Professor examinates a normally intelligent student, he 
will judge him as less intelligent than what he actually is, by contrast, if the Professor has 
just examined a highly-gifted student. Likewise, “a factual outcome may be judged worse 
if a more desirable alternative outcome is salient and better if a less desirable outcome is 
salient” (Roese 1997: 140). Which consequences do these contrast effects have? First of 
all, they strongly determine affective experiences if the counterfactual option is evidently 
better or worse in comparison to reality. Upward counterfactual reasoning may easily 
generate regret (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014), whereas downward counterfactual 
reasoning may easily generate relief (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014). Secondly, 
counterfactual contrast effects guide social judgements, which are influenced by the affect 
implied in the contrast. For instance, in judgements involving people’s victimization, 
considering that an accident that has caused a victim could have been avoided represents 
a crucial upward-comparison standard, inducing to conceive the accident even more 
negative and distressing. As a whole, we can say that contrast effects act when 
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counterfactual points of reference represent better or worse state of affairs. These points 
of references may then cause an extremization of the consequent affective and judgemental 
responses (Roese 1997: 140). The psychologist Roese has claimed that the contrast-effect 
mechanism mainly produces or fosters negative emotions, and that, on the contrary, causal 
inferences mainly have beneficial effects (Roese 1997: 141). Thanks to the analysis of 
counterfactual reasoning via AMT I will show that this is not the case and that the 
discriminating feature is the comparison of ‘what could have made a difference in reaching 
a goal’, resulting from the final causal inference, with what has been chosen; a better or 
worse alternative that is evaluated as positive or negative with reference to a given value 
system of a given social community. In the case of the newsroom implicit and explicit 
editorial norms are at stake. The comparison of ‘what could have made a difference’ with 
a better alternative ‘that has not been chosen’ causes negative emotions that may 
nevertheless illuminate future planning (upward counterfactual reasoning), whereas the 
comparison of ‘what could have made a difference’ with a worse alternative ‘that has been 
avoided’ causes positive emotions that may eventually produce self-enhancement and 
confirmation of one’s convinction. Therefore, contrast effects and causal inferences can 
be said to be strictly interdependent mechanisms at stake in counterfactual reasoning. 
We have seen how violated expectations, negative emotions and divergence from 
norms may easily generate the thought of ‘how things might otherwise have been’. 
Therefore, counterfactual reasoning let people imagine hypothetical situations and 
alternative realities; hypothetical situations, being they a subtype of virtual situations, are 
strictly bound with extrinsic loci, namely “all those loci that that are bound to the 
standpoint through a relation of alternativity” (Greco Morasso 2011: 131). Counterfactual 
reasoning involves on extrinsic loci41, since relationships in which a difference could have 
produced a better or worse outcome are at stake. As I have said in Chapter 4.3, according 
to AMT, the category of extrinsic loci relies on the linguistic category of paradigmatic 
relations, namely relations in absentia. In this category, all loci are regrouped that refer to 
the comparison of one or more alternative possible worlds, such as locus from opposition 
                                                
41	Extrinsic loci are called paradigmatic loci by Eddo Rigotti.	
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based on different types of opposition, locus from analogy, locus from alternatives, locus 
from all the more and all the less, locus from termination and setting up.  
When counterfactual reasoning is at stake, however also a causal inference is always 
produced; therefore, in terms of AMT, a locus from efficient cause is applied in all cases 
of counterfactual thought, in which the causal-reasoning implications stem from the 
connection of antecedent with the end result within a counterfactual conditional. More 
specifically, this connection may evoke a causal reasoning involving ‘something that 
makes a difference in the result of an outcome and that has not been carried out’. For 
example, Margaret is persuaded that if her mother, who has died for a pancreatic cancer, 
had never eaten red meat (which is widespread acknowledged as being cancirogenic), she 
wuold still be alive today. In this case ‘not eating red meat’ is a cause that may (or is 
believed to) ‘make a difference’ in terms of preventing cancer. This causal inference is 
necessary for the subsequent mental reasoning applied in counterfactual reasoning, namely 
a mental operation of contrast, in the shape of a locus from alternatives in both types of 
counterfactual reasoning. 
  
 
8.5 Upward counterfactual reasoning and regret 
 
In view of the forthcoming case studies, it is important to highlight the connection between 
upward counterfactual reasoning and the complex emotion of regret. Regret presupposes 
a counterfactual reasoning, since it is not possible to experience regret for a being that is 
not able to make complex mental representations such as counterfactuality. It is known 
from literature that “regret is a counterfactual emotion that heavily relies on comparison 
processes” (Zeelenberg & Pieters 2007: 5). The reason of regret is “a bad decision in that, 
according to the agent’s counterfactual thinking, some alternative was available which 
would have led to a better outcome” (Castelfranchi & Miceli 2014: 88).   
Regret implies at least two mutually exclusive goals, one of each has been selected 
(among two or more possibilities) and converted into an intention (put into practice in the 
shape of a course of action) (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 88). The agent has 
	 	
	
	
221	
transformed a possibility into an intention and then in an action thanks to a positive 
expectation about the accessibility and opportuneness of the goal. As stated by 
Castelfranchi and Miceli,  
convenience implies that the costs of intention p’s pursuit and achievement 
(including negative side effects of p’s realization as well as of the possible renunciation 
to other goals) are supposed to be lower than the benefits it can provide. In addition, when 
a comparison with alternative goals is involved, p is assumed to be more convenient than 
such other goals (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 88). 
 
 Nevertheless, after a consideration made a posteriori, the initial positive 
expectation is undone or weakened; the discarded goal is re-evaluated and judged as either 
more accessible or more appropriate and convincing compared with the one that has been 
effectively adopted and with the result to which it has led. 
Therefore, regret presupposes a situation in which, once a particular alternative has 
been chosen, it is no longer possible or convenient to invalidate it, that is in cases in which 
one has ‘missed the boat’ for choosing the alternative goal: indeed, if that could be the 
case, it would be easy to carry out the discarded goal without regret or with less regret. 
However, “that choice can be viewed as unmodifiable not only when the intention has 
already been pursued, but also when the conditions for unattainability or convenience of 
the alternative goal no longer apply” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 89). 
To experience regret it is not necessary that the alternative goal is active, i.e. present 
in the individual’s mind at the moment of the choice. It happens frequently that one 
alterantive goal is not explicitly rejected, but rather that it is simply overlooked. In these 
cases no actual choice between the two depicted alternatives has occurred at the time of 
the intention formation. However, an agent may take into account a possible alternative q 
in a subsequent moment, which may then be preferred to p (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 
89). For instance, Elisa regrets having studied cultural heritage, whereas she might have 
become a good pedagogue, even though when she chose the degree course ‘cultural 
heritage’ she didn’t even consider the possibility of studying pedagogy. Elisa is 
considering it now, since she cannot find a permanent job. She regrets having disregarded 
the option of becoming a pedagogue, even though at the time of choosing the degree course 
she did not take into account that option. 
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Anyway, “what matters for feeling regret is that the individual represents- even a 
posteriori, the situation as a choice” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 89). If one agent 
returns to the time when the intention was constructed and retrospectively takes into 
account alternative goals (that were possible at the time of the choice), and now favours 
one of those options, he may experience regret. 
At this stage of the literature review on regret, it should be clear that regret may arise 
only if an agent assumes that two or more alternatives were available in the moment in 
which the intention was formed. Regret strictly builds upon the accessibility of 
counterfactual options (e.g. Seta et al. 2008). 
Another focal component of regret, presupposed by the concept of choice is the self-
ascribed responsibility for one’s decision. Indeed, one cannot feel responsible for his 
choices if he believes that he could have not contemplated some alternative during the 
decision-making process. There are distinct degrees of regret: regret is experienced in a 
more intense way when there was an active possibility of making a choice that is 
considered more desirable a posteriori; on the contrary, when there was only an abstract 
possibility, the experience of regret is less intense. Subsequently, we can say that if a 
possibility was not active at the time of the choice, it is more difficult that one attributes 
himself responsibilities. 
The function played by responsibility in regret has been highlighted in recent 
psychological contributions (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). Regret correlates with the 
agent’s possibility of controlling a situation and with the perception that some actions may 
be self-generted (self-agency) (Frijda et al.1989; van Dijk and Zeelenberg 2002). 
Furthermore, regret may be correlated with feelings of self-blame, which is the cognitive 
processs in which an individual attributes the occurrence of a bad event to oneself: the 
agent may easily reflect on his error may desire to remedy by invalidating his choice (e.g. 
Roseman et. al.  1994; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead et al. 1998: quoted in Castelfranchi 
and Miceli 2014: 91). 
Three are the types of responsibility at stake when one agent regards himself as 
responsible for a bad or suboptimal outcome that provokes regret. Firstly, an agent may 
experience a causal responsibility since a) he caused the bad or suboptimal outcome in an 
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explicit or implicit way. Secondly, an agent may experience a goal responsibility, since b) 
he had “the goal or intention proper of causing it” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 91) 
Thirdly, c) if the agent did not have the goal of causing the outcome, at least he had the 
“the power to predict or prevent it (avoidance responsibility) but omitted (that is, did not 
have the goal) to do so” (Miceli 1992; quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 91). 
Avoidance responsibility is a very important factor in regret. Indeed, put into Castelfranchi 
and Miceli’s words: 
whereas one does not typically have the goal of obtaining a bad (or less than 
optimal) outcome, it is more common that one self attributes responsibility with respect 
to a further goal, namely that of bypassing the negative or suboptimal implications of 
one’s choice whenever one has the power to do so, lest one is regarded as responsible of 
careless and negligence (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 91). 
 
The self-blame that is correlated with regret is focused on credences such as ‘I 
should have considered that alternative chance’ or ‘I should have foreseen the negative (or 
sub-optimal) repercussions of my decision’. From this viewpoint, regret entails “a mistake 
by omission, as long as one considers the moment when the choice has been made” 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 91). 
In particular, in regret one feels responsible because one perceives himself as able 
to avoid the outcome, and to choose a better alternative. More specifically, one important 
feature of regret is the need for ‘utility maximization’ (Schwartz et al. 2002). One agent 
may feel regret even after reaching a positive result (such as a having passed an exam), in 
case that he is convincted that he could have had a better result by choosing another 
alternative (such as getting a higher grade by studying more) (Carmon and Ariely 2000). 
This pinpoints at Gabriel Rossetti’s unrealized foregone, and the convinction that one 
should have done ‘q rather than p’ is the core of regret. In Figure 40, taken from 
Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 92) we can see the genesis of regret arising from the 
decision-making process; 
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Figure 40. The genesis of regret in the decision-making process (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 
92). 
 
 
8.6 Downward counterfactual reasoning and relief 
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In view of the forthcoming case studies, it is important to highlight the connection 
between downward counterfactual reasoning and relief. If regret is clearly correlated with 
upward counterfactual reasoning, relief can be said to be strictly bound to downward 
counterfactual reasoning. Indeed, if regret is elicited by invalidated positive anticipatory 
reasoning and invalidated positve expectations, relief is often elicited by invalidated 
negative anticipatory reasoning and by invalidated negative expectations. When one 
individual imagines a foregone worse alternative and thinks to ‘what might have been’, he 
experiences relief. But what is relief? Generally speaking, relief is when one feels a 
decrease in (physical or psychological) affliction. Nevertheless, a more composite type of 
relief can occur: the emotion produced by an invalidated negative anticipatory reasoning 
or by an invalidated negative expectation, that Castelfranchi and Miceli label anticipation-
based relief (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 102). I will focus on anticipation-based relief, 
since this is the type of relief generated by downward counterfactual reasoning that I have 
found in editorial conferences and in retrospective verbal protocols. A correlation exists 
between relief produced by the avoidance of an unpleasant experience and downward 
counterfactual reasoning (Sweeny and Vohs 2012). According to Castelfranchi and Miceli 
(2014), the cognitive primary elements of anticipation-based relief are an “anticipatory 
belief (either a belief of possibility or a prediction proper about a future event) and a goal 
(or intention), followed by the invalidation of the original expectation” (Castelfranchi and 
Miceli 2014: 104). Anticipation-based relief originates from a negative invalidated 
anticipatory reasoning or from a negative invalidated expectation; there is always a more 
or less clear contrast between the affliction faced in a previous moment and the ongoing 
state of affairs in which the feeling of affliction has decreased. In anticipation-based relief, 
the core of the comparison is centered on the divergence between the ongoing state of 
affairs, namely “what is” and an anticipated negative one that has not actually taken place 
but that is only imagined, namely that “might have been”. Differently, in basic relief the 
two compared states of affairs concern the ongoing situation, namely “what is”, and a past 
actual situation that has taken place, namely “what has been”. In case of anticipation-based 
relief derived from downward counterfactual reasoning, there is always a retrospective 
anticipatory representation. For instance, when Sara, who is walking alone by night in a 
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desert street in Detroit and is insulted by some drunk strangers, realizes that she might 
have been raped, she feels retrospective fear, implying the negative anticipatory reasoning 
concerning the “possible rape” together with the goal “not to be raped”, and subsequently 
experiences retrospective relief (given by the invalidation of the negative anticipatory 
reasoning “thanks God it did not occur!”). Relief experienced in retrospect implies a 
simulation of the anticipatory reasoning, by going back to the time when it could have 
been developed.  Applied to the newsroom, anticipation-based relief is often perceived by 
journalists when they anticipate a fictive unrealized alternative of having broadcasted or 
published items producing a bad or sub-optimal impact on the audience, as it is the cases 
in downward counterfactual reasoning producing relief in retrospective verbal protocols 
and in editorial conferences. For example, journalists may experience relief when they 
have opted for an editorial choice that has enabled not to damage the audience and when 
there was the possibility to opt for that choice, that however has been avoided.  
 
 
8.7 Counterfactual reasoning in the newsmaking domain.  
 
What is the role of counterfactual reasoning in journalism and, more precisely in 
newsroom activities and in news items? 
To answer this question I will take inspiration from an existing analysis of 
counterfactuality and irrealis in a specific kind of media discourse.  Gaik (1992) examines 
possible worlds in a very specific mediatized genre “talk show therapy”. An example of 
how certain kinds of epistemic possibility and conditionality are functional to the goals of 
an activity type can be found in Gaik’s paper on possible worlds in radio talk-show therapy 
(Gaik 1992). By observing this mixed kind of therapeutic discourse, in which listeners call 
in during a radio talk show for a short therapy session with a psychotherapist, Gaik 
discovered that the therapeutic intervention of the psychotherapist within the “talk-show 
therapy” activity type can be arranged following two very different interaction schemes in 
terms of model of communication in context, which are at stake in usual psychotherapeutic 
contexts: therapy and counseling. In the therapy interaction scheme, the doctor attemps to 
bypass “any prescriptive or directive role – in the interest of motivating the patient into 
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further introspection, self analysis and eventual autonomy” (Gaik 1992: 276). Counseling, 
on the contrary, is an interaction scheme that deals to furnish advice: “What shall I do?” 
is the typical issue of this interaction scheme. The psychoterapists’ and the patient’s shared 
goal is therefore to answer this question and the psychotherapist has the role –and the duty- 
of carefully guiding the patient in answering this question. 
Gaik notices that certain types of epistemic possibility and conditionality, which he 
calls irrealis, deal to improve the therapy: they “present the caller with alternative 
hypotheses about the sources of his or her anxiety” (Gaik 1992: 279) and give incentive 
to further introspection. On the contrary, irrealis are not used in the counseling interaction 
scheme, since they are not functional to answer practical issues.  
A parallel can be drawn between this situation and the newsmaking context. In the 
next empirical chapters I will show how counterfactual reasoning may be functional to 
this context and its different interaction schemes. For example, the use of counterfactual 
reasoning in evaluative editorial conferences seems to be functional to the goals of the 
activity type at stake. In fact, counterfactuals may be seen as markers of the subtype of 
editorial discussion ‘evaluative editorial conference’; thus, they are employed to change 
the interaction scheme within an editorial conference: they signal the switch from the 
interaction scheme ‘deliberation’ to ‘evaluation’ or viceversa. I will also show the very 
distinct functions of upward counterfactual reasoning and downward counterfactual 
reasoning in the newsroom.  
In Sections 9, 10 and in sub-sections 11.1-11.2 I will show two case studies in which 
journalists apply upward counterfactual reasoning and experience regret. In one case of 
study regret seems to be productive and to remedy to the previous mistake by applying the 
counterfactual unrealized alternative by analogy in future similar situations (BEBE case 
in Chapter 10). On the contrary, in the TEMPO case in Section 9 I will show a case of 
detrimental regret, namely of regret that does not have beneficial and productive effects, 
since there is no possibility to apply the foregone counterfactual alternative in a future 
similar situation. In sub-sections 11.5, 11.6 and 11.7 I show two case studies of downward 
counterfactual reasoning.
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9. The framing implications of anticipating emotive uptake: 
from editorial conference to news item 
 
 
9.1 The rethorical aspect of journalists’ anticipation of audience emotions 
 
In the previous Chapter I have introduced the theoretical foundations of counterfactuality 
in view of the present and of the forthcoming case studies. Indeed, if in the previous 
analyzed case study (JUGE case) counterfactual reasoning played a minor role. In the case 
study42 illustrated in this Chapter it plays a crucial role. The anticipation of “what might 
have been” is discussed in an excited way in the editorial conference and is chosen by the 
journalists as the leitmotiv of the news piece to be broadcasted. In the case studies that I 
will analyze in Chapters 10 and 11 the role of counterfactual reasoning will be even more 
evident. 
Here counterfactual reasoning is intertwined with the anticipation of audience’s 
emotive uptake (for more details see Chapter 8), which represents the most prominent type 
of anticipation of audience uptake in the newsroom. Its peculiarities depend on the object 
of anticipation, namely emotions. In Section 4.2.2 I have underlined the rhetorical 
dimension of journalists’ anticipation; in this Chapter I will show how journalists can 
decide to frame the news piece on the basis of their anticipatory inferences concerning the 
possibility to emotionally impact the audience. In short, we can say that audience’s 
emotions are anticipated and predicted in order to be modified through rhetorical means 
in the news piece: this is a means to persuade people in line with the journalists’ opinions, 
beliefs and value systems and to change or foster their opinions about a reported event. I 
take into consideration the whole intertextual chain (editorial conference, final news 
product and writing processes). As previously said, the study of intertextual chains has 
                                                
42 The acronym of the case of study under investigation in the official nomenclature of the Project is 
‘TEMPO CASE’. 
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been clearly recognized as an important resource for studying the effects of discourse in 
different contexts of interaction (Krieg-Planque 2009).  
 
 
9.2 A case of study from Swiss-German tv-journalism: an argumentative analysis 
of an intertextual chain 
 
On the 8th December 2006 the Swiss-German tv-program 10vor10 broadcasted a “bad 
news” item about a girl run over by a car running too fast in a suburban area. As I have 
said in Chapter 7, 10vor10 is not a prototypical news reporting program, but rather it can 
be classified as “infotainment”, inbetween a news reporting genre and an entertainment 
genre. As a consequence of that, journalists at the same time have the duty of being 
interesting and exciting as well as informative, as specified in the program’s mandate.  
The program is characterized by two distinc types of journalistic voices. Martin and 
White (2005: 173) distinguish between a reporter voice and a writer voice. The first is 
either a voice without authorial “unmediated inscribed judgement”, or a voice in which, if 
there is some judgement, this is attributed to an external source (such as interviews to 
experts). The writer voice involves some kind of inscribed authorial judgement. These two 
distinct types of voices are co-present in the program 10vor10, even though the reporter 
voice is predominant. We might hypothesize that the anticipation of the audience emotive 
uptake becomes prominent, since it enables to overcome the limits imposed by the genre 
of news reporting and it enables to adopt rhetorical constructions that entertain the 
audience.  
  The newsmaking interaction data on which I will focus consists of the extract of 
an editorial conference at 10vor10 (sf_zvz_061208_1000_redaktionskonferenz_ 
discourse_1.doc, lines [0042-0714]). From the point of view of the activity type, I consider 
an editorial conference as an activity type. According to the model of context, the 
interaction field of this activity type is at a wide level SRG and at a closer level of zooming 
the program 10vor10. In particular, the editorial conference under investigation is an 
evaluative editorial conference, since the interaction scheme is evaluation; more 
specifically, the object of evaluation of the editorial conference at stake is whether it is 
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positive or not to broadcast the news item highlighting or not a crucial detail of the 
accident.  
          The discussion took place on the 8th of December 2006, starting at 10.00 am. The 
whole editorial conference lasts 56:13 minutes. The participants to the editorial conference 
are the producer (P), the editor in chief (R) and other eight journalists (X1 to X8). I will 
focus on a part of the editorial conference that concerns a polylogue, namely a many-to 
many discussion (Lewiński 2010: 101). The participants to the argumentative 
confrontation include the producer (P), the chief editor (R), and four journalists (X1 to 
X4). During the editorial conference, journalists start by discussing other events that could 
become news and then they begin discussing about the girl run over by the car. The 
discussion concerns the car’s speed and the fact that if the driver wuold have gone slower, 
the accident would not have happened. The girl has been run over by a car that was going 
53 km/h: the legal speed limit on that road was of 50 km/h, but the journalists decide to 
center the news on an invented benchmark corresponding to the speed of 30 km/h (for 
more details on the speed see Fig. 59). The main issue of the journalists sounds: ‘Should 
we broadcast the news highlighting that the driver was going 40-50 km/h instead of 30 
km/h in order to interest and involve the audience? Is this detail crucial or not?’. The 
standpoint is explicitly expressed by the producer at the beginning of the discussion: 
 
(1)  
0441 P:  aber ich finde den fall noch interessant  
         but i think the case is still interesting 
 
0442     eben mit dieser angemessener fahrweise 
         precisely because of this adjusted manner of 
driving. 
 
 
Afterwards, journalists reflect on the way in which they had previously handled this news, 
as we can read in excerpt (2).  
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(2) 
0518 R:   also es steht ein mädchen am strassenrand oder 
          there is a girl at the border of the street or  
0519      wenn ich das richtig sehe 
          if I see right 
0520 J:   genau 
          exactly 
0521 R:   und dann kommt ein offroader 
          and then an offroader comes 
0522      man hat es damals mehr zu der offroaderproblematik 
gemacht 
          it was focussed mostly on the problem oft he 
offroader 
0523      ich würde sagen das ist schon auch ein thema 
          I would say this is also a topic 
 
Then, the editor in chief, the producer and another journalist say that focusing on the issue 
of the speed would have been more interesting for the audience, since the accident could 
have been avoided if the driver had gone slower, as we can read in excerpt (3): 
 
 
(3) 
0524      aber ich würde eher jetzt auf diese geschwindigkeit     
          bringen oder 
          but i would rather shift the focus on the speed or  
0525 J:   ja ja      
          yes yes 
0526 R:   das finde ich eigentlich noch fast spannender 
          I think this is even more exciting 
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0527      also da kommt ein offroader 
          then here comes an offroader 
0528      und kann mit- 
          and can with- 
0529      fährt fünfzig 
          goes fifty 
0530 J:   fährt äh dreiundfünfzig bis siebenundfünfzig 
          goes fiftythree to fiftyseven 
0531 R:   (xxx)      
0532 J:    also (xxx) 
           then 
0533 R:    fünfundfünfzig oder so   
           fiftyfive or something like that 
0534 J:    jaha 
           yes 
0535 R:    und wenn er vierzig gefahren wäre 
           and if he would have gone fourty 
0536       hätte er bremsen können 
           he could have stopped  
0537 J:    wenn er dreissig gefahren wäre 
           If he would have gone thirty  
0538       hätte er bremsen können 
           he could have stopped 
0539 R:    dreissig 
           thirty 
0540 J:    ja 
           yes 
0541 X6:   mhm 
           mhm 
0542 J:    dann wäre er eineinhalb meter vor dem mädchen 
           then he would have stopped  
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0543       zum stillstand gekommen 
           one meter before the girl 
0544 R:   (xxx)mit dreissig hä 
          (xxx)with thirty yes 
0545 X6:   das weiss man aufgrund von bremsspuren und so 
           this is known from brake traces and so. 
 
 
However, we can identify another minor issue that can be phrased as: ‘is this event 
newsworthy or not?’. The intermediate standpoint concerning the validity of the news is 
explicit ‘the news is interesting because it is newsworthy’ and is explicitly expressed by 
the journalist R as we can see in line 0562 of the transcription.  
 
(4)  
0561 R: also von dort haben wir wirklich gutes material  
           we have very good material from there  
        
0562  und es ist schon interessant  
           and it is very interesting 
            
0563  weil allgemeingültig natürlich 
           because it is universally valid 
[…] 
0565  ich meine ich wohne ja in einer dreissigerzone 
          i mean i live in a 30 km/h area  
 
0566  in der einfach ((schüttelt den Kopf))  
          in which ((shakes the head)) 
 
0567  nonstop vierzig und fünfundvierzig gefahren wird   
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oder nonstop 
          one drives no-stop fourty and fourty-five 
 
0568  noch mal ein thema (xxx) 
          that’s another theme (xxx) 
 
0569 P: ja 
          yes 
 
0570 R: an vielen orten oder 
          in many places 
 
0571 P: ja 
          yes 
 
0572 J: mhm 
          mhm 
 
0573 R: an vielen orten wird (xxx) dreissig (xxx) 
          in many places one drives thirty (xxx) 
 
0574  das könnten wir dann mal allenfalls als geschichte 
nachziehen 
          this we could tell as a story 
 
[…] 
 
0577  du siehst überall- überland haben sie radar und so 
          you see everyone- everywhere they have radar and 
so 
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0578  aber in einer dreissigerzone überprüfen  
          but in an area with speed limit 30 km/h 
0579  das tut man nicht 
          no one checks 
            
 
 In Figure 41 we can see the argumentative reconstruction in support of this 
intermediate standpoint; 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Argumentative reconstruction of the editorial conference: intermediate evaluative 
standpoint concerning the validity of the news. 
 
Here we notice that an evaluative standpoint concerns the interest of the news: a 
news is considered to be interesting, since it is a universally valid news, it is a classical 
1. The news is interesting (R) (2) (0561-
0562)
1.1.1.1 There are radar 
everywhere, but there is no 
supervision in areas with speed 
limit 30 km/h.(R) (2) (0577-
0579)
Intermediate standpoint: validity of the news
1.1 it is a universally valid 
news (R) (2) (0563)
1.1.1 I also live in an area in 
which the speed limit is 30 
km/h but everyone drives 40-
50km/h (R) (2) (0565-0567)
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example of news value. The validity of the news is judged on the basis of the value system 
of the editor in chief, who uses an argument from analogy (1.1.1): indeed, he refers to his 
personal experience and compares the driving habitude of people living close to him to 
that of people of the whole world. This argument is supported by another argument that 
concerns the common usage to drive 40/50 km/h in areas where there is no supervision.  
Then, the journalists’ discussion revolves on how to evoke the tragedy and produce 
an emotive impact on the audience: journalists say that the family and the girl have many 
problems and expenses that they would not have had if the accident had not happened, as 
we can read in excerpt (5). 
 
(5) 
0589 R: aber dann kannst du die tragik davon 
          but then evoke the tragedy  
0590  dass die da so geld haben und probleme 
          saying that they have money problems 
0591 J: mhm 
          mhm 
0592 R: ausgaben haben und probleme  
          that they have paid and they have problems 
0593  weil es niemand finanziert ist natürlich (xxx) oder 
          because noone finances or 
0594 J: mhm 
          mhm 
0595 R: und die krankenkasse würde nur für heilungskosten- 
          and the health insurance would pay only for cure 
costs 
0596  oder die unfallversicherung von ihnen würde nur- 
          or the accident insurance would pay only  
0597  vorläufig für die heilungskosten aufkommen 
          for the cure costs  
0598 J: mhm 
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          mhm 
0599 R: hat es denn noch personal das es braucht 
          then there is also some personal problems 
0600 J: ja nein sie braucht jetzt einfach zum teil eben so 
so- 
          yes nos he needs now simply   
0601  in kleinklassen muss sie zum teil unterrichtet 
werden 
          to stay in small classes 
0602  also spezielle schulen 
          then special schools 
0603  sie überlegen sich jetzt auch 
          they reflect now also  
[…] 
0608  eben ob sie jetzt in eine privatschule müsse das 
mädchen 
          if she has to go in a private school 
0609  weil sie hat einfach mühe in der volksschule 
          because she simply tires herself out 
0610 R: mhm 
          mhm 
 
In particular, journalists compare the good psychophysical conditions of the girl 
before the accident with her bad conditions after the accident as well as the better 
economic situation of the family before the accident with the increase of expenses after 
the accident: 
 
(6) 
0611 J:   sie hat eben konzentrationschwächen und alles 
          she has also concentration weaknesses and much more 
0612      und äh das das kostet natürlich dann auch wieder   
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          immens geld also- 
          and this is again very expensiv 
0613 R:   das hat sie vorher nicht gehabt 
          this is something that she did not need before 
0614 J:   die probleme nein also ((schüttelt den Kopf)) 
          these problems no ((shakes the head)) 
0615      so wie sie sagen sei sie ganz ein normales mädchen    
          sie- 
          how they say she was a totally normal girl 
0616 R:   ah soweit bekannt mhm 
          ah as far as we know  
0617 J: mädchen gewesen ja 
          she was a normal girl yes 
 
The journalists, forming an argumentative coalition, all argue that the girl and the 
family would not have had these problems if the driver had gone slower: 
 
(7) 
0618 R: und das gutachten ist- sagt verkehrstechnisch 
          And the report is- from a technical point of view 
0619  der unfall wäre nicht passiert 
          that the accident would not have happened 
0620  wenn der nicht übersetzt gefahren wäre 
          if he had not exceeded the limit 
0621 J: wenn der mit dreissig gefahren wäre 
          if he had gone thirty 
0622 X6: ja nein (xxx) also ja übersetzt stimmt ja nicht 
          no then exceeded the limit is not true 
0623 J: also mit angepasster geschwindigkeit 
          then with adjusted speed 
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Journalists make a contextual framing of the news that should lead the audience to 
support their standpoint. This operation is known in literature: “contextual framing starting 
from presentational devices – in the case of written journalism, from the linguistic 
characterization of an issue – creates cultural premises which are then used by the 
journalist to support a certain standpoint” (Greco Morasso 2012: 200). The final 
evaluative standpoint that answers the issue of how to frame the item is supported by 
many arguments acting on emotions, which are personally experienced by the 
journalists and then attributed to the audience. In Figure 42 I show the whole 
argumentative reconstruction of the discussion under investigation: 	
 
 
Figure 42. Argumentative reconstruction of the editorial conference: the final evaluative 
standpoint concerning interest of the news for the audience. 
 
1 The item is more interesting and exciting underlining this speed (R, J, X1) (1) (0441-0442)
1.1a1 if the driver had gone 
30 km/h instead 50, he 
could have stopped the car  
one meter and a half un 
before the girl (J) (4) (0535-
0544)
1.1b the parents and the girl
wouldn’t have had expenses
and problems. You can evoke
the tragedy from this. (R) (5)
(0589-0592)
1.1b.1 the health 
insurance would 
pay only for 
health costs (R) 
(5) (0595-0597)
1.1a The accident could 
have been avoided if the 
driver had gone 30 km/h … 
I think this is also more 
exciting (R, J, X6) (7) 
(0618-0624)
Final standpoint: emotion and interest caused by the news in the audience
1.1a.1.1 this is known from the 
report, from brake tracks and 
other things (X6) (4) (0545)
1.1b.2 the child 
has also 
personal 
problems/ she 
needs to stay in 
small classes 
and to go in 
special schools 
(J) (5) (0599-
0603) 
1’ (the audience will experience regret if we highlight the high speed) (R, J, X1)
1.1b.3 she may 
have to go in a 
private school (J) 
(5) (0608)
1.1b.3.1 she simply 
tires herself out and 
she has 
concentration 
problems (J) (5) 
(0608-0611)
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We notice a coordinative argumentation (1.1a-1-1b), which is further developed in 
subordinate arguments; the first argumentative line (1.1a) acts on the negative emotions 
of regret and anger evoked in the audience by countefactuality (for more details on the 
theory of counterfactuality see Chapter 8), which opens a possible hypothetical positive 
scenario (the avoidance of the accident), which has not taken place due to the high speed. 
This argument is further sustained by an argument from authority conveying 
authoritativeness to the statement (1.1a.1.1). Furthermore, in the whole argumentative 
reconstruction (Fig. 42) it is evident that journalists attempt to find the best way to 
maximize the possibility to let the audience experience regret. In the first argumentative 
line (1.1a) they argue via counterfactual reasoning that the accident would not have 
happened with a lower speed and in the subordinate arguments they give all the subsequent 
reasons for that (1.1a.1) by saying that the car would have stopped two meters in front of 
the girl; furthermore, they put forth an argument from authority (1.1a.1.1) that conveys 
authoritativeness to the previous statement (“it is known from the report, from brake traces 
and other things”). In so doing, journalists decide to frame the driver as a daredevil author 
of the accident, inducing the audience to blame him by paying attention to the presumed 
mistake that he has made and to the hypothetical belief that he should have considered to 
go slower. Therefore, they entice a feeling of regret in the audience. In fact, following 
Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 92) we know that “regret typically implies a mistake by 
omission, as long as one considers the moment in which the choice has been made”.  What 
is more, in the second argumentative line (1.1b) journalists argue that the parents and the 
girl would not have had expenses and problems, therefore inducing the audience to 
imagine the unrealized hypothetical better scenario. The argument 1.1b, focused on the 
expenses due to physical and psychological problems caused by the accident is particularly 
effective in the Swiss German environment, in which economic prosperity is an important 
and acknowledged value. In Switzerland there are no public health services: on the 
contrary, private health coverage is mandatory for all those that reside in Switzerland. 
Health coverage pays for the expenses of medical treatment and hospitalisation of the 
insured. The Swiss healthcare system is organized in such a way that Swiss are asked to 
pay for primary health insurance, which pays for various basic cures. Next to the basic 
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insurance, there is the option to purchase a supplementary insurance, which covers (only 
partially) some services that are not part of the basic insurance cover such as dental care 
or free choice of doctor when spending time in hospital. Therefore, with reference to the 
case study under investigation, the girl’s special cures are very expensive, since she needs 
therapies that are not included in the basic insurance, but that are rather included in the 
supplementary insurance, that in turn pays only partially for unconventional therapies.  
 
9.2.1 A reflection on counterfactual reasoning and regret 
 
In this argumentation structure (Fig. 42) we observe that counterfactual reasoning triggers 
a cognitive process called simulation heuristics. The simulation heuristics was recognized 
by Kahnemann and Tversky in their works on heuristics and on the way in which heuristics 
support people in complex reasoning by using simple mental procedures (Kahnemann and 
Tversky 1982). The simulation heuristic represents a type of the availability heuristic that 
accounts for the reason why humans feel regret and employ counterfactual reasoning. In 
short, the simulation heuristic concerns the degree of likelihood perceived by an agent 
concerning the realization of an outcome. The authors maintain that the ease with which 
you can simulate an outcome “is used to judge the propensity”. In a counterfactual 
assessment, the simulation involves the way in which occurrences would have happened 
in a distinct manner if and only if one element of the situation had been altered. The authors 
make an example about Nazi Germany: if Nazi Germany had succeded in fabricating the 
atomic bomb, what would have been result on World War II? (Kahnemann and Tversky 
1981). With reference to the case study under investigation, the cognitive mechanism of 
simulation heuristics causes that the audience imagines what could have happened if 
different courses of actions had taken place, i.e. if the accident would have been avoided. 
Concerning a negative event, the easier you can imagine a different course of events, the 
more intensely dramatic emotions will be perceived. In our case, the outcome would have 
been different if the driver was driving 30 km/h instead of 50/53 km/h: The imagined 
unrealized better scenario ‘avoidance of the accident’ results from an only slight decrease 
of the speed (20 km/h). Similarly, in the second argumentative line (1.1b) (Fig. 42) the 
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journalists argue that they want to deploy the drama evoked by the consequences of the 
accident in order to emotionally hit the audience: journalists predict that this framing of 
the news will have a high emotive impact on the audience, because ‘if the accident had 
been avoided, the family and the girl would not have had problems and expenses’. 
It is interesting that journalists argue that the item is more interesting saying that the 
accident could have been avoided and that the girl and the family would not have had 
dramatic consequences; an intermediate implicit predictive standpoint is at stake that 
predicts that ‘the audience will feel regret by highlighting that the accident could have 
been avoided thanks to the high speed’ (1’) (Fig. 42). Indeed, journalists induce the 
audience to feel regret for the accident: they lead the audience to be angry with the driver, 
because he has driven 40-50 km/h, even though the alternative of going slower was 
possible –according to them. 
It is wise to remark the fact that journalists want to induce a sort of regret in the 
audience, and not another similar emotion like sadness or discouragement. According to 
Castelfranchi and Miceli 
 
 regret is a special kind of disappointment that implies an invalidated positive 
expectation in which the involved goal is an intention. Differently from discouragement, 
which is focused on one’s lack of power to realize the intended p, the focus of regret is 
on one’s own choice (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 88).  
 
However, in our case study we do not deal with a case of pure regret, as intended by 
the above mentioned authors. It is a case of empathic regret: if we consider that journalists 
have empathized with the family and the girl, we can say that it is a sort of regret 
transferred on a third person. When one agent empathizes, he suspends his Self and takes 
the perspective of the other.  
Regret results from realizing that the present state of affairs is in an unfavorable 
comparability relation with a hypothetical and unrealized better state of affairs (Sugden 
1986: 86). With reference to this point, Bell argues that the degree of regret depends on 
“the difference in value between the assets actually received and the highest level of assets 
produced by other alternatives” (Bell 1982: 963, quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 
88). 
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In this case of study, we know that the driver was going 53 km/h in a residential area 
and that the legal speed limit was 50 km/h; however, we also know that going 50 km/h 
would not have avoided the accident and that in turn going 30 km/h would have avoided 
it. The journalists induce the audience to expect that the accident could have been avoided, 
by considering the possibility that the driver could have chosen to go 30 km/h instead of 
having gone 50 km/h. However, the speed limit on that road was of 50 km/h… how could 
the driver have decided to go slower in order to prevent the accident if the legal speed limit 
was 50mkm/h? Journalists are arguing on a hypothetical reality that has not taken place; 
they are exaggerating the driver’s possibility of choosing to go slower. The speed limit 
that journalists imagine as the right one, namely 30 km/h, has neither legal nor public 
value, but rather it is gathered from their counterfactual reasoning. They come up with a 
fictive speed limit (30 km/h) towards which the driver’s action is relevant. The imaginary 
limit of 30 km/h is rationally constructed; journalists have imagined the reasonable limit 
of 30 km/h on the basis of an analogy that has been created having in mind one similar 
situation in another place. A relevant alternative difference is constructed referring only 
to later facts and it is not an alternative that the driver has actually considered, as it is 
shown in Figure . 
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Figure 43. Mental spaces at stake in the construction of a relevant difference between the actual 
speed 53 km/h, the legal speed limit 50 km/h and the fictive speed 30 km/h. 
 
As I show in Figure 43 following the theory of mental spaces by Gilles Fauconnier 
(1994), journalists build a relevant counterfactual alternative and an ethically right speed 
limit; the legal limit is not important anymore to them, since it is judged as not right in an 
ethic sense. The mental space 1 represents the deontically admissible version, in which the 
driver hypothetically drives 50 km/h and in which the legally and publicly relevant speed 
limit is 50 km/h. The mental space 2 represents the actual version of the accident, namely 
that the driver goes 53 km/h and that the legal speed limit is 50 km/h. The difference that 
arises from these two mental spaces, namely between the legally acceptable situation and 
the actual situation is not relevant. This irrelevant difference (mental spaces 1 and 2) acts 
as a concessive counter-argumentation; it is as if journalists were saying ‘yes, it is true that 
the driver was going 53 and not 50 but it is not important, it does not make any difference 
(the accident would have equally happened); on the contrary, if he had gone 30 km/h the 
accident would not have happened’. At this point we notice that the speed limit of 30 km/h 
enters in journalists’ reasoning; they retake this speed limit from an analogical situation 
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deriving from one journalist’s experience about a place near where he lives. It is at this 
point that the mental space 4 is created, in which the legal speed limit of 50 km/h is retaken 
from the mental space 2 and the fictive limit 30 km/h is analogically retaken from mental 
space 3. The outcome of the mental space 4 is the accident, since driving 50 km/h instead 
of 30 km/h has caused an accident. The mental space 4 is opposed to mental space 5, in 
which a world is imagined in which the driver goes 30 km/h, the legal speed limit is 30 
km/h and there is no accident; the opposition between mental space 4 and mental space 5 
creates a relevant difference, a relevant counterfactual alternative with an ethically right 
speed limit that makes the difference in terms of ‘happening/avoiding the accident’. 
Journalists’ desire to emotionally strike the audience brings them to build a relevant 
difference. However, the better unrealized alternative that journalists offer to the audience 
has no legal nor public value, and it was not immediately available to the driver. 
Furthermore, the driver’s decision of going 53 km/h is almost justifiable by the legal speed 
limit fixed at 50 km/h. A justifiable decision can be only barely regretted, since “the less 
justifiable the decision, the more regret will be experienced” (Zeelenberg et. al 2002, 
quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 93). Therefore, we can say that journalists induce 
in the audience a regret that comes from an imaginary injustifiability of the driver that has 
not respected a fictive speed limit without public relevance. Indeed, the possible 
alternative of going slower has been considered a posteriori in the journalists’ minds: they 
are considering it in the light of the dramatic results of the accident, even though this 
alternative was not an active possibility for the driver at the moment of the accident. They 
do not rely on an evidential basis. Journalists regret that the driver has neglected the option 
of going slower: indeed, they present the driver as an agent that has to choose the speed 
and that has to choose among many alternatives that were possible (according to them). 
This is the focal center that enables us to understand that journalists decide to frame the 
news piece in a way that presents some risks of manipulatory deviation. This way of 
presenting facts is not manipulative per se, since it does not induce the audience to make 
false inferences (for instance to think that the legal limit is 30 km/h); however, the whole 
item is constructed around an invented speed that presents the driver as the only guilty. 
Therefore, it presents some risks of manipulation, since the TV-viewer is led to focus on 
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a hypothetical and imaginary speed limit and on its preferable consequences that have not 
taken place; journalists choose to impose the regret frame as unique frame. At this point 
of the analysis, it should be clear that journalists seem to be aware of people’s ability to 
feel regret depending on the availability of counterfactual alternatives (Seta et al. 2008 
quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 90) and of “people’s natural tendency to focus 
on the foregone” (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007: 4).  
Concluding, journalists’ reasoning concerning how to induce regret in the audience 
a propos of the driver’s possibility to choose to go slower can be summarized with the 
argumentative reconstruction presented in Figure 44;  
 
Figure 44. Argumentative reconstruction of journalists’ reasoning that reflects the mental spaces 
at stake in jounralists’ discourse illustrated in Fig. 42.  
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In Figure 44 I show the argumentative reconstruction of journalists’ reasoning that 
reflects the mental spaces at stake in journalists’ discourse illustrated in Figure 42; ‘if the 
journalist would have gone 30 km/h instead of 40-50 km/h, the accident would not have 
happened (the outcome would have been different) and this will cause regret’ (1.1). 
Therefore, ‘constructing the item mentioning this speed is more interesting and exctiting’ 
(1). The regret in the audience will be due to the audience possibility to imagine a distinct 
possible and preferable alternative that has not taken place, but that, according to the 
journalists, was actively possible in the driver’s mind (1.2). The accident could have been 
avoided; the audience’s positive expectation (the avoidance of the accident) is invalidated 
(1.3). And finally, according to the slightly manipulatory framing made by the journalists, 
the accident could have easily been avoided since the driver had at his disposal an active 
possibility of going slower (1.4). 
 
 
9.3 Analysis of the inferential structure of one focal argumentative move: why is 
it desirable to let the audience experience regret? 
 
Until now I have focused on the argumentative reconstruction; however, in order to prove 
the crucial role played out by journalists’ anticipation of the audience regret, it is necessary 
to make a more in-depth analysis and to investigate the inferential structure of arguments. 
In this sub-section I illustrate the analysis of the inferential configuration of one focal 
argumentative move of the editorial conference analyzed in the previous section following 
AMT: this enables us to grasp the missing link represented by the implicit premises.  
In the analysis shown here, the journalists’ argumentation is reconstructed as a three-
phases argumentative sequence; the first and the second step are founded on the locus from 
efficient cause, whereas the last step is founded on the locus from definition. The 
argumentation chain is the following: ‘the news piece is more interesting underlining that 
the speed was 40-50 km/h instead of 30 km/h’ (1 in Fig. 42), which is supported by the 
implicit predictive standpoint ‘the audience will experience regret if we highlight the high 
speed’ (1’ in Fig. 42), which in turn is supported by the counterfactual argument that ‘the 
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accident could have been avoided if the driver had gone 30 km/h instead of 50 km/h’ (1.1a 
in Fig. 42).  
We show here below in Figures 45, 46 and 47 the Y-structures of the single 
argumentative moves that constitute the argumentation. In Figure 45 I show the first 
argumentative step, which applies the locus from efficient cause, that deals with the 
activation of a certain causal chain (Rigotti 2008); 
 
 
Figure 45. It could have been different if the speed was 30 km/h instead of 40-50 km because the 
accident would not have happened (1.1a.1>1.1a). 
 
From the analysis of the first Y-structure we can observe the presence of an emotive 
endoxon and of a simulative datum, due to the fact that it is not observed in reality, but 
that it has been imagined. The conjunction of the statements of the emotive endoxon and 
simulative datum creates an inferential effect leading to an ‘evaluative’ first conclusion 
Locus from 
the efficient cause
Maxim: if the sufficient cause of a state 
of affairs is the case, then also the state 
of affairs is the case
First conclusion/ minor premise: a
hypothetical lower speed of 30 km/h
would have been (ceteris paribus) a
sufficient condition for creating a
significantly more desirable situation
(for making a difference)
Final Conclusion: it could have been different
(better) if the speed was 30 km/h instead of 40-
50 km/h (retrospective prediction) (=1.1a)
Datum:
-the accident would not
have happened if the speed
was 30 km/h (simulative
datum)
-the speed was not 30 km/h
(factual datum) (= 1.1a.1)
Endoxon: (emotive)
avoiding an accident
“makes a difference” in
terms of desirability
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‘A hypothetical lower speed of 30 km/h would have been (ceteris paribus) a sufficient 
condition for crediting a significantly more desirable situation (for making a difference)’.  
This conclusion perfectly meets the condition established by the maxim and conjoined 
with it, allows inferring the evaluative counterfactual standpoint. We know in fact from 
the maxim that ‘if the sufficient cause of a state of affairs is the case, then also the state of 
affairs is the case’ and from the minor premise/first conclusion that ‘a hypothetical lower 
speed of 30 km/h would have been a sufficient condition for crediting a significantly more 
desirable situation (for making a difference)’. Therefore, we are led to conclude that ‘it 
could have been different (better!) if the speed was 30 km/h instead of 40-50 km/h because 
the accident would not have happened’. This passage enables us to understand the implicit 
premises that lead journalists to positively evaluate the hypothetical course of action that 
has not taken place. 
However, we need another Y-structure in order to understand how journalists infer 
the implicit standpoint ‘the audience will experience regret highlighting the high speed’ 
starting from the fact that it could have been different if the speed was 30 km/h instead of 
40-50 km/h. Here the maxim at stake can be said to be ‘if the sufficient cause of a state of 
affairs is the case, then also the state of affairs is the case’. The maxim is conjoined with 
the line of reasoning originated in the endoxon ‘regret is caused by a bad decision that has 
disregarded some alternative that would have led to a better outcome’. The datum 
coincides with the final conclusion of the previous Y-structure ‘it could have been 
different if the driver had gone 30 km/h instead of 50 km/h’. In Figure 46 I show this Y-
structure: 
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Figure 46. Inferential analysis of the second step of the argumentation (1.1a>1’). The audience 
will experience regret highlighting the high speed. 
 
By observing this Y-structure, it is clear that the prediction is made on the basis of 
what may cause the feeling of regret, namely the fact that the driver had the possibility 
(even though it was not an active possibility) to choose to go 30 km/h and has instead 
chosen to drive 50 km/h.  
In the ultimate part of the argumentation supporting the final standpoint of the whole 
reasoning process, namely ‘the item is more interesting highlighting the adjusted speed’ 
the locus from definition is applied. The locus from definition, dealing with the relation 
between the definition and the defined, also appears to play a crucial role in editorial 
conferences, since when journalists argue about the preference for certain editorial choices 
instead of others, they refer themselves to the value system that defines their world. 
Locus from 
the efficient cause
Maxim: if the sufficient cause of a state 
of affairs is the case, then also the state 
of affairs is the case
First conclusion/ minor premise: the fact 
that if the driver would have gone 30 
instead of 40-50 it could have been 
different (a better outcome could have been 
realized) is a sufficient condition to cause 
regret
Final Conclusion: the audience 
will experience regret 
highlighting the high speed (=1’)
Datum:
-it could have been 
different if the driver had 
gone 30 km/h instead of 50 
km/h (simulative datum)
-the alternative that would 
have led to a better 
outcome has been 
disregarded (factual datum) 
(=1.1a)
Endoxon: regret is caused 
by a bad decision that has 
disregarded some 
alternatives that would 
have led to a better 
outcome
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Journalists pay attention to the characteristics of a certain event and compare them with 
their editorial value system, then they establish the degree of salience of this event and of 
its details, classifying them as more or less newsworthy/interesting/apt for a certain type 
of audience. In Figure  we notice that the datum originates from the previous Y-structure, 
namely from the fact that ‘a lower speed would have avoided the accident affects the 
evaluation of the accident’; 
 
 
Figure 47. Y-structure showing the last argumentative step of the discussion (1’>1). The item is 
more exciting and interesting highlighting the high speed because it will probably provoke regret 
in the audience. 
 
On the vertical level of the analysis, the conjunction of endoxon ‘by definition 
interesting news items are those that provoke emotions in the audience (especially bad 
Locus from 
definition
Maxim:if A has the property D and D 
is the definition of B then A is a B
First conclusion/ minor premise:
that the item highlighting the high
speed will probably provoke regret
in the audience meets the definition
of an ‘interesting news item’
Final Conclusion: the item is more
exciting and interesting highlighting
the high speed (= 1)
Datum: the item 
highlighting the high 
speed will probably 
provoke regret in the 
audience (prediction) 
(1’)
Endoxon: by definition 
CdT should publish 
interesting news items 
that provoke emotions 
in the audience 
(especially bad news) 
(goal) 
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emotions)’ and of the datum ‘the item highlighting the high speed will probably provoke 
regret in the audience’ creates the inferential effect leading to a first conclusion ‘that the 
item highlighting the high speed will probably provoke regret in the audience meets the 
definition of an interesting news piece’. This conclusion perfectly meets the conditions 
established by the maxim and conjoined with it allows inferring the standpoint ‘the item 
is more exciting and interesting highlighting the high speed’. Finally, this evaluative 
standpoint will support an implicit practical deliberative standpoint such as ‘we should 
broadcast the item highlighting the high speed’, since this is interesting for the audience. 
In the next sub-sections I will show that journalists’ anticipation of audience 
emotions, based on their own emotions, acts as starting point for producing an individually 
re-framed – and emotionally charged- news, therefore playing a crucial role in news 
editing. 
 
9.4 Anticipation of audience emotive uptake: effects on the news product 
 
After having made an argumentative analysis of the editorial conference in which 
journalists discuss detailed issues related to the news piece in the previous sub-section, let 
us now look at how the journalists’ discussions have influenced the news piece. In this 
sub-section I look at the final news product. In subsection 9.4.1 I will look also at the 
previous intermediate versions sketched by the journalist, which are observable thanks to 
the recordings of the journalist’s desktop.  
The final news piece, published by SRG at 10vor10 on the 8 December 2006 
concerns the bad news of the at the time eight-year old girl run over by the car running 
fast in a suburban area, as previously said. It is wise to say that the main source at 
journalists’ disposal when they construct a news is often represented by interviews; in this 
case by the interviews made with the parents of the girl right before the trial. On the basis 
of these interviews the journalist builds the item, which is made up –a) by an introduction 
of the host contextualizing the whole story, 
 001 M:  der fall 
   The case: 
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 002   auf einer quartierstraße 
   On a neighborhood street 
 003  wo die geschwindigkeit auf fünfzig     
stundenkilometer beschränkt ist 
   where the speed is limited to 50 km/h 
 004  wird ein autofahrer von einem kind überrascht 
   a car driver is surprised by a child 
 005  das auf die straße tritt 
   that steps onto the street. 
 006  er kann nicht rechtzeitig bremsen 
   He cannot brake in time 
 007  und verletzt das damals achtjährige mädchen schwer 
   and injures the, at the time, eight-year-old girl 
severely. 
 008  in erster instanz erhält der fahrer nur ein kleine 
buße 
   In the lower court the driver only receives a 
small fine 
 009  weil er drei stundenkilometer zu schnell fuhr 
   because he was driving 3 kilometers per hour too 
fast. 
 010  vom hauptvorwurf der schweren fahrlässigen 
körperverletzung  
   From the main charge of grievous, negligent 
personal injury 
 011  wird er freigesprochen 
   he is acquitted. 
 012  heute kam dieser fall vors zürcher obergericht 
   Today this case was heard at the Zurich superior 
court. 
 013  die eltern des mädchens hofften auf eine 
verurteilung 
   The parents of the girl were hoping for a 
conviction. 
 014  auch, weil ihnen sonst  
   Also because, otherwise,  
 015  wesentliche entschädigungs- und 
genugtuungsleistungen  
   substantial compensation and reparation payments  
 016  vorenthalten bleiben 
   would be withheld from them. 
 017  matthias rusch berichtet 
   Matthias Rusch reports. 
 
 -b) by some introductory parts of the journalist framing the interviews to the mother 
and to the father of the girl,  
 018 O:  heute mittag 
   Today, at midday, 
 019  kurz vor dem gang zum obergericht 
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   shortly before the walk to the superior court. 
 020  zu hause in urdorf 
   At home in Urdorf 
 021  studiert das ehepaar merlo nochmals die unzähligen 
unterlagen 
   the married Merlo couple again studies the 
countless documents 
 022  zum fall ihrer tochter 
   on the case of their daughter. 
 023  in vier jahren haben sich sechs ordner mit akten 
angesammelt 
   In four years six binders of files have 
accumulated; 
 024  für die familie eine lange leidensgeschichte 
   for the family a long tale of woe. 
 
-c) by the the interview to the parents,  
 025 A: ja der unfall hat natürlich  
   Yes the accident has of course  
 026  auch einen großen teil unseres lebens zerstört 
   also destroyed a large part of our life 
 027  und auch sehr stark eingeschränkt 
   and also limited [it] a lot. 
 028  wir waren wirklich 
   We were truly - 
 029  also ich hätte vorher sagen können 
   well I could previously say 
 030  ich war glücklich 
   I was happy, 
 031  ich war ein zufriedener mensch 
   I was a content person 
 032  und das fällt heute halt schon noch schwer 
   and today that still just remains difficult  
 033  das einfach so rauszubringen 
   to simply say it like that. 
 034  und dann eben zu sehen 
   And then just to see 
 035  wie das kind leidet 
   how the child suffers. 
 
-d) by a reproduction in black and white slow motion of the accident and -by a 
simulation in black and white slow motion showing what happened to the girl, integrated 
with actual photos of the accident and of the girl in coma: 
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 036 O: passiert ist der unfall 
   The accident happened 
 037  am einunddreißigsten mai zweitausendundzwei 
   on May 31st 2002. 
 038  die achtjährige sabina macht sich auf den weg zur 
schule 
   The eight-year-old Sabina starts off on her way 
to school, 
 039  will die straße überqueren 
   wants to cross the street. 
 040  plötzlich taucht ein auto auf 
   Suddenly a car appears 
 041  mit über fünfzig stundenkilometern 
   [going] over 50 kilometers per hour. 
 042  der jeep cherokee rammt sabina auf kopfhöhe 
   The Jeep Cherokee hits Sabina at head level 
 043  und schleudert sich acht meter weg 
   and catapults her eight meters away. 
 044  diagnose schädelbasisbruch 
   Diagnosis: basilar skull fracture 
 045  und ein schweres schädelhirntrauma 
   and a severe head injury. 
 046  obwohl sabina sofort mit der REGA ins spital 
geflogen wird 
   Even though Sabina is immediately flown by REGA to 
the hospital 
 047  liegt sie sieben monate lang im koma 
   she remains in a coma for seven months 
 048  und leidet heute noch 
   and still suffers 
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Then, the item goes on with e) another brief journalist’s introduction to the interview 
to the father that says why it is very hard and expensive to help the child:   
 049  an den folgen des unfalls 
   from the consequences of the accident. 
 050  gleichgewichtsstörungen 
   Balance disorder, 
 051  konzentrations- und lernschwierigkeiten 
   problems with concentration and learning, 
 052  emotionale schwankungen 
   emotional instability 
 053  und probleme mit der feinmotorik 
   and problems with the fine motor skills. 
 054  die eltern von sabina lassen nichts unversucht 
   Sabina’s parents are leaving nothing undone 
 055  um ihrer tochter zu helfen 
   to help their daughter. 
 056  doch das hat seinen preis 
   But that has its price. 
 057 A: also wir reden hier von einem sechsstelligen betrag 
   So we are talking about a six-figure amount 
 058  den wir aufgewendet haben 
   which we have spent 
 059  bis zum heutigen zeitpunkt 
   up to the present time. 
 060  das ist die betreuung von der sabina 
tagesbetreuung 
   That is the care for Sabina, daily care. 
 061  dann haben wir da fahrspesen 
   Then we have driving expenses. 
 062  wir haben selbstkostenbehalt von der versicherung 
   We have the deductible from the insurance 
 063  den wir selber tragen müssen 
   which we have to pay ourselves. 
 064  dann zusätzliche therapien 
   Then additional therapy 
 065  die wir der sabina zugestehen 
   that we allow Sabina. 
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Then, there is  f) a short passage showing the parents that go to the trial and that pass 
on the place of the accident: 
 066 O: auf dem weg zum gericht 
   On the way to court. 
 067  die eltern von sabina hoffen auf eine verurteilung 
des autofahrers 
   Sabina’s parents are hoping for a conviction of 
the driver 
 068  damit dessen versicherung die volle haftung 
übernehmen muss 
   so that his insurance will have to assume full 
liability. 
 069 A: also wenn ich da immer an der stelle hier 
vorbeifahr 
   So whenever I drive past this spot here 
 070  ist es für mich natürlich zum teil schon noch 
   it is of course for me sometimes still 
 071  dass mir das immer wieder hoch kommt 
   that this comes back to me over and over. 
 072  und jetzt haben wir tempo dreißig 
   And we now have a [speed] limit of 30. 
 073  und es ist natürlich schon sehr sehr belastend 
   And it is of course a very, very heavy burden 
 074  wenn man davon ausgeht 
   if you consider 
 075  dass wenn das damals schon gewesen wäre 
   that, if this had already been the case back then, 
 076  hätte der unfall sich vielleicht vermeiden lassen 
können 
   the accident maybe could have been avoided, 
 077  oder die schwere wäre nicht so schwer gewesen vom 
unfall 
   or the severity of the accident would not have 
been so severe. 
 078 O: genau zu diesem schluss kommt heute das 
obergericht 
   That is exactly the conclusion the superior court 
reached today. 
 079  ein gutachten hat ergeben 
   A report has shown 
 080  der unfall wäre vermeidbar gewesen 
   that the accident could have been avoided. 
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Then the item goes on with g) a simulation in black and white slow motion of what 
would have happened if the driver had gone 50 km/h instead of 30 km/h: 
 069 A: also wenn ich da immer an der stelle hier 
vorbeifahr 
   So whenever I drive past this spot here 
 070  ist es für mich natürlich zum teil schon noch 
   it is of course for me sometimes still 
 071  dass mir das immer wieder hoch kommt 
   that this comes back to me over and over. 
 072  und jetzt haben wir tempo dreißig 
   And we now have a [speed] limit of 30. 
 073  und es ist natürlich schon sehr sehr belastend 
   And it is of course a very, very heavy burden 
 074  wenn man davon ausgeht 
   if you consider 
 075  dass wenn das damals schon gewesen wäre 
   that, if this had already been the case back then, 
 076  hätte der unfall sich vielleicht vermeiden lassen 
können 
   the accident maybe could have been avoided, 
 077  oder die schwere wäre nicht so schwer gewesen vom 
unfall 
   or the severity of the accident would not have 
been so severe. 
 078 O: genau zu diesem schluss kommt heute das 
obergericht 
   That is exactly the conclusion the superior court 
reached today. 
 079  ein gutachten hat ergeben 
   A report has shown 
 080  der unfall wäre vermeidbar gewesen 
   that the accident could have been avoided. 
 081  damals habe zwar noch tempo fünfzig gegolten 
   Even though [the] 50 limit was in force back then 
 082  die geschwindigkeit sei den unübersichtlichen 
verhältnissen 
   the speed was, with respect to the unclear 
conditions  
 083  auf der quartierstraße nicht angepasst gewesen 
   on the neighborhood street, not adjusted. 
 084  wäre der autolenker nur  
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   If the driver had been 
 085  dreißig statt der gemessen fünfzig gefahren 
   driving 30 instead of 50 as measured, 
 086  er hätte den wagen 
   he could have (brought) the car 
 087  laut gutachten 
   according to the report 
 088  zwei meter vor dem kind zum stillstand gebracht 
   - two meters in front of the child - to a 
standstill. 
 089  der jeep-fahrer wird wegen fahrlässiger schwerer  
körperverletzung 
   The Jeep driver, because of negligent grievous 
personal injury, 
 090  vom obergericht 
   (is sentenced) by the superior court 
 091  zu einer bedingten gefängnisstrafe von zwei monaten 
verurteilt 
   to a conditional imprisonment of two months.  
 092  zudem ist er verpflichtet 
   Additionally, he is obliged 
 093  dem opfer schadenersatz und genugtuung zu zahlen 
   to pay the victim compensation and reparation. 
 094 A: ich erhoff mir 
   I am hopeful 
 095  dass dies einen wegweisenden charakter hat 
   that this has a groundbreaking quality  
 096  und dass man wirklich auch 
   and that one really also 
 097  auf die schwächeren teilnehmer auf der straße 
rücksicht nimmt 
   shows consideration for the weaker participants 
on the street 
 098  und nicht nur das gefühl hat 
   and does not just have the feeling 
 099  man sitzt im auto 
   one sits in a car 
 100  und man könne jetzt Gas geben und habe das 
vortrittsrecht 
   and can step on the gas and have right of way 
 101  auf jeden fall 
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   in every case. 
 102  und ich denke 
   And I think 
 103  es hat ein umdenken stattgefunden in der 
gesellschaft 
   there has been a rethinking in society. 
 104  und es hat auch 
   And there has also 
 105  ein umdenken in den gerichten stattgefunden 
   been a rethinking in the courts. 
 106  und darüber bin ich natürlich sehr froh 
   And I am of course very glad about that. 
 107 O: der verteidiger des autofahrers 
   The car driver’s defense attorney 
 108  will dieses urteil allerdings nicht akzeptieren 
   does not want to accept this verdict. 
         109  die geschwindigkeit sei der situation angepasst 
gewesen 
   The speed had been adjusted to the situation. 
 110 A: wir prüfen im moment 
   We are investigating at the moment 
 111  eine nichtigkeitsbeschwerde ans bundesgericht 
   a nullity appeal at the federal court 
 112  wegen verletzung von bundesrecht 
   for breach of federal law. 
 113 O: das ehepaar merlo hat heute einen ersten sieg 
errungen 
   The Merlo couple today scored an initial victory 
 114   doch es wird noch lange zu kämpfen haben 
   but they will have to fight for a long time. 
 
 
 In Figure 48 I show the argumentative reconstruction of the whole item; we can 
identify an overall implicit descriptive-evaluative standpoint ‘1 (the parents and the girl 
are innocent victims and the driver is the only guilty)’, which is supported by many distinct 
argumentative lines and by other two explanatory-descriptive sub-standpoints (1.2 and 
1.6).  
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Figure 48. Argumentative reconstruction of the whole item. 
 
The argumentative reconstruction of the final product confirms the considerations 
previously emerged from the analysis of the editorial conference; it becomes clear that the 
journalists’ anticipation of the audience emotions has led them to frame the news in such 
a way that the audience is induced to feel regret. 
The argumentative line 1.1 concerns the actual economical inconveniences that the 
family should face if the driver is not condemned; this is an argument that was widely 
discussed in the editorial conference and that relies on the high cultural value attributed to 
prosperity in the German-speaking part of Switzerland.  
Then, in the second argumentative line (1.2 and subordinate arguments) we observe 
the journalist’s sub-standpoint concerning the family’s long story of suffering (1.2.1). 
1. (The parents and the girl are the only victims) (Host, Journalist, Mother, Father)
1.2 ‘for the family it was a 
long tale of woe’ (J) (024)
1.2.1 ‘in four 
years six 
binders of 
files have 
accumulated
, countless 
documents’ 
(J) (023)
1.1 ‘if the 
driver is 
not 
condemned
, the 
family 
must pay 
for 
substantial 
compensati
on and 
reparation 
payments’ 
(Host) 
(014-017)
1.2.2 
interview to 
the mother: 
‘the accident 
has of 
course 
destroyed a 
large part 
of our life 
and limited 
it a lot’ (M) 
(025-027)
1.2.2.1a interview 
to the mother: ‘I 
was a content 
person/ and today 
that still just 
remains difficult/ 
to simply say it like 
that’ (M) (028-033)
1.2.2.1b 
interview to 
the mother: 
‘it is difficult 
to see how 
the child 
suffers’ (M) 
(034-035)
1.3 ‘The eight-
year-old 
Sabina starts 
off on her way 
to school/ 
wants to cross 
the street/ 
suddenly a 
car appears/ 
going over 50 
kilometers per 
hour./ The 
Jeep Cherokee 
hits Sabina at 
head level/ and 
catapults her 
eight meters 
away./ 
Diagnosis: 
basilar skull 
fracture and a 
severe head 
injure’ (J) 
(036-045)
1.4 ‘Sabina 
still suffers/ 
from the 
consequences 
of the accident 
/ Balance 
disorder/ 
problems with 
concentration 
and learning/ 
emotional 
instability/ 
and problems 
with the fine 
motor 
skills’(J) (047-
053)
1.5 ‘Sabina’s 
parents are 
leaving nothing 
undone/ to help 
their daughter/ 
But that has its 
price ’ (J) (054-
056)
1.5.1 interview to the 
father: ‘So we are 
talking about a six-
figure amount/ which 
we have spent/ up to 
he present time/ That 
is the care for Sabina/ 
daily care/ Then we 
have driving 
expenses/ We have 
the deductible from 
the insurance/ which 
we have to pay 
ourselves/ Then 
additional therapy/ 
that we allow Sabina’ 
(Father) (057-065)
1.6 interview 
to the mother 
on the place in 
which the 
accident has 
occurred and 
simulation of 
the accident in 
black and 
white slow 
motion ‘the 
accident could 
have been 
avoided’ (J,M) 
(069-077)
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Furthermore, there is the interview with the mother (1.2.2) that serves the function of 
reinforcing the journalist’s sub-standpoint. Here the focus is on long legal sequences, 
heavy psychological distress and on the child’s physical impairment. In the interview, the 
mother expresses her pain for the consequences of the accident, and in particular she 
compares the positivity of her state of mind before the accident with the negativity of her 
actual state of mind due to the negative life conditions of the girl. The analysis of the 
informal meeting between the journalist and the cutter confirms the journalist’s will to 
stress the side of emotionality. In the discurse the journalist states in a self-confident way 
that the best choice to do would be that of inserting the quotation of that particular piece 
of the interview to the mother concerning her emotive state: 
 
(3) (X) 0143-0147 ah now we should quickly insert [the parents’] 
statements/ I think that now we should insert/ I think that it would 
be better to begin with/ with the emotive statement of the mother/ 
who has talked really very good 
 
The journalist evaluates the possible insertion of the emotive statement of the 
mother as the best solution to begin the item. In argumentative terms we observe an 
evaluative standpoint ‘it would be better to begin with the emotive statement of the 
mother’, signaling the journalist’s will to emotionally hit the audience.  
The third argumentative line (1.3) presents the driver as responsible of the accident, 
since he has suddenly appeared in front of the gir. 
      In the fourth argumentative line (1.4) the journalist shifts his narration from the past 
to the present moment and brings the TV-viewers’ attention on the current girl’s sufferings 
and on the heavy consequences caused by the accident. The tragedy is evoked also in the 
fifth argumentative line (1.5), in which the journalist underlines the parents’ efforts not to 
leave anything undone, specifying that this has a high price: here a piece of interview with 
the father of the girl is inserted (1.5.1), in order to support the journalists’ sub-standpoint 
(1.5).  
In Figure 49 I separately illustrate the sixth argumentative line with the sub-
standpoint ‘the accident could have been avoided’, since it is the focal point of the item 
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that has been excitedly discussed in the editorial conference. Indeed, counterfactual 
reasoning is crucial and journalists insert the interview with the mother, in which she 
remarks the sense of injustice for what has happened and could have been avoided, 
according to her retrospective expectations. Put into Castelfranchi and Miceli’s words: 
 
As noted by Folger (Folger 1987, 1993; Folger et al. 1983), the relative deprivation 
phenomenon can be accounted for by a perceived discrepancy between one’s actual 
outcomes (or general standard of life) and what one believes one should get according to 
one’s own expectations (either prospective or “retrospective”; that is, simulated by going 
back to a previous time when they could have been formulated) (Castelfranchi and Miceli 
2014: 72). 
 
 In a similar fashion, “counterfactuals may play the role of anchor for comparison – 
(e.g. Olson et al. 2000)” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 72): the mother narrates their life 
before and after the accident, makes a comparison with the past and both she and we are 
prone to experience a sense of loss of their past happy life. The journalist decides to insert 
exactly the piece in which the mother stresses that what has happened could have been 
avoided and what transpires from her narration is the sense of injustice. As it has been 
specified in the theoretical chapter on counterfactuals (see Section 8), invalidated positive 
expectations entail some right infringement, which according to Castelfranchi and Miceli 
(2014: 74) lies in our “intolerance of invalidation”. By quoting this interview to the mother 
and by constructing the item in a peculiar way, journalists clearly point at the refusal of 
the present situation and emphasize a form of resentment that favors the wrong causal 
attribution that the jeep driver was necessarily fully responsible of the accident. This 
embittered attitude used (and perhaps also perceived) by journalists induces the audience 
to remain fixed on the critical event and on its ‘injustice’: this produces a high emotive 
impact on the audience, and all other aspects of the accident are backgrounded. In Fig. 49 
I show the argumentative reconstruction of the interview to the mother: This last 
argumentative line (1.6 and subordinate arguments, shown in Figure ) consists of the 
interview with the mother made on the place in which the accident had occurred and of 
the successive accident’s simulation in black and white slow motion. This scene physically 
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imitates the foregone but mentally evokes the better ideal -fictive- condition of a never 
happened accident: this contrast creates a very strong emotive impact. In the interview the 
mother says that they are driving 30 km/h at the moment and she remarks that if the driver 
would have gone 30 km/h, the accident could have been avoided. 
 
 
Figure 49. Argumentative reconstruction of the sub-standpoint 1.6 (interview to the mother). 
 
Interestingly, the whole argumentative line is based on counterfactual reasoning and 
is not only based on an actual datum but rather also on a simulative datum, namely on the 
fact that the accident could have been avoided if the driver had gone 50 km/h instead of 
30 km/h (argument 1.6.3 in Figure 49). This argumentation perfectly mirrors the editorial 
strategy discussed in the editorial conference. Adopting van Eemeren’s (2010) strategic 
maneuvering perspective on rhetorical choices, we can observe that the importance given 
to the sixth argumentative line does not coincide with its importance in terms of 
1.6 interview to the mother: ‘It is of course a very, very heavy burden/ if you consider/ 
that the accident could have been avoided/ or the severity of the accident would not 
have been so severe’ (Mother) (073-077)
1.6.1.2 ‘even though 
the 50 limit was in 
force back then/ the 
speed was, with 
respect to the 
unclear conditions/ 
on the 
neighborhood street, 
not adjusted/’ (J) 
(081-083)
1.6.1 ‘a report has shown 
that the accident could have 
been avoided’ (J) (079-080)
Sub-standpoint 1.6
1.6.1.3 ‘if the driver 
had been/ driving 
30 instead of 50 as 
measured/ he could 
have brought the car/ 
according to the 
report/ two meters in 
front of the child- to 
a standstill/ ’(J) 
(084-088)
1.6.1.1 ‘that is 
exactly the 
conclusion the 
superior court 
reached today’ (J) 
(078)
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argumentative force, since this premise is not the most relevant for justifying the guilt of 
the driver. Indeed, as we can see in Figure 48, according to the news, the driver should be 
condemned because the speed was not adapted to the situation (and because the accident 
could have been avoided) and not because he has slightly exceeded the legally allowed 
speed limit (he was driving 53 km/h), i.e. the driver should be condemned for a 
hypothetical assumption based on simulations and not on actual facts. We observe the 
presence of a misalignment in considering an actual normative speed-limit and a 
hypothetical counterfactual imagined speed limit: the former is underestimated whereas 
the latter is overestimated due to journalists’ will to base the news on what would have 
happened if the speed woul have been 30 km/h. 
Chronologically speaking, after the interview to the mother, the line of reasoning 
concerning the speed changes its focus; indeed, for the first time the focus shifts from the 
actual speed ‘how far was driving the car?’ and the allowed speed ‘was it allowed to go at 
that speed?’ to the the adequacy of the speed ‘was the speed adequate to the street 
conditions?’ (argument 1.6.1.2 in Figure 49). It is on this shifted focus that the whole item 
acts, in an attempt to persuade the audience to empathize with the journalist’s overall 
standpoint that the family and the girl are the only victims and that the driver is fully guilty. 
Indeed, the sub-sub-standpoint ‘the accident could have been avoided’ (1.6) is supported 
by the argument ‘the speed was not adjusted to the unclear conditions of the street’ (1.6.1.), 
which is also the main focus of the argumentative discussion of the editorial conference 
analysed in the previous paragraph. We observe a shift of issue from what is allowed to 
what is adequate: the journalist supports the adequacy of the lower speed with the 
argument that the report states that with a lower speed the car would have stopped two 
meters in front of the girl (1.6.1> 1.6.1.3). Adopting van Eemeeren’s (2010) strategic 
maneuvering perspective on rhetorical choices in arguments, we can observe that this 
argument is not the strongest one for justifying the adequacy of a lower speed and 
subsequently the guilt of the driver, but can be seen as functional to maneuvering with 
audience demand. Proving that a lower speed would have avoided the accident is not a 
very good reason to support the inadequacy of the speed of the car driver, but it acts on 
audience feelings and on its expected emotions of pity and empathizing. 
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9.4.1 Intermediate news drafts and final news product: a useful comparison 
 
In the previous paragraphs I analysed the editorial conference and the final news item: In 
this paragraph I compare the final news piece with previous intermediate news drafts, 
gained from the observation of journalists’ desktop recordings, since this comparison can 
offer further proofs of journalists’ reasoning on the audience uptake. 
 By looking at the difference between the same news passage of the final version 
and of an intermediate version of the news piece, we notice that in the final news piece the 
journalist attempts to convey to the audience a clearer and more explicit point of view 
concerning the avoidability of the accident. In the initial draft the journalist used the 
question ‘could the accident have been avoided if the jeep driver would have gone 30 
instead of 53?’, that could leave some doubts on the actual possibility of a better scenario; 
in order to eliminate any doubt, in the final draft of the news product the journalist 
substitutes the question with the affirmative statement ‘the accident could have been 
avoided’ followed by the argument of authority ‘an official report has shown this’. The 
journalist evaluates the two possible writing strategies in view of the anticipated inferences 
of the audience. He interprets the potential versions as two different arguments from which 
the audience could draw an inference to an implicit standpoint: 
 
Figure 50. Inferred audience’s standpoints ‘in response’ to the journalists’ arguments. 
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In the first case the TV-viewers could have thought that the fact that the accident 
could have been avoided was only a weak possibility, whereas with the affirmative 
statement in the second version the journalist attempts to induce a strong degree of 
certainty referring to the fact that the accident could have been avoided: in short, an initial 
version with a simple assumption becomes a final version with a strong statement. 
Furthermore, an interesting observation can be made with reference to the 
commentary of the journalist that follows the interview with the mother; in the interview, 
the mother remarks that the accident could have been avoided and the journalist says 
(that is exactly the conclusion the superior court reached 
today/ a report has shown/ that the accident could have been 
avoided 078-080). If we look at the intermediate drafts of the news, we observe a 
shift from an initial draft ‘this exactly was the point at issue in front of the court’, to an 
intermediate version ‘this exactly is the object of the negotiation’, to the final version 
‘this exactly is the conclusion the superior court reached today’. With this last formulation 
the journalist stresses the certainty of the decision of the superior court. 
In order to give further evidence of how journalists’ frame the news on the basis of 
their own emotions and of the anticipated audience emotions, I illustrate further passages 
of the intermediate drafts of the news piece observed thanks to the journalists’ desktop 
recordings and I compare them with the final version of the news product. 
Firstly, at the beginning of the item, during the part that precedes the interview with 
the mother of the girl, the journalist changes the initial draft ‘The parents of the girl again 
study the documents on the case of their daughter’ into ‘The married Merlo couple again 
studies the countless documents on the case of their daughter (021-022)’ of the final news 
product. This implies a change of perspective in the construal of the protagonists of the 
story, indeed the father and the mother are conceived as couple rather than as parents, as 
a unity aiming to win the painful trial. Furthermore, the journalist conveys the idea of 
difficult effort that the parents are making in facing the trial whereby the use of the verb 
‘to study’ that suggests a demanding mental task; this is reinforced via the insertion of the 
adjective countless in the final version ‘The documents > the countless documents’. 
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Furthermore, in the final version the journalist adds the sentence ‘in four years six folders 
with acts have been accumulated: for the family a long tale of woe’: this reinforces the 
causal chain that has led the family to suffer a lot. All these additions contribute to give 
force to the journalist’s sub-standpoint ‘For the family it was a long tale of woe’ (1.2 in 
Fig. 48), which in turn supports the overall implicit news’ standpoint ‘1 (the driver is fully 
guilty and the parents and the girl are the victims)’ (Fig. 48). 
Journalists’ will to frame the family and the girl as victims is witnessed also through 
the modification of the verb ‘to fight’ in the intermediate version into ‘to suffer’ in the 
final version with reference to the girl’s coping with the accidents’ consequences: ‘the girl 
fights still today with the consequences of the accident’ > ‘she suffers still today the 
consequences of the accident’ (048-049). By looking at the semantics of the two verbs, we 
are able to grasp the core difference of framing conveyed by them: the verb ‘to fight’ 
presupposes a battle against something that can be faced and overcome, whereas the verb 
‘to suffer’ presupposes that someone passively undergoes events against her/his will: it 
underlines the impossibility to act against the painful event, implicitly denying the 
possibility of a full healing. 
In order to increase the framing of the family’s victimization, the journalist also 
exactly specifies the precise date of the accident, changing the sentence indicating an 
approximate lapse of time ‘the accident happened four years ago’ into ‘the accident 
happened in May 2002’ and then into the sentence ‘the accident happened on the 31st May 
2002 (036-037)’ that precisely specifies the exact date of the event: the exhaustiveness of 
the date signals the boundary that delimits the life of the girl and of her family before and 
after the accident, it remarks that their life has dramatically changed on that day. 
 Furthermore, the dramatic framing of the event is conveyed through the change of 
the sentence ‘Sabina is on the way to school’ into ‘Sabina is about to go to school (038)’, 
creating an expectation in the reader that suddenly something bad would happen.  
Finally, the journalist reinforces the dramatic framing of the event also by specifying 
the model of the car in the final draft; with the nominal phrase ‘the Jeep-Cherokee (<the 
car) smashes into Sabina at the level of the head and throws her eight meters away’, the 
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journalist sheds light on the big size of the car and better conveys the dramatic effect of 
the accident on the little body of the girl.  
In this sub-section I have observed the differences between intermediate drafts and 
final versions of the news item: I have shown the journalists’ will to increase the dramatic 
framing of the item. In the next sub-section I will show how journalists increase the 
dramatic framing via concessive counter-argumentation.  
 
 
9.4.3 Journalists using concessive counter-argumentation and dramatic 
framing: which relationship? 
 
In the analyzed news product, which is characterized by a dramatic and slightly unfair 
framing, journalists use many concessive counter-argumentations: I claim that this 
increases the dramatic framing of the news all focused on the girl’s victimization. The 
journalist uses the two parts of the concessive sentences in view of the anticipated 
inferences of the TV-viewer. Indeed, if we think of arguments as ‘invitations to inference’ 
(Pinto 1996: 168), we can say that he uses the two parts of the sentence bound by the 
concessive connectors as two different arguments from which the audience could draw an 
inference to two implicit standpoints. 
For instance, during the black and white slow motion of the simulation of the 
accident, journalists increase the pathos to be conveyed to the audience with the sentence 
‘even though she has been immediately brought with the 
elicopter in the hospital, she lies seven weeks in coma (046-
047)’. Indeed, the connector even though marks the first datum as concessive, signaling 
out the second datum as argumentatively relevant, underlining the passive suffering of the 
victim and the impossibility to avoid heavy consequences even though all possible 
solutions had been taken into account: 
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Figure 51. Audience’s implicit standpoints drawn due to the journalists’ arguments. 
 
Thanks to the connector even though the journalist prepares the audience to the 
major relevance of the second datum, namely that the girl has undergone heavy 
consequences due to the accident. This increases the victimization’s framing. 
The journalist goes on with another concessive counter-argumentation: 
“Sabina’s parents do not leave anything untried, yet this has 
its price (054-056)”. The adversative yet marks the second part of the sentence 
(the parents’ attempts to fight for the girl have a high cost in terms of sufferings and efforts) 
as the most relevant for the TV-viewer;  
 
 
Figure 52. Audience’s implicit standpoints inferred starting from the two journalists’ arguments. 
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In this case the journalist again uses the two parts of the sentence bound by the 
connector yet as two different arguments from which the audience could draw two 
inferences to two implicit standpoints. The standpoint drawn from the argument following 
the connector ‘but’ is marked as the most relevant: in the end, the final conclusion is that 
for the parents it is very hard to not leave something untried. This is a point that is then 
further developed with the insertion of the father’s quotation, which as a whole represents 
a complex argument supporting the inferred TV-viewers’ standpoint conveyed by the 
journalists’ words that ‘Sabina’s parents are doing everything not to leave something 
untried, but this has its price’, as we can see in Figure 53: 
 
 
Figure 53. Implicit journalists’ and inferred TV-viewers’standpoint conveyed by the father’s 
arguments.  
 
Towards the end of the item we find an interview with the mother in which the focus 
is on the injustice of judging only on the basis of the ‘allowed speed’. The court after the 
trial has decided that the driver should be considered guilty even though the allowed and 
legal speed limit was 50 km/h and the mother is satisfied. The item ends with a two-lines 
summary ‘The Merlo couple today scored an initial victory, but 
it will have to fight for a long time (113-114)’: we can hypothesize 
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two potential unexpressed evaluative standpoints inferred by the TV-viewers starting from 
the journalists’ arguments, as shown in Figure 54.  
 
Figure 54. Implicit inferred TV-viewers’ standpoints conveyed by the journalists’ arguments that 
‘The Merlo couple today scored an initial victory, but they will have to fight for a long time’. 
 
The victory of the couple is only an initial -and not a definitive- victory, and the 
efforts and sufferings deriving from a predicted indefinite and long lapse of time are 
presented as a stronger reason to believe that the Merlo couple is the victim and to 
empathize with them. In other words, the use of but marks the first line of argument as a 
concessive representation of the point of view of an hypotethical antagonist identified in 
the TV-Viewer potentially imagining a positive situation for the couple, and the second 
line of argument is the one endorsed by the protagonist, namely by the journalist and 
coinciding also with the TV-Viewer potentially imagining a negative situation for the 
couple. This mental battle instantied by the journalist in the TV-viewers’ mind is supported 
also by the evocation of the metaphorical frame of the war through the lexicon, and more 
specifically through the use of the verbal phrase win a victory and of the verb fight. We 
find evidence of this dramatic framing even in the square where journalists use to save the 
reminder of the items’ quotations: in order to choose a label for the mother’s interview, he 
chooses ‘mother of the victim of the accident’. 
As a result of this analysis on concessive counter-argumentations in the final news 
product, we can conclude that concessive counter-argumentations are deployed by the 
journalists to increase the dramatic framing of the reported event, in which the girl and her 
family are conceived as victims and the driver as fully guilty. Nevertheless, by looking 
	 	
	
	
273	
exclusively at the intermediate and final versions of the news product, it is hard to assess 
the extent to which journalists frame the news: to what extent do journalists frame the 
news item in an individual way according to their own emotions and to the consequent 
audience expected emotions and to what extent do they try to convey a balanced view of 
the news?  I will attempt to definitely answer this question by analyzing the retrospective 
interviews made to the journalist in section 9.5.  
 
 
9.5 How the study of journalists’ writing processes shows a continuous struggle 
between capturing audience attention and conveying a balanced view  
 
In order to understand journalists’ reasoning that have led them to make a dramatic 
framing of the news item, I also analyse the retrospective verbal protocol: this type of 
interview offers insights that are revealing both of the journalist’s will to capture the 
audience attention via a dramatic framing and of his will to convey a rebalanced view of 
the news. Thanks to the fact that we can identify explicative standpoints in retrospective 
interviews, which reproduce practical standpoints of soliloquial argumentation (that the 
journalist has spontaneously given himself while he was reflecting on what he had 
previously written), the journalists’ reasoning about writing choices is explicitly shown.  
In the retrospective verbal protocol we find evidence that the journalist is torn about 
whether to give priority to capture audience attention or to convey a re-balanced view of 
the news. Indeed, by looking at the retrospective verbal protocol, it is clear that the 
journalist critically reconsiders his initial stancing towards the dynamics of the accident 
and we clearly understand that the journalist believes that the initial draft of the item was 
too much framed towards the victimization of the girl and her family and the stigmatization 
of the car driver than the final news item.  
The data from the retrospective verbal protocol cast new light on the situation 
emerging from the analysis of the news product and of the desktop recordings of the 
journalist, since they enable us to clearly understand the journalists’ reasonings at stake in 
the anticipation’s phenomenon. In the interview the journalist comments on the central 
issue of the speed and on the difficulty of conveying the misalignment of the two 
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alternative standpoints concerning the actual/allowed speed and the adjusted/auspicable 
speed; 
 
(4) 0195-0220 I reflected/ how it would have been 
more logic/ how the TV-viewer would have understood it 
better/ that it was like saying/ this was above all the 
problem/ that it was an area with speed limit 50/ and that 
the driver was driving 53/ slightly too fast/ and the judge 
however believes that/ due to the fact that the issue on 
the residential street is not so clear/ that driving with 
a speed of 50 should be illegal/ even though officially it 
was an area with speed limit 50/ and I have had some 
interruptions/ there were too many figures to compress in 
a unique sentence/ therefore I have written/ before I have 
written/„area with speed limit 50“/ for him it has been 
measured a speed of 53/ and I have thought/ that there were 
too many figures/ then I face the TV-viewer/ and therefore 
I deleted it/ and I changed it/ I tried to reformulate it 
in a more comprehensible way  
  
In this excerpt we notice the interweaving of emotive and cognitive anticipation, 
since the journalist firstly anticipates the cognitive uptake of the audience, which is 
however subordinate to an anticipation of an emotive uptake aiming at the audience 
persuasion. With respect, in particular, to the passage above, it is interesting to observe 
how the journalist evaluates the two possible writing strategies in view of the anticipated 
inferences of the audience. Indeed, in the excerpt above, the journalist makes very explicit 
his difficulty in choosing the issue that he intends to convey and the way in which the 
issue should be conveyed in view of the audience reaction. The journalist asks himself 
whether he should underline that it was an area with speed limit 50 km/h and that the driver 
was going 53 km/h, or whether he should underline that driving 50 km/h in a residential 
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area should be illegal even though the speed limit was 50 km/h (therefore avoiding to write 
the actual speed). In Fig. below (Figure 55) I show the argumentative reconstruction of 
the above excerpt of the retrospective verbal protocol, showing the two hypothetical 
alternative ways of proposing the item; 
 
 
Figure 55.	 Two distinct argumentative reconstructions of the journalist’s reasoning in the 
retrospective verbal protocol based on counterfactual reasoning (excerpt 4). 
 
As we can see in Figure 55, these two argumentative reconstructions are based on 
counterfactual reasoning, in a typical fashion of retrospective verbal protocols. The 
journalist is indecided on how the audience would have understood better the issue of the 
different speed. In order to choose the better linguistic strategy, he anticipates and 
simulates both scenarios. He asks himself: “will the audience understand better the core 
issue of the event by specifying the adjusted speed and avoiding writing the actual speed 
of 53 km/h or by writing the allowed speed 50 km/h and the actual speed of 53 km/h?”. 
Counterfactual reasoning is deployed to choose the best alternative available that would 
have enabled a better audience comprehension; the journalist decided to avoid to write the 
actual speed 53 km/h due to the fact that the difference with the legal speed limit 50 km/h 
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would have been irrelevant, since the accident would have equally occurred, as previously 
explained and shown in Figure 43. Conveying to the audience a relevant difference instead 
of an irrelevant one was the better editorial strategy chosen by the journalist thanks to the 
simulation produced by counterfactual reasoning. I have provided a full explanation of the 
combination of these different mental spaces at stake in the construction of a relevant 
difference between the actual speed 53 km/h, the legal limit 50 km/h and the hypothetical 
right limit 30 km/h in Fig. 50, in the first part of this Chapter in which a similar issue is at 
stake during the editorial conference. 
In the following passage of the retrospective verbal protocol, we find further 
evidence that the anticipation of the audience emotive uptake, often carried out whereby 
counterfactual reasoning, plays a crucial role in journalists’ reasoning and in their attempt 
to frame the news in an audience-oriented way. In this passage the journalist comments 
on a hypothetical insertion of a crash test simulation, which has not been carried out due 
to spatial constraints and to the fact that in order to insert the simulation of the crash test, 
it would have been necessary to do an intrigue; 
 
(5) 0226-0245 then there was also the fact that/ that 
christian düschler has said to me/ that I should have built 
also a framing/ of a ‘crash’ test/ [… ]/ it would have been 
a crash test/ in which we should have seen/ how a jeep 
crashes with a doll/ and then this doll begins to whirl in 
the air/ and this would have been a strong picture/ 
therefore we would have put it gladly/ but then I noticed/ 
it did not fill/ I should have done an intrigue/ in order 
to construct the picture 
 
By looking at this passage, it is evident that the journalist positively evaluates a 
hypothetical choice to put a piece with a crash test simulation, due to the strong emotive 
effect that it would have had on the audience, therefore underlining the continuous 
journalistic tendency to anticipate audience emotions that in this case was functional to 
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persuade it about the guilt of the driver and the victimization of the girl. However, the 
journalist decided not to insert a simulation of a crash test, since he should have done an 
intrigue (a chaotic mix of news pieces) to construct the picture, and so he had to opt for 
preserving the major goal of respecting space and time limits imposed by the program 
rules as well as for proposing the news in an ordered way. The journalist has decided not 
to insert the framing of a simulated crash test because it was the only alternative that did 
not require making a chaotic mix of news pieces: this has led to the positive outcome of 
enabling the audience to fluently follow the item.  
The journalist applies a downward counterfactual reasoning based on the locus from final 
cause and alternatives. In Figure  I show the inferential relation of this reasoning: 
 
Figure 56. It would have been different (worse) if journalists had inserted a crash test because 
they should have done an intrigue that could have confused the audience. 
 
Inserting a crash test and not inserting it are two alternatives when an agent 
composes a news piece and the goal of journalists when they compose a news piece is not 
to do intrigues that confuse the audience (endoxa). Considering these endoxa and the data 
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that “we have chosen not to insert a crash test which has led not to do an intrigue that 
confuses the audience (factual datum)” and that “it was possible to choose to insert a crash 
test and it would have led to do an intrigue that could have confused the audience” 
(simulative datum and retrospective prediction), then among the two alternatives they have 
chosen the alternative that has led not to do an intrigue that could have confused the 
audience, disregarding the alternative that would have led to do it (first conclusion/ minor 
premise and invalidation of negative expectation). The merge of the first conclusion/ 
minor premise (and invalidatioin of negative expectation) with the inferential force given 
by the maxim from the reasoning of final cause and alternatives “if between two 
alternatives X and Y in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas 
the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X” 
gives rise to the final conclusion that “we have chosen the better alternative disregarding 
the worse one”, which is a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead to experience 
possible relief.  
In excerpt (5) we can observe that the journalist uses both downward counterfactual 
reasoning and upward counterfactual reasoning (for more details on this distinction see 
Chapter 8). Firstly, the journalist uses upward counterfactual reasoning and imagines a 
better scenario in which the framing with the crash test would have had a high impact on 
the audience. Later, the journalist uses downward counterfactual reasoning in order to say 
that in order to insert a crash test simulation, a chaotic mix of news pieces should have 
been inserted.  
The two utterances containing distinct simulation directions of counterfactual 
reasoning (one pointing at a hypothetical unrealized better alternative and one pointing at 
a hypothetical unrealized worse alternative) are connected by the disjunctive conjunction 
but: and this would have been a strong picture/ therefore we 
would have put it gladly/ but then I noticed/ it did not 
fill/ I should have done an intrigue (0241-0245). 
 The utterance that follows the connector but dealing with the fact that an intrigue 
would have been necessary in order to insert the framing of the crash test is presented as 
more important than the utterance preceding the connector but that is focused on the fact 
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that a framing with the crash test would have been nice. Furthermore, it is interesting to 
notice the shift in tense from past to present tense after having applied upward 
counterfactual reasoning (it would have been a crash test/ in which 
we should have seen/ how a jeep crashes with a doll/ and then 
this doll begins to whirl in the air). This is a further proof that 
upward counterfactual reasoning stimulates cognitive process; in this case it actualizes the 
moment of the choice and it enables to connect the world of the past in which there was 
the possibility to insert a framing with the crash test and the world of the present in which 
the journalist re-experiences the impact of the nice framing. Also in this case, upward 
counterfactual reasoning seems to stimulate imagination and to let journalists imagine the 
outcomes of past hypothetical editorial strategies in the present moment.  
Until now, it is clear that the journalist’s priority is to produce a news with a high 
emotive impact on the audience. Interestingly, at a certain point in the retrospective verbal 
protocol we notice an inversion of tendency: the journalist’s priority becomes that of 
conveying a more balanced viewpoint. Indeed, the journalist explicitly states that the first 
draft of the item was framed in a slight unfair way, due to the usage of the word ‘causer 
of the accident’. As soon as he acknowledges that the news framing was unfair, he decides 
to modify the news item in a more balanced way: 
  
(6) 0433-0455    R: now you delete „causer of the 
accident“ (Unfallverursacher)/ J: „jeeep driver“ 
(Autofahrer) yes this is a bit/ this is/ I had the feeling 
that/ what had I put/„author“ I had put/ in that case I 
eliminated it because-/ well the judge has concluded that/ 
that he is guilty/ but then I have thought how/ author of 
the accident/ even the girl has suddenly appeared from 
behind the bush/ this is a bit like/ finally in order to 
make an accident we need two persons so to say/ so I had 
the feeling that/ yes I have preferred writing jeep driver/ 
rather than causer of the accident/ this is this would have 
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been a bit like  his total sentence/ even though he has 
been declared guilty now/ but it is not fully clear/ how 
much the girl has contributed [to the accident]/ when she 
has suddenly appeared from behind the bush ((yawns))/  
 
In excerpt (6), the journalist clearly expresses his difficulty to reach and convey a 
balanced view of such a delicate news. The journalist reframes his previous implicit 
standpoint ‘The driver is the only guilty’ and reformulates it in such a way that may 
comprehend also a responsibility of the girl, such as ‘The driver is guilty and the girl is 
the victim, but she may have a part of responsibility in the accident’. 
The journalist critizes his previous linguistic choice (causer of the accident), 
which would have invalidated a balanced view of the situation, inducing the audience to 
attribute full responsibility for the accident to the driver. In Figure  I show the 
argumentative reconstruction of excerpt (6): 
 
Figure 57. Argumentative reconstruction of excerpt (6) of the restrospective verbal protocol. 
 
The journalist attempts to «lessen» the driver’s guilt using the appellative «jeep 
driver» instead of «causer of the accident», therefore bringing to the foreground also other 
factors of the situation, such as the sudden appearing of the girl from the bush. It is clear 
that the journalist is trying to convey a critical view of the event to the audience and that 
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he is aware that formulating the news in a way instead of another can influence the 
audience opinion in a decisive way. Again, in one focal argumentative move of exerpt (6) 
the journalist uses downward counterfactual reasoning: “this would have been a bit like 
his total sentence”. The journalist’ s hypothesis of a worse unrealized scenario in which 
the driver could have been considered fully guilty is used in order to support his decision 
to write ‘jeep driver’ rather than ‘causer of the accident’. This was the best alternative to 
give a balanced view of the event; writing ‘causer of the acident’ would have made the 
difference in attributing guilt to the driver, whose plain guilt had not been demostrated. In 
order to show the missing link represented by the implicit premises, I show the inferential 
configuration of the focal argumentative move containing downward counterfactual 
reasoning in Figure 14. Reasoning from final cause and alternatives has been applied, as 
we can see in Figure 14; 
 
 
Figure 14. It would have been different if the nominal phrase ‘causer of the accident’ had been 
used (worse), because by using the nominal phrase ‘causer of the accident’ and not ‘jeep driver’ 
the driver would have been unfairly considered fully guilty by the audience. 
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If a) writing “Autofahrer” (car driver) and writing “Unfallverursacher” (causer of 
the accident) are two alternative actions in the writing of an item and if b) when a journalist 
composes a news piece he has the goal not to make an unfair framing of the news (endoxa); 
and if a) journalists have chosen to write “Autofahrer” that has led not to make an unfair 
framing of the news (factual datum) and if b) it was possible to choose to write 
“Unfallverursacher” and it would have not led not to make an unfair framing of the news 
(simulative datum, retrospective prediction) then, among the two alternatives we have 
chosen the alternative that leads not to make an unfair framing of the news, disregarding 
the alternative that would have led to make an unfair framing of the news (first conclusion/ 
minor premise and invalidation of negative expectation).  Regarding the intersected topical 
constituent, the maxim stemming from the locus from final cause and alterantives “if 
between two alternatives X, Y in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of 
C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y 
rather than X” conjoined with the first conclusion acting as a minor premise leads to the 
final conclusion “we have chosen the better alternative disregarding the worse one”. This 
final conclusion is a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead journalists to experience 
possible relief. 
Furthermore, in one consecutive passage of the retrospective verbal protocol, the 
journalist widens the scope of his explanations to the judiciary cases in general, being 
aware of the consequences that every wrong word can have in the subtype of news genre 
‘news concerning judicial cases’; 
 
(7)[…] 0455-0481 R: yes/ J: this is a bit- I think/ 
still a bit exceptional/ in this text/ because it is a 
judiciary case/ we must think/ we must ponder every word/ 
how can we write/ in a way that then a party/ does not feel 
in some way judged/ or that  does not feel misunderstood/ 
or even always/ yes here all the legal field is concerned/ 
ehm in all these legal situations (xxx)/ we must always pay 
a lot of attention/ not to damage/ in the formulation/ if 
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it would have been a portrait/ or a feature/ then you could 
write in a fanciful way/ simply like that/ and the damage 
would not be big/ in another context you should not/ have 
weighted every word/ but  rather in these cases you must 
look good/ that the statement really arrives with the right 
meaning/ and that it is not understood in a false way 
 
Again, the journalist uses downward counterfactual reasoning in the externalization 
of his inner reasoning. He imagines a different situation in which it could have been 
possible to write in a more fanciful way without severe consequences. However, he 
maintains that in the context of news concerning judiciary cases this is inadequate, since 
it is indispensable that every word is conveyed to the audience with its instrinsic meaning 
acception and without ambiguous polisemies that could convey wrong meanings. The 
disjunctive conjunction but signals that the positive scenario imagined for another 
journalistic context is not valid for journalism dealing with judiciary cases in which every 
word must be weighted. The counterfactual reasoning is used to make a comparison, to 
open another hypothetical world in which words can be used without thinking too much: 
this alternative world is compared with the actual world in which the journalist must 
ponder every word.  
Afterwards, the journalist remarks that he had been influenced too much by his own 
emotions and that he had framed the news in an unfair way, in such a way that was too 
much shifted on the emotional side;  
 
(8) 0545-0556 in this point in which the parents had this 
feeling/ I reformulate it differently/ this does not add 
anything/ because she says it also in the interview/ and 
it would have been too heavy/ so a bit too much on the track 
of the emotions/ it says something that/ in the end I have 
already said/ here the mother hopes/ that they can reach a 
	 	
	
	
284	
total sentence for the driver/ so that then even from the 
insurance of the driver/ they can receive some money  
 
Again, in this passage it is interesting to notice the presence of downward 
counterfactual reasoning; the journalist hypothesizes a worse scenario in which the news 
is presented as redundant and emotionally heavy for the audience. In this case we observe 
a chain of subordinate arguments that the journalist uses to give always more specific 
reasons of why a different reformulation was the only possible alternative to reach a better 
goal, namely producing an interesting but not too heavy item. Indeed, reformulating the 
mother’s statements about her feelings was the best alternative to reach the main goal of 
not being heavy and redundant. In Figure 15 I show the locus from final cause and 
alternatives; 
 
 
Figure 15. It would have been different (worse) if the interview had not been reformulated because 
the interview would have been redundant in terms of audience emotive uptake. 
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The reasoning works as follows: if a) reformulating a piece of interview in a 
different way from what was already said and not reformulating it are two alternatives 
when a journalist composes a news piece and if b) journalists have the goal of not 
producing heavy and redundant news pieces for their audience (endoxa); if a) we have 
chosen to reformulate the interview differently which has led not to produce a heavy and 
redundant news piece for the audience (factual datum) and if b) it was possible too choose 
not to reformulate differently the interview and it would have led to produce a heavy and 
redundant news piece (simulative datum and retrospective prediction); then, among the 
two alternatives we have chosen the one that has led not to produce a redundant and heavy 
news piece, disregarding the alternative that would have led to produce it (first conclusion 
and invalidation of negative expectation). The latter acts as a minor premise, whose major 
premise is “if between two alternatives X,Y in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the 
goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus 
to choose Y rather than X”. This leads to the conclusion that “we have chosen the better 
alternative, disregarding the worse one”. This final conclusion coincides with a positive 
evaluative standpoint that may lead the audience to experience relief. 
        After his becoming conscious of this, the journalist reconsiders the priorities of his 
item that according to his new viewpoint should be less emotionally charged and more 
informative about the actual sequence of events. In the light of this new reconsideration, 
the piece of news that is believed to be too much shifted on the emotional track and that 
would strike too much the audience is considered useless, since it does not add any relevant 
information for the audience comprehension of the actual sequence characterizing the 
event.                  
All these excerpts of the retrospective verbal protocol have shown the journalist’s 
awareness of having framed the news in a slightly unfair way and his consequent desire to 
give a rebalanced, fair view of the event, more comprehensive of all factors at stake, 
aiming at conveying a critical view of the news. 
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9.6 Conclusions of the case study 
 
Concluding, in this Chapter, I have focused on the way in which journalists reason on the 
audience emotive uptake in TV-journalism, i.e. on journalists’ anticipatory inferences 
concerning audience emotive uptake, which determine an explicit framing of the news 
piece, that is highlighted by specific argumentative and linguistic choices in the news.  
The analysis of the whole intertextual chain has shown that journalists continuously 
struggle between capturing the audience attention on the one side and conveying a 
balanced view of the event on the other side. In this case of study it is clear that journalists 
have implemented a strategic maneuver (for more details on strategic maneuver see 4.2.1). 
The rhetorical dimension inevitably affects the argumentativeness of the news products, 
provoking a strategic maneuvering between a) the needs of criticality and b) the wish to 
capture the audience attention. Journalists want to be at the same time reasonable and 
effective; in order to do that, they make three distinct types of choices.  
Firstly, they make specific topical choices: the arguments concerning the fictive 
speed limits, acting on regret, represent the main sources for justifying the journalist’s 
overall standpoint that the driver is the only guilty. Hence, the car driver is presented as a 
hit-and-run driver who could choose to go slower and who has destroyed the life of a 
whole family: the audience is induced to think that he could have actually decided to go 
slower. However, at the same time, journalists also attempt to produce an item that 
conveys a more rebalanced view of the situation, namely diminuishing the guilt attributed 
to the driver, for example by changing the linguistic label from Unfallverursacher (causer 
of the accident) into Autofahrer (car driver). Counterfactual reasoning plays a fundamental 
role in inducing the audience to feel regret for the possibility to avoid the accident. 
Secondly, journalists have chosen “how to adapt the argumentative moves made in 
the strategic maneuver to meet the ‘audience demand’, the requirements pertinent to the 
audience that is to be reached” (Van Eemeren 2010: 94). The journalists aim at capturing 
the audience attention, by highlighting emotional aspects of the dramatic story, also via 
usage of many concessive counter-argumentation, as I have shown in sub-section 9.4.  
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Thirdly, journalists make a very peculiar usage of presentational techniques in this 
news item. Indeed, all arguments in the final news piece support the standpoint in favor of 
the full guilt of the driver and of the victimization of the girl and of her family: they are 
presented in a manner that makes the driver’s guilt more prominent. Indeed, all journalists’ 
standpoints or sub-standpoints are then supported by further arguments gained from 
interviews with the family members. In the end, we can say that journalists dispose 
arguments in such a way that is more strategic for reaching the journalistic purpose of 
capturing the audience attention. 
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10. “If only I had…”: Journalists’ use of unrealized better 
scenarios in evaluating past editorial choices  
  
 
 
10.1 A journalist negatively evaluates a previous news piece and imagines a better 
unrealized outcome: the BEBE case43 
 
The case of study that I analyze in this Section is based on a Monday morning editorial 
conference at CdT, held on the 21st January 2013. As it is usual in morning editorial 
conferences, the daily topics of the newspaper are organized and the items of the previous 
newspaper are evaluated. The case involves a long argumentation by one journalist (MF) 
focussing on the evaluation of news piece from the previous week about the abandonment 
of a newborn in Tessin. This evaluation is supported by many counterfactual arguments; 
more specifically, these arguments consider past hypothetical better unrealized 
alternatives, being therefore upward counterfactual reasonings (McMullen, Markman & 
Gavanski 1995: Roese 1994). This negative evaluation is preceded by the journalist’s 
positive evaluation of a news’ piece concerning Lugano’s cathedral: according to him the 
news on the cathedral has been handled in the right way, since journalists have paid enough 
attention to a theme that concerns citizens’ life and have deepened it. This is seen as 
perfectly congruent with the function of the local journalist, as we can read in the extract 
below:  
(1) 0001-0010 MF: I would like to make some 
observations/ i agree with what you have said on the service 
on the cathedral/ it is an interesting service and we should 
do others/ starting from the observations of citizens’ life/ 
beyond the news coming from press releases and so on/ what 
interest us is to talk about things that people grasp/ and 
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than people take care and we should develop them/ this is a 
classical example but there are many others/ the function 
of the local journalist is also that of having this 
sensitiveness/ and not only the function of reporting news 
In Error! Reference source not found. I show the argumentative 
reconstruction in support of the positive evalutation: 
 
Figure 60. Argumentation in favor of the standpoint ‘The service of the cathedral is interesting 
and we should make others starting from the observations of citizens’ life’.	
 
Immediately after this digression on the news of the cathedral, MF introduces his 
negative evaluation of the news on the abandoned baby. Indeed, he uses the positive 
evaluation of the news on the cathedral (Error! Reference source not found.) as a 
starting point for criticizing the way in which the past item on the abandoned baby had 
been handled. MF says that he had found perplexing the way in which the news of the 
abandonment of the baby had been handled by the editorial team. 
He argues that the way in which this news was handled was doubly wrong; firstly, 
it was a mistake because the other local newspaper ‘La Regione’ had handled it one day 
before in comparison to them, and secondly it was a mistake because they had not 
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developed the news in many ways and they did not write the news in an empathic way, as 
we can read in the following excerpt of the editorial conference:  
(2) 0011-0038 the second thing I must say is that it 
has left me very perplexed/ how we have handled the news of 
the baby/ look that we have made a mistake/ because it has 
been la regione to handle it first/ and then the day after 
we have mistaken the service/ when one year and a half we 
have presented the new guidelines of the corriere/ there 
was a very important and simple sentence/ that said that we 
should give more we should also think to the emotive 
emotional aspect of the news/ we do not have to become 
sensationalist/ but this was the news about which everyone 
was speaking/ not only us but the whole Canton/ a news that 
has hit people and that emotions/ even though it is true 
that the next day we have deepened tha religious topic/ this 
was a thing that should have been developed in many ways/ 
we should have made the interview to the psychologist to 
say why one does that/ some website has done this/ a piece 
of someone with an appeal to sensibility and say/ but how 
is it possible that I cannot have a child/ how can one do 
something like that/ the precedents what happens in the 
other countries and in other cantons/ if there are the wheels 
of the abandoned babies/ […]/ if you understand that it hits 
people’s sensitiveness/ is is so strange and new in Tessin/ 
that it should have been prepared in a distinct manner 
The issue at stake is ‘was the way in which we handled the news of the baby good?’, 
and the discussion is elementary, with MF’s standpoint ‘the way in which we handled the 
news of the abandonment of the baby has left me perplexed’ opposed by a doubt that the 
other journalists may not agree. MF’s standpoint is supported by a multiple argumentation 
(Figure ). Differently from the news on the cathedral, that was not a simple report of facts 
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and that was emotionally charged, the news on the abandoned baby has been perceived by 
MF as a pure reporting without any empathic emphasis. As previously said, the negative 
evaluation of the news of the baby stems from the very fact that the news was handled first 
by La Regione (and hot topics should be handled quickly and in preview by a prestigious 
newspaper). What is more, the negative evaluation is accentuated by the fact that not only 
the journalists published the news in delay after another newspaper, but also they handled 
the news in a wrong way, since they did not develop it in many ways. In fact, they did not 
insert; a) an interview with the psychologist that explains which are the psychological 
reasons that induce a mother to make such an apparently illogical and unreasonable 
gesture, b) an interview with a woman that cannot have children and c) they did not recall 
similar cases occurred in other Cantons and and/or in other countries. In Figure  I show 
the whole argumentative reconstruction of MF’s digression;  
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Figure 61. Argumentation supporting ‘The way in which we handled the news of the 
abandonment of the baby has left me perplexed’. Blue arrows indicate the lines of argument 
whose inferential configuration I analyze. 
 
Here we notice that a coordinative argumentation supports the journalist’s negative 
evaluation (1.1a-1.1b). The second line of argument (1.1b), which acts as an evaluative 
sub-standpoint supported by six argumentative lines (1.1b.1 to 1.1b.6), is the most 
developed one, since the journalist believes that the editorial team had the possibility to 
publish a news of higher quality. Moreover, that a news piece could have been handled in 
a more empathic way is not only a mere epistemic belief in the journalist’s mind, but rather 
it is an expectation, since CdT journalists have the duty and the goal of publishing 
empathic news pieces according to CdT guidelines. Furthermore, there is also the 
1 the way in which we handled the news of the abandonment of the baby has
left me perplexed (MF)
(2) (0011)
1.1a it was the newspaper 
“La Regione” to handle it 
first (2) (0014)
1.1b the day after that La Regione had 
published the news, we have made a 
mistake in handling the news (2) (0015)
1.1b.1 we 
did not 
follow the 
guidelines 
of CdT 
drawn up  a 
year ago 
following 
which we 
should give  
more and 
think also 
to the 
emotive 
emotional 
aspect of 
the 
research 
(2) (0016)
1.1b.2 it was the news of 
which everyone spoke (not 
only CdT, but rather the 
whole Canton) (2) (0020)
1.1b.3 it was a 
news that 
should have 
been developed 
in many ways, 
in a better way 
than what we 
did by inserting 
the religious 
topic (2) (0023)
1.1b.4  if you 
grasp that a 
hypothetical 
news touches 
people’s 
sensitiveness, 
you should  
prepare it in a 
different way 
(2) (0036)
1.1b.5 if the 
day after you 
publish 
something 
analogous to 
what is 
published on 
the websites, 
the 
newspapers’ 
mission fails 
(2) (0042)
1.1b.6 we 
should have 
written a 
nice piece in 
the front 
page written 
with the 
heart in an 
empathic 
way (through 
an interview, 
a 
consideration 
of past 
cases..) (2) 
(0036)
1.1b.2.1 it is a 
news that hits 
people and 
that touches
(2) (0022)
1.1b.3.1 we should 
have put an 
interview with the 
psychologist in 
order to explain the 
reason why a 
mother does that 
(2) (0025)
1.1b.3.2 we should 
have put a piece of 
someone with an 
appeal to 
sensitiveness like 
the deposition of a 
mother  (2) (0027)
1.1b.3.3 we should 
have put past 
analogous cases, 
what happens in 
other countries and 
in the other 
Cantons (2) (0031)
1.1b.2.2 the 
topic is really 
strange and 
new in Ticino 
(2) (0031)
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prediction that a news written following CdT guidelines will have a positive impact on the 
audience. Therefore, in MF’s mind “it was possible not to handle it in a wrong and 
unempathic way” becomes “that the news should not have been handled in a wrong an 
unempathic way”. All the subordinate arguments (1.1b.1-2-3-4-5-6) give reasons for MF’s 
evaluation that the news has been handled in a wrong way. In the first argumentative line 
(1.1b.1) the journalist relies on the authority given by CdT newsroom editorial guidelines. 
The second argumentative line (1.1b.2) acts on the acknowledged fact that news with 
topics that interest many people should be handled in an accurate way by definition: this 
news had a widespread and strong impact on the whole Canton. The third argumentative 
line (1.1b.3), all focused on upward counterfactual reasoning, deals with the journalist’s 
regret of not having developed the news in many productive ways. Here, the counterfactual 
is of deontic nature, signalling the editorial team’s failure of not having handled in a deep 
and articulated way a news that makes appeal to sensitiveness: journalists have infringed 
one of their professional duties.  
The argumentative lines 1.1b.4 and 1.1b.5 refer to the importance of editorial 
strategies that should lead to fulfill the newspaper’s mission. The fourth argumentative 
line (1.1b.4) is very interesting and is entirely based on upward counterfactual reasoning; 
the journalist criticizes the sterile way in which  the editorial team has handled the 
emotional news and he considers the emotive impact that an emotive news –handled in a 
proper way- could have had on the audience. According to him, a news that hits people’s 
sensitiveness should be carefully prepared and deepened; here, again, the journalist makes 
the endoxon ‘if you grasp that a hypothetical news touches people’s sensitiveness, you 
should prepare it in a different way’ explicit. The fifth argumentative line (1.1b.5) is 
focused on the unproductivity of publishing something analogous to what has been 
published on the websites; here, MF explicitly states that in that way the newspaper 
mission fails, being it contradicted by not publishing original and in preview news. 
Therefore, journalists experience regret for ‘not having published something different 
from what websites had published on the day before’. 
Again, in the sixth argumentative lines (1.1b.6), the journalist makes appeal to the 
lack of empathy and to its consequences, in a similar way as in the fourth argumentative 
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line (1.1b.4): the focus is on the fact that the empathic news should be put in the front 
page.  
As a whole, MF’s argumentation serves the function of shifting the editorial team’s 
attention from the previous mistaken news to new ways of improving future news that 
may easily touch people’s sensitiveness.  
 
 
10.2 “We have made a mistake in handling the news”: opposition to an editorial 
norm  
 
If we look at the argumentative line 1.1 b.1>1.1b, we notice that it is all focused on the 
mistake made by not having followed the guidelines of the newspaper. This is a focal 
argumentative move, since it contains one of the fundamental reasons given for the fact 
that the news was handled in a wrong way; therefore, I analyse its inferential configuration 
(Figure ). In this case the journalist applies a reasoning from opposition.  
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Figure 62. We have made a mistake in handling the news since the article has been published 
without following CdT guidelines. 
 
In this inferential configuration it is interesting to notice that the endoxon is made 
explicit, indeed the journalist states that they should have thought more to the emotional 
aspects following CdT guidelines. Endoxa are generally made explicit when they are weak 
or when the arguer feels the necessity to remember them to the community to which he is 
talking, as in this case. If newspaper items must be published following editorial guidelines 
and if CdT guidelines state that emotional aspects must be included in news (endoxon), 
and if the article on the abandoned baby has been published without following CdT 
guidelines that state the need to include emotional aspects (datum), then publishing an 
article with such characteristics is the contrary of what is required by CdT (first 
conclusion). The first conclusion acts as minor premise of a topical syllogism that relies 
on the locus from opposition, from where the maxim is drawn that ‘if P is a requirement 
for correctness, and Q entails not P, then Q is wrong, incorrect’. Therefore, they conclude 
that they have made a mistake in handling the news (final conclusion). 
Maxim: if P is a requirement for
correctness, and Q entails not P,
then Q is wrong, incorrect.
Endoxon:
-Newspaper items must be published
following editorial guidelines (goal)
-Taking into account emotional
aspects is a CdT guideline
Datum:
-This article has been published
without following CdT guidelines that
state the importance of taking into
account emotional aspects (=1.1b.1)
FINAL CONCLUSION: we have
made a mistake in handling the news
(=1.1b)
Locus from 
opposition
First conclusion / Minor premise:
publishing a newspaper item without
following CdT guidelines may be the
contrary of what is required by CdT
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 10.3 Remedying to the error: looking forward by looking backward 
 
Now I will focus on the the third argumentative line (1.1b.3) and on the sixth 
argumentative line, which are the most important ones in order to understand the crucial 
role played out by arguments based on upward counterfactual reasoning in supporting a 
negative evaluative standpoint referred to some editorial decisions taken by journalists. 
Focusing on the third argumentative line (1.1b.3) and subordinate arguments, it is 
interesting to notice that the journalist uses four counterfactual arguments (as it is shown 
in the argumentative reconstruction in Fig. 81) in order to support his negative evaluation 
concerning how they have handled the news of the baby. By using so many times 
counterfactual reasoning, the journalist asks his colleagues to compare two distinct worlds. 
He asks his colleagues to imagine a past world, namely the world in which the wrong 
decision has been made and a present world in which there is the possibility to remedy. In 
re-experiencing the past, the journalist considers an hypothetical better alternative 
(handling a news in an empathic and emotional way) that was possible at the moment of 
the editorial decision (CdT guidelines state that news must pay attention to people’s 
sensitiveness) and that has been omitted. This omission of the concrete possibility to 
choose the other alternative is what causes him to feel regret; indeed, as I have explained 
in section 8.7, regret depends on the availability of counterfactual alternatives at the time 
in which the choice has been made. In fact, if an agent assumes that no alternative were 
available at the time of the decision-making process, he should not feel regret. The 
journalist MF identifies a posteriori some alternatives that were in principle ‘available’ at 
the time of the editorial decision, thinking to the development of the news in many ways. 
In particular, journalists ‘should have put an interview with the psychologist in order to 
explain the reason why the mother does that’ (1.1b.3.1), they ‘should have put a piece of 
someone with an appeal to sensitiveness like the deposition of a mother’ (1.1b.3.2), they 
‘should have put past analogous cases’ (1.1b.3.3). With reference to the argument 1.1b.3.1, 
the journalist stresses the importance of giving a reason in order to explain why a mother 
may abandon her baby, therefore demonstrating to have perfectly understood the audience 
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expectancy for a reason. As I have said above, in lines 1.1b4-5 the journalist abandonds 
the use of the past tense used in argumentative lines 1.1b.3 and shifts to the present tense 
‘we should’ ‘the mission fails’ (1.1b.4-5). In this argumentation it is interesting to notice 
a shift in verbal tense; in a first moment we find a counterfactual reasoning expressed with 
the past tense “we should have developed, we should have put…” (1.1b.3), whereas in a 
subsequent moment we notice the use of the present tense “if you grasp that a hypothetical 
news touches people’s sensitiveness, you should prepare it in a different way” (1.1b.4) 
and “ if the day after you publish something.. the mission fails” (1.1b.5). The co-presence 
of the two verbal tenses in the same argumentative discussion allows the journalist himself 
and the recipients to have access to two worlds of inferencing simultaneously: the past in 
which an error about a news piece was made and the present in which some other 
alternative is imagined in order to remedy the mistake. By actualizing the past mistake and 
by actualizing a situation that occurred in the past, the journalist embeddes the past 
experience within the present moment of enunciation. This is done in such a way that  the 
past situation is made present by the act of talking (if you grasp that…/ the mission fails). 
In this case the whole editorial team experiences St. Augustine’s “present of past things” 
in memory as well as “present of present things” in straight perception (Confessions XI: 
20; Lyons 1977: 811). To be more precise, the pragmatics of irrealis in evaluative editorial 
conferences must be examined within the higher purpose of the activity type at stake, 
namely evaluating past items in order to produce better future news pieces that fulfil the 
insitutional mission of the newsroom. The justapposition of a past counterfactual world 
and of an actualized past which becomes present requires this sort of double-perception or 
double-experience described by St. Augustine and Lyons (Jauss 1982: 92). Therefore, in 
evaluative editorial conferences in which there is a negative evaluation of a past item, the 
use of upward counterfactual reasoning and of irrealis may be productive and may deal as 
a trigger for finding new solutions and for not repeating previous mistakes. By contrast, I 
will show in chapter 11 (subsection 11.5) that when downward counterfactual reasoning 
is used in evaluative editorial discussions in order to support a positive evaluative 
standpoint, it is not instrumental, but rather it simply deals to confirm the positive esit and 
evaluation of a past item, and it acts as a reinforcer that does not foster further discussion.  
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As a whole, we can conclude that the whole argumentative discussion is not simply 
a veiled suggestion to the editorial team, but rather it is a request for action to produce 
better news pieces in future, therefore demonstrating the productive role that upward 
counterfactual reasoning may have by opening the path to new scenarios by learning from 
past mistakes. 
At this point, I analyse the inferential configuration of the argumentative line 
1.1b.3.1> 1.1b.3 . The third argumentative line is a crucial one, since it focuses on the 
actual ways in which the news could have been improved and that have been disregarded 
or omitted. His counterfactual reasoning is based on a locus from final cause and 
alternatives.  
The locus from final cause and alternatives is shown in Error! Reference source 
not found. below :  
 
Figure 63.	We have mistaken the news because we should have developed the news in many ways, 
and it would have been better. 
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If a) developing the news in many ways and not developing it are alternative actions 
when one agent composes a news piece and if b) the goal of journalists when they compose 
a news piece is to have a high emotive impact on the audience (endoxa); if a) journalists 
have chosen not to develop the news in many ways, which has led not to have a high 
emotive impact on the audience (factual datum), and if b) it was possible to choose to 
develop the news in many ways and it would have led to have a high emotive impact on 
the audience (simulative datum and retrospective prediciton), then among the two 
alternatives journalists have chosen the one that does not realize the goal of having a high 
emotive impact on the audience, disregarding the alternative that would have le realized it 
(first conclusion). The conjunction of endoxa and data, resulting in the first conclusion 
gives rise to an invalidation of positive expectation. The first conclusion functions as a 
minor premise of a topical syllogism that stems from the locus from final cause and 
alternatives, from where the maxim is derived that “if between two alternatives X,Y, in a 
course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize 
it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y instead of X”. Thus, the final conclusion is 
drawn that we have chosen the worse alternative disregarding the better one (the news 
would have had a high emotive impact on the audience if it had been developed in many 
ways). This is a negative evaluative standpoint that may lead the journalists to experience 
possible regret. At this point of the analysis it has become clear why the journalist believes 
that the news was a mistake: the core of the negativity is bound to the journalists’ disregard 
of potential better alternatives.  
 
 
10.4 ‘If only we had written a nice piece in the front page written with the heart 
in an empathic way’ 
 
Again, in the sixth argumentative line, we find another counterfactual argument: ‘we 
should have written a nice piece in the front page written with the heart in an empathic 
way’ (1.1b.6). Here, the arguer does not focus on the potential better content of the news 
as in the argument 1.1b.3, but rather he chooses to focus on the potential better – and 
unrealized- disposition of the article and on the empathic attitude that could have been 
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conveyed: the article could have been put in the front page and written with an empathic 
way and this was not the case. In Fig. 64 I show the inferential nature of this counterfactual 
argumentation, based on a locus from final cause and alternatives: 
 
 
 
Figure 64. We have mistaken the news because it would have been different (better) if we had 
written a nice piece in the front page with an empathic attitude. 
 
If a) writing a nice piece in the front page with an empathic attitude when a news 
deals with an emotive topic and not writing it are alternative actions when one agent 
composes a news item and if b) the goal of journalists when they compose a news item is 
to have a high emotive impact on the audience (endoxa); if a) journalists have chosen not 
to write a nice piee in the front page with an empathic attitude, which has not led to have 
a high emotive impact on the audience (factual datum) and if b) it was possible to choose 
to write a nice piece in the front page with an empathic attitude and it would have led to 
have a high emotive impact on the audience (simulative datum and retrospective 
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prediction), then among the two alternatives we have chosen the one that does not realize 
the goal of having a high emotive impact on the audience, disregarding the alternative that 
would have realized it (first conclusion and invalidation of positive expectation). The first 
conclusion perfectly meets the conditions established by the maxim ‘if between two 
alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, whereas the 
other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y instead of X’ 
(maxim from the locus from final cause and alternatives), and conjoined with it allows to 
infer the final conclusion ‘we have chosen the worse alterantive disregarding the better 
one’ Again, this is a negative evaluative standpoint that may lead journalists to experience 
regret. In particular, as in every argument based on counterfactual reasoning, a part of the 
datum is simulative: this means that it is not an actual evidence, but rather it is a simulative 
evidence. A simulative datum can be considered a datum, since it concerns an alternative 
that has not been chosen, but that was possible and present at the time of the decision. In 
the case of upward counterfactual reasoning, considering better unrealized hypothesis, the 
datum coincides with a possible better unrealized state of affairs.  
In this case we observe an upward counterfactual reasoning of deontic nature: “we 
should have written an empathic news and put it in the front page ..”. Indeed, a given 
editorial value (interesting news should be developed in many ways and should be put in 
the front page) acts as a norm to which the journalist should adhere. The journalists have 
infringed an editorial norm and thus MF feels legitimate to negatively evaluate the past 
news piece. Indeed, in all his counterfactual arguments the journalist repeats six times the 
deontic verb should (the news should have been developed in many ways, we should have 
put an interview, we should have put a piece of someone with an appeal to sensitiveness, 
we should have written a nice piece in the front page written with the heart). The negative 
evaluative standpoint referred to an evaluation that is directed to the self (we have made a 
mistake…) is supported by an argument based on upward counterfactual reasoning of 
deontic nature and induces regret in the other journalists.  
This missed opportunity that could have been gathered clearly induces to feel regret, 
which is worsened by the “self attributed responsibility for one’s choice”, which is a very 
important component of this emotion, as stated by Castelfranchi and Miceli (Castelfranchi 
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and Miceli 2014: 94). In the analysed discussion the frame of the regret dominates, and 
this is witnessed not only by the counterfactual reasoning but also by the presence of 
linguistic markers such as the verbs left perplexed, mistake, make a mistake, fail and 
prepositional phrases such as in a better way, in a different way: all these linguistic markers 
imply a comparison between two distinct states of affairs, that in this case are the actual 
negative one and the better and unrealized –but possible- one.  
With reference to the feeling of regret, even though MF is not responsible in first 
person for the mistaken news on the abandoned baby, he assumes the full responsibility 
of it, being he part of the editorial board, which is considered as a unique kritès in terms 
of editorial decisions. In particular, he feels responsible for the whole editorial board 
because he believes that the journalists had the “power to avoid the negative outcome and 
to opt for a better alternative”, which is a crucial point in the mechanism of self-attributed 
responsibility (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 94). In this discussion it is clear that the 
journalist is aware of the impact of  certain editorial choices on the audience: the journalist 
is perfectly aware that a better structured and empathic article would have had a better 
impact on the audience. In Figure  I show the newspaper article that has been the object of 
MF’s criticism, in order to illustrate the the unempathic and unemotional attitude and the 
purely reporting style with which the news was written.  
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Figure 65. News piece on the abandoned baby published on CdT. 
 
As we can see, the item has a cold title ‘The mother remains under arrest’ and the 
highlight points at reporting the developments of the inquiry and at explaining the mental 
conditions of the woman: ‘The inquiry on the abandoned baby in Montarina street 
continues apace. The 28-years-old woman, incarcerated and in confusion will undergo a 
medical examination’. Therefore, we can notice that already in the title and highlight 
journalists have chosen a purely reporting style. The whole item is constructed around the 
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developments of the inquiry and on the minor or major guilt that should be attributed to 
the woman depending on the psychiatric reports and on the police’s interrogatories.  
Concluding, this case of study has enabled to gain evidence that counterfactual 
reasoning and irrealis in general are a fundamental strategy used by journalists in the 
persuasive rhetoric of their editorial conferences. The case of study has shown that thanks 
to counterfactual reasoning the journalist makes a request to the other journalists, namely 
that of thinking to future possibilities of improving the way in which similar news pieces 
should be handled. The other journalists can imagine and anticipate how the past item 
could have looked in the present and how a future similar news should be treated in a more 
fruitful way, therefore experiencing St. Augustine’s “present of future things” as well as 
his “present of past things” (Confessions XI: 20; Lyons 1977: 811). The editorial team can 
recall the past into the actual present existence and can reflect on better options to choose 
in future similar situations. It is an invitation to reflect and to inference, in such a way that 
widens the number of choices, giving the possibility to elaborate a better – and previously 
unexplored- solution in future. 
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11. Journalists applying distinct types of counterfactual 
reasoning  
 
 
11.1 Editorial norms’ infringement determining upward counterfactual 
reasoning 
 
Similarly to the BEBE case, the case of study that I present in this subsection (the ACCI 
case44) illustrates a case of journalists’ consideration of unrealized better alternatives in 
the evaluation of a previous item’s editorial choices. In particular, in the case under 
investigation a journalist negatively evaluates the fact that the editorial team has given too 
little prominence to a quite important news concerning a railway accident occurred in 
another Swiss Canton. Indeed, this news has been put in a picture news (it. fototesto), 
which is a particular component of Corriere del Ticino’s front page, and which is usually 
used to insert news that do not have great importance. More specifically, as defined by 
Zampa and Bletsas, the picture news is a multimodal component “made up by a visual 
component (a photograph) and a textual component (a title and a caption)” (Zampa and 
Bletsas 2018). This discussion about the low importance given to this news by putting it 
in the picture news has occurred during a morning editorial conference at Corriere del 
Ticino, which has taken place on January 10, 2013. The participants to the argumentative 
discussion are three journalists: MC, FB and X1. During this editorial conference the 
journalist MC argues that the choice they made to put a picture news on the railway 
accident was wrong. According to her, the whole editorial team has underestimated the 
event of the railway accident; as we can read in the excerpt of the editorial conference 
below, the journalist uses a collective “we” that includes the whole editorial team and that 
considers it as a unique entitiy to which full responsibility for what has happened can be 
attributed, even though it is the Conferedation desk that is responsible for the news from 
the other Cantons and for the whole Switzerland. According to Margaret Gilbert, a joint 
commitment and a shared responsibility are at stake when we use the collective “we” 
                                                
44 the ACCI case: cst_cdt_130110_1030_editorial_discourse_1.docx. 
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(Gilbert: 2014), as it becomes clear from reading the following excerpt of the editorial 
conference of the ACCI case; 
 (1) 0003-0019 MC we have a bit underestimated 
the railway accident/ to put a picture news on such a 
railway accident/ that is happened in Switzerland in which 
there are twentyseven injured persons/ according to me it’s 
not enough/ FB: twentyseven slightly injured/ let’s say 
that between picture news and the opening of La Regione/ 
there is a middle way/ MC: the splash is perhaps excessive 
but it is not what i thought/ but i always make this 
reasoning/ if this thing had happened in Tessin/ i wanted 
to see if we would have put it in a picture news/ eh however 
the sense of the operation is the same/ there is a crash/ 
there is a railway line that is very congested and it is 
blocked/ there are people that have had a ugly time/ X1: 
let’s say that in our layout either you choose the splash/ 
or you give this emphasis here [with picture news] there 
is nothing in the middle honestly 
 
At the beginning, the issue at stake is thus ‘was it a bad choice to choose to use a 
picture news for the news on the railway accident?’, with MC’s standpoint ‘it was not a 
good choice to use a picture news for the news of the railway accident’. Then, FB 
intervenes by saying ‘0008-0009 let’s say that between picture news 
and the opening of La Regione/ there is a middle way’, therefore 
opening the path for a shift of the issue. The newspaper La Regione has made a full page 
opening and the journalist FB compares it with CdT’ s picture news to say that even though 
La Regione has exaggerated, CdT’s picture news was not adequate, and other types of 
handling the news staged inbetween a full page opening and a picture news could have 
been used. Indeed, the issue becomes “was it the only possible choice to use a picture news 
for the news on the railway accident?”. MC does not pick up FB’s invitation to reformulate 
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the standpoint and conceives FB’s words as an objection (0010 the splash is 
perhaps excessive but it is not what i thought). Therefore, she 
continues to put forth arguments in order to support the fact that it was a bad choice to use 
a picture news for the news of the railway accident. Afterwards, X1 advances the 
standpoint that ‘let’s say that in our layout either you choose the 
splash/ or you give this emphasis here [with picture news] 
there is nothing in the middle honestly 0018-0019’. According to 
X1 the choice was due to the fact that they had no other available alternative layout at their 
disposal. MC and X1 have two misaligned standpoints that are interdependent but that 
answer two distinct issues. MC’s standpoint is supported by multiple argumentation, as 
we can see in Figure :  
 
 
Figure 66. Argumentation supporting MC’s standpoint ‘the way in which we handled the news 
on the railway accident was wrong’. 
1 (The way in which we handled the news on the railway accident was wrong) (MC)
1.1 picture news does not suit to the 
importance of news on the railway accident 
happened in Switzerland where there are 
twenty-seven injured (MC) (1) (0004-0006)
1.1.1 there is a 
railway line that 
is very 
congested and it 
is blocked (MC) 
(1) (0016)
1.1.2 there are
people that have
suffered a lot (MC)
(1) (0017)
1.2a if this had 
happened in 
Ticino, we 
wouldn’t have 
used a picture 
news (MC) (1) 
(0012-0013)
1 we  have underestimated the news of the railway accident (MC) (1) (0003)
1.2b but the sense of 
the mental operation 
is the same (MC) (1) 
(0014)
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           Firstly, MC states that the editorial team has underestimated the news of the railway 
accident (1) because it has been wrong to put a picture news on a railway accident 
happened in Switzerland where there are twenty-seven injured (1.1); there is a traffic 
congested railway line and it is blocked (1.1.1) and there are people that have suffered a 
lot (1.1.2). In the second argumentative line MC argues that the news would have been 
handled differently (more prominence would have been given to the news) if the accident 
had happened in Ticino (1.2). 
I zoom on the counterfactual argument, since it is the focal argumentative move that 
enables us to understand why the journalist negatively evaluates the way in which the news 
has been handled: here, MC applies a reasoning from final cause and alternatives, exactly 
as in every case of upward counterfactual reasoning.  
In Figure  I show the way in which the relationship between the standpoint and the 
argument 1.2 is accounted for from an inferential point of view by a locus from final cause 
and alternatives, in a similar way to the BEBE case. 
 
Figure 67. It would have been different if the event had happened in Tessin because journalists 
would not have used a picture news and it would have been better. 
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Again, we notice that the locus from final cause and alternatives accounts for how a 
possible and disregarded alternative would have made a difference and how it would have 
produced a better result. Using a picture news or not using it for an important news are 
alternative courses of action when journalists compose a news piece and the goal of 
composing a news piece is to give prominence to important news (endoxa). The data can 
be subdivided in a factual datum and in a simulative datum; a) journalists have chosen to 
use a picture news, which has not led to give prominence to an important news occurred 
outside Tessin (factual datum) and b) it was possible to choose not to use a picture news 
for an important railway accident occurred outside Tessin and it would have led to give 
prominence to it (simulative datum and retrospective prediction). The conjunction of 
endoxa and data gives rise to a first conclusion, which is an invalidation of a positive 
expectation. The conjunction of the first conclusion and maxim derived from the locus 
from final cause and alternatives “if between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action 
C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable 
ceteris paribus to choose Y instead of X” gives rise to the final conclusion that “we have 
chosen the worse alternative disregarding the better one”, which represents a positive 
evaluative standpoint that may lead to experience possible regret.  
Again, as in the BEBE case, it becomes clear that the negative evaluation is given 
taking into account the editorial more or less implicit norms or habitudes that journalists 
share in their community.  
 
 
11.2 Journalists’ negative evaluation of visual elements’ choice in a past item45 
 
In this sub-section I will show another case of study that is similar to the BEBE case and 
to the ACCI case; in fact, this case of study contributes to shed light on the argumentative 
foundation of counterfactuals in supporting negative evaluative standpoints referred to 
decisions taken by the journalists themselves.  
                                                
45	FOTO case, cst_cdt_130206_1030_editorial_discourse.1.docx. 	
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The FOTO case is based on a discussion within a morning editorial conference at 
CdT that has taken place on February 2nd, 2013: the journalists evaluate a news piece 
published on the previous day. In this case the journalists discuss about whether it was a 
good choice or not to put a very old photo of Berlusconi and Maroni (two Italian 
politicians) as a splash of the foreign affairs section without a caption telling the moment 
in which the photo had been taken off. The vice-director LT argues that it was not a good 
choice, since according to him it gives a cheap idea of the newspaper and it has no sense 
since it is not understandable for readers; according to the journalist, the editorial team 
should have put a caption in order to make explicit the time in which the photo had been 
taken off. In terms of anticipation, this is a case of anticipation of the audience 
interpretation, acting on the illocutionary level according to the typology that I have shown 
in the theoretical section 5.3. Indeed, the omitted tagging line is conceived by the 
journalists as a semiotic tool, useful to enable the audience’s understanding and 
contextualization, as it becomes clear by reading the excerpt below: 
(2) 0001-0013 LT: i wanted to say that on the photo that 
we have put on the opening of the foreign section/ honestly 
it is a photo of twenty years ago/ maroni has short pants 
and berlusconi does not have hairs/ it is very old/ due to 
the fact that we know that berlusconi’s hairs grow again/ 
my opinion is that honestly it gives a cheap idea of the 
newspaper/ we are not so poor we can find a photo of these 
days/ if we do not have the two of them together/ we can 
put berlusconi with maroni of these days in the square/ i 
give a look and/ otherwise we should put a caption saying 
that it was them twenty years ago/ because putting the 
photo in this way it does not make sense/ if it is referred 
to those days it is fine otherwise we should explain 
 
In this excerpt we notice that the journalist actualizes the past by using the 
counterfactual ‘we should put a caption’ instead of ‘we should have put a caption’, 
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even though he refers to a past decision. In this case the journalist applies an upward 
counterfactual thought, therefore imagining a better course of action that has not 
taken place (having put a caption under the old photo), which would have led to a 
better outcome (not giving an unprofessional idea of the newspaper to the audience 
and favoring a better comprehension by the audience of the reported event). This 
upward counterfactual reasoning follows some sentences that are uttered in the 
present tense (‘if we do not have the two of them together/ we can put Berlusconi 
with Maroni of these days in the square/ I give a look and..’). The shift in tense 
provides a crucial function by allowing the journalists to have access to two worlds 
of inferencing simultaneously: the past one, in which the item was written and a 
mistake by avoiding to put a caption was made (‘I wanted to say that on the photo 
that we have put on the opening of the foreign section’), and the present one, in 
which the journalist is evaluating the past item and has the possibility to find more 
functional solutions for the future. Furthermore, the present tense is used by the 
journalist when he is imagining the audience uptake, in a sort of re-experience of the 
past in view of future similar situations. The past experience is embedded and 
examined within the present moment of utterance, in view of the shared goals of the 
activity type ‘evaluative editorial conference’. The past experience can be made 
present by the act of talking ‘we can put.. / I give a look and…/ we should put a 
caption’; the actualization of the past serves the function of examining past errors in 
the present time and to project their solution to future analogous situations.  
As I have said, in order to anticipate a possible audience uptake, the journalist 
imagines to be a reader  
(3) (I give a look 0010).  
Furthermore, he speaks in the present tense for the most part of the discussion 
(we can put Berlusconi and Maroni 0008-0009), in order to argue 
about what they should have done in the past to make so that this photo was 
comprehensible to the audience. Here, it is interesting to notice that the journalist is 
already projected towards the future; indeed, the use of this present tense signals that 
he is trying to learn from the previous mistake of not having put a caption explaining 
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the different timing of picture and article under the photo. In Figure  I show the 
argumentative reconstruction of LT’s argumentation in favor of his negative 
evaluation. 
 
 
Figure 68. Argumentative reconstruction of LT’s argumentation of the negative evaluative 
standpoint ‘Putting this old photo as a splash was not a good choice’. 
 
As we can see, two are the focal parts of the argumentation: the first one is based on 
the mistake of having chosen a too old photo that conveys a poor idea of the newspaper 
(1.1), anticipating the emotive impact on the audience, whereas the second one is based 
on the counterfactual reasoning that is used to argue the very fact that it had no sense to 
put a photo in that disposition since a caption under the photo was missing (1.2). In the 
argumentative reconstruction shown in Fig. 91 I have used the past tense ‘we should have 
1.2 it does not make sense to put the
photo in this arrangement (2) (0012)
1 Putting this old photo on the opening was not a good 
choice (LT) (2) (0001)
1.1 it gives an old-fashioned idea of the 
newspaper (LT) (2) (0006)
1.2.1 we should put a line in which we
said “20 years ago they looked like in
this way..” (2) (0011)
1.1.1 it is very old, 
it is a photo tracing 
back to 20 years 
ago 
(2) (0002)
1.1.2 it seems that we
are unprofessional
(2) (0007)
1.1.2.1  it seems
that we are not 
able to  put a 
recent photo, a 
photo of these 
days 
(2) (0007)
1.1.1.1a 
Maroni 
looks very
young
(2) (0003)
1.2.1.1 if the photo is referred to these
days, we must explain it (2) (0013)
1.2.1.1.1 otherwise it is not
understandable (2) (0013)1.1.1.1b 
Berlusconi 
does not 
have hairs
(2) (0003)
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put a line’ because the journalist refers to a past choice, even though actually he uses the 
present tense (0011 otherwise we should put a caption saying that 
they were twenty years ago), as previously said.  The journalist believes that it 
was possible to choose to put a caption at the moment of the decision; nevertheless, it was 
a possible choice that has been omitted by the journalists of the Foreign affairs desk. LT’s 
upward counterfactual reasoning is based on the locus from final cause and alternatives, 
as we can see in Fig. 69:  
 
 
	
Figure 69. It could have been different (better) if journalists had put a caption under the photo 
because the article would have been more comprehensible. 
 
If a) putting a caption under a photo taken in a distinct temporal moment and not 
putting it are alternative actions when one agent composes a news item and if b) the goal 
of composing a news item is to increase the audience comprehension (endoxa); if a) 
journalists have chosen not to put a caption under the photo taken in a distinct temporal 
moment, which has not led to increase the audience comprehension and if b) it was 
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possible to choose to put a caption under the photo taken in a distinct temporal moment 
and it would have led to increase the audience comprehension  (data), then among the two 
alternatives journalists have chosen the one that does not realize the goal of increasing the 
audience comprehension, disregarding the alternative that would have realized it (first 
conclusion and invalidation of positive expectation). The conjunction of the first 
conclusion with the maxim from the loci from final cause and alternatives “if between two 
alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, whereas the 
other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y instead of X”, leads 
to the final conclusion that “we have chosen the worse alternative disregarding the better 
one” (final conclusion). This coincides with the final positive evaluative standpoint that 
may lead the audience to experience relief.  
This example has contributed to understand the mechanism at stake in upward 
counterfactual reasoning and has confirmed the observations made in the BEBE case and 
in the ACCI case; journalists’ imagination of better forgone alternatives leads them to take 
into account the mistakes they have made for remedying or simply improving in future 
similar situations. Furthermore, evidence is given that a simulative datum can be 
considered a piece of evidence, since it is referred to a choice that was possible at the 
moment of the decision, even thoug it has been omitted. 
 
 
11.3 Regret caused by upward counterfactual reasoning may be 
constructive: it may favor journalists’ anticipatory activity and planning 
of future news 
 
At this point of the analysis I propose a reflection on the functional and effective role 
played out by upward counterfactual reasoning in the newsroom. In order to do that I 
briefly explain when a counterfactual thought (either or not accompanied by regret) may 
be detrimental and when it may have advantages in terms of future planning. I shall start 
by saying that regret may entail a high rate of upward counterfactual reasoning, since the 
person experiencing it may be focused on ‘what might have been and cannot be anymore’, 
which according to some scholars may be associated with rumination (Rachman et al 
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2000), which is correlated with depression and anxiety (Cox et al. 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema 
2000). However, there is also evidence that not all kinds of counterfactual reasoning are 
correlated with depressive symptoms; it has been highlighted that depressive symptoms 
were associated with counterfactual reasoning only when the the counterfactual alternative 
concerned an uncontrollable feature of the self, rather than controllable features, such as 
counterfactuals based on human actions (Markman and Miller 2006). Indeed, 
counterfactual reasoning may be useful and constructive or useless and unconstructive 
(Watkins 2008), depending on whether or not it enables to find out the reasons of one’s 
mistake or suboptimal outcome (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 99). 
Counterfactual reasoning may be detrimental if it does not help in identifying the 
reasons of one’s mistake, and in particular, if it “fails to produce intentions (either because 
the foregone alternatives are no longer available or because one feels unable to pursue 
them)” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 99); in these cases one cannot but think about an 
hypothetical better alternative that is no possible anymore and that will not be possible in 
future similar conditions. For instance, a big error that has caused some consequences that 
cannot be remedied anymore, as in the TEMPO case, may cause rumination and may 
produce detrimental effects; journalists are aware of that and use this awareness to 
generate regret in the audience. 
On the contrary, upward counterfactual thought may be constructive in the case that 
it is able to influence intentions. As suggested by Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 99), 
“mistakes and the associated negative affect are likely to activate counterfactuals (‘I 
should have done action b rather than a’), which in turn (whenever possible) activate 
intentions to perform specific actions and take specific decisions (‘next time I will do b’)” 
concerning the matter of the counterfactual reasoning (Smallaman and Roese 2009), and, 
as it is known from literature, intentions trigger behavior (e.g. Gollwitzer 1993, 1999; 
Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006). This is the reason why we find a verbal tense shift (from 
past to present tense) in utterances that follow upward counterfactual reasoning in which 
a reason for the mistake can be identified; this is to due to the projection to the future. 
Therefore, upward counterfactual thought may have a positive function (accompanied or 
not by regret), since “it improves subsequent problem solving and behavior aimed at 
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obtaining better outcomes” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 100). In fact, a direct 
consequence of regret is modifying one’s choice in similar future situations (Zeelenberg 
and Pieters 1999). As stated by Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 100), “the general 
principle of following successful and maximizing strategies and modifying unsuccessful 
(or less successful) ones, especially if sustained by accurate counterfactual reasoning, 
seems to serve a functional role”. 
 Therefore, we can say that upward counterfactuals and regret may be productive in 
the newsroom. In fact, in all the three case studies on upward counterfactual reasoning 
presented above (BEBE case, ACCI case and FOTO case) we have observed that upward 
counterfactual reasoning leads journalists to the acknowledgement of their mistakes and 
to reconsider unrealized better alternatives that have been disregarded or omitted, but that 
can be considered for future similar situations. In those cases, ‘journalists’ learning by 
their mistakes’ is highly beneficial, since they have the chance to understand what was 
wrong and could be different and thus they are fostered to think ‘next time I will do in that 
other way that has not been the case this time’.  
In the BEBE case (Section 10), as we have seen, the journalist feels regret when he 
negatively evaluates the past item, so that he focuses on the better foregone unrealized 
alternative. It is exactly the awareness of the difference that could have been made that 
could foster the journalist to activate that distinct course of action in a future analogous 
situation. In these cases the journalist will reason like that; ‘next time when I will face an 
interesting event that touches people’s sensitiveness, I will develop the news in many ways 
and write a nice piece in the front page written with the heart in an empathic way’. This 
hypothetical future purpose is strongly influenced –if not determined- by the content of 
the counterfactual thought and aims at maximizing successful editorial strategies; a 
hypothetical similar event will be developed in many ways and written in an empathic 
way. 
Similarly, in the ACCI case (subsection 11.1), the journalist MC argues in favor of 
the negative evaluation of the past item concerning a railway accident in Switzerland, so 
that she focuses on the better foregone unrealized alternative. Again, the journalist is aware 
that a better choice could have been made at the moment of the editorial decision, because 
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there is an implicit editorial norm that regulates the way in which important events should 
be handled in terms of editorial layout (‘we should not have used a picture news for such 
an important news and we could have done it’). This awareness could foster the journalist 
to activate the more functional course of action (not using a picture news for an important 
news- even though it occurs outside Tessin) in a future analogous news dealing with an 
important event that has not occurred in Tessin.  
Also in the FOTO case, the journalist FB argues in favor of the negative evaluation 
of the past item. He focuses on the better alternative of having put a caption under a photo 
that would have made the timing more comprehensible. Again, the journalist is aware of 
the possibility that a better choice could have been made at the time of the editorial 
decision (‘we should not have put an old photo without a caption and we could have not 
done it’), due to the presence of an implicit editorial norm that prescribes to contextualixe 
photos that have been taken off in a different temporal moment in respect with the reported 
event. This awareness could foster the journalist to activate a more functional course of 
action (putting a caption under an old photo) in a future analogous situation in which he 
deals with an old photo that has been taken off in a distinct timing from that of the news.  
Concluding, all three case studies have shown that upward counterfactual reasoning 
dealing with journalists’ anticipation of the audience uptake may improve problem solving 
and decision-making processes, since journalists’ focus on unrealized better 
counterfactual situations leads them to take future decisions related to the content of the 
counterfactual thought ‘next time I will do in this way that I have disregarded but that was 
preferable’. This serves the function of improving editorial practices and of reaching 
journalists’ ultimate goal, namely promoting public understanding. 
 
 
11.4 When counterfactuals do not trigger intentions as in the TEMPO case: 
‘journalists crying over spilled milk’  
 
In this sub-section I illustrate the other side of the coin of counterfactual reasoning: its 
potentially detrimental effect. In order to do that, I will rely on the TEMPO case that has 
been analyzed in Chapter 9. In the TEMPO case journalists experience regret for the fact 
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that the accident could have been avoided if the car’s speed had been lower and they are 
aware that conveying this feeling to the audience will increase the probability of producing 
a high emotive impact. In this case of study, upward counterfactual thought has distinct 
consequences than in the three other cases analyzed (BEBE, ACCI- and FOTO- case); in 
fact, in these three cases counterfactual thought had a beneficial effect on journalists’ 
performance improvement, whereas in the TEMPO case counterfactual thought has a clear 
detrimental effect that induces to rumination. It is exactly this detrimental effect that 
represents journalists’ main objective of communication and that represents the leitmotiv 
of the whole item; indeed, journalists speak in a excited way and many different times of 
the fact that if the speed was different the accident could have been avoided (see 9.2, 9.3, 
9.4 and 9.5 for the analysis of the editorial conference and of the other interviews), and 
the whole item is pervaded by the sense of ‘what might have been if ...’ (see 9.4 for the 
analysis of the item). In this case there are no beneficial effects of counterfactual thought, 
because neither journalists nor the audience can imagine a distinct course of action such 
as ‘next time the driver will go slower and will avoid the accident’; the better alternative 
is no longer available. Furthermore, even hypothesizing a future scenario of another 
hypothetical accident with the same driver, the journalists could not decide to pursue the 
foregone better alternative; in fact, they cannot decide for the driver, because the driver’s 
actions are not under their control.  This is an evident case in which counterfactual thought 
is unconstructive, since the unattained goal (avoiding the accident) cannot be changed 
anymore. It is a dysfunctional thought that leads (both journalists and the audience) to 
rumination and psychological distress. It is journalists’ awareness of this perceived 
‘ruminative regret’ (i.e. repetitive counterfactual thought) induced by the possibility to 
avoid the accident that has led them to predict that the news highlighting the high speed 
would have had a higher emotive impact on the audience. What is more, in this case of 
study, the counterfactual argument is of epistemic nature ‘the accident could have been 
avoided’ focusing the attention on the possibility; on the contrary, in the BEBE case and 
in the FOTO case, the counterfactual argument is of deontic nature, as we have seen, since 
the journalist underlines the divergence from an implicit editorial norm. 
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11.5 Journalists considering unrealized worse alternatives and positively 
evaluating a past item in editorial conferences: two case studies concerning 
downward counterfactual reasoning 
 
In this sub-section I analyze a different type of counterfactual reasoning from the one that 
I have shown in the TEMPO, in the BEBE, ACCI and FOTO case; in fact, in the above 
mentioned case studies I have analyzed upward counterfactual reasoning, whereas in this 
subsection I consider two cases of downward counterfactual reasoning (PEDO case46  and 
FORM case47). Downward counterfactual reasoning implies the consideration of worse 
alternatives, and which stems from the avoidance of bad or suboptimal experiences. The 
two cases both deal with journalists’ positive evaluation of past editorial choices supported 
by downward counterfactual thought. In looking at these two cases, following Markman 
et al. (2008), I will distinguish not only between upward and downward counterfactual 
reasoning (simulation directions), but also between simulation modes, namely between 
the evaluative versus reflective mode of simulation of counterfactual reasoning. The 
evaluative mode consists in the “individual’s focusing on the outcome implied in mental 
simulation, which is used ‘as a reference point against which to evaluate oneself or one’s 
present situation’ (Markman et al. 2008: 422)” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109). On 
the contrary, when one assumes a reflective mode, one is centered on the counterfactual 
itself, and “temporarily experiences the counterfactual as it were real” (Markman et. al. 
2008: 422). Put in terms of mental spaces, in the evaluative mode one focuses on the actual 
world, whereas in the reflective mode one focuses on the unreal world opened by the 
counterfactual, namely on what might have happened. This distinction will enable us to 
understand the way in which downward counterfactual arguments may determine 
journalists’ positive evaluation of past editorial choices. 
 
 
                                                
46 cst_cdt_130131_1730_editorial_discourse_1.docx. 
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11.6 Downward counterfactual reasoning focusing on the better actual situation 
 
The first case of downward counterfactual reasoning that I analyse in this section is the 
FORM case48 and is based on a Monday morning editorial meeting at CdT. This case of 
study has been analyzed under a distinct perspective in the paper “Capturing editorial 
gatekeeping through the analysis of argumentation in editorial conference discussions” co-
authored with Andrea Rocci and Marta Zampa (Luciani, Rocci, Zampa 2015) and in 
Zampa (2015): the analysis presented in the present case study are partly based on this 
work. The discussion starts with an utterance about possible observations on the ongoing 
topic of the newspaper proposed by the vice-editor in chief, who leads the editorial 
conference. The vice-editor in chief (X1) says: 
(4) 0232 wanted to present an item for discussion  
We are in front of a single mixed difference of opinion concerning a layout sample 
utilized for an interview in the Culture section. The issue is: “is the layout solution adopted 
in the interview OK?”. The arguers advance two contrary standpoints. On the one side, X1 
advances the subsequent standpoint: “the layout template adopted for the interview is not 
effective/ expedient”.  
 
                                                
48 cst_cdt_130128_1030_editorial_discourse_1.docx.  
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        Fig. 70. News item. The highlight is circled in red. 
In the highlight of the interview piece one reads: 
(5) Di ritorno dal Sundance parla del cinema indipendente USA dei film italiani di quelli 
svizzeri e dell'imminente "primavera locarnese". [Coming back from Sundance Festival 
he talks about independent USA cinema, of Italian and of Swiss movies, and of the 
upcoming “Locarnese spring”]. 
 
The verb ‘parla’ (talks) lacks an explicit subject –which is perfectly fine according to 
Italian grammar as long as a clear subject can be attributed either anaphorically or 
deictically. In fact, X1 mainly criticizes the fact that the highlight comes before (in the 
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predicted reading order) the title. Therefore, according to this point of view, the identity 
of the quoted person is not comprehensible from the beginning. Undeniably, the subject 
of ‘parla’ in the highlight can be recognized afterwards in the reading process, presuming 
that one reads from top to bottom and from left to right.  
On the other side, X2 (the responsible for the culture section), puts forward the standpoint 
that "the layout template adopted for the interview is ok/ not a problem". In excerpt (6) I 
show the part of X2’s argumentation in favor of this standpoint: 
(6)  
X2: 0261 this is a template we use 
 […] 
 
0268-0269 allows to highlight various elements/ that you 
often cannot put into headlines  
 
[…] 
 
LT: 
0293 I ask myself if it is opportune  
0294 
X2: ((laughs)) for me it can be abolished  
0295 it’s been used for years 
0296 nobody ever raised this issue 
 
[…] 
 
0301 this graphical template has been approved 
0302 by everybody I imagine 
0303 I have not invented them ((laughs nervously)) 
 
LT:  
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0304 I have not said that they are not admitted 
0305 I have said that I put the thing under discussion  
 
X2: 
0306 the problem is that   
0307 it allows us to do a full-page opening  
0308 with a photo 
0309 that if we would put on five columns  
0310 would be unacceptable 
0311 this would swallow a lot more of text 
0312 and we would only have a thin strip of text left 
[…]  
0316 this template is hard to dispense with 
 
For the purpose of the present investigation I will focus only on the positive evaluative 
standpoint put forth by X2. The journalist X2 supports his standpoint via three 
argumentative lines as shown in Figure :  
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Figure 71. Argumentative reconstruction of the standpoint in favor of the chosen layout. 
 
First of all, X2 proposes an argument that deals with the convenience of the used 
layout, which  
(6) 0268-0269 allows to highlight various elements/ that 
you often cannot put into headlines. 
   
What is more, he proposes another argument – that he repeats and further specifies 
three times – dealing with the idea that the layout hints at a well-established implicit 
editorial rule,  
 
(7) 0261 this is a template we use  
(ma è uno schema che usiamo). 
2. The layout template should be kept (X2)
2.2.1a It’s 
been used 
for years 
(0295)
2.2 this is a template 
we use (0261)
2.2.1b 
Nobody 
ever raised 
this issue 
(0296)
2.1.1 It 
allows us to 
highlight 
certain 
elements 
(0268)
2.1 It is one 
of our most 
interesting 
templates 
(0264-0265)
2.2.2 this 
graphical  
template 
has been 
approved by 
everybody 
(0301-0302)
2.3 This template is 
hard to dispense with 
(0316)
2.3.1 It allows us to do 
a full-page opening 
with a photo that if 
we put on five 
columns would be 
unacceptable (0307-
0310)
2.3.1.1 this would 
swallow a lot more of 
space and we would 
only have a thin strip 
of text left (0311-0312)
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 Since the layout has always been accepted, why should the editorial team put it 
into question now? Furthermore, the journalist X2 repeats that it is more conveninent to 
keep the layout also for what concerns the productive process (2.3), considered from the 
point of view of the journalist conceived as a sender of the communication to the readers. 
I will focus on this argumentative line, since it is the one in which the journalist makes use 
of two downward counterfactual arguments, by imagining a worse scenario that could 
have happened if journalists had not had the questioned layout at their disposal. Here, the 
journalist again applies a reasoning from final cause and alternatives, as we can see in 
Figure , in which I analyse the inferential configuration of the argumentative move 2.3.1> 
2.3: 
 
 
Figure 72. It would have been different (worse) if journalists had not used the layout Y because 
not using the layout Y would have produced an item without a full-page feature with a photo (an 
unacceptable outcome). 
Maxim: if between two alternatives X, Y,
in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the
goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does
not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus
to choose Y rather than X.
Endoxa:
En1_using a layout Y that enables to produce a full-page feature 
with much space for the body of the text with a photo for an 
important news and using a layout X that does not enable to have 
much space for the body of the text are two alternatives when an 
agent composes a news item
En2_journalists have the goal of avoiding to publish important 
news without a full-page feature with much space for the body of 
the text and without a photo for important news (GOAL)
Data:
D1_We have chosen to use a layout Y that enables to produce a 
full-page feature with much space for the body of the text and with 
a photo for an important news which has led to avoid to publish an 
important news with a layout with less space for the body of the 
text (FACTUAL DATUM)
D2_ It was possible not to choose a layout that enables to produce 
a full page feature with much space for the body of the text and 
with a photo for an important news and it would have led to 
publish an important news with less body of the text 
(RETROSPECTIVE PREDICTION: SIMULATIVE DATUM)
FINAL CONCLUSION: we have chosen the better alternative disregarding the
worse one (POSITIVE EVALUATIVE INFERENCE-> possible RELIEF)
Locus from 
Final cause and 
alternatives
First conclusion / Minor premise: Among the two alternatives we
have chosen the one that has led to avoid to publish an important news
without a full page feature with less space for the body of the text,
disregarding the alternative that would have led to produce it.
INVALIDATION OF 
NEGATI VE EXPECTATION
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The reasoning works as follows: if a) using a layout Y that enables to produce a full-
page feature with a photo for an important news and not using it are two alternatives when 
an agent composes a news piece, and if b) journalists have the goal of avoiding to publish 
important news without a full-page feature with a photo (endoxa); and if a) journalists 
have chosen to use a layout that enables to produce a full-page feature with a photo for an 
important news which has led to avoid to publish an important news without a full-page 
feature with a photo (factual datum) and if b) it was possible to choose not to use a layout 
Y that enables to produce a full-page feature with a photo for an important news and it 
would have led to publish an important news without a full-page feature with a photo 
(simulative datum and retrospective prediction); then, among the two alternatives we have 
chosen the alternative that has led to avoid to publish an important news without a full-
page feature with a photo, disregarding the alternative that would have led to produce it 
(first conclusion and invalidation of negative expectation). This first conclusion, conjoined 
with the maxim stemming from the reasoning from the final cause and alternatives “if 
between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of 
C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y 
rather than X” leads to draw the final conclusion that “we have chosen the better 
alternative disregarding the worse one”. This final conclusion coincides with the positive 
evaluative standpoint that may lead journalists to experience relief. 
 In this case it is interesting to notice that the journalist’s counterfactual reasoning 
is focused on the better actual situation, namely on what the layout Y allows them to do, 
namely a full-page opening with a photo. This focal argumentative move is further 
supported by another more specific downward counterfactual argument (2.3.1.1): 
(8) this would swallow a lot more of space and we would 
only have a thin strip of text left (0311-0312).  
This subordinate argument gives further evidence that eliminating the questioned 
template would produce an inadmissible outcome. 
 In this case we notice that the downward counterfactual argument closes the 
argumentative discussion, acting as an argument of reinforcement of what has been argued 
before; it leads the discussion to a conclusion phase, differently from upward 
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counterfactual reasoning that fostered the discussion and projected it into the future. In 
this case the focus is on the present positive outcome, i.e. on the fact that thanks to the 
adopted layout a full-page opening has been possible. Therefore, relief is experienced. 
From the datum, we can understand that the reasoning is focused on the better factual 
outcome, therefore representing a case of evaluative mode.  
In this case downward counterfactual reasoning is used to defend the status quo, 
which has been put into discussion: the journalist thinks to the alternatives at stake if the 
status quo is put into discussion. According to the journalist, the actual state of affairs is 
for sure better than what could have been produced by the change: the change could 
produce even worse consequences of the status quo. 
Furthermore, it serves a mood repair function, but is devoid of motivating force in 
that one just focuses on the better actual situation. Nevertheless, even though downward 
counterfactual reasoning may have a mood-repair function, it can also have a pedagogical 
function. Indeed, the journalist imagines –anticipates- for a moment that the result could 
be unacceptable (if they do not use the chosen layout) and so he experiences relief as a 
consequence of the invalidated negative expectation; this may also “foster learning about 
how to prevent negative outcomes in similar future circumstances” (Castelfranchi and 
Miceli 2014: 109). The journalist anticipates how it could be in future without that layout 
(it will be impossible to make a full-page feature) and fosters learning about situations in 
which he could or not use that layout. 
 
 
11.7 Downward counterfactual reasoning focussing on how things might 
have been worse: the PEDO case49 
 
In this sub-section I show an example in which a downward counterfactual reasoning is at 
stake in an argumentative discussion occurred within an editorial conference that has taken 
place on the 31st January 2013 at the newsroom of CdT; it is an evaluative editorial 
conference, in which journalists evaluate the items of the previous day. In this case of 
                                                
49 Cst_cdt_130131_1730_ed disc.  
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study journalists discuss about an item of the day before concerning a case of sexual abuses 
on minors perpetrated by a chauffeur of a school bus in Tessin. The chauffeur is very well 
known in the local community, since the chauffeur that drives children to school is very a 
well known figure in small villages of Tessin. Furthermore, he is very well known to 
jounalists, since he had committed other abuses.  
 
 (9) 0001-0013 L: in these cases names can be made or 
not/ MC: it is a legitimate question/ the problem is that 
he is plurirecidive and we have never written his name/ 
above all because the children on which the man has acted 
are minors/ and therefore it is not possible to write the 
name/ because there are children between six and ten 
years/ L: Bomio we have made it/ MC: yes but they were 
minors at the time of the abuse/ but at the time in which 
he has been declared guilty they were not minors anymore/ 
whereas here/ L: it would enable to identify victims/ MC: 
eh yes it would enable to identify victims/ since he was 
chaffeur at the XYZ 
 
This discussion is of evaluative-explanatory nature: indeed, the journalist who 
is in charge of the meeting (L) asks if they can quote names in news of sexual abuse 
involving minors. The other journalist involved in the discussion (MC) answers by 
exemplifying the case of the chaffeur-pedophile. The initial general issue ‘in this 
delicate cases names can be quoted?’ shifts to ‘was it good not to mention the name 
of the pedophile in the case of the chauffeur-pedophile?’. The final standpoint ‘we 
did not mention the name of the pedophile (and it was a good choice)’ is evaluative 
and is supported by three argumentative lines; the first argumentative line (1.1a-b) 
is based on a legal norm that protects minors’ provacy in cases of news that involve 
minors; indeed, a legal norm exists that prohibits to divulge elements that may 
directly or indirectly remind to victims’ (minors’) identities. The second 
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argumentative line (1.2) is based on a downward counterfactual argument, which 
induces the other journalists to focus on the worse unrealized scenario that consists 
in victims’ identification. In Figure  I show the argumentative reconstruction of 
MC’s argumentation in favor of the standpoint ‘we did not mention the name of the 
pedophile (and it was good)’: 
 
 
Figure 73. Argumentative reconstruction of MC’s argumentation in favor of the standpoint ‘we 
did not mention the name of the pedophile (and it was good)’. 
 
The focal argumentative move of the argumentation represented in Fig. 97 is the 
one based on downward counterfactual reasoning; indeed, this move enables to anticipate 
the bad consequences that may have happened if the names had been made. A reasoning 
from final cause and alternatives has been applied, as it is shown in the analysis of the 
inferential configuration in Figure 74; 
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Figure 16. We did not mention the name of the pedophile (and it was a good choice) because this 
would have enabled to identify victims (it would have been worse). 
 
The reasoning works as follows: if a) mentioning the name of a pedophile in a 
newspaper article in which minors are involved and not mentioning it are two alternatives 
when an agent composes a news item, and if b) journalists have the goal of not enabling 
victims’ identification when minors are involved (endoxa); and if a) journalists have 
chosen not to mention the name of the pedophile in a newspaper article in which minors 
were involved which has led not to enable victims’ identification (factual datum) and if b) 
it was possible to choose to mention the name of the pedophile and it would have led to 
enable victims’ identification (simulative datum and retrospective prediction); then, 
among the two alternatives journalists have chosen the alternative that has led not to enable 
victims’ identification, disregarding the alternative that would have realized it (first 
conclusion and invalidation of negative expectation). This first conclusion, conjoined with 
the maxim stemming from the reasoning from the final cause and alternatives “if between 
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two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas 
the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X” 
leads to draw the final conclusion that “we have chosen the better alternative disregarding 
the worse one”. This final conclusion coincides with the positive evaluative standpoint 
that may lead journalists to experience relief. 
Furthermore, it is interesting that the journalist uses the present tense “this would 
enable to identify victims” to refer to a past decision. She uses a present conditional for a 
counterfactual reasoning that is however referred to the past, since the news piece has been 
produced and published in the past and is now object of evaluation. As we observed in the 
BEBE (Chapter 10) and in the FOTO case (subsection 11.2), the journalist quickly shifts 
from the past tense to the present tense, inducing the editorial team to experience the past 
in the present time. However, in this case of study we are dealing with a case of downward 
counterfactual reasoning, and we notice that the counterfactual reasoning does not lead to 
further fruitful discussion as when upward counterfactual reasoning is used, but rather it 
leads to closing the discussion, it leads to confirm what has been said before. In this case, 
the way in which the item has been handled is judged in a positive way by the journalist; 
therefore, the use of the downward counterfactual serves the function of confirming the 
positivity of the judgement. Instead of reference to a possible new world in which a news 
piece may be changed and improved, downward counterfactual reasoning induces 
journalists to deal with the realities of a given item that has been produced and that in 
future should not be improved but rather eventually reproposed in a similar manner.  
Again, as in the FORM case, journalists have attempted to defend the status quo, 
which had been put into discussion: bomio we have made names (0007). Downward 
counterfactual reasoning has an important function, since by re-saying reasons, journalists 
can avoid that the force of habit becomes the only reason. It is a way of confirming the 
positivity of the attaked status quo and of disauthomizing normal decisions: it has a 
function of organizational learning in the newsroom.  
 In this case it is probable that journalists experience relief due to the positive 
evaluation of the editorial choice, due to the awareness of having avoided victims’ 
identification; indeed, as it is known from literature relief may be referred to “the feeling 
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stemming from the avoidance of an unpleasant experience” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 
2014: 104). More specifically, in this case, journalists evaluate an editorial decision (not 
quoting names) that has been taken in the past. Therefore, it can be considered a case of 
anticipation based relief that presupposes a retrospective anticipatory representation. 
When the journalist, who has published a newspaper article on a sexual abuse on minors 
anticipates via counterfactual reasoning that he could have risked to publish the item in 
such a way that minors could have been identified (by quoting names), and realizes that 
he might have caused a moral damage to the minors that could have been identified and 
scarred for life, he may have experienced retrospective fear and guilt (including a negative 
IAR; that is, the belief  “possible/likely enabling of victims’ identification” together with 
the opposite goal “not enabling victims’ identification”), and subsequent retrospective 
relief (the invalidation of that negative IAR: “thank goodness we did not enbled victims’ 
identification!”). These retrospective emotions imply anticipatory representations. “Their 
difference from the non-retrospective ones lies in the fact that the IAR (or expectation) is 
simulated, by going back to the time when it could have been formulated” (Castelfranchi 
and Miceli 2014: 104).  With reference to relief, “the intensity of relief (as the intensity of 
any counterfactual emotion) might be simply related to ‘the ease of imagining’ (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1982: 203, quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 105) some alternative 
outcome” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109). 
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that in this case of study, as in the FORM 
case, the invalidated negative IAR or expectation is expressed in the present tense (making 
names would enable to identify victims); this would support Castelfranchi and Miceli’s 
claim that “negative IAR or expectations (and the consequent relief) may foster learning 
about how to prevent negative outcomes in similar future circumstances” (Castelfranchi 
and Miceli 2014: 109). 
For what concerns the simulation mode, this case of study is a case of evaluative 
mode of downward counterfactual reasoning; indeed, the journalist compares the 
counterfactual standard (having enabled to identify victims) with the factual outcome 
(not having enabled to identify victims), and positively evaluates the present situation 
(“good!”). Journalists did not focus on the counterfactual itself, reflecting on what 
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might have happened if victims would have been identified, as it would have been the 
case in a reflective mode.  
The consequences of such orientations are quite apparent. Evaluative processing 
of downward counterfactuals seems to serve a mood-repair function, but is devoid of 
motivating force in that one just focuses on the better actual situation, and on enjoying it. 
Conversely, reflective processing of downward counterfactuals, by focusing on how 
things might have been worse, may enhance motivation, persistence, and actual 
performance (Markman et al. 2008), aimed especially at preventing negative outcomes 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109).  
 
For that reason,  
relief, if associated with reflective downward counterfactual thinking, might foster 
‘preventive’ learning. However, it is still to be ascertained whether this motivational 
implication is to be ascribed solely to reflective downward counterfactual thinking or also 
to the feeling of relief. Actually, relief, as a positive feeling, might best fit with the 
evaluative (rather than reflective) processing of downward counterfactuals (Castelfranchi 
and Miceli 2014: 109). 
 
 
11.8 Upward and downward counterfactuals: four case studies in comparison 
 
For what concerns counterfactual reasoning, I have analysed six case studies involving 
distinct types of counterfactual reasoning; four case studies concern upward counterfactual 
reasoning (TEMPO, BEBE, ACCI, FOTO case) and two case studies deal with downward 
counterfactual reasoning (FORM, PEDO case).  
With reference to upward counterfactual reasoning, I have analysed a case of study 
in which a positive evaluative standpoint not referred to the Self was at stake (TEMPO 
case) and three case studies in which a negative evaluative standpoint referred to the Self 
was at stake (BEBE, ACCI and FOTO case). In table 5 I show an overview of the analyzed 
case studies and of the argumentative analysis that I have made: 
 
Table. 5. Types of loci at the roots of upward counterfactual reasoning supporting negative and 
positive evaluative standpoint with reference to the BEBE, ACCI, FOTO and TEMPO case. 
Type of standpoint Positive evaluative standpoint Negative evaluative standpoint 
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It is interesting to notice that in the BEBE, ACCI and FOTO case the negative 
evaluative standpoint referred to the Self is supported by an argument with upward 
counterfactual reasoning that is based on a complex locus from final cause and 
alternatives; the negative evaluation depends on the fact that when one agent does not 
follow a norm of whatever nature that he considers relevant, he experiences regret. In the 
case studies under investigation journalists had not followed editorial norms; in the BEBE 
case they had not respected the editorial guidelines stating that delicate news must be 
handled in an empathic way, in the ACCI case they had not given prominence to a quite 
important news therefore not following a spontaneous editorial norm, and in the FOTO 
case they had not put a caption under an old photo therefore hindering a good audience 
comprehension and infringing another spontaneous editorial norm.  
Differently, in the TEMPO case, the positive evaluative standpoint not referred to 
the Self is supported by an argument with upward counterfactual reasoning that is based 
on a reasoning from efficient cause and a locus from definition. The positive evaluation is 
due to the journalist’s adherence to a norm; indeed, the journalist has produced a news that 
has had a high audience impact (by inducing regret in the audience), and producing news 
that have a high audience impact follows a well established editorial norm.  
Evaluation referred 
to the Self/ not to 
the Self 
Evaluation not referred to the 
Self 
Evaluation referred to the Self 
Type of locus 
involved 
Locus from efficient cause 
and definition 
Locus from final cause and 
alternatives  
Type of simulation 
of the 
counterfactual 
argument 
Argument with upward 
counterfactual thought 
(considering unrealized better 
alternatives) not attributed to 
the Self 
Argument with upward 
counterfactual thought 
(considering unrealized better 
alternatives) attributed to the 
Self 
Case study TEMPO case: the positive 
evaluation depends on the 
possibility to convey regret to 
the audience 
BEBE case, ACCI case, 
FOTO case: the negative 
evaluation depends on not 
having considered a better 
alternative, possible at the 
moment of the decision 
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With reference to downward counterfactual reasoning, I have analyzed two case 
studies (PEDO and FORM case) in subsections 11.6 and 11.7. In both case studies there 
is a more or less implicit positive evaluative standpoint (“we did not mention the name of 
the pedophile [and this was a good choice]” in the PEDO case and “this layout is hard to 
dispense with [and this was a good choice]” in the FORM case). As I show in Table 6, the 
positive evaluative standpoint is in both cases supported by an argument with downward 
counterfactual reasoning, which is based on a complex locus from final cause and 
alternatives; the positive evaluation depends on the imagination of a worse unrealized 
alternative and on the very fact that the realization of this worse alternative has been 
hindered and that the best -often the only acceptable- alternative has been chosen.  
 
Table 6. Types of loci at the roots of downward counterfactual reasoning positive evaluative 
standpoint with reference to the PEDO and FORM case. 
 
Type of standpoint Positive evaluative 
standpoint 
Positive evaluative 
standpoint 
Evaluation referred 
to the Self/ not to 
the Self 
Evaluation referred 
to the Self 
Evaluation referred 
to the item 
Type of locus Locus from final 
cause and 
alternatives 
Locus from final 
cause and 
alternatives 
Type of simulation 
of the 
counterfactual 
argument 
Argument with 
downward 
counterfactual 
reasoning 
(considering worse 
alternatives) 
Argument with 
downward 
counterfactual 
reasoning 
(considering worse 
alternatives) 
Case study PEDO case FORM case 
 
 
Journalists’ reasoning in the PEDO case is all focused on how things might have 
been worse; having hindered the realization of a worse hypothesis (enabling victims’ 
identification) is a reason to positively evaluate an editorial decision (not having 
mentioned names) that enables to reach a positive goal (protecting minors from 
identification). On the contrary, in the FORM case the journalists focus on the resulting 
better actual situation; having promoted a better state of affairs (making a full-page 
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feature with the layout Y) than what would have resulted from other alternatives (not 
making a full-page feature with the layout Y) is a reason to positively evaluate an 
editorial layout template.
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12. Conclusive considerations and future research strands 
 
 
The present Chapter is structured in three parts: in the first part I answer the research 
questions listed in the Introduction, in the second part I show the results emerged from the 
research and in the last part I propose future research strands. The main goal of this 
dissertation was to explore the newsroom as a highly argumentative field of interaction 
and, more specifically, as a context where arguments based on the anticipation of audience 
uptake play a major role. The study of the entire newsmaking processes under an 
argumentative perspective had largely been ignored by argumentation scholars, with the 
exception of the research carried out within the project “Argumentation in newsmaking 
process and product”. Research conducted within this project and the present dissertation 
have shown that journalists’ argumentation about audience uptake plays a fundamental 
role in reconfiguring news products. Indeed, journalists individually and collectively 
shape their news pieces on the basis of audience uptake anticipation, in line with their 
goals of capturing audience attention and promoting public understanding. As we saw in 
Chapter 5, anticipatory representations of goal states can be considered the cornerstone of 
cognition. In the rhetorical tradition the ability to anticipate the uptake of the audience –
especially in terms of emotions (cf. Aristotle Rhetoric II)- is a key skill of the rhetor. And 
modern media professionals are not dissimilar in the way in which they consider 
anticipation an important element of their repertoire of professional skills (see Chapters 
4.2.2, 9). Thus, my goal was to understand whether and how journalists argue about 
anticipated audience uptake, and the kinds of anticipatory reasoning journalists deployed 
both in terms of configuration of beliefs and goals (see Chapter 5) as well as in terms of 
audience uptake dimensions (see Chapter 5.3). More specifically, my goal was to 
understand the role of anticipation in newsmaking and its function in news framing. 
As the investigation progressed, some theoretical issues became central to account 
for the journalists’ anticipatory reasoning. In particular, the study of counterfactual 
reasoning and of its inferential configuration became prominent. Consequently, this 
dissertation also constitutes a theoretical contribution to studies of anticipation and 
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counterfactual reasoning, which advances the state of the art on these topics which receive 
limited attention in argumentation theoretic literature (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 8).  
 
 
12.1 Answering the research questions 
 
12.1.1 The importance of studying journalists arguing anticipated audience 
uptake 
 
A central goal of my dissertation was to understand the role played by journalists’ 
argumentation about anticipated audience uptake in the newsroom. This goal was 
expressed by research question (RQ1): 
(RQ 1) How do journalists reason about audience uptake in television- and print-
journalism before producing news items? (RQ1a) How do journalists argue about the way 
in which the audience will react to the news pieces they will produce? 
By investigating editorial conferences, retrospective verbal protocols and news 
pieces, I found articulated examples of journalists’ argumentation about anticipated 
audience uptake, both in TV- and print-journalism. Journalists’ anticipation of audience 
uptake can be considered as a subtype of hermeneutic argumentation, since it is a way of 
interpreting how the audience will react to a potential news item or to a potential news 
detail; journalists try to construct the item that best fits with their audience cognitive and 
emotive characteristics on the basis of their individual and shared beliefs, predictions and 
expectations. I have shown that when journalists have a valenced anticipatory reasoning, 
i.e. a goal is implied, they are determined to support their standpoint regarding how a news 
piece should be published/broadcast so that it has a desirable impact on the audience. 
Because newsmaking decisions always involve complex issues implying a consideration 
of audience uptake, the argumentative discourse developed by journalists in editorial 
conferences and in retrospective verbal protocols is pragmatic in nature. It therefore 
mainly deals with what it is desirable and expedient to do in order to reach the widest 
audience possible and to promote public understanding. However, pragmatic 
argumentation is very often supported by knowledge-oriented argumentation, the goal of 
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which is to determine whether a statement is true or not. Indeed, journalists must 
continuously understand and establish whether a potential news event is true, whether its 
source is reliable, and whether and how certain possible social phenomena are perceived 
by the audience. An example can be found in the JUGE case discussed in Chapter 7, where 
I have shown that journalists made their pragmatic inference to broadcast an item on youth 
aggressiveness, after having evaluated that adolescents are becoming more and more 
aggressive, a point perceived by the audience.  
 
12.1.2 Practical, evaluative and explicative standpoints in the different 
journalistic places of reflection 
 
As I have said in the previous section (12.1.1), journalists’ pragmatic inferences are often 
supported by knowledge-oriented argumentation, and therefore by evaluative-explanatory 
standpoints. However, different kinds of standpoints in terms of their propositional content 
and functions can be found to arise in different places of reflection of the newsroom. 
(RQ 2) Which types of standpoint do journalists put forth when they anticipate 
audience uptake? (RQ2a) Is there a correlation between the specific place of reflection, 
such as evaluative/ deliberative formal or informal editorial meeting and a specific kind 
of standpoint? 
Practical standpoints are clearly the final step of the argumentative chain in the 
newsroom, since a journalist’s main aim is producing news pieces that promote public 
understanding. However, practical standpoints must be argumentatively supported by 
evaluative-explanatory sub-standpoints. Indeed, to decide to disseminate a certain news 
piece, this news must be evaluated as valuable news worthy of public consumption. 
Practical standpoints emerge in deliberative editorial conferences (the aim of which is to 
make decisions concerning the news production process), where journalists make 
decisions on the items to choose, usually supported by evaluative standpoints. In fact, in 
this context journalists’ practical standpoints are usually based on material starting points 
that need to be ascertained. On the contrary, in evaluative editorial conferences, where the 
main aim is to evaluate past news items, the evaluative-explanatory standpoint is more 
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common. In this place of reflection, journalists usually judge and evaluate previous items 
and may question usual editorial practices. I have shown how this evaluative process is 
functional to better face future analogous situations and how it works to make better 
decisions in future: in this activity type a major role is played by counterfactual reasoning 
(for more details see subsection 8.7). 
In informal editorial meetings, we find both practical and evaluative standpoints, in 
a similar fashion to formal editorial conferences explained above. 
In retrospective interviews, made to the journalists after that they had composed 
their news items, explicative standpoints proved to be the most prominent type of 
standpoint at stake. Explicative standpoints reproduce practical standpoints of soliloquial 
argumentation (that the journalist has spontaneously given himself while he was reflecting 
on what he was writing), so that journalists’ reasoning about writing choices is explicitly 
shown. The retrospective interviews can be considered as a live soliloquy by the writer, 
whose decisions may be subject to change, reformulation, questioning and critical 
evaluation. Retrospective interviews are highly reflective moments in which journalists’ 
inner argumentation emerges. In retrospective interviews, journalists argued with 
themselves and their reasoning and conscious writing strategies became clear. For 
instance, as shown in the JUGE case (excerpt (11) in Section 7), the journalist clearly says 
that he has to write his news piece starting from interviews. 
We can conclude that correlation exists between the place of reflection and type of 
standpoint, even though practical (explicit or implicit) standpoints occur in every place of 
reflection and constitute the ultimate overall standpoint. Indeed, the evaluative standpoints 
of the evaluative editorial conferences support a practical standpoint in view of a practical 
decision, whereas the explicative standpoints of retrospective interviews reflect practical 
standpoints of soliloquial argumentation.   
 
   12.1.3 Different types of anticipation of audience uptake based on different 
premises 
 
A central concern of my dissertation involved the correlation between distinct types of 
premises and distinct aspects of audience uptake. As such I asked: 
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(RQ 3) Which types of anticipation of audience uptake can we identify?  
I have observed that journalists attempt to predict a) how people can be persuaded (for 
instance how people can be persuaded to read a news piece) –anticipation of audience 
persuasion, b) how people will react from an emotive point of view (for instance whether 
a content could hurt people’s sensitiveness) –anticipation of audience emotive uptake, and 
c) how people will react from a cognitive point of view (for instance whether a content 
would represent an excessive cognitive load for a certain typology of audience) –
anticipation of audience cognitive uptake, in order to build a news item that avoids 
undesired audience reactions. However, anticipation of persuasion seems to be the 
superordinate type of anticipation, including cognitive and emotive anticipation, which 
underlie it: in the end, every journalists’ anticipatory reasoning concerning the audience 
uptake is aimed at persuading the audience of a given point of view. 
At the level of topical choices, the anticipation of audience uptake is bound to distinct 
kinds of premises at stake.  
After having carried out an argumentative analysis on all case studies I have 
observed that journalists’ anticipation of audience emotive uptake, being a subtype of 
anticipation of persuasion, is mostly based on the locus from final cause.  This is since 
persuasion in the end “is an intention to modify, through communication, another’s beliefs 
as a means for modifying (generating, activating, or just increasing the value of) the other’s 
goals” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 195). In this case the object of modification (or 
reinforcement) is the other’s emotive state. Another locus applied in anticipation of 
audience emotive uptake is the locus from termination and setting up, in which a desirable 
goal has already been reached (thanks to a productive activity) and should be simply 
maintained (terminated) or a desirable goal is hindered by an ongoing counterproductive 
activity and should be terminated. For example, in Chapter 6.2 it is clear that an ongoing 
activity is counterproductive and does not lead to a desirable goal and thus it should be 
interrupted. With reference to audience emotive uptake, I found many loci from analogy, 
and especially from past analogy. This is because when a previous similar news item or 
item’s detail has created a desirable audience emotive state (a desirable goal), it is good to 
repropose it. Furthermore, the locus from definition has also been applied when journalists 
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reason about their audience’s emotive uptake. In this case, a given editorial norm or 
habitude per definition activates or reinforces a certain emotive state in the audience, as is 
the case in the inferential configuration shown in the TEMPO case (Figure  in Chapter 
9.3).  
Concerning the anticipation of persuasion on the level of behaviour, journalists 
applied reasoning from final cause, which was obviously due to inducing the audience to 
a modification of its behaviour, considered a desirable goal of the newsroom. An example 
can be found in the PIAZ case, within which the journalist aimed at persuading the 
audience to watch a TV-debate by reading a newspaper article (Figure and Figure in 
Chapter 6).  
 
12.1.4 Audience emotive uptake as the most prominent type of anticipation in 
journalistic reasoning 
 
(RQ 4) Which role does anticipation of audience emotive uptake plays in audience uptake 
oriented argumentative discussions in editorial conferences as well as in other types of 
data? 
In Chapter 5.4 I characterized the anticipation of the audience emotions as the most 
prominent type of anticipation in journalistic reasoning. I further characterized the 
anticipation of audience emotive uptake as a subtype of the anticipation of persuasion, 
which may act at the level of attitude (in turn subdivided in cognitive and emotive attitude) 
and/or at the level of behaviour (for details see Figure  in subsection 5.3). The anticipation 
of audience persuasion and comprehending the anticipation of audience emotive uptake, 
has the aims at modifying the audience’s attitude (cognitions and/or emotions) or audience 
behaviour, therefore dealing with the perlocutionary force. The frequency of journalists’ 
anticipatory reasonings concerning anticipation of audience emotive uptake shows that 
this is ‘the most prominent type of anticipation of the most prominent type of anticipation’. 
Indeed, if anticipation of persuasion is the most prominent type of anticipation, 
anticipation of audience emotions is the most prominent type of anticipation of persuasion 
(much more than anticipation of cognitions and behaviour anticipations). In Chapter 9 I 
dealt with the TEMPO case, which was focused on the anticipation of audience emotions 
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in the whole intertextual chain. Journalists’ reasonings in the editorial conferences, in 
retrospective interviews and in informal discourses all pointed to the importance of acting 
on the audience emotions, inducing them to experience regret and empathy with the 
victims of the accident.  
(RQ 4a) In which way does audience emotive uptake influence the quality of 
reporting?  
Anticipating emotive uptake is a means to persuade the audience, either by reinforcing a 
certain emotion that was already present or by modifying their emotions (via the 
modification of its epistemological premises) to think or make what the journalist wants. 
As concerns the anticipation of the audience’s emotive uptake, it is interesting to note the 
peculiarity of the content of the desired or undesired consequence in this type of uptake: 
in appealing to anticipated emotions, the content concerns the feeling of a certain emotion 
rather than the fact that a certain state of affairs is realized.  
As I showed in the TEMPO case, journalists may aim at capturing audience 
attention, but doing so emotionally may lead them to frame the news in a slightly unfair 
way. An unfair framing of a news occurs when journalists lead the audience to make false 
inferences about a certain reality. A simple risk of manipulatory attitude occurs when 
journalists produce an item that may lead the audience to make ambivalent inferences 
about a certain reality, as I have shown in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9). In all other cases, 
journalists’ anticipation of audience emotive uptake has proved to be perfectly functional 
for the creation of audience-adequate news pieces that enable journalists to capture 
audience attention and promote public understanding, in other words to carry out their 
main goal. 
 
12.1.5 The crucial role played by counterfactual reasoning in the newsroom 
 
Journalists not only use actual premises in arguing about audience uptake, they also use 
simulative premises, i.e. premises not based on actual evidence, but rather on a cognitive 
projection of an imagined state of affairs that does not exist in reality. Indeed, they often 
attempt to anticipate the possible ways in which the audience may have reacted if another 
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news had been broadcasted/published, or if a certain news item had been 
published/broadcasted in a distinct manner (for instance specifying or avoiding other 
details). Furthermore, they often ask themselves how the audience may have reacted if a 
distinct course of action had taken place, which could have radically changed a certain 
news. These kinds of audience uptake centred discussions are all based on counterfactual 
reasoning, since journalists try to imagine possible alternatives to past audience reactions 
that may have been different if.. . These reflections all deal with the imagination of a better 
hypothesis that could have been realized had a distinct course of action had taken place. 
Since journalists often try to anticipate the possible ways in which the audience 
could have reacted if another news had been broadcasted/published, I have focused on the 
role of counterfactual reasoning in this kind of argumentative discussions.  
(RQ 5) What role does counterfactual reasoning play in journalists’ argumentative 
discussions centered on audience uptake? 
Journalists’ counterfactual reasonings are mostly based on the imagination of 
possible alternative audience reactions to already spread news pieces that may have been 
different if…  
To exhaustively answer (RQ 5), two types of counterfactual reasoning must be 
distinguished on the basis of the simulation direction, namely upward counterfactual 
reasoning (simulation of better unrealized scenarios) and downward counterfactual 
reasoning (simulation of worse unrealized scenarios). 
   Upward counterfactual reasoning. Journalists’ upward counterfactual 
reasoning, dealing with better unrealized alternatives, is found in the shape of a) implicit 
counterfactual reasoning expressed via question like “How would have the audience 
reacted if we had published the other news instead of this?/ and “How would have the 
audience reacted if we had broadcast the news emphasising the other detail?” or, b) 
statements directly concerning the audience’s uptake, such as ‘If only we had put this 
detail/ handled the news in this way..’, as it happened in the BEBE case (Chapter 10), for 
example; or c) the consequent does not refer to the audience uptake but to another event 
which may have an indirect connection with the audience uptake: ‘If the actor of the event 
X would have acted in a distinct manner, then the event X would have had a distinct 
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outcome’, as happened in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9). Upward counterfactual reasoning 
may occur in evaluative editorial conferences, when journalists negatively evaluate a past 
item, an editorial practice, or a certain framing given to the item. This may lead them to 
experience regret for not having chosen an alternative that would have produced better 
audience uptake. Furthermore, upward counterfactual reasoning may occur in deliberative 
editorial conferences in cases where a negative evaluation of a past item supports the 
deliberation via past analogy (we should publish the item in the way X because it would 
have been better if that other time we would have published the item in way X), or in cases 
where the imagination of unrealized better alternatives acts in an indirect way on the 
audience uptake, such as in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9). It is important to note that in 
order to experience regret, journalists must have had the possibility of carrying out an 
action that has not been carried out, even though the alternative was not considered at the 
moment of the choice, but only a posteriori in the light of a negative or sub-optimal result. 
Therefore, journalists’ experience of regret strictly depends on the availability of 
counterfactual alternatives.  
Upward counterfactual reasoning in evaluative editorial conferences (such as in the 
BEBE case) proved to have a beneficial function of prolonging the discussion and 
motivating further reflection and self-inquiry (Chapter 10). Interestingly, after upward 
counterfactual reasoning a shift in the focus of the editorial conversation can be observed, 
the topic of the conversation can be altered, and new possible worlds of interpretation can 
be introduced. On a linguistic level this is witnessed by the shift of verbal tense from past 
to present or even future, indicating that journalists experience ‘St. Augustine’s present of 
past things’ when they prolong their discussion on the basis of past errors. The 
juxtaposition of past and present experiences actualizes the past and highlights past 
experiences for similar future situations. Additionally, we can say that the function of 
irrealis, including counterfactuals in a strict or broad sense, is highly beneficial in the 
newsroom, since it helps journalists elaborate new solutions and strategies, by widening 
the number of possible choices, in line with Von Foerster’s ethical imperative to “Act 
always so as to increase the number of choices”, which the father of the second-order 
cybernetics proposed in his 1992 essay (Von Foerster 1992). The pragmatics of irrealis in 
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evaluative editorial conferences must be examined within the higher purpose of the 
activity type at hand, namely evaluating past items to produce better future items that fulfil 
the institutional mission of the newsroom. The juxtaposition of a past counterfactual world 
and of an actualized past that becomes present, requires the sort of double-perception or 
double-experience described by St. Augustine and by the English linguist Lyons (1997) 
(see Chapter 10). Therefore, in evaluative editorial conferences where a past item is 
negatively evaluated, the use of upward counterfactual reasoning and of irrealis more 
generally is productive and may function as a trigger for avoiding previous mistakes and 
finding news solutions. It is interesting that upward counterfactual reasoning in editorial 
conferences is (almost) always of deontic nature (what should have been done), since it 
refers to editorial norms that have not been respected and that have therefore caused a 
negatively judged outcome. 
      Upward counterfactual reasoning is specifically highly beneficial when the causes of 
regret can be identified and when changes in future similar editorial situations can be made 
(see Section 11.3), since it leads one to then “learn from one’s mistakes” and to carry out 
the counterfactual situation that would have led to a better outcome that has not been 
carried out in the past. In upward counterfactual reasoning the agent acts in order to, and 
pursues involvement goals.  
Upward counterfactual reasoning may also be detrimental (see Section 11.4), however, in 
cases where the causes of the regret cannot be identified and/or changed. Evidence of this 
detrimental function of regret can be observed in the TEMPO case, wherein the victims of 
the reported event regret that ‘the accident to the girl could have been avoided if the driver 
had gone slower’. In this case it is evident that regret has a detrimental function, since the 
accident cannot be deleted and it is more difficult to imagine an analogous similar 
situation. However, the entire news item is based on the fictive possibility of remedying 
what has happened (the accident) by simulating similar future conditions wherein the 
counterfactual alternative (going slower) can be carried out. In this case the journalists 
have explicitly demonstrated their awareness of the detrimental function of this kind of 
upward counterfactual reasoning and have decided to convey to the audience the idea of 
‘no-more-possible’, in order to produce a higher emotive impact. 
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   Downward counterfactual reasoning. On the other hand, downward 
counterfactual reasoning identifies the consideration of worse alternatives and stems from 
the avoidance of bad or suboptimal experiences. If regret is clearly correlated with upward 
counterfactual reasoning, relief can be said to be bound to downward counterfactual 
reasoning. Indeed, if regret is elicited by invalidated positive anticipatory reasoning and 
invalidated positve expectations, relief is often elicited by invalidated negative 
anticipatory reasoning and by invalidated negative expectations. When one individual 
imagines a foregone worse alternative and thinks about ‘what might have been’, he 
experiences relief.   In the newsroom downward counterfactual reasoning was found in 
two distinct places of reflection, namely in retrospective verbal protocols and evaluative 
editorial conferences within which journalists positively evaluated a previous editorial 
choice.  
First, downward counterfactual reasoning in evaluative editorial conferences is used 
to support a positive evaluation of a past item or an editorial habit, which thereby confirms 
the positive aspect of the judgement. In this kind of editorial conference it may be found 
in the concluding phase of the argumentative discussion and its use tends to close it. 
Instead of referring to a new possible world in which a news item may be changed and 
improved, downward counterfactual reasoning induces journalists to deal with the realities 
of a given news item that should not be improved, but rather eventually re-proposed in a 
similar manner. We can say that downward counterfactual reasoning can be used when a 
given status quo is threatened: it can be used to defend a status quo that is questioned. 
Indeed, journalists are induced to think to the alternatives of a given status quo if it is 
questioned: the present is thus better of the invoked change. Downward counterfactual 
reasoning serves an important function, since journalists repeat themselves the reasons of 
a given choice, and this hinders that habit becomes the only reason. It has the function of 
organizational learning, since it is a way of dis-authomatize normal decisions. 
We can say that downward counterfactual reasoning is beneficial since it often 
produces relief and it may foster learning about how to prevent negative outcomes in 
similar future situations. Like upward counterfactual reasoning, after downward 
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counterfactual reasoning there is a frequent shift of verbal tense from past to present and 
future: the present tense actualizes the good choice and projects it into the future. 
Journalists’ experiences of relief due to the positive evaluation of an editorial choice are 
produced by the avoidance of a worse alternative. This occurs for example in the PEDO 
case (section 11.7), when the journalist who published a newspaper article about the sexual 
abuse of minors anticipates that the victimes could have been identified (by quoting 
names), and realizes that he might have caused a damage to the minors, identifying them, 
he feels retrospective fear and guilt (including a negative IAR; that is, the belief  
“possible/likely enabling of victims’ identification” together with the opposite goal “not 
enabling victims’ identification”), and experiences subsequent retrospective relief (the 
invalidation of that negative IAR: “thank goodness we did not enabled victims’ 
identification!”).  
Following the path forged by Castelfranchi and Miceli, I have supported the 
conception that invalidated negative anticipatory reasoning and invalidated 
expectation and the consequent relief (derived by downward counterfactual 
reasoning), “may foster learning about how to prevent negative outcomes in similar 
future circumstances” (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109). For instance, in the 
newsroom, downward counterfactual reasoning and the consequent experienced relief, 
may have the function of consolidating editorial practices that have proved to avoid 
negative impact or negative repercussions on the audience. In Section 11.5 I have 
analysed cases that demonstrate downward counterfactual reasoning’s ability to 
confirm a discussed editorial practice and to stop the discussion, therefore reinforcing 
the concluding phase.  
Another place of reflection where I have observed a noticeable prominence of 
downward counterfactual reasoning is in retrospective interviews. There, journalists are 
asked to give reasons and to explain what they have done during the composition of their 
news items. During this reflection, downward counterfactuals mostly have the function of 
justifying journalists’ choices in terms of audience anticipation. Indeed, in this type of 
interview journalists use downward counterfactual reasoning to support the goodness of 
their editorial choices in view of the audience uptake. This enables journalists to keep a 
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critical distance from the editorial choices they have made. It is a peculiar rhetorical 
strategy of this type of place of reflection, in which the journalist persuades himself of the 
goodness of his own editorial choices, providing explicit reasons of the disreagrded or 
omitted editorial choices that would have led to an unacceptable outcome. It is a kind of 
self-empathy where the journalist re-assumes his own practical standpoint and justifies it. 
The noticeable prominence of downward counterfactual reasoning in retrospective 
interviews, i.e. guided interviews, is congruent with the literature on downward 
counterfactuals that highlights that they are generated spontaneously only very rarely 
(Roese 1997). Moreover, it is wise to say that the high frequence of downward 
counterfactual reasoning in retrospective protocols may be interpreted at the first glance 
as a signal of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1947): however, this is not the case, since 
journalists have previously reasoned –both at an individual as well as at a collective level– 
on the editorial strategy to carry out and this has led them to make a certain reasoned 
choice. 
      A central issue in argumentation theory concerns the legitimacy of simulative data in 
counterfactual reasoning. Can a simulative datum be considered a licit datum, an actual 
piece of evidence? The analysis of counterfactual reasoning under an argumentative 
perspective can shed light on this issue. Indeed, by observing the inferential configuration 
of counterfactual reasoning analysed following the AMT, and more specifically the 
contextual premises, the necessary presence of two data emerges. On the one hand, there 
is a factual datum, realized in the action that has been carried out. On the other hand, there 
is a simulative datum, namely a retrospective prediction about the convenience of an 
alternative that has not been chosen. However, this simultative datum is focused on an 
alternative possibility that has not been carried out, but that was possible at the moment of 
the choice. What is simulated is a discarded or omitted choice that is a posteriori 
considered better or worse, but that was present and possible in the hic et nunc of the 
decisional moment. Thus, it is a piece of evidence in some way, since it is not a factual 
datum but it has been a factual datum in the past in some way. Subsequently, we can 
conclude that not all simulative data can be considered licit, but only those that are based 
on a choice that was possible and plausible during the decision-making process. The 
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possibility is thus the generative nucleus in which the intention takes shape and the action 
originates.  
 
12.1.7 The influence of the cultural context on journalists’ premises 
 
One concern of my dissertation was to understand the function of cultural premises in 
journalists’ topical choices in newsmaking processes and products, namely in a context in 
which acting on culturally shared valued is fundamental. 
(RQ 6) Do journalists rely on highly culture-specific shared premises? 
In general, cultural premises play a crucial role in every context. In the 
newsroom culturally shared premises are used by journalists to be more effective. 
Indeed, the more journalists make topical choices coherent with the audience’s value 
system, the more their arguments will be effective, which in turn will increase the 
possibility of capturing the audience’s attention and promoting public understanding. 
A clear example can be found in the TEMPO case and is represented by an argument 
used by the journalist in the editorial conference (argument 1.1b in Figure  in Section 
9) and by the interviewed person, i.e. the father of the victim (Figure ). This argument 
is based on the inconveniences caused by expenses due to physical and psychological 
problems caused by the accident and it is particularly effective in the Swiss German 
environment, within which economic prosperity is an important and acknowledged 
value.  
 
12.1.8 Journalists’ anticipatory inferences and news framing 
 
(RQ 7) Does the observation of journalists’ anticipatory reasoning about audience uptake 
offer elements of explanation for the news frames adopted for journalists? Specifically, 
can we trace the news frames underlying the text of news products, the explicit arguments 
observable in the products, and stylistic choices to episodes of anticipatory argumentative 
reasoning? 
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Journalists’ anticipatory inferences regarding audience uptake operate as a point of 
departure for framing the news in a particular way. A particular framing may be an attempt 
to convey a critical view of a reported event, but at the same time it may present a risk of 
unfair framing. In this regard, a distinction can be made between manipulation that occurs 
when we convey untruth information and manipulation that occurs when we omit the truth 
(that in turn may be directed to lead the other not to know or to reach a false conclusion). 
In this dissertation, I claim that journalists’ anticipatory inferences concerning audience 
uptake, considered as a subtype of interpretations of how the audience will react to their 
news, naturally represent the point of departure for a certain framing of the news by 
interpreting reality in a manner that refers to the reported events in a -non neutral- view. 
This may lead the audience to either make false inferences or omit the truth, and therefore 
to an unfair framing.  
I have carried out an argumentative analysis of the whole intertextual chain 
consisting of editorial conferences, informal conferences, retrospective interviews, 
intermediate versions of news products, as well as final news products. This analysis shed 
light on the coherence between journalists’ argumentative interactions in editorial 
conferences and the editorial strategies they actually used in news items. I have verified 
the implementation of the editorial strategies discussed in editorial conferences in the news 
items and I have confirmed these strategies in the analysis of retrospective interviews, 
which casts further light on previous data. Indeed, in retrospective interviews journalists 
are asked to make the reasons for their editorial choices, such as modifications and 
additions, explicit. In all of case studies that I analysed there was a perfect coherence 
between the journalists’ collective and/or individual argumentation in editorial 
conferences and the final news items’ argumentation.  
 
12.1.9 Journalists’ strategic maneuvering on the basis of anticipated audience 
(emotive) uptake 
 
(RQ 8) Do journalists struggle between impressing the audience/ capturing its attention 
and conveying an objective view of the event they are reporting? 
To answer this question, I must first specify that capturing audience attention 
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can be considered as a sort of effectiveness pursued by the journalist, whereas 
conveying a balanced and critical view can be considered as pursuit of a commitment 
to reasonableness on the part of the journalist. With this framing, it becomes clear that 
these two journalistic tendencies constitute a peculiar form of strategic maneuvering. 
Indeed, these two tendencies can be seen as an attempt to show events in a correct 
(reasonable) manner, while at the same time still directed at satisfying the audience’s 
emotive demand. I have observed a continuous struggle in the journalist’s mind 
between the will to convey facts in an objective/ balanced way and to frame the news 
in such a way that is coherent with their anticipatory reasoning concerning audience 
uptake. The anticipation of audience emotive uptake can be used by journalists to 
strategically maneuverer. Arguers attempt to keep an equilibrium between 
reasonableness and effectiveness in every move of an argumentative discussion when 
they pursue a strategic maneuvering. For journalists, this means that they face a 
continuous struggle between the editorial commitment to criticality, which involves 
providing a fair and balanced view of events, and satisfying audience demand, which 
involves predicting and accounting for their possible/probable/desirable audience 
emotive uptake. When journalists favour their goal of being effective (capturing the 
audience attention) instead of their goal of being reasonable and conveying a critical 
and balanced view of the event, there is the risk of employing manipulatory tendencies. 
This is particularly true in cases where the journalist’s goal of capturing audience 
attention becomes absolutely prominent and a unique framing of the news event(s) is 
presented, as was partially the situation in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9). 
 
12.1.10 Journalists as argumentative intermediaries 
 
(RQ 9) Do journalists act as knowledge mediators between their available sources 
(corporate press releases, interviews to experts or to people involved in a reported event 
...) and the audience, framing the whole news taking into consideration the audience 
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uptake? Do journalists favour a critical attitude of the audience towards the sources that 
they report? And how is this related to the anticipation of the audience uptake?  
Journalists consider their available sources, such as press releases in economic-financial 
journalism (Rocci and Luciani 2016) and interviews with experts and involved persons in 
TV programs (TEMPO case and JUGE case), as the starting points of their news pieces. 
However, journalists reformulate and select pieces of press releases and interviews, so that 
the passage from source to product is not a mere transfer of information, but an 
individually reframed piece of knowledge. I have provided evidence of the fact that 
audience uptake anticipation strongly influences journalists’ source reformulation. Indeed, 
journalists’ anticipations of audience uptake lead them to reformulate the source and/or 
insert a selected piece of it in line with their goals of capturing audience attention and 
promoting public understanding.  
In general, I have shown that journalists aim at pursuing criticality, which is a prerequisite 
of the fidelity to reality. The journalist perceives the world with his emotive and cognitive 
states, which help him develop a critical attitude and anticipate audience uptake. This 
anticipation operates as a resource to actively reconfigure certain editorial choices. 
Objectivity does not originate from the absence of involvement, but from the presence of 
criticality. Journalists do favour an audience critical attitude towards the sources they 
report: this is clear in the JUGE case, where a journalist does not want to raise a wrong 
expectation on the audience by inserting a quotation after a certain framing (see section 
7.2) and in the TEMPO case, where journalists do not want to convey a wrong idea of the 
reported event by selecting to emotional pieces of some interviews (see Chapter 9, in 
particular 9.4). We can say that the adoption of a critical attitude on behalf of the audience 
is a type of uptake on behalf of the receiver. 
Therefore, journalists open a space for critical discussion in a resource-limited 
context constrained by time and space, thus enabling the audience to build an autonomous 
opinion on a given issue, news item, or social phenomenon. 
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12.2 Further results emerged from the research 
 
This dissertation has brought to light the importance of anticipation and counterfactual 
reasoning as two key mental processes in journalists’ minds. Doing so has provided a 
number of theoretical and contextual contributions not previously recognized or 
formulated. In the next sub-sections I illustrate the contextual (Section 12.2.1) as well as 
the theoretical (12.2.2) implications emerging from my research. 
 
 12.2.1 Counterfactual reasoning as a persuasive means in both editorial 
conferences and news pieces 
 
The main finding for the context of journalism emerging from the research is the role 
played by counterfactual reasoning and irrealis in news pieces. As I have shown in the 
TEMPO case, counterfactual reasoning seems to be a fundamental strategy used by 
journalists not only in the persuasive rhetoric of their editorial conferences, but also in 
news items. This special role of counterfactual reasoning in news products is due to the 
fact that journalists use it to raise strong emotions in the audience. Upward counterfactual 
reasoning in particular may be used to raise regret in the audience in the case of bad news, 
therefore leading the audience to empathize with the victims of the news. Regret has a 
high emotive impact on the audience and producing a high emotive impact on the audience 
is one of the journalist’s main goals, since it enables them capture audience attention and 
therefore promote public understanding. 
 
12.2.2 Theoretical implications of the findings 
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12.2.2.1 The relationship between counterfactual reasoning and extrinsic loci 
Using counterfactual reasoning, people imagine hypothetical situations and alternative 
realities. Hypothetical situations, a subtype of virtual situations, are strictly bound with 
extrinsic loci. One of the main theoretical results of this dissertation is the evidence that 
counterfactual reasoning mostly relies on extrinsic loci, since this type of reasoning 
involves relationships in which a different disregarded alternative could have produced a 
better or worse outcome. In regard to the inferential configuration of upward and 
downward counterfactual reasoning, I have shown that they are both based on a complex 
locus from final cause and alternatives that realizes the comparison, based on something 
that could have ‘made a difference’ in terms of producing a more desirable or a worse 
situation. The data in counterfactual reasoning consist in a factual datum (a choice that has 
been enacted) and in a simulative datum (concerning the possibile choice that has either 
been discarded or omitted, but that was present at the time of the choice). In the case of 
upward counterfactual reasoning the final conclusion coincides with a negative evaluative 
standpoint that may lead to regret, whereas in the case of downward counterfactual 
reasoning the final conclusion consists of a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead to 
experience relief.  
In AMT terms, upward counterfactual reasoning can be represented by a complex 
Y-structure;  
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Figure 75. Generic Y-structure of upward counterfactual reasoning. 
 
In this inferential configuration (Figure ), reasoning from final cause and alternatives is 
applied, carrying out the comparison process between two alternatives x and y; the 
endoxon is constituted by the two alternatives X and Y (a belief of common knowledge) 
and by a convenient goal. Then, the data are composed by the choice that has been enacted 
(factual datum- En1) and a retrospective prediction about the possibility of choosing the 
disregarded or omitted alternative (simulative datum-En 2). The conjunction of endoxa 
and data gives rise to a first conclusion, which in terms of anticipatory reasoning is an 
invalidation of positive expectation: “Among two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action 
C we have chosen the one that does not realize the goal G, disregarding the alternative that 
would have realized it”. The invalidation of the positive expectation is the result of the 
merging of the knowledge that there were two alternatives and that there was a goal 
(endoxa) plus the actual evidence that x has been chosen that has not led to realizing the 
desired goal. There is thus an incongruity between the goal G in the endoxon and the 
factual choice in the first datum, namely the choice of an alternative that has not led to 
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realizing G). This is the feature that mostly distinguishes upward from downward 
counterfactual reasoning. 
This conclusion perfectly meets the conditions established by the maxim “if 
between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, 
whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y instead 
of X”, and conjoined with it allows one to infer the final conclusion “we have chosen the 
worse alternative disregarding the better one”, namely that y was preferable to x”. In terms 
of anticipatory reasoning, the invalidation of positive expectation (GOAL that p but 
CHOICE that has not led to realizing p) plus the inferential force given by the maxim gives 
rise to the negative evaluative standpoint that may lead the agent to experience regret. 
        In AMT terms, downward counterfactual reasoning can be represented through a 
complex Y-structure. The reasoning that is applied is a complex reasoning from final cause 
and alternative, in a similar but specular way to upward counterfactual reasoning, as it is 
shown in Figure ; 
 
Figure 76. Generic Y-structure of downward counterfactual reasoning. 
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The endoxa are constituted by a belief of common knowledge about two possible 
alternatives that can be chosen in a course of action C (En1) and by an avoidance goal of 
“not G” (En2). The data consist of a belief of evidential nature about the choice that has 
been made “we have chosen Y that has led to realize not G” (factual datum) and of a 
retrospective prediction about the undesirable results produced by the disregarded or 
omitted alternative X.  The conjunction of endoxa and data gives rise to a first conclusion, 
which in terms of anticipatory reasoning is an invalidation of negative expectation: 
“Among the two alternatives we have chosen the alternative Y that has led to realize the 
goal not G, disregarding the alternative X that would have not led to realize it”. By 
observing the endoxa, the data, and their conjunction, we can see the congruity between 
the goal not G in the second endoxon and the factual choice Y that has led to realize not 
G, differently from the upward counterfactual reasoning. This first conclusion perfectly 
meets the conditions established by the maxim “if between two alternatives X,Y, in a 
course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not 
realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X”, and conjoined with it 
allows inferring the final conclusion “we have chosen the better alternative disregarding 
the worse one”. The final conclusion, which is the result of the conjunction of an 
invalidation of negative expectation plus the inferential force given by the maxim results 
in a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead the agent to experience relief. In the case 
of downward counterfactual reasoning the agent acts in order not to and pursues avoidance 
goals, he attempts to avoid negative or sub-optimal results. 
       Investigating counterfactual reasoning via AMT disproves the view that the contrast-
effect mechanism mainly produces or fosters negative emotions, and that, on the contrary, 
causal inferences mainly have beneficial effects (Roese 1997: 141). Through an analysis 
of counterfactual reasoning via AMT, I have shown that this is not the case and that the 
discriminating feature is the comparison of the chosen alternative and the one that could 
have produced a better or worse result, resulting from the reasoning from final cause and 
alternatives. The comparison of ‘what could have made a difference’ (a better alternative 
that has not been chosen) with the actual worse state of affairs causes negative emotions 
that may nevertheless illuminate future planning (upward counterfactual reasoning), 
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whereas the comparison of  ‘what could have made a difference’ (a worse alternative that 
has been avoided) with the actual better state of affairs causes positive emotions that may 
eventually produce self-enhancement and confirmation of one’s conviction. Therefore, 
contrast effects and causal inferences can be said to be strictly interdependent 
mechanisms in counterfactual reasoning, and not independent mechanisms as has been 
claimed in previous literature on the psychology of counterfactuals. 
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12.2.2.2 The shift of verbal tense after counterfactual reasoning: a projection from 
past to future 
I have provided evidence that counterfactual reasoning is correlated with the shift of verbal 
tense from past to present, demonstrating that some cases of counterfactual reasoning may 
foster the discussion, and thus proving productive. Counterfactual reasoning, be it upward 
or downward, provides a crucial function by allowing the agent to merge two distinct 
worlds, the world of the past in which a choice was made and the present moment in which 
he is reflecting about the value of the past choices in the hic et nunc. In counterfactual 
reasoning, the past experience is embedded within the present moment of enunciation. The 
past moment of reflection can be made present by the act of talking (i.e. you raise an 
attitude of expectancy as in the JUGE case. See Section 7.5). The shift from the past tense 
of counterfactual arguments to the present tense after them, confirms the tendency for 
counterfactuals to project the discussion towards future planning and further confirms 
the claim that counterfactual reasoning stimulates cognitive processes.  In upward 
counterfactual reasoning, the shift of tense prolongs the discussion on the basis of past 
errors: the juxtaposition of past and present experiences supports the actualization of the 
past and the consideration of past experiences for future similar situations. In downward 
counterfactual reasoning, the shift to the present verbal tense actualizes the good choice 
and projects it into the future, fostering its maintenance. 
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12.2.2.3 Different types of audience uptake bound with illocution, locution or 
perlocution 
In order to focus on the distinct types of journalists’ anticipation of audience uptake, I 
have sketched a typology of audience uptake anticipation in terms of ‘objects of 
anticipation’ classified on the basis of their belonging to the three distinct levels of the 
linguistic act, namely the illocutionary, locutionary and perlocutionary, as it is shown in 
Figure . This classification holds not only for the context of journalism, but for every 
context that involves anticipation of audience uptake, of whatever kind. 
 
 
Figure 77. Typology of audience uptake anticipation on the basis of their belonging to the three 
distinct levels of the linguistic act, namely illocutionary, locutionary, and perlocutionary levels. 
 
As shown in Figure , we can distinguish between a) anticipation of audience 
interpretation, which deals with either the locutionary or the illocutionary force, and b) 
anticipation of audience persuasion, which can aim at modifying audience attitude (acting 
either on the cognitive or on the emotive uptake of the audience or on both) or audience 
behaviour, therefore dealing with the perlocutionary force. The anticipation of audience 
persuasion acting on behaviour can be considered to be the most perlocutionary type of 
anticipation.  
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12.3 Open questions and further research paths 
 
This dissertation illuminated the crucial role played by journalists’ anticipatory inferences 
about audience uptake. However, further research should consider other dimensions that 
have emerged in my analysis. In this sub-section I will discuss the theoretical aspects as 
well as the aspects bound with the journalism context that should be further investigated. 
 
    At the theoretical level: 
 
12.3.1 The importance of reconnecting inferential and interactional moves with 
particular attention on dialogue 
 
The argumentative analysis I conducted deals with the study of reasoning in editorial 
conferences and other types of interactional data, relying on the path traced by Clayman 
and Reisner (1998) that focused only on interaction in editorial conferences. After 
completing the entire analysis, I realize that the restrited focus on either the study of 
reasoning or the study of interaction creates a methodological problem bound to the fact 
that every instance of reasoning occurs in (actual or imagined) interaction and in response 
to other agents’ reasonings. A part of this problem is to trace back to the method applied 
to make the analytic reconstruction following P-D (see Chpater 4, section 4.2), which does 
not highlights many interactional aspects. In order to carry out an exhaustive analysis of 
reasoning, it would be necessary to come back on the study of interaction, in order to 
reconnect inferential and interactional moves. For further studies in this direction it would 
be necessary to take into consideration a model of interaction that considers the notion of 
speech act (Ginzburg & Sag 2000; Ginzburg 2012); such a framework would enable to 
shed light on the interaction-reasoning interface. 
 
   12.3.2 Counterfactual reasoning of past, present, future and eternally 
impossible scenarios 
 
Counterfactual reasoning has proven to play a crucial role in newsroom activities. 
However, I have only focused on counterfactual reasoning concerned with the past, i.e. on 
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reasoning that was possible in the past but that was not carried out. To gain a complete 
insight into inferences based on counterfactual reasoning, I intend to study all types of 
irrealis, as I have classified in the following Figure :  
 
Figure 78. Complete classification of irrealis that I intend to study in future work. 
 
     Specifically, I intend to devote particular attention to a) pure hypothesis in editorial 
interaction, in order to understand the role of this type of irrealis in enabling the 
acceptability of the standpoint put forth by the protagonist of a discussion, and b) eternally 
impossible hypothesis (“if my grandmother had wheels, she would be a wagon”), which 
often occur as a critical reaction to unacceptable hypothesis or proposals, namely to  
hypothesis or proposals that are perceived as irrelevant since they do not have a 
sufficient closeness with the receiver’s frames of reference. Do eternally impossible 
hypothesis act as implicit counterarguments? Are they evaluative in nature? Finally, I 
intend to deepen the study of c) hypothesis that were possible in the past but that are 
IRREALIS!
!
!
Epistemically!uncertain!
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!
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!
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now no longer possible, i.e. stricto sensu counterfactuals, in order to gain further 
evidence of the role of arguments containing this type of reasoning in supporting 
pragmatic inferences. In particular, I intend to shed light on the inferential nature of 
simulative and factual data emerging in loci from final cause and alternatives of 
counterfactual reasoning. 
 
   In the journalistic domain: 
 
    12.3.3 The influence of journalists’ personal and interpersonal stories on 
argumentative dynamics 
 
In this dissertation I have looked at the study of reasoning in newsroom activities, but I 
have omitted to consider the role played by personal and interpersonal stories. I believe 
that these aspects may strongly influence the argumentative discussion and that they 
should be considered in the study of argumentation in the newsroom. Further interviews 
should be conducted to find hidden conflicts, cooperative behaviours as well as friendship 
ties among journalists in the investigated editorial boards. Further, it would be wise to pay 
special attention to the interpersonal relationship between each journalist and the leading 
figures of the newsroom, i.e. the editor-in-chief and the chair of the editorial conferences. 
Indeed, these two figures play a directive role in the newsroom and this may have an 
influence on the other journalists’ stance taking and choice of rhetorical strategy in 
editorial argumentative discussions.  
 
    12.3.4 The importance of considering the relationship between journalists’ 
pessimist or optimistic orientation and upward/downward counterfactual 
reasoning 
 
I have devoted  special attention to counterfactual reasoning and to its two distinct 
simulation directions (upward and downward). In this regard, Castelfranchi and Miceli 
(2014) point out that if an agent has a pessimistic orientation, he will more frequently use 
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upward counterfactual reasoning, whereas if he has an optimist orientation, he will more 
frequently use downward counterfactual reasoning. They state: 
 
Optimists tend to use downward counterfactuals in response to negative life 
events. […] This ‘strategy’, as we know, is likely to accomplish a mood-repair function 
(e.g. Sanna et al. 2001). In fact, downward counterfactuals are associated with less 
negative affect and lower level of dissatisfaction than upward counterfactuals (McMullen 
et. al. 1995; Medvec et al. 1995; Roese 1994). Therefore, whereas a pessimist (as well as 
a neutral type) maintains the expectation as a reference point for evaluating the factual 
outcome, thus focusing on upward counterfactual thinking, an optimist is likely to 
disregard the original positive expectation and change the comparison standard, thus 
focusing on downward counterfactual thinking (2014: 115-116).  
 
For this reason, journalists’ pessimistic or optimistic tendencies should be assessed 
with special interviews and should be considered in the analysis of editorial argumentative 
interactions, so as not to confuse the usage of a certain type of counterfactual due to a 
personal tendency with the usage of a certain type of counterfactual for other reasons, such 
as improving editorial habits and/or improving the audience impact. Furthermore, 
journalists’ pessimistic or optimistic tendency may have a strong influence on the choice 
of the topical potential, and should be taken into account. Indeed,  
 
a further important difference between optimists and pessimists in dealing with 
invalidated positive expectations is the ‘value of proof’ that is attached to invalidation. 
As we have already pointed out, dispositional pessimism is likely to favor a view of 
invalidation as a proof that the original positive expectation was unwarranted, inaccurate 
and unrealistic. For a pessimist the invalidation of one’s positive expectations is, by 
default, always possible (as well as fearsome), whereas the confirmation of one’s positive 
expectations is taken with some circumspection, perplexity, and uncertainty (isn’t this 
just luck? Am I allowed to expect a similar success in similar circumstances?) 
(Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 116). 
 
12.3.5 A typology of journalists’ conflicts 
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A further open question arising from my research deals with journalists’ intrapersonal and 
interpersonal conflicts. I have shown that journalists always struggle between achieving 
the newsroom goals of capturing the attention of the audience and conveying a 
balanced/objective view of the event that they are reporting. This opens the path for future 
research questions. This struggle can be seen as a form of conflict that the journalist 
experiences daily. In future work, I intend to sketch a typology of conflicts experienced 
by journalists, since I believe in the generative power resulting from conflicts, since new 
solutions may arise from a conflictual discussion. To do so, I will first investigate 
intrapersonal conflicts, namely conflicts arising between the journalist’s contradictory 
goals. Second, I will investigate conflicts arising from the discrepancy of the journalist’s 
goals and the newsroom’s goals, namely conflicts between the individuum and the 
institution. Third, I will examine the distinct types of interpersonal conflicts at stake in the 
newsroom and their roots. In so doing, I will devote particular attention to conflicts arising 
between journalists and leading figures of the newsroom, since this type of conflict may 
enable us to understand the role played by hierarchic roles in shaping argumentative 
discussions. Finally, I intend to examine the distinct possible ways of handling conflict in 
the newsroom that may generate new positive solutions. 
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